

# The Mystery of Karma

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# Yoga, Karma, and Rebirth

*A Brief History and Philosophy*



Stephen H. Phillips



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{ 228 } probably the profoundest overall cultural impact, the occult psychology, is not much addressed by him, though it is present in many of the sacred texts he recognizes. A yogic or “subtle” or occult body comprised of “canals,” *nadis* for *prana* and *shakti*, along with *chakras*, “wheels” or centers of occult consciousness and energy exchanges, became systematized in tantra, though hardly at a stroke. I shall discuss the tantric psychology in the next section, in connection with the *Hatha Yoga Pradipika* (c. 1400, which, by the way, quotes Abhinava). This ordering of topics is mainly for convenience; one should not think that earlier tantric literature—pre-Abhinava—contains no expressions of the distinctively tantric psychological or physiological system. In this appendix, I shall try to take more of a philosophic overview, with a tilt toward the Kaulism of Abhinava.

According to scholar Alexis Sanderson, in tantra’s early history in Kashmir rituals were reformed and “aestheticized” in Kaulism.<sup>3</sup> This judgment is broadly in accord with that of the scholar of classical aesthetics Edwin Gerow, who finds the Vedantic philosophy of Brahman to be “aestheticized” in the case of Abhinava.<sup>4</sup> This, the premier Kaula philosopher, brought together at least three prominent streams of tantric practice and ritual, the early Kaula (the “Familial,” from *kula*, “family”) with two other Shaivite groups, the Trika (the “Triadic”) and the Krama (the “Sequential”).<sup>5</sup> These “streams” are not really sects but rather traditions of practice and teaching. Abhinava also synthesized these views with two further textual and philosophic lines (in texts not associated with particular rituals and practices), the Spanda, the “Vibration” view (the world is a tremor in the divine consciousness) and the Pratyabhijña, “Recognitive” view (liberation is like recognizing something from your past, the self, *atman*, that you have forgotten).

Abhinava wrote prolifically in aesthetics and metaphysics, but not so prolifically about yogic practices. Perhaps, as some have surmised, he considered certain Tantras to be sufficiently clear in that regard.<sup>6</sup> Still, he was influential as a guru as well as a writer. He is a prime source for the yoga of art and beauty discussed in chapter 5, although he hardly makes what we said explicit. The little he says explicitly about practices centers not on *rasa* but on four ways, *upaya*, to experience the unitive consciousness.<sup>7</sup> But my claim in chapter 5 was not that Abhinava lays out a *rasa* yoga but rather that one is implicit in much of what he says—as well as in the practices of countless artists offering their performances to the divine, in the spirit of karma yoga.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, we cannot do justice to all the many dimensions of Abhinava’s contributions—more than twenty-six major compositions, including a commentary on the *Gita* that is terrifically subtle along with philosophic works such as the *Tantraloka*, “Light on Tantra,” that are terrifically long.<sup>9</sup> We shall try to flush out the convergence of aesthetics and yoga (or Yoga) in Kaulism and Abhinava.

First let us look at verses from the *Kularnava Tantra*, the tantra of “The Surge of the Kula, the Family, the All,” the title of which is more commonly rendered “Ocean of the Kula.” This text allows an overview before turning to Abhinava’s work. This popular Agama may have been contemporaneous with Abhinava or

more probably appeared a century or so later (c. 1100). He does not mention it among the scriptural sources of his philosophy (more than twenty Agamas, according to the count of K.C. Pandey).<sup>10</sup>

Like many other Agamas, the *Kularnava Tantra* (KT) is structured as a dialogue between Shiva and the Goddess, with the Great God teaching the Devi principles and methods of yoga, and enjoining her to teach them herself to help human beings of good will and resolve. The KT has been said to be “without doubt the most important of its class,”<sup>11</sup> that is, of the later Agamas that are in this way dialogically structured. It is often quoted in still later literature, the experts tell us, and its style and language are clear and crisp but also light and cheerful, with many simple symbols and analogies. Some of it has been translated, and almost the entire text nicely summarized by M. P. Pandit.<sup>12</sup> Of the text’s seventeen chapters, I present below verses from the first two. In the notes, some interpretive problems are addressed and further background given.

### From the *Kularnava Tantra*

1.1. Seated on the peak of Mount Kailasa, the God of Gods, the World Guru, the Supreme Lord, whose bliss is transcendent, was approached and questioned by Parvati (the Goddess).

Shri Devi said:

1.2. O Blessed, O God of Gods, O Lord, who have ordained the five ritual acts, all-knowing, you whom it is easy to love, you who love as loves a mother all who in you take refuge!

1.3. O Lord of the Family (*kula*), Supreme Ruler, O Ocean of the nectar of compassion, in what is not your essence, in wild transmigratory existence, there are those fouled by every kind of pain and suffering.

1.4. In various types of embodiment, endless living hosts are born and die. For them, there is no freedom (no *moksha*, no “spiritual liberation”).

1.5. They are afflicted by pains and sufferings continually; there is never anywhere a truly happy person. O Deva, tell me by what means, Lord of Lords, by what method (*upāya*) can a person be free?

Shri Ishvara (the “Blessed Lord,” Shiva) said:

1.6. Listen, Goddess (Devi), I will tell you, I will answer the question you ask. Merely from hearing what I have to say, a person can be liberated from *samsara*, from transmigration.

1.7. There is, Devi, the Auspicious (*shiva*, "kind," "agreeable"), the status of the Highest that is Whole, Integral, whose own form is the Supreme Brahman (the Absolute)—all-knowing, all-doing, Lord of all, pure, without a second.

1.8. Self-luminous, without beginning or end, without flaw, changeless, beyond the beyond, transcendent of the *gunas*, (in itself) being, consciousness, bliss. Every living thing is a part of That.

1.9. Living things are characterized by beginningless (spiritual) ignorance, like sparks (thrown away) from a fire (forgetful of the whole, their origin). They are differentiated by circumstances of birth determined by karma, talents, and so on.

1.10. Controlled by their own good and bad deeds that result in pleasures and pains, they obtain a body connected to this and that kind or species, a life span, and enjoyment born of karma.

1.11. Every rebirth they get this, coming to be humans of dull consciousness, Beloved, the subtle body is imperishable up to liberation.

1.12. Plants, worms and lotuses, birds, wild beasts, humans of thirteen different characteristics, and then, in order, like that, there are those who are seeking liberation.

1.13. Having held and held—restraining a thousand times—the bodies of four types (physical, breath, lower-mind, and higher-mind), from good action having become a human being, liberation would be got if one has Knowledge (of the Whole).

1.14. Among the eighty-four-hundred-thousand bodies that are possible for the embodied, Knowledge of reality is not had by any without a human birth.

1.15. O Parvati, here among thousands of (types of) births taken by even more thousands, occasionally a creature attains the human level from accumulation of merit (by action).

1.16. Having attained the difficult to obtain, the human status, step by step, one who does not carry himself across (to the further shore of liberation), well, who is worse than he?

1.17. Therefore, having obtained the best birth as well as excellence of talents and faculties, if you do not know what is good for yourself, you are going to harm yourself. (By listening to what is being revealed, you can learn what is good for yourself.)

1.110. Some want the Advaita (Nondual view), and others prefer the Dvaita (Dual view). Neither group knows my truth, which goes beyond both. { 231 }

1.111. There are two paths, to bondage and to liberation. One is the path of "It's mine," and one is the path of not-"It's mine," the nonpossessive. By the path of "It's mine" a creature is bound. It is not the case that one becomes liberated by the path of "It's mine."

1.112. That karma which is not for bondage is the Knowledge that liberates. Karma, action, that is other than that leads to exhaustion. Knowledge that is other than that is nothing but skillful craftsmanship.

1.113. So long as desire and the like burn, so long as there are (untoward) mental dispositions, vectors of transmigration, so long as the faculties are unsteady, what is the point of telling the truth of things?

1.114. So long as you have to try very hard, so long as the effort is intense, forced, or impulsive, so long as you are thinking about what you are going to do, thinking about your resolve, so long as your mind is not steady, what is the point of a telling of the truth?

1.115. So long as there is identification with the body, so long as there is my-ness, so long as there is not the compassion of the guru, why then a telling of the truth?

1.116. So long as the truth has not been found, people do *tapas*, make pilgrimages, chant, sing praises, and so on, and the stories of the Vedas, the Shastras, and the Agamas are necessary.

1.117. Therefore, with every effort, in every state of consciousness, at all times, be one, Devi, who takes her stand in the truth, if you would desire self-realization, the liberation of the self.

The blessed Devi said:

2.1. O Lord of the Family (Kula), you who for every living being are the ocean of compassion, yes, indeed, I do desire to hear. The Dharma of the Kula, the Way of the Family that you have indicated has not by you been made clear.

2.2. Speak to me the Mahatmya (the "Importance," a succinct statement of the essence) of this Dharma that you say is the supreme way. Speak to me the Mahatmya, as conceived by you, of (the text named) the "Upper Road of the High Tradition."<sup>13</sup> If you care about me, Supreme Ruler, tell me about this.



2.3. Listen, Devi, I will explain what you of me implore. By merely hearing this, one will become dear to the yoginis.<sup>14</sup>

2.4. I didn't tell this to Brahma, Vishnu, or Guha, the royal seer. I say it to you because I love you. You are a person whose mind is one-pointed, exclusively intent on listening.

2.5. What I am about to say has come down in a sequence (of teachers), a lineage, firmly established (originating) in (one of) my "five mouths."<sup>15</sup> In its deepest sense it is unsayable. Even so, I am going to tell you.

2.6. By you too this must be kept protected. It is not to be given to just anyone. It is to be given to a practitioner of *bhakti* yoga or a devoted student. Otherwise, a falling away will occur. (You will lose the secret, if you tell it to just anyone.)

2.7. The Vedas are superior to all other teachings (about ordinary life), better than the Vedas is the Vaishnava teaching, the Shaivite is better than the Vaishnava, and better than the Shaivite is the Right-handed tantric.

2.8. The Left-handed is superior to the Right-handed, the Siddhanta better than the Left-handed. The Kaula is better than the Siddhanta. Nothing is better than the Kaula.<sup>16</sup>

2.9. O Goddess, this is more secret than secret. This is the essence of the essence. This is better than the best. O Goddess, it is the Kula (the Family), the word of Shiva, come down directly from ear to ear, hearer to hearer.<sup>17</sup>

2.10. The Kula Dharma has been extracted by me stirring with the staff of Knowledge the ocean of the Vedas and Agamas, stirred by me who knows their essence, Devi.

2.11. The Dharmas (the teachings, paths), sacrifices, pilgrimages, vows and the like (undertaken in spiritual endeavors) in all their diverse portions are unified (in the end sought). (Similarly) because of its unity, the Kaula Dharma, among these, is the best, O dear one.

2.12. For, as rivers (all) enter the ocean whether they go straight or wind, just like that all observances enter the Kula.

2.13. As you can put the footprint of any living creature into the footprint of an elephant, so, dear one, all the (spiritual) philosophies (*darshana*) fit into the Kula.

2.14. And insofar as copper is similar to gold, in that way another observance is similar to the Kula Dharma.

2.15. As of all rivers there is no equal to the Ganga, just so there are no observances equal to the Kula Dharma.

2.23. If a yogin, then not at all could one enjoy the world. If enjoying the world, then not at all could one be skilled in yoga. The Kaula is of the nature of enjoyment and yoga. Therefore, dear one, it is universal.<sup>18</sup>

2.24. If one follows the Dharma of the Kula, O Queen of the Family, enjoyment becomes yoga immediately, misbehavior art (the good deed), and trans migratory existence (all of life) liberation.<sup>19</sup>

2.33. Knowledge of the Kula (the Family, the Whole, the All) shines forth for a person whose thought and emotion (*chitta*) have been purified, for the one of spiritual peace who serves the guru in action, for the zealous devotee, for the one who lives in secret.

2.34. The person whose love and devotion (*bhakti*) stays firm, for the blessed guru, for the Kula teachings, for Kaulas, for the Kula's supports, that person is one for whom Knowledge of the Kula comes to shine.

2.35. Through faith, culture, joy, and the like, right behavior and vows that are firm, by righteous acts protecting the guru's instructions, Knowledge of the Kula is obtained.

2.36. For the unfit, for one yet unready for deep Knowledge of the Kula, it (*bhakti*) won't stand long at all (even if he or she seems to grasp what I am saying). Therefore, consider carefully what's to be said, the Knowledge of the Kula by me presented (in words).

2.52. The Way, the Dharma, of the Kula, dear one, if harmed harms (the offender), if protected protects. If honored, it will make honored in an instant. Therefore, don't reject it.

2.61. Mere trees live. Deer and birds live. The person whose mind is based in the Kula Dharma, well, that person (really) lives (in the fullest sense of the word).

2.62. Days come and go for one unmindful of the Kula Dharma. Like the bellows of an ironsmith, though breathing he doesn't (really) live.

2.70. People who are wealthy and fortunate, whose karma is meritorious, good people, as well as yogins and yoginis, well, Devi, the Knowledge of the Kula (the Whole) can shine forth for them too, by (your) grace.

- 2.71. People who are the best of the human lot, venerable, generous, content in their accomplishments, in the hearts and minds of such people I make Knowledge of the Kula appear.
- 2.72. All (contemplative) visiting of places of light, all plunging into mysteries at holy crossings (*tirtha*) brings one into the Kula Dharma as well as any sacrificial performance or ritual.
- 2.77. For a person who knows the Kula (the "All") knows everything (worth knowing), even if he has left the Vedas and the Shastras behind. A person may know the Vedas, the Shastras, and the Agamas, but if he does not know the Kula he doesn't know anything.
- 2.78. Only those who are your *bhaktas*, your devotees, know the greatness of the Kula, not others. Only the chakora bird (singing to the moon in love with it), not others, knows the moonbeam.
- 2.83. The world is made of Shiva and Shakti. The Kaula teaching is founded on the world. Therefore, it is the best of all. What a universal, comprehensive teaching!
- 2.84. The six philosophies (Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa, and Vedanta) are limbs of my body, feet, belly, hands, head. He who carves divisions in them breaks my body.
- 2.85. Just these are also six limbs of the Kula. Therefore, know the Vedic Shastras to be Kaula in character.
- 2.86. According to all the philosophies (properly interpreted), there is a single Divine who grants results. Dear one, the Divine grants enjoyment and liberation within this family (*kula*) of human beings.
- 2.87. The Kula teaching may run against the wisdom of the world, O Queen of Siddhas, O Queen of accomplished yogins and yoginis. But, dearest, it is a knowledge source because it is the result of (yogic) perception.
- 2.88. And perception is directed to the generation of knowledge in the case of all beings with breath, dear. All bad reasoners ("bad" in opposing Kula teachings) are defeated by the force of perceptual evidence.
- 2.89. Who indeed knows what is not perceived, what will be, or to whom it will occur? Verily only that which is the fruit of perception is the best philosophy.
- 2.113. Such a vision of the Kula (the Whole) is obtainable through the guru's grace. Your *bhaktas* alone, not others, have it, know it, know that which gives enjoyment and liberation.

- 2.117. If a human could really attain perfection (*siddhi*) through wine drinking, then let all the riffraff get perfection who'd love to do nothing but drink wine.
- 2.118. If by merely eating meat (spiritual) merit would accrue, then all the meat eaters in the world would enjoy (spiritual) merit.
- 2.119. O Queen of the Gods, if liberation could really be had by sexual enjoyment, then just any creature could be liberated by having sex.
- 2.120. In no case is the path to be blamed, the path of the Kula, Great Goddess. It's those lacking good behavior that are to be blamed here, not others (practitioners of Kaula rituals whose behavior is good).
- 2.121. Otherwise is the behavior described by me (above) of one who is on the Way of the Kula. Goddess, deluded people thinking themselves learned are wayward when acting otherwise (than acts the true Kaulika as described).
- 2.122. You may walk on the edge of a sword, you may hang on to the neck of a tiger, you may hold a (poisonous) snake and carry it—these are all easier than living (in the right way) in the Kula.<sup>20</sup>

The selections now from Abhinava Gupta belong to two different genres of literature. The first is a type of poem, a *stotra*, hymn of praise, followed by a remarkable prose passage on aesthetics. A similar poem translated by Paul Mueller-Ortega comes from the same collection of nine poems edited by K.C. Pandey and reproduced in Devanagari characters.<sup>21</sup> My translation and understanding, I should like to acknowledge, benefit from both Mueller-Ortega's and Pandey's work, as well as from a French translation and commentary by Lilian Silburn.

Professor Silburn explains the poem in lucid detail in her commentary, uncovering multiple senses and interpretations as well as echoes of earlier tantric literature.<sup>22</sup> In notes, I mention several points of hers. She also identifies an overall theme of alignment of the microcosm of the human individual with the macrocosm of the reality of Shiva/Shakti. Shakti engages in creative, supportive, and ecstatically reabsorptive activities (see in particular verse 6). Silburn brings out the image of the thousand-petaled lotus that is indeed there, suggested pretty explicitly though not in so many words: the infinitely petaled "wheel," or *chakra*, namely, the lotus above the head that spreads in all directions from a central axis or hub where sits Shiva/Shakti, Bhairava/Bhairavi. Note, however, in verse 3, "Bhairava-Bliss" (*bhairavananda*) is said to be "seated in the lotus of the heart." Combining the images, one would have Bhairava illumining the central channel, *sushumna*, or perhaps raining down from the outside, penetrating the heart center.

# Lakṣmī Tantra

A PĀÑCARĀTRA TEXT

*Translation and Notes with Introduction by*

SANJUKTA GUPTA

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10-12. Śakra:—Why dost thou manifest thyself in these two distinct courses of pure and impure (creation) involving the three pairs (of attributes, namely) knowledge etc. I salute thee, lotus-born (goddess); as I ask this question please answer me.

12. Śrī:—My divine power<sup>1</sup> is sovereign, (so) my will is the sole cause (i.e. instigation for creation).

13. This point even the wise fail to grasp. Yet learn from me (who will explain) this truth (i.e. relationship). I am ever evolving both as lord and subordinate.<sup>2</sup>

14. Nārāyaṇa is the supreme Lord of all and I am His lord-hood. O Purāṇḍara, that which is subordinate is known as (a combination of) consciousness and unconsciousness.<sup>3</sup>

15-20. Absolute consciousness determines the state of the enjoyer; the non-conscious state covers the things enjoyed (*upakaraṇa*). That conscious element (*citsakti*), influenced by beginningless nescience (*avidyā*) which is introduced by me, becomes the enjoyer and, on account of its own ego-hood, identifies itself with non-conscious objects in terms of the relationship I and mine. When through the influence of knowledge that *avidyā* is eliminated, consciousness having dropped its ego-concept recaptures my essential nature. That (absolute) knowledge present in the pure course (of creation) is introduced by me as the supreme Vyūha,<sup>4</sup> when out of compassion I reveal knowledge (to the adept). The relationship between the two courses is that of protector and protected. The one course (of creation), i.e. the pure, protects; whereas the other (i.e. the impure) is protected. This concludes my explanation. What else do you want to hear?

21. Śakra:—Why dost thou function in two states, i.e. as Lord

<sup>1</sup> Here *aśvarya* cannot denote the second of the divine attributes, since the word is used for Lakṣmī's essential nature. Hence in this context *aśvarya* refers to the aggregate of the six attributes constituting her essence.

<sup>2</sup> Lakṣmī as God's essence, the supreme truth, is primarily identical with the undifferentiated Brahman. In the next stage God and His essence are differentiated as embodied attributes, i.e. the divine presence and the supreme soul represented by Lakṣmī and Nārāyaṇa. The next stage is when God is immanent in creation yet transcends it. As transcendent He is Īśa (the Lord), while as immanent He is the governed (universe) or Īśitavya.

<sup>3</sup> Thus the same principle evolves into the subjective as well as into the objective world. As subjective creation the supreme conscious principle retains its conscious nature; but as objective creation it changes into matter.

<sup>4</sup> The sentence is confused and appears to be irrelevant, but is put here in order to remind the pupil of the absolute nature of God and His Śakti.

and as subordinate? Deign to tell me how many varieties of subordinates there are and describe their traits.

22. Śrī:—This (i.e. distinction *Īśa* and *īśitavya*) cannot be related to my own or Nārāyaṇa's essential nature. The eternal God and myself do not (really possess the aspects of) *Īśa* or *īśitavya*.

23. Subordinates are of two types distinguished as conscious and non-conscious. Consciousness is here the enjoyer and assumes the forms of conscious beings.

24. Non-consciousness becomes objects of enjoyment and is of three types. The learned call that (non-conscious) aspect my third state of expansion.

25. I voluntarily divide myself into these two śaktis, i.e. conscious and non-conscious, to represent my two everlasting aspects.<sup>1</sup>

26. The conscious śakti is flawless and pure, consisting of consciousness and bliss. Influenced by beginningless nescience it travels unendingly (through the bondage of many lives and deaths).

27. Although the non-conscious śakti is insentient, impure, evolving and the embodiment of the three (phenomenal) guṇas, yet I voluntarily manifest myself as such.

28. Just as a blazing fire of its own accord produces smoke, so do I—though in essence pure consciousness—assume non-consciousness as a mode of existence.<sup>2</sup>

29. Although beyond being affected by misconception or even distortion through word, I voluntarily manifest<sup>3</sup> myself in the non-conscious state.

30. Although indivisible, through various limiting factors consciousness is divided into the external (non-conscious) and the internal (conscious) creation.

31. Such limitations are imposed by my own (divine) sovereign

<sup>1</sup> These śaktis are apparently accepted as different, but basically they represent the one and same Śakti. Cf. ch. IV (in extenso).

<sup>2</sup> The apparent paradox of the essentially conscious principle assuming unconscious form is explained by stressing the Śakti's miraculous will. The idea of God's miraculous power is derived from the Upaniṣads. (Cf. *Īvet*, U. 1, 10; 4, 9 and 10; Br.Ā.U. 2, 5, 19; Nṛ.P.U. 3, 1; 5, 1). In the Pāñcarātra system Māyā, i.e. the miraculous power, becomes personified as a manifestation of Śakti. Vide J.S. 6, 82.

<sup>3</sup> The editor gives two explanations for the word *ādhyānopādhi*: i) my will as the limitation; ii) the limitation needed to visualize me. The first seems more plausible.

(will) and I am subordinate to none. Recognizing my sovereignty you become enlightened.

32. Śakra:—How is it that thou createst worlds in which both pleasure and pain exist? Would it not be better to abstain from creation altogether or to allow only happiness to exist?

33. Śrī:—I create a mixed creation (consisting of both), because I take into account the cumulative results of acts (both good and evil) committed by the living who are under the influence of beginningless nescience.

34. Śakra:—O goddess born out of the milky ocean, if thou art obliged to create both pleasure and pain on account of karman, where then is thy freedom of will?

35. Śrī:—This karman is regarded as my instrument in fulfilling my (creative) function. The dependence of a creator on use of an instrument does not impair his freedom of will.

36. Pure and independent as I am, I am subordinate to none. I divide myself variously as the performer of a deed, the object of performance and the deed itself.

37. You should not search for a reason (for my doing this). My playfulness (*līlā*) is the reason. Therefore be calm.

Śakra:—Be that as it may, O goddess! If thou hast such a free hand (in creation), then deign to explain the process of creation. O lotus-born, I salute thee.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### VYŪHAS AND THEIR ŚAKTIS

1. Śrī:—In essence I consist of consciousness and matchless bliss like pure space. I am Nārāyaṇī, Hari's state of existence and my nature resembles His.

2. My essence being consciousness, I am neither inert nor active, nor an intermediary state between the two. I represent the nature peculiar to Hari, the all-pervasive (Viṣṇu), who is the soul of all and has the same character as myself.<sup>1</sup>

3. His form is undifferentiated, homogeneous and inscrutable; and I, also undifferentiated, am of His form and possess perfect tranquility.

4. From time to time a billion-billionth particle of ourselves, composed of consciousness, stirs into activity.

5. (That particle) which is known as the urge to create (*śiṣṭkṣā*) is in the form 'I will create according to my liking', whereupon I, with that particle of myself, instantaneously evolve into pure creation (*viśuddhādhvā*).

6. As the brilliance of a diamond shines forth in all directions, so does my pure course (of creative activity) diffuse its rays in every direction.

7. Pure creation issues from my form of concentrated (absolute) knowledge, whose (tranquility) resembles a cloudless sky or a still ocean.

8. Devoid of all activity, ever blissful, pure, all-embracing and supreme, the primeval jñāna (knowledge)<sup>2</sup> becomes manifest and is called Saṃkarṣaṇa.

<sup>1</sup> This is the natural state of the truth principle (Viṣṇu), and is a completely tranquil state of pure knowledge and bliss. Lakṣmī represents the same state and remains identical with Him, as in that state the principle and its quintessence cannot be differentiated. This is the ultimate, absolute truth which has been variously denoted in the tantras by terms such as *sāmarasya*, *yāmala*, *advaya-tattva* and the like.

<sup>2</sup> This is the state when the first of the divine attributes is in full display. See ch. II, 9-10.

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# THE DOCTRINE OF KARMAN

IN JAIN PHILOSOPHY

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which she read and commented on several drafts of this project bolstered me in what seemed to be a neverending process of writing and rewriting, thinking and rethinking.

My parents, Gerald and Helene Tull, never questioned, but at all times enthusiastically supported the choices I made.

My wife Lekha has shared this project with me from its inception to its completion. Through her persistence—sacrificing with the one concern of seeing my work in a completed form, first as a dissertation and now as a book—she has contributed to it perhaps more than I have.

## Introduction

J. C. Heesterman has recently observed that the Vedic sacrificial texts propose “a separate self-contained world ruled exclusively by the comprehensive and exhaustive order of the ritual.”<sup>1</sup> The closed world of the Vedic sacrifice recalls the larger closure of the Hindu universe, depicted from an early period as an egg “whose total contents can never increase but can only be redistributed.”<sup>2</sup> As Wendy O’Flaherty has noted within the world egg “the Hindu cosmos is a series of receding frames, circles within circles.”<sup>3</sup> This image of circles within circles leads back to the world of the Vedic sacrifice, which itself consisted of a series of concentric circles;<sup>4</sup> and so articulates again the close resemblance between the world of the ritual and the larger cosmos.

The world of the sacrifice is intentionally made to resemble the larger cosmos. The Vedic ritualists sought, in their own sacrificial activity, to recreate the primordial events which shaped the cosmos. An often-quoted passage that appears in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa thus declares: “This [ritual act] done now is that which the gods did then [in the beginning].”<sup>5</sup> What the gods did then was to create the world, an event that the late Vedic texts often depict as having occurred through the sacrifice of an anthropomorphic being, whose dismembered body was formed into the ordered cosmos.

However, the death and destruction implicit in the primordial event created an untenable situation for the sacrificer; in particular, the reenactment of the cosmogony would seem to have required the sacrificer to give up his own life.<sup>6</sup> The Vedic ritualists attempted to circumvent this actuality by employing various substitutes (ranging from grain and animals to a gold effigy) for the sacrificer’s own person. Moreover, the closed world of the ritual, with its carefully delimited boundaries, seems to have been constructed to keep out the reality of death;<sup>7</sup> for, just as the sacrificial arena itself represented a symbolic cosmos, so, too, the death that occurred in the ritual was only symbolically that of the sacrificer. There was one situation,



however, in which the body of the sacrificer was used as the material of the offering; namely, the funeral rite, which is appropriately called the *final sacrifice* (*antyeṣṭi*). This final sacrifice, in which the death of the sacrificer is a real death, moves the sacrificer from the world of the ritual to the larger cosmos.

This transition forms the subject of what is considered to be the earliest statement of the karma doctrine, a statement that appears in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. After discussing how the deceased enters into the various planes of the cosmos, a process that replicates the dismemberment of the primordial man, the famed Brāhmaṇic sage Yājñavalkya is asked: "What then becomes of this person?" Yājñavalkya then enunciates the doctrine of action (*karman*): "Indeed one becomes good by good action, bad by bad [action]."<sup>8</sup> In the context of Vedic ritual thought good and bad apparently refer to a valuation of action based on ritual exactitude; good being equated with the correct performance of the rite, bad with the incorrect performance. And, since the funeral sacrifice is not performed by the sacrificer who is about to attain either a good or a bad state, Yājñavalkya is apparently referring not to the funeral sacrifice but to the actions of a lifetime of sacrificial performances. The nature of that activity, which had been contained in the closed world of the ritual, now determines the conditions of the sacrificer's afterlife within the larger cosmos.

This interpretation of the karma doctrine differs from the doctrine's apparent meaning in later texts, which propose that an individual attains a specific state in the afterlife, or is reborn, according to the moral quality of all sorts of actions performed prior to death. If the context in which Yājñavalkya enunciates his doctrine of action is presumed not to be that of the Vedic ritual, then this general meaning can easily be seen in Yājñavalkya's statement, "one becomes good by good action, bad by bad [action]." And, in fact, this was precisely how nineteenth and early twentieth century Indologists tended to view this and other presentations of the karma doctrine in the *Upaniṣads*. These scholars remained curiously silent about the doctrine's attachment here to the paradigmatic event of the Vedic ritual, the sacrifice of the cosmic man, and focused instead on how, in isolation, the phrase "one becomes good by good action, bad by bad [action]" seemed to express a principle of morality extending to all sorts of actions.<sup>9</sup>

How and why scholars of an earlier generation adopted this view of the karma doctrine is discussed in the first chapter of this book. At the simplest level, this viewpoint owes much to a larger

tendency among these scholars to disparage "priestcraft," a perspective rooted in the philosophy of the Enlightenment.<sup>10</sup> In its application to the ancient Indian context this tendency led scholars to separate the Brāhmaṇas, ritual texts par excellence and the exclusive possession of the Vedic sacerdotalists, from the *Upaniṣads*, discursive texts that seek to express the nature of reality. Accordingly, the karma doctrine, which is first articulated in the *Upaniṣads*, was seen as addressing itself to issues not germane to the Vedic ritual tradition. There is strong textual evidence, however, suggesting the continuity of the Brāhmaṇas and the *Upaniṣads*: their physical contiguity; their use of a similar "idiom";<sup>11</sup> their claims of a shared authorship. In the early *Upaniṣads*, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* in particular, the Vedic rites represent the starting point for the disquisition into the nature of what is real: beneath increasingly greater levels of abstraction lies the concrete event of the sacrifice.

It is this ritual substratum that scholars of an earlier generation failed, or were simply unwilling, to recognize in their examination of *Upaniṣadic* thought. Such lack of recognition, I believe, was at the base of these scholars' inability to understand generally the origin of the karma doctrine,<sup>12</sup> for at least certain aspects of the doctrine are clearly rooted in the conceptual context of the Vedic ritual milieu.<sup>13</sup> Certainly, the notion that particular actions lead an individual after death to the attainment of a particular state ("becoming good by good action, bad by bad") reflects precisely the sort of effective action that, albeit in the closed world of the ritual, was believed to result from the sacrifice. In examining this ritual substratum I shall draw out some of the difficulties inherent to the sacrifice; in particular, those that resulted from the relationship of the officiants, who performed the ritual, to the sacrificer (*yajamāna*), who was supposed to benefit from the rite. How this relationship affected notions of the attainments of the afterlife—that is, the transition from the world of the ritual to an existence in the larger cosmos—is clearly articulated in the formulation of the *Upaniṣadic* karma doctrine.

In moving from the world of the ritual to the larger cosmos the sacrificer becomes *saloka*, "one together with the world(s)." The ability to attain this state implies that the sacrificer's own existence is in some sense correlative to that of the cosmos—though perhaps this relationship could not be realized in the sacrificer's ordinary experience. The late Vedic cosmology expresses this idea of a correlation between man and cosmos in the ideology of the

cosmic man (Puruṣa in the Ṛgveda, Prajāpati in the Brāhmaṇas). The investigation of this ideology—as the notion that the cosmos arose from the sacrifice of a primordial anthropomorphic being expresses it—is the subject of Chapter 2, “The Cosmos as Man: The Image of the Cosmos in Vedic Thought.” This myth’s implicit notion that the cosmos has the shape of a man reflects the belief that man might potentially integrate himself with the cosmos. Here, the correlation between body and cosmos, senses and natural phenomena, that the Vedic cosmogony proposes, seems to facilitate—at least theoretically—this integration.

However, as noted earlier, the application of this cosmogonic theory would seem to have required the dismemberment and death of the individual who attempted to re-create the primordial activity of the cosmic man. Although the sacrificer may have been able to meet this requirement in the funeral rites, the “final sacrifice,” the event of the sacrificer’s death in the ordinary (i.e., nonfuneral) rituals creates an untenable situation. Death would keep the sacrificer from meeting a myriad of ritual obligations, obligations which could be fulfilled only through a lifetime of sacrificial performances. One particular response to this problem is seen in the Brāhmaṇic myth of Prajāpati, which modifies certain elements of the established Vedic mythology of the cosmic man. This myth, which is the subject of the second half of Chapter 2, replaces the act of a cosmogonic dismemberment with a combination of creative activities: heating, desire, and in particular, sexual generation. Whereas in each instance the body of the cosmic man shapes the cosmos, the emphasis shifts from a disjunctive to a conjunctive model of creation: Puruṣa establishes the various cosmic spheres with his own dismembered body parts (he is said literally to be “divided up,” *vi-/dhā*); Prajāpati puts himself into the cosmos by a process of “uniting [with it] as a pair” (*mithunam sam-/bhū*). The Brāhmaṇic myth thereby proposes a model that, in its application, would seem to alleviate man of the need to die in the ritual performance.

To meet the demands of the ritual theory—that is, the notion that the sacrificer reenacts the cosmic man’s primordial activity—these modifications required a complex ceremonial. The ritual of constructing the fire altar (*agnicayana*), as it is presented in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, is considered to be the greatest practical expression of this modified cosmogony.<sup>14</sup> The complexity of the Agnicayana, like the complexity of the Prajāpati mythology, derives from its attempt to circumvent the problem of death. The Vedic

sacrifice, accurately described by J. C. Heesterman as “a controlled act of death and destruction,”<sup>15</sup> by its nature would seem to oppose this attempt. How the Agnicayana ritualists responded to the problem of death in the sacrifice and how their response allowed the human sacrificer to replicate the events of the cosmogony forms the subject of Chapter 3, “The Fire Altar as Man and Cosmos.”

Chapter 4 returns to the nature of the sacrificer’s transition, through his death, from the self-contained world of the ritual to the larger cosmos. How the ritual event prepares the sacrificer for the afterlife, and how it facilitates his transition into the larger cosmos on the event of his funeral forms the particular subject of this chapter. The relationship between the Agnicayana and the funeral rite for one who in life performed the Agnicayana, exemplifies this relationship. For, the funeral rite for one who in life performed the Agnicayana replicates the Agnicayana, with the apparent intention of ensuring that the same attainments experienced in the ritual event are attained again in the sacrificer’s transition into the larger cosmos. Along with this specific relationship between rites performed in life and the funeral rite there are certain general ritual theories that express how the sacrificial oblation—which, at the funeral rite, was the sacrificer—moved from this world to the other planes of the cosmos. One prevalent theory explains this event through the model of a cycle of generation and regeneration; thus, the smoke from the sacrifice forms clouds in the other world, which then return to this world in the form of rain, which nourishes the plants and creatures, which again form the objects of the sacrifice.<sup>16</sup> These theories lead us back to the karma doctrine, as they represent an essential aspect of the theory of rebirth as it appears in the earliest expressions of this doctrine.

### *The Vedic Origins of the Karma Doctrine*

Recent studies suggest a consensus regarding the origins of the karma doctrine, a subject that really is “shrouded in the mists of time.” On the one hand, the karma doctrine seems to contain an agricultural component, specifically one that reflects the cultivation of rice: as O’Flaherty notes, “rice is planted twice, first the seed and then the seedling that is replanted; rice is also harvested over and over in a year, rather than at a single harvest season; hence it is a natural symbol for rebirth.”<sup>17</sup> And, because rice cultivation was not a feature of the Indus Valley, where Vedic culture arose, these notions support a “tribal” origin for the karma

doctrine. However, the supposition of a tribal origin in a certain sense evades the issue of karma's origins, for, citing O'Flaherty once again: "To postulate a . . . 'tribal origin' is to some extent a way of passing the buck away from the major religions which must be explained; it is a scholarly way of saying 'somewhere else.'" <sup>18</sup>

Throughout India's history, there has been a constant exchange of ideas and practices between tribal (non-textual, local) and textual traditions. The osmotic nature of the Indian tradition is evident from what has been a tired and fruitless attempt to delineate Vedic from non-Vedic (an enterprise rooted in the nineteenth century desire to separate racially ancient India's Aryan and non-Aryan populations) <sup>19</sup> in the development of the ancient Indian tradition. Quite simply, once an idea or practice, whatever its origins, was incorporated in the Vedic tradition, the nature of which can be understood through the evidence of a substantial textual record, it must be considered Vedic—that such ideas and practices may have been antithetical to the established Vedic tradition bears no relevance here. For example, the Brāhmaṇas contain a notion of the sacrificial oblation that seems based in agriculture (though perhaps not in rice culture per se); that is, the notion that the oblation went from the smoke of the sacrifice to become the clouds, rain, plants or food, semen, and again creatures, which form the oblation. <sup>20</sup> Although this notion may have originated outside the Vedic sphere, its association with the sacrifice means that, at least by the time these texts were composed, this notion was Vedic. In choosing to discuss karma's Vedic origins, I have in mind this inclusive view of what is Vedic.

At the most basic level, the Vedic tradition employed the term *karman*, from the Sanskrit root /kr̥ ("to do"), to describe the "doing" of the sacrificial ritual. However, over the many centuries during which it represented India's "culturally hegemonous" system of belief and practice, <sup>21</sup> the Vedic sacrifice developed into an entity of astounding complexity, and the "doing" of the sacrifice became more than a matter of simple action.

Karma, as a "doctrine," emerges from these complex structures; the textual point of this emergence is the early Upaniṣads. This textual epoch represents a "privileged" point in the history of the Indian tradition; for these texts represent at once the furthest edge of Vedic sacrificial thought and the first stage in the rise of classical Hindu thought. And at this point certain notions, such as karma, attain the stature of "doctrines"; that is, they are articulated in ways quite similar to their later existence as the presuppositions for nearly all (post-Vedic) Hindu thought.

The aim of this book is to examine and delineate the Vedic structures leading to this emergence, for, I believe, the earliest statements of karma in the Upaniṣads look back to structures, patterns, and paradigms already contained—in both ideology and practice—in the Vedic rite. And, though not all these structures may have been "originally" Vedic, before the karma doctrine emerges in the Upaniṣads, its antecedents were already entrenched within the sphere of the established Vedic tradition.

### *A Note on Texts, Method, Terms, and Translations*

The Vedic texts—Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads and Vedāṅgas ("limbs" of the Veda)—with their many recensions, constitute a vast corpus. Although a number of the texts in this corpus have been used in this study, it has not been my intention to present a comprehensive view of the Vedic textual tradition. For the most part, the texts cited in this study are from the late Vedic period (ca. 800–600 B.C.E.), when the latest of the Brāhmaṇas and the earliest of the Upaniṣads were composed. One Brāhmaṇa in particular, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, reflects this transition in textual epochs, as it contains within its final book the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, a text with which it has much in common. <sup>22</sup> This Brāhmaṇa, said to occupy "the most significant and important position of all the Brāhmaṇas" <sup>23</sup> and described as "one of the highest achievements in the whole range of Vedic literature," <sup>24</sup> has been used as the chief source for the views expressed in this book.

Despite this praise the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa has not escaped the general disdain Western scholars have expressed for the Brāhmaṇas. In 1860, more than a decade before critical editions of a significant number of Brāhmaṇas became available to scholars in the West, <sup>25</sup> Max Müller declared that: "The general character of these works is marked by shallow and insipid grandiloquence, by priestly conceit, and antiquarian pedantry." <sup>26</sup> If this warning did not sufficiently discourage scholars from investigating the Brāhmaṇa texts, Müller went on to note a few years later that: "No person who is not acquainted beforehand with the place which the Brāhmaṇas fill in the history of the Indian mind, could read more than ten pages without being disgusted." <sup>27</sup> For Müller, only a trained Sanskritist—much in the same fashion as the physician alone is able to bear the raving of madmen—possessed the intestinal fortitude to face these texts "which no circulating library



## The Problem of Karma and the Textual Sources

The doctrine of karma and rebirth was well known to Western Indologists long before the Indian textual tradition had been fully investigated. In one of the earliest knowledgeable accounts of Hindu beliefs and practices, Abbé J. A. Dubois noted the "doctrine is, as is generally known, one of the fundamental principles of the Hindu religion" and cited a popular religious text that accurately represented the main tenets of the karma doctrine,<sup>1</sup> while he depicted with wild inaccuracy the Indian philosophical schools, grossly misrepresenting their doctrines as well as those found in other orthodox Hindu texts.<sup>2</sup> This is not at all surprising; although the doctrine is found as a presupposition in almost all Indian philosophical thought,<sup>3</sup> it is perhaps most widely disseminated on the level of popular culture. As the anthropologist Ursula Sharma has noted: "In practice the individual receives the concept of karma as a part of a living folk tradition."<sup>4</sup>

However, that the doctrine imbues virtually every level of Indian thought seems to hinder the task of arriving at an explicit definition of karma.<sup>5</sup> Because the general parameters of the doctrine are so well known, the doctrine is often defined by default—as one eminent Indologist remarked: "The doctrine is so well known that it seems hardly necessary to define karma."<sup>6</sup> This approach assumes the meaning of karma is fundamentally the same regardless of its context. Yet, not all its several elements—causality, rebirth, ethicization<sup>7</sup>—are implied in each instance the doctrine occurs. To understand what karma means first requires an assessment of its context.<sup>8</sup>

The failure to assess properly the doctrine's context has been an enduring problem in efforts to understand the nature of karma in its earliest appearances. Scholars have generally agreed that

the earliest formulation of the karma doctrine occurs in the Upaniṣads.<sup>9</sup> However, the doctrine's pre-Upaniṣadic history represents, as the great nineteenth century Sanskritist W. D. Whitney noted, "one of the most difficult questions in the religious history of India, how that doctrine arose, out of what it developed, to what feature of the ancient faith it attached itself."<sup>10</sup> The problem of ascertaining the karma doctrine's pre-Upaniṣadic history may be attributed to the view that nineteenth and early twentieth century Indologists held regarding the relationship of the Upaniṣads to the preceding Brāhmaṇic period; namely, that the Upaniṣads rejected entirely the viewpoints expressed in the Brāhmaṇas and so expressed views unprecedented in ancient Indian thought. As a result of this view scholars often failed to acknowledge—or simply ignored—that the Upaniṣadic contexts in which the doctrine first appears exhibit themes clearly drawn from the Brāhmaṇas. And, because the meaning of the karma doctrine is inextricably linked to the circumstances of its presentation, these scholars often incorrectly assessed the import of the karma doctrine in its earliest appearances.

In particular, there was a marked tendency in these scholars' interpretations to emphasize that, similar to its later occurrences, the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine was characterized by a concern with a broad range of ethical behavior and its consequences. The supposed range of the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine's ethical concern contrasts sharply with the limited sphere of Brāhmaṇic ethics, which values behavior in terms of ritual performance. Yet, rather than turn to the Brāhmaṇas' ritual orientation, which is an obvious aspect of the early Upaniṣadic karma doctrine, scholars preferred to interpret this doctrine through imposing upon it a broad notion of ethics. This approach resulted not only in the estrangement of the karma doctrine from its original context but, in an odd circular argument, in the estrangement of the thought of the Upaniṣads from that of the Brāhmaṇas. For, if karma in its earliest appearances in the Upaniṣads was indeed broadly ethical in scope, then the doctrine itself evinced a gulf between Brāhmaṇic and Upaniṣadic thought.

Although many of the views expressed by scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regarding the relationship of Upaniṣadic and Brāhmaṇic thought, and the role of the karma



doctrine in that relationship, are no longer considered to be authoritative, the work of these scholars represents the foundation of modern Indological studies (and also a large part of the foundation of the modern study of history of religions). Accordingly, these views, which led scholars to discount the role of Brāhmaṇic thought in the formulation of the karma doctrine, underlie the confusion that still reigns regarding the doctrine's early history.<sup>11</sup> The attempt to discern the Vedic origins of karma thus requires a reexamination, of how and why an earlier generation of scholars arrived at their peculiar view of the relationship of the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads, to see where scholarship made a wrong turn and so obfuscated karma's early history.

Following this examination, I shall turn to a detailed study of the karma doctrine's earliest appearances in the Upaniṣads. I do not intend here to formulate an explicit definition of the karma doctrine; rather, my intention is to ascertain its meaning within the larger context of Brāhmaṇic thought, where I believe the origins of the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine lie. Here, it appears the doctrine represents the natural outgrowth and culmination of certain developments in the performance of the Vedic ritual—in particular, those concerning the role of the individual sacrificer and the nature of the results of the ritual performance in both this world and the next.

### *The Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads in the View of Nineteenth Century Indology*

Although a realistic depiction of the Vedic texts appeared in 1805, it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that Western scholars were able to undertake a systematic investigation of the whole of the Vedic literature.<sup>12</sup> Significant for the later course of Vedic studies was the availability during this interval of a Latin translation of the Upaniṣads, Anquetil-Duperron's *Oupnek'hat*,<sup>13</sup> and its introduction into Western academic circles by scholars such as Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Schelling, who embraced the philosophy of these texts.<sup>14</sup> These scholars esteemed what they perceived to be the timeless spirit of these texts; Schopenhauer, in fact, anticipated that the influence of the Upaniṣads "will not be less profound than the revival of Greek in

the fourteenth century."<sup>15</sup> However, as Edward Said has recently noted of early Oriental studies: "almost without exception such overesteem was followed by a counterresponse: the Orient appeared lamentably underhumanized, antidemocratic, barbaric, and so forth."<sup>16</sup> In the early history of Vedic studies, the obvious overvaluation of Upaniṣadic thought inevitably led to an undervaluation of other aspects of the Vedic literature. Even before the Vedic literature had been thoroughly investigated, Schopenhauer thus expressed the opinion that "the Upaniṣads were the only portion of the Veda which deserved our study, and that all the rest was priestly rubbish (*Priesterwirtschaft*)."<sup>17</sup>

When scholars did turn their attention to the early Vedic texts, they found this preconceived notion of "priestly rubbish" disproved by the tenor of the earliest of these texts, the Rgveda. In this text scholars believed they glimpsed the Vedic religion before the rise of Indian sacerdotalism. Writing soon after Western scholars began studying the Rgveda, W. D. Whitney noted:

To characterize the Vedic religion in general terms is not difficult . . . it is not one which has been nursed into its present form by the fostering care of a caste or priesthood; it is one which has arisen in the whole body of the people, and is the true expression of the collective view which a simple minded, but highly gifted nation, inclined to religious veneration, took of the wonders of creation and the powers to which it conceived them ascribable.<sup>18</sup>

However, this exalted view of the religion of the Rgveda, like the previous estimation of the Upaniṣads, seems to have been established at the expense of nearly all other aspects of Hinduism. With the exception of Upaniṣadic thought, the history of Hinduism following the Rgvedic period appeared to be one of complete degeneration. Rudolph von Roth, exemplified this view when in 1853 he wrote of the Rgveda:

The charm of primitiveness which surrounds these ancient hymns in a yet higher degree than the immortal poems of Homer, is united with a nobility of diction, a pure and fresh earnestness of thought, which are no longer to be met with in the later literary productions of India. . . . [One] finds the high spiritual endowments which belong of right to the Indo-European family of nations, and which have placed it foremost in the world's history, still fresh and vigorous in

perous (*śreyas*) daily. Indeed this [rite] is his divine, undying, body (*ātman*); who performs these [rites] for another gives his divine body to another. Only a dried trunk remains.<sup>161</sup>

This passage suggests the Prajāpati model, with its emphasis on the single sacrificer,<sup>162</sup> was viewed by at least some Brāhmaṇic thinkers as the exclusive model for the sacrifice; the notion that “a dried trunk” rewarded those who followed a traditional path of worship (indicated here by the practice of performing for another) effectively represents the denial of this mode of worship.<sup>163</sup> The severity of this view is lessened in the Upaniṣads in the contrast between the respective afterlife attainments of those who attain the *devayāna* and those who attain the *pitryāna*. Although these afterlife attainments are based on a distinction in performance similar to that described in the Brāhmaṇa passage cited earlier, unlike this Brāhmaṇa passage, the formulation of the *pitryāna* indicates that those who follow the traditional sacrificial format do attain an afterlife existence. Moreover, this afterlife existence resembles to a degree the attainments of the *devayāna*, as the *pitryāna*—albeit on a different level from that proposed by the *devayāna*—leads the deceased to an integration with the cosmos, thus reenacting Prajāpati’s cosmogonic activity. This relationship suggests that rather than denying the traditional sacrificial format, the Upaniṣadic thinkers were concerned with assimilating it to the Prajāpati model; for, as the normative model in Upaniṣadic thought, promulgated in the form of the “interiorized” sacrifice with its emphasis on knowledge, the assertion of its dominance no longer required the rejection of an earlier form.

The Upaniṣadic attempt to correlate two types of worship within the single paradigm of Prajāpati’s sacrifice led, I believe, to the promotion of the idea that even for those who follow the traditional sacrificial format—despite its sharply delimited nature—all actions, not just those associated with the ritual performance, affect the conditions of the afterlife. In other words, the conduct of those worshippers following the traditional ritual format was viewed in the same way as the conduct of those following the “interiorized” sacrifice, which was not limited to a specific arena or to a certain aspect of an individual’s life. On the one hand, the nature of the *devayāna*, an abiding integration into the world of Brahman,

reflects the “otherworldly” nature of the activity of those who follow the interiorized path of worship: life itself is the activity of the sacrifice. On the other hand, the nature of the *pitryāna*, which leads the sacrificer back to this world, reflects the “this worldly” nature of the activity of those who follow the traditional path of worship: except for those acts contained within the sacrificial arena, actions are mundane. Accordingly, the *pitryāna* leads finally to this world and the attainment, “for those who have been of pleasant conduct,” to a birth as a Brahman, Kṣatriya, or Vaiśya, or, “for those whose conduct has been stinking,” to a birth as an animal or an outcaste.<sup>164</sup>

The point that draws the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine out of the realm of ritual activity is simultaneously the point that leads back to the model of the sacrifice. For, only when the activity of the sacrifice became equated with all activity—that is, with life itself—did the Upaniṣadic thinkers begin to envision a doctrine of the moral efficacy of actions that actually were disconnected to the sacrifice. And, although this notion of the moral efficacy of all actions is itself unprecedented in the Brāhmaṇic texts, its presentation in the Upaniṣads suggests it represents the culmination of views that had emerged in Brāhmaṇic thought regarding the relationship between (sacrificial) acts, those performed by the individual sacrificer and those performed by the ritual specialists, and their effects in the conditions of the afterlife.

### **Conclusion: The Karma Doctrine in the Context of Brāhmaṇic Thought**

In this chapter, I have emphasized the continuity of the Upaniṣadic and the Brāhmaṇic traditions and, in particular, the continuity of the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine with the Brāhmaṇic ritual world view. In part, I have emphasized the continuity of these traditions to counter the pervasive bias against the Brāhmaṇas that stands at the foundation of Western Indology. The result of this bias has been a tendency to remove the Upaniṣadic tradition from its historical and conceptual context. In the case of the karma doctrine this failure to investigate, or even to acknowledge, the Brāhmaṇic structures that continue to assert themselves in the thought of the Upaniṣads has been particularly damaging.

for scholars tended to view the karma doctrine from its successors, which measure the moral efficacy of actions in all contexts, rather than from its antecedents, which are concerned with the moral effects of ritual action. By not understanding or by simply misrepresenting this Vedic substratum, scholars of an earlier generation believed the appearance of the karma doctrine in the Upaniṣads meant that the Brāhmaṇic notion of the rewards of the sacrifice was no longer considered to be effective; as Deussen remarked: "strictly speaking the entire [Brāhmaṇic] conception of recompense is destroyed."<sup>165</sup> Viewed in this way the karma doctrine represented to these scholars the point of separation between the thought of the Upaniṣads and the thought of the Brāhmaṇas.

Although in this chapter I have emphasized the continuity of the Brāhmaṇic and Upaniṣadic traditions, it is not accurate to assert that the Upaniṣads are entirely inseparable from the Brāhmaṇic tradition—undeniably, even the earliest Upaniṣads express views that are unprecedented in the Brāhmaṇas—or that the karma doctrine in its earliest appearances in the Upaniṣads has the same meaning as karma in later Upaniṣadic and in later Indian thought. In investigating karma's earliest manifestations in the Upaniṣads I have sought primarily to isolate the Vedic antecedents of karma and, thereby, to show that karma does have a prehistory in Vedic thought, an understanding of which is critical to an understanding of the karma doctrine in its earliest appearances in the Upaniṣads. For, the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine continues to develop the structures underlying Brāhmaṇic ritual thought.

In the following chapters, I shall turn to a detailed examination of what is perhaps the chief structure underlying Brāhmaṇic ritual thought; that is, the notion that the cosmos itself arose from the primordial sacrifice of an anthropomorphic being (Puruṣa-Prajāpati). The ideology of this event seems to have been the point from which the Brāhmaṇic ritualists began to question the nature of the sacrificial format—in particular, focusing on the problem of (ritual) death and how it affected, as well as its effect on, the traditional relationship between the sacrificer and the ritual specialists employed by the sacrificer to perform the rites for his benefit. Although the Brāhmaṇic authors naturally framed their discussions in terms of the sacrifice (in developments in both practice and theory), they nevertheless addressed the fundamental questions of hu-

man existence: the nature of life and death and man's relationship to the larger cosmos in which he exists. However, the Brāhmaṇic doctrines that treat these fundamental questions, largely as a result of their being constantly related to a ritual format developed over many centuries, are sometimes ambiguous, at other times inconsistent. The Upaniṣadic karma doctrine, which is not only prefigured in these Brāhmaṇic doctrines but is presented as the textual successor to them, represents an important interpretive tool in clarifying their ambiguities. To utilize the karma doctrine toward this end I have "reintroduced" it into its proper historical and conceptual context of Brāhmaṇic ritual thought.

# Yoga, Karma, and Rebirth

*A Brief History and Philosophy*



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Buddhists embrace largely these same views, though, as mentioned, Buddhist philosophers see *samskara* as causal continua, in contrast with Hindu or Vedic views (of Vedantins, Nyaya philosophers, etc.) of *samskara* as properties of a self or a substance. Buddhists for their part eschew all notions of enduring substances and thus weave into their psychologies of *samskara* commitments to doctrines of momentariness and "no-self." The question of what survives death will be taken up in chapter 4. There too we shall survey the Buddhist–Nyaya controversy about personal identity (What makes the present person continuous with the person she was in the past?) And we shall revisit translife identity in the very last section of chapter 5.

Finally, a historical note on the ethical dimensions of karma theory. The karma idea first appears in the Upanishads, where the main point seems to be that virtue is its own reward. This holds for this lifetime and our reincarnations. A passage from the *Bṛihadaranyaka* (c. 800 B.C.E.), 3.2.10:

"Yajnavalkya," said he [Jaratkarava], "when the voice of a dead man goes into fire, his breath into wind, his eye into the sun, his mind into the moon, his hearing into the quarters of earth, his body into the earth, his soul (*atman*) into space, the hairs of his head into plants, the hairs of his body into trees, and his blood and semen are placed in water, what then becomes of this person (*purusha*)?"

"Artabhaga, my dear, take my hand. We two only will know of this. This is not for us two to speak of in public."

The two went away and deliberated. What they said was *karma*. What they praised was *karma*. Verily, one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action.<sup>15</sup>

Jaratkarava's question targets personal survival, and the answer seems to be that only karma survives. The word used for "person" is *purusha*, which connotes the fully particular individual, whereas the dead man's *atman* ("self" would be a better translation than "soul") is said to merge into ether, *akasha*, translated above as "space." As in the later *Katha Upanishad* (see appendix A), the question of survival concerns the person as an individual, not as the cosmic self, *atman*. Anticipating the Buddhist positions of no-self and karmic continuity, the Upanishad identifies karma as key to a translife personal identity. It is also the most important element in the composite that makes up the living man or woman. Karma can be good or bad, including, presumably, the karma that shapes a subsequent birth: "Verily, one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action."

{ 88 } Thus *samskara* are conceived to underpin an appeal to self-interest that is a foundation of morality. What's wrong with being a thief? Well, your choice to be a thief binds you to being a thief, a karmic pattern that determines what you'll be like tomorrow and next month and next year and in a decade.<sup>16</sup> But the body ages and dies, and strategies to make life as pleasant as possible might prudentially include thievery. Against this, the Upanishadic idea is its rebirth teaching. Imagine determining yourself unendingly, choosing to be a thief not only in this lifetime but into another and endless incarnations. Contrast this with one who acts now compassionately and begins to become forever compassionate. Which would one want to be?

Then there is a second consideration: put crudely, payback, future pain and suffering or future pleasure and happiness. In the Buddhist conception, some karma leads to stable experiences of happiness while other leads to pain, and, unlike in the theistic view where God guarantees the justice of payback, it happens as natural law. Mimamsa has a similar theory. In endless rebirths, not only are you stuck with what you are but also, if you are a legitimate target, watch out, for in beginningless transmigration it's guaranteed, in either this or another body.

### *Ahimsa*, Nonharmfulness

The Upanishadic claim that yoga leads to discovery of a universal self, *atman*, is taken to have ethical implications, in particular that we should practice *ahimsa*, nonharmfulness (also translated “noninjury” and “non-violence”<sup>17</sup>). Similarly, the ubiquity of sentience in Jaina cosmology and the universal accessibility of nirvana in Buddhism are said to necessitate an ethics of *ahimsa*, according to both classical and modern authorities. And the list of five “social restraints” (*yama*) in the *Yoga Sutra* begins with nonharmfulness (YS 2.30: see appendix C). No one can say that only her preferred metaphysics entails *ahimsa*, but each of several positions seems sufficient to justify, motivate, and explain the practice. My own view is that the ethics of Yoga can be constructed independently from Yoga metaphysics. (Buddhists too tend to take this position about the relation between ethics and metaphysics.) But it is instructive to review the ways previous Yoga philosophies have found a relation between the deep nature of ourselves and reality and prescriptions about what we should and should not do. In practically all Yoga philosophies, ethics begins with *ahimsa*.<sup>18</sup>

Yoga and practice of *ahimsa* are said to have, furthermore, a converse

side, fearlessness, namely, transcendence of life's evils. We also learn this first in the Upanishads. The *Isha* (c. 500 B.C.E.) makes the connection with yogic self-discovery in a common theme: realization of a cosmic self (*atman*) brings freedom from sorrow. Verse 7: “Those who see all beings as in the self alone / And the self in all beings, henceforth do not recoil (from anything). / For whom all beings are known as just self, / For him how can there be delusion? How can there be grief? / For he sees (everywhere) unity.”<sup>19</sup> There is only the single self, the knowledge of which banishes fear and grief.<sup>20</sup> Conversely, we practice *ahimsa*, trying to see others as ourself or having the same self as we.

From the *Gita* (6.32): “Who sees through the lens of likeness to self the same everywhere, Arjuna, whether pleasure and happiness or pain and suffering, that yogin is deemed the very best.” The commentary by Shankara (c. 700 C.E., the oldest and most important classical interpreter) takes the words “pain and suffering” to mean the pain and suffering of others, who dislike it just as one dislikes one's own pain and suffering. Similarly with the favorable attitudes of all toward pleasure and happiness. Shankara:

As to me pleasure is desired, so to all beings with breath pleasure is agreeable. . . . And as what pain or suffering is mine is disagreeable, disliked, in that way for all beings with breath pain and suffering are disliked, disagreeable. So it is explained that one who, seeing the same in all beings, sees through the lens of likeness to self pleasures and pains as similarly regarded by all, well, such a person does not do anything disagreeable to anyone, becoming an *ahimsika*, one who desires no harm—this is the verse's meaning. The one who is in this way an *ahimsika*, firmly settled in a vision of equality, is deemed (i.e., considered) the very best yogin, preeminent among all.<sup>21</sup>

In line with Advaita Vedanta metaphysics, Shankara interprets the self mentioned here and elsewhere in the *Gita* as identical in everyone. The discipline to be practiced to realize it includes seeing others as like oneself. Thus Shankara and hosts of later Vedantic interpreters, including of rival subschools, tie the practices of *ahimsa* to both a yogic goal and a conception of commonality, or identity, of consciousness.

Jainas, like Buddhists, reject Vedanta and the institutions of Hinduism, but not of course yoga practices or *ahimsa*. According to Jaina doctrine, everything is sentient. There is a hierarchy of consciousness, some beings having only a single sense faculty, two, three, and so on. Human beings have eleven sense faculties: five external senses of knowledge and five more of action, along with *manas*, the inner sense, and *buddhi*,

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{ 102 } vertical flow is the transcendent sacrifice (see, e.g., *Gita* 4.6 and 4.13). The horizontal comprises the interactions belonging to the separate universes of the separate “sheaths,” *kosha*: food and the “food sheath” and the worlds of feelings and thoughts along with one’s particular feelings and thoughts, the emotional and mental sheaths (see figure 4A). In different terminology, by karma yoga one opens to a universal *prana* leading to extraordinary powers or *siddhis*, becoming, in Vedantic language, the Vaishvanara, the “universally human,” which is considered a stage in yogic transformation of consciousness. The tantric turn is all about the formation of a more complex harmony of the divine and the individual.

One of the most striking of the *Gita*’s many striking conceptions concerns reincarnation. If you think the goal of yoga too distant, don’t worry, one continues yogic practice into the next lifetime. Arjuna, at *Gita* 6.37, voices this along with the further complaint that if he practices yoga he will be lost to the world, not a success in worldly terms as well as a yogic failure. Krishna replies (*Gita* 6.41–44), “someone [like you describe] fallen from yoga would be born in a household of pure and beautiful people. Or, he would be born just into a family of yogins and yoginis, people of wisdom. . . . There he would recover the purposefulness of his previous life, and would strive, O joy of the Kurus, from that point on toward perfection. For even without trying he would be carried just by the practice in his former birth.” This is the yogic soul-making conception of the *Gita*.

The tantric and neo-Vedantin philosopher Aurobindo uses soul making as the lynchpin of his theory of the relation between Brahman and the world.<sup>45</sup> Brahman is in the process of creating materially embodied spiritual individuals who are in part responsible for making themselves across lifetimes. Thus there would be in the material world as a whole a teleological cause, an “attraction of the future,” that would be expressed in us in terms of right desire and right effort, i.e., in yoga practices and all their wondrous results. We shall return to this yogic soul-making theory both in the next section and in chapters 4 and 5.

### Karmic Justice

Fear of karmic consequence and joy in karmic confidence constitute a second variety of both moral and yogic incentive on most Yoga views.<sup>46</sup> The universe is so arranged that an individual will get her due, if not in this life then in a future one. Karmic justice is a distinct variety of in-

centive, according to Yoga. The idea is similar to Western religious teachings about heaven and hell as doctrines of moral reward. In this section, I shall examine the slippery concept of *adrishta*, unseen force, which is the name given to the influence of a person’s (or a group’s) karma on events in the sense of moral retribution, including, most importantly, one’s next birth. For obvious reasons, some lines of investigation cannot be closed until I take up theories of rebirth in chapter 4. Here I shall concentrate on matters of ethics, and also, at the end, the theistic problem of evil, against which ideas of karma and rebirth are used to defend the thesis that God is good. The fine points of Yoga views of survival and issues about personal identity will be the focus in chapter 4.

The most widely held picture is that an individual has both a sum of karmic worth and individual lines of karma that attract, like magnets, situations for discharge, karmic cathexis in worldly events causing pleasure and pain in various combinations and flavors. The aggregation depends on moral coefficients added to a total in the case of good karma and subtracted in the case of bad, although the moral worth of some acts stands alone and invites reward or payback independently of the moral worth of the aggregate. The power of karmic vectors to affect events, especially outcomes of enterprises, is considered to be outside or beyond ordinary sensibilities, as is implied in the very word—unseen force, *adrishta*—used in all schools to refer to the causal power of karma’s side of justice. This is a fate that can work *apurvaka*, without intermediaries. That is to say, it may bring about a consequence, a bit of bad luck, for instance, in a subsequent birth remotely, without an immediately preceding cause. The classical Indian school of Mimamsa propagated the view that every experience is to some degree, however slight (or overwhelming), influenced by *adrishta*.<sup>47</sup>

The force of *adrishta* is tied to a balance of pleasure and pain, suffering and happiness. That is to say, negative karma is considered paid off, and good karma exhausted, by certain kinds of pain or pleasure. Certain enjoyments and sufferings are, to be sure, deemed themselves sources of good or bad karma. The joke in yoga class is that loosening tight hip joints—a well-known source of torment—pays off bad karma but only if endured with grace. The philosophic point is that the currency of the moral exchange is not merely the moral worth of acts. The workings of karma are complex, and include whole “life lessons,” as are captured in the Jataka tales of the Buddha-to-be’s previous births (recall the story of Sumedha in the introduction).<sup>48</sup>

Furthermore, on certain Vedantic and tantric and indeed some Buddhist views of an underlying bliss of a true self or no-self state of

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consciousness, happiness is supposed to be closer to the natural state than pain or suffering, which are deviations. The renunciants' warning that "All is suffering" is not the final word, existence or nonexistence not being so niggardly in happiness and bliss as one might think. Pain and suffering are instrumental—and thus of positive overall value—in leading us to somehow better bliss or to find the bliss at our core. We shall return to this instrumentality thesis in connection with Yogic theism. For the present, the main point is that the workings of karma are typically only part of the picture when it comes to the hedonically positive and negative sides of experience.

Yoga philosophers have also recognized that getting what we want and avoiding what we want to avoid are wellsprings for all our acts. It is all the more true, then, that the precise relations among karma, destiny, and happiness, though presumably lawlike, are not discerned easily. Buddhists in particular are well known for the simplification that with respect to one's own actions one can be sure that cruelty and other evil acts will be avenged (without an agent, an avenger, a judge of the dead), and one will secure good results for oneself by good deeds. The processes remain unknown or even unknowable (except to buddhas, according to Buddhists), but that hardly matters given what we know firsthand about suffering.

Nevertheless, even without its lines very precisely drawn, this picture of moral worth is potentially in tension with the causal picture of *samskara* continuity. Individual patterns of karma—habits and skills—are said to survive and shape the character of the person in his or her next lifetime. The thesis seems crucial to the theory of yogic soul making and is veritably common Yoga opinion, namely, that some habits, values, intentions—karma, in a word—are so deeply entrenched that they re-emerge in the next birth as talents or deep dispositions of mental or emotional character.

The problem is that continuity of *samskara* works from moment to moment, without a break, unlike the remote workings of *adrishta*. That the two ideas of karmic force are potentially in conflict can be seen in the notion of Hitler reborn in a nonhuman form subject to constant fear and torture. This may be a righteous image, but since the soul is not a *tabula rasa* according to Yoga, even tremendously positive or negative moral value of the karmic aggregate could not determine a dramatic species crossing, Hitler being reborn as a bat, for instance, or Stalin as a mosquito. What could be continuous between Stalin and an insect? Only a future human being could be shaped by the mental dispositions that are the most important to a human being, I should dare to speculate.

However, it is not just a matter of popular opinion among Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas, etc.; philosophers too hold that there is no guarantee that you cannot take a lower rebirth. Appeals to mental complexity are countered by the consideration that a complex mind can dream or experience itself under simpler forms.<sup>49</sup>

The overall lesson remains the intricacy of karmic laws. The tension between the two ideas of karmic influence leads me to think that by and large, humans are restricted to future human reincarnations. The argument against reincarnation that human population growth has turned up sharply in the last couple of centuries and so there would not be enough human souls to meet the bodily demand can be answered quickly: more souls of higher animals, such as horses and dogs, have perhaps ascended to the human level in recent years than was the rate previously (or maybe heaven or hell are emptying!). In line with our minimalism, all we need say is that an individual who achieves the human level is unlikely to return to an animal incarnation for the very reason that the mental life typical of a human being cannot be continued in the body of a different species. Therefore, it seems reasonable to speculate that the determinant power of the moral worth of karma has to be restricted to birthings by potential mothers within the human species, and of course fathers and others important to an upcoming childhood. Perhaps a karmic sum determines a range of candidate wombs to which are attached likelihoods of future suffering and happiness.

Such speculation is of course pretty airy, since isolating the influence of karma is practically impossible. According to Yoga psychology, we live simultaneously in different bodies or personalities, physical, vital, emotional, mental, and spiritual (see figures 4A, 4B, and 4C). A bad habit for the body, coffee in the morning, for example, may be part of a good mental practice, writing a book, for instance. And not only are there complications concerning types and ranges of pleasures and pains along with the complexity of human action (think of the difference, e.g., between a quick response and a long project), there are further complexities concerning karma itself.

First, it is commonly held that there are interpersonal relations to karma, souls reincarnating in groups, friends and families hanging together through lifetimes—called a "karasse" by novelist Kurt Vonnegut—a group karmically bonded, "soul mates."<sup>50</sup> It's as though the magnetic effect of karma includes drawing together people who have been associated in previous lives. Is there, then, a second type of coefficient qualifying *samskara*? Or is a personal affinity vector somehow contained within *adrishta*? Or are, for example, such ideas as the soul mate or



{ 106 } karasse merely wishful thinking, maintained by desire for close affinities to endure beyond death? The evidence for reincarnation is not strong enough to support a very determinate theory and certainly not to support all the popular images.<sup>51</sup>

Second, it is commonly claimed that karma “ripens” according to law; in other words, that *adrishta*, though its consequences are remote, works just at certain times. Temporal factors do seem to be evident in those (evidentially key) instances of people reporting memory of events in previous births. As documented by Ian Stevenson, children of five tend to remember incidents in the life of a previous person when he or she was five, and the same for children of seven, ten, twelve, and so on, years of age, to include, one would suppose, adult rememberings.<sup>52</sup> The law here might be that an act of type A in circumstances C is made probable by karma of type A created in the past, and some sets of circumstances are more probable at certain ages.

The ripening idea also connects with the widely held Yogic theory that one is presented opportunities to change course in life (and to practice yoga) only at specific times. Popularly the idea is expressed in such stories as that in every incarnation, at the age of thirty Devadatta has to overcome a temptation to murder or at age forty meets his guru. Similarly, Siddhartha of our age, says the Pali canon, throws his begging bowl out into the current of the river, where it clinks against the side of the begging bowl thrown by the buddha of the previous epoch, which in turn clinks, gently, the side of a still previous buddha’s bowl resting on the bottom.<sup>53</sup> But some popular lore also has it that karmic payback works more rapidly the more developed the individual. We are lucky if we suffer for our sins in the near term, so the idea goes. The image is of bad karma as like a festering sore.

Third, a certain kind of action is said to block, or at least blunt, the retributive force of karma, including acts of atonement (*prayash-chitta*) and auspiciousness (*mangala*, such as chanting *om*).<sup>54</sup> On the *Gita*’s version of the thesis, action in tune with the dharmic (righteous) forces of the universe—or with the action of Brahman itself in the grand sacrifice that maintains the universe—transcends the moral/amoral distinction (“Though acting, the person who sees himself in all beings is not stained [by karma],” *Gita* 5.7, and “He who, depositing actions in [the fire of] Brahman, giving up attachment, acts [in the world], sin does not cling to, like water on a lotus leaf,” *Gita* 5.10). Such action creates no *adrishta*, or even wipes out karmic influence altogether. In the *Yoga Sutra*’s conception, a certain kind of meditation creates *samskara* that self-destruct, leaving no karmic residue (YS 1.50, 3.9–10). The Buddhist view is that

karma operates within samsaric consciousness. Once nirvana is attained { 107 } and one becomes a high-level bodhisattva, one is incapable of acting in a karma-generating way that would lead back into the unenlightened state. Moreover, claims about certain actions lying outside karmic law occur throughout the perfectionist tradition that emphasizes self-development and the attainment of *siddhis*. Finally, in tantra broadly the yogic soul-making idea is tempered with an inevitable “attraction of the future,” to wit, further “manifestation,” the ongoing creation of Shakti or Shri.<sup>55</sup> Thus would we be destined to become greater beings than we are now. Therefore, we have to be able to be creative, to make new patterns not bound by karma.

In all these different views, individual will, though itself creating *adrishta* normally, can somehow by force of right effort (or by God’s grace provoked by right effort) overcome the influence of *adrishta*, past and present and therefore future. Yoga philosophy is not determinist. In chapter 1, we saw that Yoga denies causal closure in the physical realm. In my judgment, almost all previous Yoga philosophy has it that consciousness and its powers also transcend karma, or can.

Fortunately, in the concept of the bundle of causal conditions sufficient for an effect, *samagri*, classical theorists found a notion well suited to the complexity of karmic consequence. That an event shows karmic justice amounts to the claim that unseen moral force, *adrishta*, counts as a single causal factor bundled into a *samagri*, that is to say, a single factor among many, the bundle being technically what brings about whatever happens.<sup>56</sup> Karmic influence on any particular event may or may not be very great. Yoga has traditionally tended to the view that except in the special circumstances of yogic practice, karmic justice always has at least some small influence.

There are several different psychological versions of karmic justice among classical theorists. Buddhists tend to view karmic justice as tied to the type of contamination of one’s perspective that blocks enlightenment. Thus is avoided the need for a divine arbiter of a soul’s fate, a referee who determines which souls get the better births the next go-round and which will be born in squalor. Such a naturalistic theory is present in Samkhya and the *Yoga Sutra* and even in some theistic Vedanta, although there is also non-naturalism in some Buddhist schools as well as in more mainstream theistic Vedanta.<sup>57</sup> The differences need not further detain us.

Finally, let us turn to theistic treatments and in particular to ideas explaining how God is not the author of evil. The *Brahma Sutra* of Vedanta has a long section on the problem of theodicy, and the elaboration by the

{ 108 } oldest commentator, Shankara, makes plain a mainstream position.<sup>58</sup> Although Shankara is an Advaitin, he takes seriously the theistic teachings of the Upanishads and the *Gita* as meditational aids. Scripture says that Brahman is the source of the world, so since Brahman is unsullied value and bliss, whence evil? How could evil have its source in what is inherently its opposite?

Shankara's explanation is complex, and only the second part is taken over by the more genuine theists. That part, however, remains the centralmost plank on God and evil within the long history of theistic Vedanta. The first part relies on the distinction between Brahman as "without" and "with" "qualities" (or "attributes"), *nirguna* contrasting with *saguna brahman*. According to Shankara, Brahman without qualities is supremely real. Brahman with qualities is talked about in scripture as an aid to meditation. Scripture is like a patient teacher (*guru*), and it is difficult to appreciate that Brahman as supremely real has no qualities. Scripture talks about God, i.e., Brahman with qualities, as preparation to the austere truth—which is that nothing but Brahman without qualities is really real. God too is part of a cosmic illusion due to spiritual ignorance.

Brahman with qualities is God, the Lord and Creator. How then could the Lord, who is perfect—much as in the Western conception—allow evil in the world? Shankara asks this question and moves to the second part of his theodicy, the part that is shared. Here karma as affecting rebirth is the absolutely hinge notion, and the theodicy is a *samskara* version—the Eastern version, we may say, a direct parallel—of the free-will theodicy prominent in Christian philosophy. For not only are we responsible for our karma in making our future births; the Lord is just in arranging the universe so that it embodies principles of karmic justice. Rebirth is fair.

The work of the first part of Shankara's two-part defense is done, in the theistic views, mainly by a sense of gratefulness, it seems to me. God creates many worlds much better than this. But in those worlds I do not exist. Our world is definitely not the best of all possible worlds, but it is a world where I exist. So I am grateful that God in her infinity suffers it.

Alternatively, there is the supposition, which is quite widespread (appearing in Buddhism as well as Shankara's Vedanta), that there is no first creation, that the transmigratory round or universe is beginningless (*anadi-samsara*). Shankara in responding to the objection that at the beginning of the universe there was no good or bad karma denies explicitly that nescience (*avidya*) has a beginning.<sup>59</sup>

Habits, which we have ourselves made and for which we are responsible, the fundamental dispositions of the soul, carry over into and determine the course of a soul's next incarnation. The Lord guides the workings of *adrishta*; unseen force is not blind, according to the theists.<sup>60</sup>

If in this way beyond virtue and vice being their own reward, there is justly payback for bad acts—i.e., beyond the badness of bad habits—and pleasure and happiness for good karma, then God's universe could well be just, at least in the sense required to defend the thesis that God is good and worthy of worship. Thus some of what we see as natural evil would be payback, for which, then, the Lord should not be blamed.<sup>61</sup> And of course some evil, such as pain, has a biological or other instrumental function, without which our world would not be possible. And so the Eastern version of free-will theodicy, coupled with instrumentality considerations, is quite compelling, it seems to me.

In the view of the *bhakti yoga* practitioner, suffering is an opportunity to pay off bad karma. We should be grateful and not generate further bad karma by whining and complaining. Far from disproving the existence of God, suffering is a manifestation of God's love and concern for our welfare. Better to pay off bad karma now than to let it fester, let it blindside us later or in another life. Who cares about it really anyway, since essentially life is delight?

With Shankara the deep question is: Why is there nescience, *avidya*, spiritual ignorance? If Brahman is the supreme reality, our own true self, why is it we are unenlightened? Advaita has no answer to this, it seems. Theistic views struggle with a similar problem: Why, given the possibility of living enlightenment such as Krishna's, are we not all enlightened? The answer, again, is karma. We somehow deserve not to be enlightened. But why does God let us get into such straits? The best answer seems to be that otherwise we would not be who we are and there would not be the opportunities we have for development. Like everything finite, from the gods and goddesses down to a pebble, we have our day in the sun. Gratefulness is the appropriate attitude.

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KARMA

by

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## **Chapter 2: Karma in and after Greater Magadha**

The region east of the Vedic homeland, i.e. east of the confluence of the Ganges and the Jumna, in the eastern Ganges plane, may conveniently be called Greater Magadha, in view of the fact that one of its most important constitutive regions was called Magadha. It saw the appearance of a number of religious currents during the centuries around the middle of the first millennium B.C.E. We will consider — after some introductory remarks about Greater Magadha — Jainism, Ajivikism, those who saw in knowledge of the self the key to the highest goal, and Buddhism.

Magadha was the name of a kingdom in the eastern Ganges valley. In the fourth century B.C.E. it became the center of an empire that at its height unified most of the Indian subcontinent, but Magadha and its surrounding regions — jointly to be referred to as Greater Magadha — was characterized by an own culture already before the creation of this empire and for some time after its collapse. It was in this area that urbanization took off again from ca. 500 B.C.E. onward (after the disappearance of the so-called Indus civilization more than a thousand years earlier).

The culture of Greater Magadha was in many respects different from Vedic culture, whose heartland was situated to its west. The two cultures could not but come in close contact, especially when the rulers of Magadha expanded their kingdom and included the Vedic heartland and much else into their empire (which reached its greatest extent under the Maurya emperor Ashoka). The resulting confrontation and sometimes assimilation of the two cultures constitutes the background against which much of the subsequent history of Indian culture has to be understood.

One of the most distinctive features of the culture of Greater Magadha was the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution. This explains why the religious movements that were based on this belief originated here. The most well-known of these religious movements are Jainism, Buddhism and Ajivikism. The way in which this belief came to be adopted in Brahmanism, in spite of resistance that took many centuries to dissipate, will be explained in a later chapter. Note here that this belief came to be thought of in the Brahmanical tradition (and in modern scholarship until recently) as an inherent and inseparable part of it.

The cyclic vision of time — in which creations and destructions of the universe succeed each other in a beginningless and endless sequence — is another notion that originally belonged to Greater Magadha, only to be subsequently adopted and claimed as its own by Brahmanism. This vision is to be distinguished from the belief in a beginningless and endless sequence of births and deaths of sentient beings, but the parallelism between the two is easy to see.

Funerary practices, too, opposed the culture of Greater Magadha to Vedic culture. The inhabitants of Greater Magadha built round funerary tombs for their dead; it is possible that dead bodies were placed in those tombs, without prior incineration, but this is not certain. The custom survives in the stupas of the Buddhists and Jainas, and in the so-called *samadhīs* (funerary constructions) built for certain Hindu saints until today. Brahmanism absorbed in due time the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution (see below), but never accepted the funerary practices of its eastern neighbors, except in the exceptional case of certain Hindu saints.

There are good reasons to assume that Ayurveda, the classical form of Indian medicine, had its roots in the culture of Greater Magadha. Unlike the Vedic medical tradition, which heavily relied on sorcery, spells and amulets, the medical tradition prevalent in Greater Magadha prepared and used drugs, often in ointments and plasters. What is more, the idea of restoring the balance of bodily fluids, central to classical Ayurveda, also appears to derive from the culture of Greater Magadha. As in the case of other cultural features (think of rebirth and karmic retribution), the medical tradition of Greater Magadha found its way into Brahmanical medicine, and lived on as part of Ayurveda, whose very name (note the part *-veda*) bears testimony to the unjustified Brahmanical claim that this tradition was originally theirs.

The influence of Greater Magadha on the subsequent cultural and religious history of South Asia is hard to overestimate, and may include many more features than the ones here enumerated. Unfortunately this culture left us virtually no textual sources apart from the Buddhist and Jaina canons, so that it is extremely hard to find out more about it. Its major historical position was overshadowed in later centuries by the unprecedentedly successful spread of Brahmanism, to be discussed below. Here as elsewhere, Brahmanism reinterpreted past events, and even spread the idea that the creation of the



Maurya empire (which had been a disaster for Brahmanism) was due to a Brahmanical advisor to its first emperor.

## **Jainism**

One of the religious currents to appear in Greater Magadha in the middle of the first millennium B.C.E. is Jainism, and it is the one most apt to enlighten us on the problem of rebirth and karmic retribution as it was conceived of in that region at that time. The reason is that it offered a solution that fits the problem like a glove. By studying its solution we find out how exactly the problem was thought of.

The solution offered in the earliest Jaina texts (and confirmed in other early sources) is asceticism. Not just any kind of asceticism. Liberation was thought to be the end result of a long period of ascetic exertions, which culminated in the total immobilization of the ascetic. This immobilization concerned the body, but also the mind. This immobilization went as far as it could possibly go, eventually including the suppression of activities such as breathing, and inevitably resulted in physical death. Indeed, liberation was thought to occur at the moment of death, provided that all other conditions had been fulfilled.

We will return to those other conditions in a minute, but will first consider what link there could possibly be between immobility asceticism and the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution. This link can easily be discerned. Karmic retribution means that *my* future is determined by what *I* do. Deeds are central to this believe, and the Sanskrit word *karma* does indeed primarily mean *deed*, *activity*. If deeds lead to rebirth, and I don't want to be reborn, the obvious remedy is, of course, to abstain from all activity. This is what the early Jainas did.

Probably the earliest surviving detailed description of the road leading to liberation in the Jaina texts occurs in the so-called *Acaranga Sutra*. I will not present it here, for it is long and difficult. The main points are however clear. The ascetic who decides that he is ready for it takes up a position — lying, sitting or standing —, abstains from all food and faces death with complete indifference. He

starves to death in a state of total restraint with regard to all activity and movement. It is the culmination of a life of training and preparation.

#### BOX: JAINISM AND ITS CANON

The founder of Jainism as we know it, Mahavira, was a contemporary of the Buddha and must have lived, like the latter, in the fifth century B.C.E. Buddhist sources indicate that he died before the Buddha. It appears that the two teachers were aware of each other's existence, but never met.

Jaina tradition is no doubt correct in its claim that Jainism split up at an early date. The consequences of this split are visible today: Jainism survives in two divisions that disagree with each other on a number of points of theory and practice. One of these differences concerns the dress requirements of monks. This difference has given the two divisions their names: The monks of the Shvetambaras ("dressed in white") wear white clothes, those of the Digambaras ("dressed in space") wear no clothes whatsoever.

A further difference concerns the survival of the earliest texts, believed to include (among other things) Mahavira's words. According to the Digambaras, these earliest texts have not survived; according to the Shvetambaras, they have, though incompletely. But even the Shvetambaras admit that these early texts, or what remained of them, were not committed to writing until the fifth century C.E. Until that time they had presumably been preserved orally.

Theoretically the Shvetambara canon consists of three parts: I. The Purvas ("old texts"); II. The Angas ("limbs"); III. The Angabahya ("subsidiary canon"). The Shvetambaras themselves consider that part I is entirely lost, and that the same is true of portions of part II. Linguistic and other criteria justify the belief that some of the surviving texts in the canon (among them: the *Acaranga* and the *Uttaradhyayana*) are considerably older than others.

For the modern scholar it is clear that many of the texts included in the Shvetambara canon belong to a period not far removed from the date at which these text were written down. Only some of these texts (such as the *Acaranga* and the *Uttaradhyayana*) may go back to a period closer to the time

of Mahavira. Other texts, most notably the *Thananga* and the *Samavayanga*, present topics in numerical sequence; they are based on, and give expression to, lists of topics that were considered important and that had been arranged in accordance with the number of items they contained. This is an interesting feature of the Jaina canon, for the Buddhist canon contains similar texts, which came to exert a profound influence on the development of Buddhist thought (see “The Buddhist canon”, below).

The unreliability of a large part of the Jaina canon (at least as far as information about the earliest period is concerned) is no doubt due to the lack of a strictly organized mnemonic tradition. In this respect Jainism differed a lot from Brahmanism, where the mnemonic tradition was strong and implied intensive training from a young age onward. Buddhism, too, with the institution of a well regulated monastic tradition, succeeded much better in preserving its ancient texts.

The emphasis on restraint of activity and movement is not surprising. We read repeatedly in the *Acaranga* that suffering is the result of activity: “he knows that all this suffering is born from activity”; “no action is found in him who has abandoned activity, the condition for rebirth originates on account of activity”.

The most obvious remedy against such a situation is abstention from activity: “Free from activity he knows and sees, he does not long for anything because of his insight”; “He is wise and awakened who has ceased from activity. ... Looking at those among the mortals in this world who are free from activity, having seen the result connected with activity, he who really knows turns away from activity”; etc.

All this gives us a clear and intelligible picture of the way to liberation in early Jainism. Activity being the source of all unhappiness, the monk tries to stop it in a most radical manner. The monk abstains from food and prepares for death in a position which is as motionless as possible.

The picture presented so far contains yet a serious flaw, and the early Jainas were aware of it. Given their beliefs, it cannot be denied that the abstention from all activity does not produce karmic consequences. However, before abstaining from all deeds, even the most committed Jaina ascetic has been active in the world, in his present life, and even more so in the innumerable lives that he has lived

before. All those earlier deeds will be clamoring for retribution, and the short time which our ascetic spends motionlessly will not change this. As a result, even the most extreme form of asceticism cannot lead to the desired end. The crucial question the Jaina practitioners were confronted with is how to disencumber themselves from the traces of their earlier deeds.

They had an answer. Immobility asceticism is not agreeable. Remaining in a standing position for days on end, preferably in the heat of the sun, abstaining from food and drink, not protecting one's body from stinging insects and other vermin that will prey upon the ascetic, all this creates great suffering. The Jainas looked upon this suffering, not as an inevitable byproduct of the chosen method, but as an essential part of it. This suffering, they claimed, destroys the traces of earlier deeds.

Already the *Uttaradhyayana*, another early Jaina text, gives expression to this double role of asceticism. We read here, for example: "What does the soul produce by renouncing activity? By renouncing activity it produces a state without activity. By being without activity the soul does not bind new karma and destroys the karma that was bound before".

Note that this passage, along with many others, explicitly attributes a double function to immobility asceticism. On the one hand, the ascetic, for the very reason that he (or more exceptionally, she) does not do anything, does nothing that could bring about karmic retribution. On the other, he burns the traces of earlier deeds. Asceticism, if judiciously practiced, may in this way culminate in a moment (the moment of bodily death of the ascetic) in which no karmic traces are left that might be the occasion for a new life. The ascetic, in this case, will not be reborn.

Interestingly, the early Buddhist texts, where they criticize the Jainas, attribute to them this same conviction of the double function of asceticism. The following passage, which presents the Buddha as being in conversation with a person named Mahanama, is of particular interest:

At one time, Mahanama, I resided ... on the mountain Gijjhakuta. At that time there were many Jainas on the black rock on the slope of the mountain Isigili, standing erect, refusing to sit down, and they experienced painful, sharp, severe sensations which were due to self-inflicted torture. Then, Mahanama, having arisen in the evening from my retirement, I went to ... where those Jainas were; having gone there I said to those Jainas: 'Why, dear Jainas, are



you standing erect, refusing to sit down, and do you experience painful, sharp, severe sensations which are due to self-inflicted torture?’ When this was said, Mahanama, those Jainas said to me: ‘Friend, the Jaina Nathaputta, who knows all and sees all, claims complete knowledge and insight saying: “Always and continuously knowledge and insight are present to me, whether I walk, stand still, sleep or be awake.” He (i.e., Nathaputta) says: “Formerly, Jainas, you performed sinful activities; you must exhaust that sinful activity by means of this severe and difficult practice. Being here and now restrained in body, speech and mind, amounts to not performing sinful activity in the future. Thus, as a result of the annihilation of former actions by asceticism, and of the non-performing of new actions, there is no further effect in the future; as a result of no further effect in the future there is destruction of actions; as a result of the destruction of actions there is destruction of suffering; as a result of the destruction of suffering there is destruction of sensation; as a result of the destruction of sensation all suffering will be exhausted.” And this word of Nathaputta pleases us and is approved of by us, and therefore we are delighted. ... Happiness, dear Gotama, should not be reached through happiness, happiness should be reached through hardship.’

The person called Nathaputta in this passage is the same as Mahavira, held to be the last omniscient saint of the Jainas. The Jainas, we learn from this passage, were “standing erect, refusing to sit down”, and we are given to understand that they did so for the purpose of ‘the non-performing of new actions’ and ‘the annihilation of former actions by asceticism’.

It will now be clear that serious Jaina ascetics should take care not to die too soon. If they died before they had experienced the required amount of suffering, traces of earlier deeds would remain, and they would be reborn. This explains why all conditions must be fulfilled before Jaina ascetics can decide that they are now ready for liberation, by means of a self-inflicted death induced by lack of food and exhaustion.

This, then, is the method proposed in the early Jaina sources. What does it teach us about the notion of rebirth and karmic retribution?

The answer is straightforward: The Jaina method is based upon the assumption that all activity — including involuntary activity, such as breathing — has karmic consequences, and binds a person to the cycle of rebirths. All activity, it may be recalled, includes *good* deeds. Good deeds may secure a good rebirth. They get us no closer to the highest aim: liberation from rebirth. Morality has no role to play on the highest steps of the ladder to liberation in early Jainism.

The activity from which committed Jaina ascetics try to free themselves was not only bodily activity. Breathing, a bodily activity that is particularly difficult to stop, is part of it. But mental activity, too, should be stopped. The accomplished Jaina ascetic does not only physically resemble some kind of statue in the landscape. Their mind, too, has come to a complete standstill. It has to be like this, for also thoughts and feelings have karmic consequences.

### **Ajivikism**

Ajivikism is a vanished Indian religion, in the sense that it has no followers any longer. It arose roughly at the time of Jainism and Buddhism, in the same region, and survived for some two thousand years before it disappeared without leaving any literature of its own. There are reasons to think that it was quite popular in its early days (the great Emperor Ashoka gave them a cave with an inscription to that effect in the third century B.C.E.), and also that it was close to Jainism. A close inspection of the sources of information about this religion that have survived confirm that it was indeed close to Jainism. Its ideas about rebirth and karmic retribution, in particular, differ only in one important respect from those of the early Jainas.

Remember that advanced Jaina practitioners pursued a double goal: (i) abstaining from all bodily and mental activity by means of immobilization asceticism; (ii) destroying the traces of deeds performed in the past by means of the suffering brought about by that same immobility asceticism. Asceticism played in this manner a double role.

The Ajivikas agreed with the Jainas on all essential points but one. They, too, were of the opinion that all deeds, whether physical or mental, had consequences, usually in a future life. They

also drew the conclusion that the only means not to create now the seeds for future lives was the abstention from all activity. They did not however accept that the suffering that necessarily accompanies such a radical immobilization destroys the traces of deeds performed in the past.

Their dilemma is manifest. How could they liberate themselves from the cycle of rebirths and karmic retribution if there was no way to destroy the traces of earlier deeds? The answer is simple: they could not. Liberation could not be forced. Traces of earlier deeds could not be suppressed. They would only go away once they had brought about their natural, karmic, consequences. But by the time they had done so, new acts would have been committed, which would leave traces of their own that would not go away until they too had brought about their karmic consequences. And so it would go on, birth after birth over endless periods of time.

The one, and relatively small, theoretical difference which we brought to light between Jainism and Ajivikism resulted thus in a major difference in practice. Jainism taught that there was a way to put an end to the cycle of rebirths, Ajivikism had to concede that there wasn't. For Ajivikism every individual would go on being born and reborn according to a fixed pattern from which there was no escape. The belief of the ordinary Ajivikas therefore amounted to a strict determinism or even fatalism, which left them no way to reach the highest goal: freedom from rebirth.

Our information about the Ajivikas is admittedly lacunary, primarily because no Ajivika texts have been preserved. There is however an enigmatic passage about Ajivika doctrine preserved in the Buddhist canon and confirmed in its essentials by information contained in the Jaina canon. This passage reads as follows in the paraphrase of A. L. Basham:

There is neither cause nor basis for the sins of living beings; they become sinful without cause or basis. Neither is there cause or basis for the purity of living beings; they become pure without cause or basis. There is no deed performed either by oneself or by others, no human action, no strength, no courage, no human endurance or human prowess. All beings, all that have breath, all that are born, all that have life, are without power, strength, or virtue, but are developed by destiny, chance, and nature, and experience joy and sorrow in the six classes of existence. There are 1,400,000 chief uterine births ... and 8,400,000 great world periods

(*kalpa*) through which fool and wise alike will take their course, and make an end of sorrow.

There is no question of bringing unripe karma to fruition, nor of exhausting karma already ripened, by virtuous conduct, by vows, by penance, or by chastity. That cannot be done. The cycle of rebirths (*samsara*) is measured as with a bushel, with its joy and sorrow and its appointed end. It can neither be lessened nor increased, nor is there any excess or deficiency of it. Just as a ball of thread will, when thrown, unwind to its full length, so fool and wise alike will take their course, and make an end of sorrow.

The passage contains parts that are difficult to understand, some of which have been omitted here.

However, the central point of Ajivikism is clearly expressed: there is no such thing as discarding past karma by any other means than experiencing its consequences.

However, even the dark clouds of Ajivikism had a silver lining. The cycle of rebirths, they believed, was not endless. It covered a long time, to be sure; 8,400,000 kalpas is a long time indeed. Given that each kalpa covers many millions of years, it is easy to see that the full number of years in a complete “life-cycle” is astronomical. (A duration of 4’320 million years is sometimes advanced for a kalpa; 8,400,000 kalpas will in that case correspond to more than thirty five quadrillion ( $35 \times 10^{15}$ ) years, far longer than the modern astronomical estimate of the age of the universe with its “mere” 13.7 billion ( $13.7 \times 10^9$ ) years.) But yet, there is going to be an end. Those who have come to the end, how will they behave? The answer, after what we have learned from Jainism, is obvious. Such people will practice immobility asceticism. They do so, in this case, not *in order to* reach liberation, but *because* they are about to attain liberation. The distinction is subtle, but not unknown in other religions: Calvinists claimed that they lived virtuous lives not in order to be saved, but because they had been predestined to be saved.

Ajivikism was preached by people who lived ascetic lives because they were sure that they had come to the end of their time. They succeeded in converting people to their views, but most of those converts, naturally, did not become ascetics themselves, but limited themselves to accepting a strictly deterministic world view. It is possible that such a world view suited them well in a world which increasingly emphasized the fixed position that each individual occupied, and had to occupy, in



society, as we will see below. We do not know for sure, and we never will, for no texts belonging to this religion have survived. We will see, however, that other sources (including the *Mahabharata*, a famous Sanskrit epic dating from the last centuries preceding the Common Era) are acquainted with forms of fatalism, which they do not however associate with the name Ajivikism.

Before we leave Ajivikism, it will be useful to have a closer look at the fatalism it preaches. For the doctrine to make sense, it must be assumed that previous deeds determine the present completely or almost completely. Most in particular, previous deeds determine our present deeds, which in their turn determine our fate in a next life. There is no possibility of escape, because we are in no position to resist our karmic pressure from the past. Only in this way can it be maintained that the full series of births and rebirths is determined from the beginning, and that the number and nature of life-forms everyone has to pass through is fixed.

There is of course no logical necessity to the belief that earlier deeds determine every last detail of subsequent lives, even if we accept that they do play a major role in this process. It is easy to imagine a situation in which a person, though under great karmic pressure, decides to resist this pressure and act in accordance with his or her own judgment. Many religious thinkers of India did indeed take this position, leaving to individuals at least some freedom to act in ways that were not completely predetermined by their earlier deeds. However, the deterministic current remained strong, too, and finds variously expression in the early texts. We will come across an example in our discussion of the *Bhagavadgita*, below.

### **Knowledge of the self**

The clear and straightforward understanding of the nature of karma which we find in early Jainism was not confined to that religion. Exactly the same notion, and therefore the same problem, was associated with a different solution. To understand this other solution, we have to think, here too, of karmic retribution as concerning all forms of activity, bodily as well as mental. And in the case of this other solution, too, moral considerations play no central role.

Consider the following disagreement someone might have with the early Jainas: You, Jainas, have correctly understood that your deeds — all deeds, whatever their nature — are responsible for your future lives. To avoid rebirth, you have decided to desist from all forms of activity. But what you do, is forcing your body and your mind to stop acting. In so doing, you identify with your body and your mind. You appear to think that what your body and your mind do is what *you* do. But how can you be so sure that you are your body and your mind?

The critic who formulated these questions did, as a matter of fact, have ideas of his own as to his real nature. Far from looking upon himself as being identical with his body and his mind, he was convinced that his real self was different from both. This real self, aside from being different from body and mind, never acts. And being inactive by its very nature, it is not affected by the deeds carried out by body and mind. These deeds of body and mind continue the cycle of rebirth and karmic retribution, to be sure. But that is due to the fact that the person concerned is ignorant about his true nature. Knowledge of the inherently inactive nature of the real self, once acquired, changes the situation. Once fully realized, it frees the person from the consequences of deeds which he has in reality never carried out.

It should be noted that the entity here referred to as ‘self’ is altogether different from what this word may refer to in different cultures. Indeed, one of the Indian terms used to designate it (though not the only one) is *atman*. Like *self* in English, *atman* is (or can be used as) a reflexive pronoun, as in “He gave himself a holiday”. This is the reason for the choice of ‘self’ in this context, this in spite of the fact that the English ‘self’ is probably never thought of as an inactive entity. Some translators prefer other words, such as ‘soul’, but this seems to me even more prone to misunderstandings. Whatever the translation chosen, it is vital to remember that it refers to a notion altogether different from any notion current in the modern western world. (Something remotely similar was found in Christian Gnosticism, see the conclusion at the end of this book.)

Knowledge of the true nature of the self becomes an oft recurring theme in Indian religious thought. This self was thought of in various ways: some thought it was pure consciousness, others added bliss, others again took both away and stated that the true self was as unconscious as a stone. But all agreed on one thing: the true self never acts. And this was crucial, because this feature of the

self turned knowledge of the self into a prerequisite for liberation from the cycle of rebirth and karmic retribution.

Are we entitled to suspect that this particular concept of the self was invented to suit the purposes of those who wished to escape from the effects of karma, but were not ready to engage in the extreme forms of asceticism practiced by the Jainas? It is true that we find this concept of the self in India almost exclusively in connection with the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution. However, very similar concepts of the self occur in religions elsewhere in the world, in contexts where the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution is not found. This is not the place for a survey of those comparable concepts in other religions. Their very existence should warn us against drawing too rapid, and too glib, conclusions. It seems highly unlikely that the notion of an inactive self was invented by spiritual seekers who wanted to avoid the hardships of immobility asceticism. The opposite view — that the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution was invented by people who thought that their real self was inactive by nature — is not justified either. Beliefs like these are not “invented” by clever schemers who calculate their advantage. In spite of this, a case could be made that the different notions involved — karmic retribution, an inactive self, immobilization as spiritual practice — belong together, and have always belonged together. This does not help us much in finding out how the notion of karma with all that implies came about in India, but it does arm us against simplistic theories that treat beliefs like this as isolated elements that could be transferred from one culture to another the way commercial objects can be traded. (Further reflections about the coexistence of these notions will be found at the very end of this book.)

The notion of an inactive self became extremely popular in India. Most of the Brahmanical philosophies adopted it, and their ontologies may be looked upon as theoretical constructs built around this notion. More will be said about this in a later chapter. Here we must first turn to another religious current that originated in the region in which Jainism arose, and see how it came to terms with the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution.

## Buddhism

Ajivikism could only be understood against the background of Jainism. In order to understand Buddhism, we need to know about both Jainism and the currents that emphasized the role of knowledge of the self for gaining liberation.

Early Buddhism rejected both. It rejected immobility asceticism as a method to attain liberation, and it rejected knowledge of the true nature of the self as such a means. It could reject both, because it accepted a different notion of karma, i.e., of karmic retribution.

In early Buddhism, the cause of rebirth is not deeds, but desire; indeed, the word karma and its cognates are not prominently used in its texts in this particular sense. Buddhist teaching is often presented in a nutshell in the form of the Four Noble Truths: the noble truth of suffering, the noble truth of the origin of suffering, the noble truth of the cessation of suffering, and the noble truth of the path which leads to the cessation of suffering. These Four Noble Truths are explained as follows:

This is the noble truth of *suffering*: Birth is suffering, old age is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suffering, to be united with the unloved is suffering, to be separated from the loved is suffering, not to obtain what one desires is suffering, in short the five-fold clinging to the earthly is suffering.

This is the noble truth of the *origin of suffering*: it is the thirst for being which leads from birth to birth, together with lust and desire, which finds gratification here and there: the thirst for pleasures, the thirst for being, the thirst for non-existence.

This is the noble truth of the *cessation of suffering*: the cessation of this thirst by the complete annihilation of desire, letting it go, expelling it, separating oneself from it, giving it no room.

This is the noble truth of the *path which leads to the cessation of suffering*: it is this Noble Eightfold Path, to wit: Right Faith, Right Resolve, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Living, Right Effort, Right Thought, Right Concentration.



It is clear from this passage that Buddhism psychologized the notion of karmic retribution. Indeed, the *Dhammapada* (1.1-2), an early Buddhist text, puts it like this:

All things are led by thought, are controlled by thought, are made up by thought. If one speaks or acts with malevolent thought, then suffering follows one, just as the wheel follows the foot of an ox.

All things are led by thought, are controlled by thought, are made up by thought. If one speaks or acts with benevolent thought, then happiness follows one, just as a shadow does not leave.

Occasionally karma is also identified with intention.

#### BOX: THE BUDDHIST CANON

Apart from Vedic literature, the Buddhist canon has preserved some of the earliest texts of South Asia. The Buddhist tradition ascribes many of these texts, though not all of them, to the Buddha himself, but this claim has to be treated with caution, for it is clear that the Buddhist canon had grown for a long time before it reached the more or less fixed character in which we now know it.

The Buddhist canon is known by the name Tripitaka, this because it consists of three (*tri*) baskets (*pitaka*). One of these three baskets, the *Vinaya-pitaka*, deals with monastic discipline (*vinaya*) and is supposed to contain the rules pronounced by the Buddha. The second basket, the *Sutra-pitaka*, contains the discourses (*sutra*) believed to have been uttered by the Buddha or occasionally one of his disciples. The third basket, finally, is called *Abhidharma-pitaka* because it deals with Abhidharma, a form of Buddhist scholasticism that belongs to a more recent period. Only the second basket, the *Sutra-pitaka*, provides us with material regarding the teachings of early Buddhism.

Already the *Sutra-pitaka* manifests — in its internal arrangement, and in the contents of certain sutras — the tendency to create lists of items that were considered important in Buddhist teaching. These lists subsequently became the basis for the scholastic developments that find

expression in the *Abhidharma-pitaka*, and for the creation of Buddhist systematic philosophy (see “Buddhist scholasticism and the beginning of Indian philosophy”, below).

The date of the Buddha is not precisely known, but much recent research justifies the conclusion that he may have died around 400 B.C.E., give or take a few decades in either direction. The Buddhist canon, on the other hand, did not reach its final form until many centuries later, and additions and modification may still have been made during the early centuries C.E. A first written version was produced in Sri Lanka during the first century B.C.E.

The early Buddhists preserved their texts, orally, in the languages of the regions in which they lived. Buddhists in different parts of the subcontinents therefore preserved their texts in different languages. The Buddhists of Sri Lanka, for example, preserved their texts in a language that in recent centuries came to be known as Pali, but which they thought was Magadhi, the language of Magadha, the region where the Buddha had preached. Scholars have been able to show that Pali was really a language of western India (and therefore not from Magadha, which lies in the east), this no doubt because Sri Lanka received Buddhism from western India. The Tripitaka in Pali has been preserved in its entirety.

The Buddhists of the subcontinent adopted, from the first or second century C.E. onward, Sanskrit as language, and translated their sacred texts into this language. This explains that bits and pieces of the early Buddhist texts have also survived in Sanskrit. Since Buddhism disappeared from the Indian subcontinent soon after the year 1000 C.E., very few of its scriptures have survived there. However, the spread of Buddhism into China from the early centuries C.E. onward had as consequence that numerous early Buddhist texts were translated into Chinese. Texts belonging to the properly Indian schools of Buddhism have therefore survived in that language.

The Buddhists, then, believed that rebirth could be prevented, not by the destruction of all deeds, but by the destruction of the roots of all desire. Destroying the roots of desire is different from stopping activity. The Buddhist method was therefore altogether different from the Jaina one. Rather than practicing immobility asceticism, Buddhists in search of liberation would try to bring about psychological changes in themselves by means of exercises designed to help them in this endeavor.

Given this different notion of karmic retribution, knowledge of the true nature of the self as inactive does not help much either. Passages in the ancient discourses express themselves to that extent. Their formulation is unfortunately such that many later Buddhists, as well as a number of modern scholars, have misunderstood them, thinking that these passages deny the existence of the self rather than its role in gaining liberation.

In an important and frequently recurring passage the Buddha is presented as contrasting the constituent part of a human person as conceived of by him with the notion of a self. These constituent parts are the five aggregates: (i) the body (*rūpa*); (ii) the sensations (*vedana*); (iii) the ideations (*sañña*); (iv) the conditioned factors (*samskāra*); and (v) consciousness (*viññāna*). The Buddha said the following about them:

“The body (*rūpa*) is not the self. For if the body were the self, the body would not give rise to affliction, and one should be able to say: ‘Let my body be thus and so; let my body not be thus and so.’ But because the body is not the self, the body gives rise to affliction, and one cannot say: ‘Let my body be thus and so; let my body not be thus and so.’

The sensations (*vedana*) are not the self ... Ideations (*sañña*) are not the self ... The conditioned factors (*samskāra*) are not the self ... Consciousness (*viññāna*) is not the self. For if consciousness were the self, consciousness would not give rise to affliction, and one should be able to say: ‘Let consciousness be thus and so, let consciousness not be thus and so.’ But because consciousness is not the self, consciousness gives rise to affliction, and one cannot say: ‘Let consciousness be thus and so, let consciousness not be thus and so.’

“What do you think, monks, is the body permanent or impermanent?”

“Impermanent, sir.”

“Is that which is impermanent suffering or happiness?”

“Suffering, sir.”

“Is that which is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this is I, this is my self?’”

“No, sir.”

“Are sensations permanent or impermanent? ... Are ideations permanent or impermanent? ... Are the conditioned factors permanent or impermanent? ... Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?”

“Impermanent, sir.”

“Is that which is impermanent suffering or happiness?”

“Suffering, sir.”

“Is that which is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this is I, this is my self?’

“No, sir.”

“Therefore, monks, the body, the sensations, the ideations, the conditioned factors, consciousness should be seen for what they really are: ‘This is not mine, this is not I, this is not my self.’”

This passage reveals a clear notion of the self: it is permanent, bliss, not subject to change. This notion shares the features of permanence and unchangeability with the self conceived of by those who think that knowledge of that self is crucial for attaining liberation. (Indeed, some add bliss to this list of characteristics of the self.) The Buddhist texts know the notion, but do not consider knowledge of such a self important. The above passage does not state that a self of that nature does or does not exist, and the same is true of other canonical passages. The existence of such a self is passed over in silence, but the soteriological significance of knowing such a self is rejected.

If, then, Buddhism rejected both immobility asceticism and knowledge of the true (immobile) nature of the self as means to gain freedom from rebirth and karmic retribution, did it think that liberation was possible at all? Ajivikism had no method, and had no better advice for its spiritual seekers than that they had to wait, perhaps for an inconceivably long period of time. Like Ajivikism, Buddhism rejected the two methods that we have considered so far. Did it have a method of its own, or did it tell its followers to give up all hope?

Buddhism did have a method of its own. Given the way it conceived of karmic retribution, it is even possible to predict what kind of method this was. Since desire is the cause of rebirth, liberation of rebirth can be attained through the destruction of desire. Desire, however, is a psychological phenomenon. The destruction of desire is not to be identified with the restraint of desire. Restraint, characterized the asceticism of the Jainas. Buddhism proposed to dig deeper, at least where desire is concerned. It taught a path leading to the annihilation of desire, or at any rate it claimed to do so.

How does one destroy one's desires? The question is a lot more difficult to answer (at least theoretically) than the question how one stops activity. Stopping activity is straightforward, even if infinitely difficult in practice. But even in mere theory it is not obvious how one could destroy one's desires. Destroying desire is yet a center piece of Buddhist teaching. It is hardly surprising that an important part of the ancient Buddhist canon consists of descriptions of various psychological practices which ultimately are supposed to lead to that end.

Clearly the path taught by the Buddha is a psychological path. Those who follow the path engage in a number of psychological practices of different kinds. Some parts of the ancient canon concentrate on some chosen practices, more or less in isolation from the other ones, which makes it at first sight difficult to get a overview of the path in its entirety. Fortunately there is one relatively long passage that occurs numerous times in the ancient texts and that presents a complete sketch — from beginning to end, so to say — of the path. It describes the steps taken by someone who hears the teachings of the Buddha, is convinced by them and decides to follow them to the letter. He leaves society and avoids all forms of interaction with others that might deviate his attention, cultivating peace and contentment. This is however only the beginning of what follows. Once this man (note that the passage concerned only speaks of men, and that it is indeed uncertain whether the Buddha accepted nuns during his lifetime) has developed peace and contentment and discarded causes of friction, he turns to practicing awareness of all he does. This practice, known as *smṛiti* in Sanskrit, *sati* in Pali, henceforth accompanies all (that means, every single thing) our adept does. It is, as a matter of fact, the background and condition for what follows. What follows is what is called meditation (*dhyāna* in Sanskrit, *jhāna* in Pali). This meditation is presented as consisting of four stages, beginning with a complete disengagement with the world, and characterized by complete equanimity and an ever



deeper state of absorption. Meditation itself does not however by itself lead to the goal. The destruction of desire, or rather of the ‘taints’ that are the roots of desire, takes place in the deepest state of absorption. It is hard to extract from the texts what exactly the meditator does in this deepest stage of absorption, but it is clear that he directs his concentrated mind in a way that results in the removal of those ‘taints’. Once this done, the meditator knows that he has succeeded, that he is liberated, that he has arrived at the end of suffering.

One might reasonably ask how and why the practice of meditation should lead to the end of rebirth and karmic retribution. Unlike the link between, say, immobility asceticism and liberation from rebirth, the link between meditative practices and liberation is far from self-evident. The connecting factor is, of course, desire. A link between meditative practices and the destruction of desire, whether real or imagined, makes sense: if one wishes to change one’s psychological constitution, a psychological method seems appropriate. Liberation from rebirth follows from the destruction of desire, because desire is the force that brings about karmic retribution.

In spite of these considerations, the belief that desire rather than activity is responsible for karmic retribution is not evident. Its remedy in the form of a psychological operation, too, does not share the simplicity and straightforwardness of its competitor, viz. stopping all activity. Buddhism therefore had some explaining to do to make clear why desire should lead to karmic retribution. What is more, it seems likely that among the early converts there were many who, though willing to accept the pre-eminence of the Buddha, were loath to abandon their conviction that activity, and the control of activity, were key players in the process that leads to karmic retribution and to its cessation respectively.

These two factors were responsible for certain important developments. One of these is the following. Buddhism reveals itself from an early date onward highly susceptible to influences from outside, primarily from the milieu to which Jainism belonged. This leads to the peculiar situation that the same ascetic practices are sometimes criticized and sometimes prescribed in the early Buddhist texts. Also the cultivation of mental states whose main purpose is the cessation of all mental activity is sometimes rejected, sometimes recommended. Buddhism, in brief, comes to unite elements that originally belonged to altogether different currents of thought. Let us look at this more closely.

We know that early Buddhism distinguished itself from the other religious movement of Greater Magadha in various respects, most notably in its different conception of karma, and as a result in the different path it taught to attain liberation. The Buddhist path was, if not harder to practice, more difficult to understand. Indeed, why should complicated mental practices be all that is required to put an end to rebirth? If rebirth results from karma, one would expect that the end of rebirth will result from the suppression of karma, of deeds, whether literally through the suppression of all bodily and mental activity, or through the realization that the core of one's being, one's self, never acts and is incapable of acting. Early Buddhism taught neither of these two, and we can be sure that more than one early listener to the Buddhist message felt confused and failed to understand the connection between the problem and its presumed remedy.

The Buddhist canon has left ample traces of this confusion. It contains as a matter of fact a disturbing number of different precepts that are all attributed to the Buddha. These precepts are regularly in conflict with each other, so much so that it is necessary in a number of cases to conclude that teachings altogether different from those of the Buddha somehow found their way into the ancient canon. And more than once it is possible to identify those non-authentic precepts as belonging to those religious currents of Greater Magadha in which suppression of all activity or identification of the core of one's being as inactive played a central role.

Consider the non-Buddhist notion that knowledge of the inactive nature of one's true self is an essential (perhaps even sufficient) condition for liberation from the effects of one's deeds. Buddhism rejects this notion in the famous passage studied above, which shows that none of the five main constituents of the person are such a self. However, another passage turns all this on its head by emphasizing that knowledge of the fact that all constituents of the (active) person are not the self is a condition for liberation. The liberating knowledge of the self of the non-Buddhists has in this way become a liberating knowledge of the not-self, for the same reason: one disidentifies with the active parts of the person. Here we find a rejected non-Buddhist doctrine that has found its way, in a slightly modified form, into the Buddhist tradition.

Also the non-Buddhist notion that cessation of activity was a prerequisite for liberation exerted a strong attraction on certain Buddhists. This is clear from the fact that practices of that nature have

found their way into the Buddhist canon. Most of these practices concern the immobilization of the mind and of the senses. Beside passages in which the Buddha ridicules the immobilization of the senses by stating that if that is the aim, the blind and deaf will be performing these practices, there are others in which he boasts not to have noticed a thing even though he found himself in the middle of a thunderstorm that killed, through lightning, several people and animals close to him.

Examples of such contradictions can easily be multiplied. They help us to identify non-authentic elements in the Buddhist canon. Recall, for example, that the Jaina method of asceticism could be characterized as ‘the non-performing of new actions’ and ‘the annihilation of former actions by asceticism’. The Buddha is regularly depicted as criticizing this path, and on one occasion he even makes fun of it, saying: "If the pleasure and pain that beings feel are caused by what was done in the past, then the Jainas surely must have done bad deeds in the past, since they now feel such painful, racking, piercing feelings." Elsewhere in the canon, however, he is presented as saying the opposite, recommending his listeners to carry out no fresh action, and to wear out their former actions. Here the Jaina method is described, not in order to criticize it, but as the method taught by the Buddha. Clearly this non-authentic practice was introduced into the Buddhist canon, perhaps by followers who had never fully grasped the difference between the Buddhist and the Jaina methods.

Probably the most important among these non-authentic elements are certain meditational states that are sometimes rejected but elsewhere presented as essential elements on the path to enlightenment. Most of the canonical passages (presumably the authentic ones) mention four meditational states, called *dhyana* in Sanskrit, *jhana* in Pali. Other texts add a number of further states that are never called *dhyana/jhana* but carry altogether different names. Among these additional states, often five in number, we find the ‘realm of nothingness’ and the ‘realm of neither ideation nor non-ideation’. The series culminates in the ‘cessation of ideation and feeling’. These names reveal that the emphasis in these additional states, unlike the states called *dhyana/jhana*, is on the suppression of thoughts and other mental activities. This aim — the suppression of all mental activities — has its place in the more general aim to suppress all activities whatsoever, an aim that we have come to associate with the Jainas and perhaps other non-Buddhist ascetic movement of Greater Magadha. Unlike the *dhyanas/jhanas*, they do not lead to a higher goal (such as the destruction of the taints), and

we may be sure that these meditational states, too, found their way into the Buddhist canon from outside and cannot be looked upon as authentic teachings of the Buddha. With only one exception known to me, they are indeed never mentioned in accounts of the Buddha's enlightenment. On the other hand, they have found a place in the story of the Buddha's death: the Buddha is supposed to have passed through the four *dhyanas* and the five additional states before he finally expired in the fourth *dhyana*.

Another question that Buddhism had to answer is the following. Buddhism had to provide a theoretical justification why desire has karmic consequences. A list of twelve elements illustrating "dependent origination" is usually assumed to fulfill this task. The list is however obscure (already a canonical text states that it is extremely difficult to understand). Later theoreticians are faced with the challenge to throw further light on it, which they do with a but limited amount of success. It is possible to speculate that the tendency to theorize that accompanies Buddhism in subsequent centuries owes at least some of its impetus to this challenge that lies at the basis of the Buddhist attempts at understanding karmic retribution.

If we now turn to the practical role the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution played in the life of ordinary Buddhists, we may assume that Buddhism followed Jainism and Ajivikism in holding karma responsible for many of the differences that distinguish people from each other, including differences in social status. The following passage from the *Majjhima Nikaya* (III p. 202-203) illustrates this:

"Master Gotama, what is the cause and condition why human beings are seen to be inferior and superior? For people are seen to be short-lived and long-lived, sickly and healthy, ugly and beautiful, uninfluential and influential, poor and wealthy, low-born and high-born, stupid and wise. What is the cause and condition, Master Gotama, why human beings are seen to be inferior and superior?"

“Student, beings are owners of their actions, heirs of their actions; they originate from their actions, are bound to their actions, have their actions as their refuge. It is action that distinguishes beings as inferior and superior.”

Note that this passage does not mention the Brahmanical division of society into four classes:

Brahmins, Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas and Shudras. As a matter of fact, the early Buddhist texts do not normally speak about this Brahmanical division of society, because they feel critical toward it. However, occasionally they do mention it in connection with karmic retribution, as in the following passage from the *Samyutta Nikaya* (I p. 93-94):

There are these four kinds of persons found existing in the world. What four? The one heading from darkness to darkness, the one heading from darkness to light, the one heading from light to darkness, the one heading from light to light.

And how is a person one heading from darkness to darkness? Here some person has been reborn in a low family — a family of untouchables, bamboo workers, hunters, cartwrights, or flower-scavengers — a poor family in which there is little food and drink and which subsists with difficulty, one where food and clothing are obtained with difficulty; and he is ugly, unsightly, deformed, chronically ill — purblind or cripple-handed or lame or paralyzed. He is not one who gains food, drink, clothing, and vehicles; garlands, scents, and unguents; bedding, housing, and lighting. He engages in misconduct of body, speech, and mind. Having done so, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in the plane of misery, in a bad destination, in the nether world, in hell. ...

And how is a person one heading from darkness to light? Here some person has been reborn in a low family ... one where food and clothing are obtained with difficulty; and he is ugly ... or paralyzed. He is not one who gains food ... and lighting. He engages in good conduct of body, speech, and mind. Having done so, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in a good destination, in a heavenly world. ...

And how is a person one heading from light to darkness? Here some person has been reborn in a high family — an affluent warrior family, and affluent Brahmin family, or an affluent householder family — one which is rich, with great wealth and property, with abundant gold and silver, abundant treasures and commodities, abundant wealth and grain; and he is handsome, attractive, graceful, possessing supreme beauty of complexion. He is one who gains food, drink, clothing, and vehicles; garlands, scents, and unguents; bedding, housing, and lighting. He engages in misconduct of body, speech, and mind. Having done so, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in the plane of misery, in a bad destination, in the nether world, in hell. ...

And how is a person one heading from light to light? Here some person has been reborn in a high family ... with abundant wealth and grain; and he is handsome, attractive, graceful, possessing supreme beauty of complexion. He is one who gains food ... and lighting. He engages in good conduct of body, speech, and mind. Having done so, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in a good destination, in a heavenly world.

Brahmins and warriors (*kshatriya*), two of the four regular Brahmanical classes of society, are explicitly mentioned in this passage, as are outcasts (*candala*), another Brahmanical designation. Interestingly, none of these are presented as the outcome of earlier deeds. It is as if the author of this passage was loath to use the doctrine of karma as a justification of a division of society about which the Buddhists felt very critical.



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# THE DOCTRINE OF KARMAN

IN JAIN PHILOSOPHY

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matter, it has, in the natural course of things, no ending. The deliverance of the soul from the *karman* is, therefore, only possible by artificial means. Through a series of special processes the *jīva* must hinder the absorption of new *karman* and eliminate the *karman* already accumulated before they come to realisation. If, through the eradication of the physical cause which predisposes him to assimilate certain *karman*, he succeeds in restricting and in the end totally hindering the binding of new *karman*, as well as, through the methodical subjugation of the senses, in annihilating the potential *karman* already in existence, he will become free from all *karman*. Then all obstacles which impede the development of his true nature are automatically overcome; released from the power of the *karman*, he can undisturbedly make manifest his own innate capabilities.

The *karman* doctrine, which in the foregoing has been only briefly sketched, has been formed by Jainism into a remarkable system, accurately worked out in its most minute details. To represent this is my task in the following chapters. We shall at first show the different *karmans* in themselves and in their relation to one another; further on, the conditions which arise in the soul under the influence of the *karmans*; then, the causes which produce the formation of certain *karmans*; and, finally, the way that leads to release from them.

## II

### THE KARMAN IN ITSELF

The atoms which have become *karman* in the soul can be contemplated from 4 points of view :

1. according to the manner of their effect (*prakṛti*),
2. according to the duration of their effect (*sthiti*),
3. according to the intensity of their effect (*rasa*), and
4. according to their quantity, i.e. according to the number of their *pradeśas*.

Even as an article of confectionery (*modaka*), which is composed of a substance that cures wind in the body through its natural quality annihilates the wind—a sweetmeat composed of a substance that cures the bile, annihilates the bile—a sweetmeat composed of material that destroys phlegm, annihilates phlegm—so the *pudgalas* which have become *jñānāvaraṇa-karman* veil the knowledge, those changed into *cāritra-mohaniya-karman* disturb the right conduct, etc. Even as the effect of one *modaka* is restricted to one day, of another to two days, and so forth, so the duration of one *karman* is 30 *sāgaropamakotikoṭis*, that of another is 70, and so forth. Even as this pill has a sweet, that a still sweeter taste, so the one *karman* works with a lesser, the other with a greater intensity. And, finally, even as one pill measures 1 *prasyti*, or 2 *prasyti*, according to the number of grains that compose it, so also a *karman*-particle has a greater or less dimension according to whether it contains more or less *pradeśas*.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. THE SPECIES OF THE KARMAN.<sup>2</sup>

There are 8 chief or fundamental species (*mūla-prakṛti*) of the *karman*, namely :

1. *jñānāvaraṇa-k*, the *k* which obscures knowledge,
2. *dārśanāvaraṇa-k*, the *k* which obscures undifferentiated cognition,

<sup>1</sup> Kg I, 3a, II 2b. Wilson 312 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Kg I, 3b *et seq.*, II 120b. Ps. 265, Lp. X, 145 *et seq.*, Gandhi 13 *et seq.*, Tattv. VIII, 5 *et seq.*

3. *vedanīya-k*, the *k* which produces the feeling of joy and grief,
4. *mohanīya-k*, the *k* which obstructs belief and conduct,
5. *āyus-k*, the *k* which determines the duration of life,
6. *nāma-k*, the *k* which gives the various factors of individuality,
7. *gotra-k*, the *k* which destines family surroundings,
8. *antarāya-k*, the *k* which hinders the *jīva* in his capability of resolution and enjoyment.

Each of these *mūla-prakṛtis* is divided into a number of *uttara-prakṛtis*, sub-species. The latter can, on their part, be separated into yet smaller sub-divisions, so that the entire number of the *karmans* is exceedingly large. For the system, however, only the 8 *mūla* and the 148 *uttara-prakṛtis* are of importance ; I can therefore restrict myself to presenting a summary of these.

#### I. JÑĀNĀVARAṆA-KARMAN.

The *jñānāvaraṇa-k* obscures the knowledge peculiar to the soul, i.e., it hinders the *jīva* from recognising a thing with its individual attributes. It is divided into 5 *uttara-prakṛtis*, according to the 5 kinds of knowledge :

1. *mati-jñānāvaraṇa-k* which causes the obscuration of the knowledge transmitted through the senses,
2. *śruta-jñānāvaraṇa-k* which produces the obscuration of knowledge acquired by interpreting signs (i.e. words, writings, gestures),
3. *avadhi-jñānāvaraṇa-k* which hinders transcendental knowledge of material things,
4. *manahparyāya-jñānāvaraṇa-k* which hinders transcendental knowledge of the thoughts of others,
5. *kevala-jñānāvaraṇa-k* which obscures the omniscience inherent in the *jīva* by natural disposition.

Of these, the last mentioned *karman* hinders omniscience altogether ; the four others do not always involve, through their realisation, a complete destruction of the corresponding faculties of knowledge, but often produce only greater or less disturbances.

#### II. DARŚANĀVARAṆA-KARMAN.

The word *darśana* has two different meanings in Jain Philosophy. Firstly, it means : "opinion, doctrine, philosophical system", and *samyag-darśana* then has the signification "the right view, the true

belief". But, secondly, the word *darśana* has also the meaning "the recognition of a thing in its general outlines or in its notional generality." (Jacobi *ad Tattv. I, 1*), i.e., formaliter indistinct knowledge. Here the *darśana* mentioned in the second place is dealt with : for the sake of brevity and for lack of a better word, we translate it by "undifferentiated cognition". According to the 4 species of undifferentiated cognition<sup>1</sup> there are 4 species of the *darśanāvaraṇa-karman*, namely :

1. *cakṣur-darśanāvaraṇa-k* which produces the obscuration of the *darśana* conditional upon the eye,
2. *acakṣur-darśanāvaraṇa-k* which causes the obscuration of the undifferentiated cognition, conditional upon the other senses and the organ of thinking,
3. *avadhi-darśanāvaraṇa-k* which causes the obscuration of the transcendental undifferentiated cognition of material things,
4. *kevala-darśanāvaraṇa-k* which hinders the absolute undifferentiated cognition (the counterpart of the omniscience).

The last mentioned *k* hinders completely ; the three others produce under certain circumstances only a disturbance of the respective cognition-faculties.

In addition to these 4 *darśanāvaraṇa-ks* come still 5 others which produce physio-psychological conditions in which the sense-organs are not active, and which, therefore, exclude all possibility of perception. These are the 5 *nidrā-ks*, "sleep-ks", namely :

1. *nidrā-k* which produces a light, pleasant slumber, out of which the sleeper is already aroused by the clicking of finger-nails.
2. *nidrānidrā-k* which produces a deep slumber, out of which the sleeper can only be awakened by being shaken violently,
3. *pracalā-k* which causes a sound sleep, that overtakes a person when sitting or standing upright (cf. *Deśi-kośa VI, 6*),
4. *pracalāpracalā-k* which produces an exceedingly intensive sleep, that overcomes a person while walking,
5. *styānagṛddhi-(styānārdhhi-)k* which causes somnambulism, acting in an unconscious state.

<sup>1</sup> A *manahparyāya-darśana* does not exist, because, through the transcendental knowledge of the thoughts of others, the details and not the general outlines are recognised (*Kg. I, 22b*).

## VI

THE CAUSES OF THE KARMAN AND THE MEANS  
FOR ITS ANNIHILATION

## 1. THE CAUSES OF BONDAGE.

Kg. I 148b *et seq.*, Ps. 365 *et seq.*, Tattv. VIII 1 *et seq.*, Gandhi 54 *et seq.*, Warren 37 *et seq.*

The penetration of matter into the soul and the transformation of it into *karman* proceeds through the activity (*yoga*) of the *jīva*. The species of *karman* into which the matter can be transformed is, in addition to the *yoga*, conditional upon 3 other causes<sup>1</sup>, of which each as long as it operates, affords the *bandha* of a certain number of *karmaprakṛtis*. The 4 causes of bondage are :

1. *mithyātva*, unbelief.
2. *avirati*, lack of self-discipline, i.e. non-observation of the commandments.
3. *kaṣāya*, passion.
4. *yoga*, activity.

Each of these chief causes (*mūla-hetu*) is divided into a number of subdivisions, the secondary causes (*uttara-hetu*), namely *mithyātva* in 5, *avirati* in 12, *kaṣāya* in 25, and *yoga* in 15. The entire number of *uttara-hetus* amounts therefore to 57.

Every *mūla-hetu* causes the binding of certain *karman-species* :

*Mithyātva* causes the *bandha* of the infernal state of existence, *ānupūrvī* and *āyus* ; 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-sensed class of beings, immovable, common, fine, undeveloped body ; warm splendour, worst figure and firmness, 3rd sex, unbelief.

*Avirati* causes the *bandha* of 35 *prakṛtis*, 4 *anantānubandhin-*, and 4 *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa-kaṣāyas*, female sex, the 3 worst kinds of unconsciousness, animal and human state, *ānupūrvī*, *āyus* ; the 4 middle figures, the 5 first firmnesses, cold lustre, bad gait, unsympathetic, unsuggestive, ill-sounding, physical body and limbs, low family surroundings.

The *kaṣāyas* produce the bondage of 68 *prakṛtis*, i.e. all of them remaining, with the exception of *tīrthakara*, translocation-body and its limbs, and *sāta-vedanīya*.

<sup>1</sup> Several teachers (also Umāsvāti, Tattv. VIII 1) consider as the 5th *mūla-hetu* "negligence" (*pramāda*). According to the opinion of the Kgs. this is already included in *avirati*.

*Yoga* alone causes *bandha* of *sāta-vedanīya*.

The *karmans tīrthakara* and translocation-body and its limbs, are caused through none of the above mentioned causes of bondage ; they are, on the contrary, only bound by specially favoured men ; the *bandha* of *tīrthakara* is caused by true belief (*samyaktva*), that of the translocation-body and its limbs through self-control (*samyama*).

Each of the *karmans* can only be bound so long as its cause of bondage is in existence ; if the cause disappears, the *bandha* of the corresponding *prakṛti* ceases. The causes can only be eliminated successively and not out of their order. So long, therefore, as *mithyātva* exists, *avirati*, *kaṣāya* and *yoga* are in operation, and all *prakṛtis* caused through these 4 can be bound. If *mithyātva* is eliminated, the 16 *karman-species* caused thereby vanish, and so forth. If the first 3 causes of bondage are extinguished, the *jīva* only binds *sāta-vedanīya*. This lasts until the *jīva* returns within the power of the *kaṣāyas* and binds corresponding *k.*, or till the *jīva* also completely annihilates the *yoga*, and thus altogether puts an end to *bandha*.

We have seen which *k-prakṛtis* can be bound, as long as certain psychical factors are in existence ; in the following we learn details concerning the actions through which the *jīva* produces a *karman*<sup>1</sup>.

Hostility against knowledge and undifferentiated cognition, against those who know and the means of cognition, denial, annihilation and hindrance of them, disregard of the doctrine and its commandments, rebelliousness and lack of discipline towards teachers and masters, destruction of books, the tearing out of the eyes, etc.—such actions are the causes of the *bandha* of the *ks jñāna-* and *darśanāvaraṇa*.

Piety, respect for parents and teachers, gentleness, pity, keeping of vows, honourable conduct, overcoming of passions, giving of alms, fidelity in belief, are causing the *bandha* of *sāta-vedanīya-k* ; the contrary causes the *bandha* of *asāta-vedanīya-k*.

The teaching of a false, the hindrance of the true religion, the blasphemy of the Jains, of the saints, of the images of gods, of the community, of the canon, the rape of sacred objects, causes *darśana-mohanīya-k*.

<sup>1</sup> What is here reproduced is the doctrine of the *āsravas*, dealt with in detail in Tattv. VI. The *āsravas* are the activities of body, speech and *manas* which cause certain *karmans*. Regarding two meanings of the word *āsrava* vide Sarva-darśanasamgraha p. 30 ; comp. Colebrooke p. 246, Wilson p. 310, Jhaveri 27, Mrs. Stevenson 67. In the Kgs. the word which only occurs I, 25 in a Sūtra, is neither in the text nor in the commentary used in this place, it is only spoken of the "*bandha-hetavaḥ*" which cause, that the *jīva* "*badhnāti, jayati, samupārjayati*" a certain *k*. In quotations however, the word frequently occurs.



The actions caused by the outbreak of passions produce the binding of *kaṣāya-mohanīya-ks*. The one whose mind is confused through joking, liking, disliking, sorrow, fear and disgust, binds the corresponding *nokaṣāya-mohanīya-ks*. Slight passionate desire, conjugal fidelity, inclination for right conduct, cause *pum-veda-k*; jealousy, pusillanimity, mendacity, great sensuality, adultery cause *strī-veda-k*; violent love of pleasure and strong passions directed towards sexual intercourse with men and women cause the binding of *napuṃsaka-veda-k*.

One who tortures and kills other beings, who strives in an extraordinary manner after possessions, and is governed by life-long passions, obtains *naraka-āyus*. The deceitful, the fraudulent man, who is in possession of the thorns<sup>1</sup>, binds *tiryag-āyus*; the humble, sincere one, whose passion is slight, *manuṣya-āyus*. One who possesses the right belief, but who only partially or not at all practises self-discipline, whose passions are slight, a heretic, who practises foolish asceticism, and involuntarily extinguishes *karman* (*akāma-nirjarā*), by suffering hunger and thirst involuntarily, who is chaste, who endures troubles, who falls from mountain-heights, who perishes in fire and water—these obtain *deva-āyus*<sup>2</sup>.

Honesty, gentleness, absence of desire, purity cause the *bandha* of good; the reverse, the *bandha* of bad *nāma-k*.

Just recognition of the excellence of others, modesty, reverence towards teachers and masters, the desire to learn and to teach are causes of the *bandha* of *uccair-gotra-k*<sup>3</sup>; the contrary causes *bandha* of *nīccair-gotra*.

The hindering of the veneration of the *Jina*, the withholding of food, drink, lodging, clothing, the destroying of the power of others with the help of magic spells, altogether the preparation of hindrances of any kind, causes *bandha* of *antarayā-k*.

<sup>1</sup> *Saśallo*, which is explained: "saśalyo rāgādivaśācīrṇānekavrataniyamāticāra-sphuradantahśalyo'nālocitāpratīkrāntah". In Tattv. VII, 13 as "thorns" are given *māyā, nidāna* (sexual enjoyment) and *mithyādarśana*.

<sup>2</sup> On the courses of rebirth in the different classes of gods comp. Aupapātika-Sūtra §§ 64-84, 117-129.

<sup>3</sup> Tattv. VI 23 gives in particular the causes of *tīrthakara-k*. I quote the *sūtra* according to Jacobi's German translation: "Perfect belief, possession of veneration, no breach of vows and laws, permanent practice of knowledge and indifference to worldly objects, according to one's power alms and asceticism, assistance to and readiness to serve the community and the monks, love of the Arhats, masters, wise men and the doctrine, the fulfilment of the *Āvaśyakas*, the glorification of the way to salvation, attachment to the confessors of the true religion are (causes) of *tīrthakara-n-k*."

## 2. THE IMPEDING AND DESTRUCTION OF KARMAN

Concerning the impeding and destruction of *karman*, the Kgs. give us no explanation, as their aim is simply a theoretical exposition of the annihilation of the *ks*., but is in no way an indication of the means which must be practically employed in pursuit of this aim. Considering the great importance which the doctrine of *saṃvara* and *nirjarā* have for the philosophy of the Jaina, as a counterpart to the preceding section, I believed myself, however, called upon to give a condensed description of the practical means for *karman*-annihilation. The following account is based if I except the short notices Kg. I 26a and the section on the *parīṣahās*, Ps. 435 *et seq*—chiefly on Tattv. IX, Comp. Hemacandra, *Yogaśāstra* I, 33 *et seq.*, IV 78 *et seq.*

The *karman* assimilated by the *jīva* realising itself, fades, consumes itself. But as the *jīva* is ever binding new *karman*, through the consumption of *karman*, no decrease of it is produced. A reduction of *karman* is only possible, if, through suitable measures the binding of new *karman* is prevented and the existing *karman* is annihilated.

The suppression of the inflow of new *karman* is called "impeding" (*saṃvara*). It is attained by 6 means. These are:

1. *guṇti*, control, i.e. the right regulation of the activity of body, speech and mind.
2. *saṃiti*, carefulness in walking, speaking, collecting alms, in the lifting up and laying down of a thing, and in the discharging of the body, to avoid sins against laws, and to hinder the killing of living beings.
3. *dharma*, the 10 duties of a monk, namely: forbearance, humility, purity, self-abnegation, truthfulness, self-control, asceticism, abstinence, voluntary poverty, and spiritual obedience.
4. *bhāvanā, anuprekṣā*, the 12 reflections, namely: the consideration of the transitoriness of all things, of the helplessness of man, of the *saṃsārā*, of the isolation of the soul, of the heterogeneity of soul and body, of the impurity of the body, of the inflow of *karman*, of its impeding and destruction, of the world, of the scarcity of enlightenment, and of the truth well proclaimed by religion.
5. *parīṣaha*, the patient endurance of the 22 troubles, i.e., the *jīva* must be indifferent to: 1. hunger, 2. thirst, 3. cold, 4. heat, 5. mosquitoes, 6. nakedness or bad clothing, 7. the discomfort connected with long wandering, 8. women, 9. a vagrant life, 10. the place where he meditates, 11. the couch he finds, 12. abusive words, 13. ill-treatment, 14. the unpleasantness of begging, 15. the failure in begging, 16. sickness, 17. the pricking of the grass-blades on which he lies,

18. the dirt on the body, 19. praising, 20. conceit of knowledge, 21. despair concerning ignorance, 22. doubt of the truth of the doctrine.

The troubles are caused through *udaya* of the following *karmans* : 20 and 21 through veiling of knowledge, 22 through disturbance of belief, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19 through disturbance of conduct, 15 through hindrance, the remaining 11 through *vedanīya*. (Comp. Ps. 45 *et seq.*, Js. II, 8).

6. *cāritra*, conduct (its 5 degrees, see above).

The annihilation of *karman* is called destruction (*nirjarā*). It is attained by :

1. external asceticism, namely : fasting, reduction of food, restriction to certain food, renunciation of delicacies, a lonely resting-place, and mortification of the flesh.

2. internal asceticism, namely : penitence, modesty, eagerness to serve, study, renunciation and meditation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Asceticism also causes simultaneously impeding of the inflow of *karman*.

## VII

### THE WAY OF SALVATION

#### 1. THE CAPABILITY OF SALVATION

Gandhi 76 *et seq.*, Warren 45

The souls, the number of which is infinite, are of a two-fold kind :

1. worldly souls (*saṃsārin*) provided with *karman*-matter, and 2. released souls (*mukta, siddha*) free from *karman*. The former are again separated into 2 groups : 1. into souls, in which a spiritual development has not yet begun, and 2. into such, in which it has begun. Each of these 2 latter species comprises two classes of *jīvas*, namely, 1. such as can attain salvation (*bhavya*) and 2. such as cannot (*abhavya*).

The entire universe is filled with very minute, fine living beings (*nigoda*), imperceptible to our senses, which pervade everything and which nothing can destroy. The *jīvas* have undifferentiated unbelief (*avyakta mithyātva*), they have no tendency either for good or evil ; a spiritual development has not yet begun in them. Special circumstances are rousing the *nigoda* out of its apathy ; its unbelief differentiates itself, assumes a certain form (*vyakta mithyātva*) ; through it the *nigoda* awakes from indifference and starts a spiritual development, which, under favourable circumstances, leads finally to salvation.

The beginning of development as well as the capability of salvation are solely dependent upon accidental circumstances : " In a whirlpool some bit of stick or paper or other matter may in the surging of the water get to one side and become separated from the rest, be caught by the wind, and dried by the sun ; and so some such thing may happen to a *nigoda* which would awaken just a spark of the latent potential power of development " (Gandhi 77). The same parable is used in order to show that also the *bhavyatva* is dependent upon chance.<sup>1</sup>

The number of *abhavyas* is small in comparison to that of the *bhavyas*. *Jīvas* incapable of being released, are existing in all classes of beings ; they never reach beyond the *mithyātva* (and thereby not beyond the 1st *guṇasthāna*) and feel themselves quite well in the

<sup>1</sup> A Jain gentleman related to me the following parable : Some men want to go from London to Brighton, but they do not know the way and have no possibility of learning it. Therefore they start as chance leads them. Some of them in the end, after longer or shorter wandering, arrive in Brighton, whilst others never reach there.



embodied state, because they do not know anything better. The *bhavyas*, on the contrary, finally become tired of the wandering in ever new forms of existence, they recognise the truth of the religion of the Jina, practise self-control and asceticism, and, in the end, after the lapse of longer or shorter periods of time, attain salvation.

## 2. PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE GUNASTHĀNAS.

From the state of complete dependency upon the *karman* to the state of complete detachment from it, 14 stages, the so-called *guṇasthānas* (states of virtue) can be distinguished.<sup>1</sup> There are stages of development in which the soul gradually delivers itself, firstly from the worst, then from the less bad, and, finally, from all kinds of *karman*, and manifests the innate faculties of knowledge, belief, and conduct in a more and more perfect form. They are named according to their owners, the characteristics of these always being associated with the word "*guṇasthāna*". The owners of the different stages are the following :

1. *mithyādṛṣṭi*, the unbeliever.
2. *sāsvādana-samyagdṛṣṭi*, the one who has only a taste of the true belief,
3. *samyag-mithyā-dṛṣṭi* (or *miśra*), the one who has a mixed belief.
4. *avirata-samyagdṛṣṭi*, the one who has true belief but has not yet self-control.
5. *deśavirata*, the one who has partial self-control.
6. *pramatta-samyata*, the one who has complete self-control, sometimes, however brought into wavering through negligence.
7. *apramatta-samyata*, the one who has self-control without negligence.
8. *apūrva-karaṇa* (or *nivṛtti-bādara-saṃparāya*), the one who practises the process called *apūrva-karaṇa*, in whom, however, the passions are still occurring in a gross form.
9. *anivṛtti-bādara-saṃparāya*, the one who practises the process called *anivṛtti-karaṇa*, in whom, however, the passions are still occurring in a gross form.
10. *sūkṣma-saṃparāya*, the one in whom the passions still only occur in a more subtle form.

<sup>1</sup> "tatra guṇā jñāndaśanacāritrarūpā jīvasvabhāvaviśeṣāḥ, sthānaṃ punar atra teṣāṃ śuddhyaviśuddhiprakaśapakaśaktiḥ svarūpabhedāḥ. tiṣṭhanty asmin guṇā iti kṛtvā, guṇānāṃ sthānaṃ guṇasthānaṃ" Kg. I, 56a.

11. *upaśānta-kaṣāya-vītarāga-chadmastha* (or shortly *upaśānta-moha*) the one who has suppressed every passion, but who does not yet possess omniscience.
12. *kṣīṇa-kaṣāya-vītarāga-chadmastha* (or *kṣīṇa-moha*), the one who has annihilated every passion, but does not yet possess omniscience.
13. *sayogi-kevalin*, the omniscient one who still practises an activity (*yoga*).
14. *ayogi-kevalin*, the omniscient without *yoga*.

The *guṇasthānas* are arranged in a logical order, according to the principle of the decreasing sinfulness and the increasing purity. In the 1st *guṇasthāna* all 4 causes of *bandha* are operating : unbelief, lack of self-control, passion and activity ; in the 2-5th, only 3 : i.e., unbelief is absent ; in 6-10th only passion and activity exercise their influence ; in the 11-13th only activity. In the last *guṇasthāna* a bondage of *karman* no longer takes place. With the single causes of bondage, the *bandha* of the *karman*-species conditional upon them disappear. Likewise, also, with every step the number of the *karmans* which have *udaya* and *sattā*, decreases. Further details on this subject will be given later.

The order of the *guṇasthānas* is logical and not chronological. The succession in which they are to pass is different with each individual, because relapses can throw the *jīvas* down from the ardously attained height and can, wholly or partially annul the development hitherto achieved. This becomes still more comprehensible, if we call to mind the fact, that the remaining on one stage may only last a few minutes, so that in the morning one can be on a high level, sink down from it at noon, and climb up to it again in the evening. But even if we put aside the possibility of a relapse, it is impossible to pass through all 14 *guṇasthānas* successively, because a direct transition from the 1st into the 2nd stage is out of question (Kg. II, 19b) and the 11th stage cannot be passed before the 12th to 14th. The different possibilities of the succession of the *guṇasthānas* are conditional upon the process which lead to the attainment of *samyaktva* and upon the two ways, by which a methodical reduction of *karman* can be brought about. Before we turn therefore to a detailed analysis of the *guṇasthānas*, a description of the events in the attainment of the true belief and in the suppression or annihilation of the disturbances of the true belief, is necessary. The *samyaktva-lābha* and the two *śreṇis* belong to the most difficult points in Jain metaphysics ; all sources at my disposal treat these psychic events always in the same dry, stereotyped way, without giving any clues which could facilitate our understanding or still less the feeling of the spiritual conditions which underlie them.

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ULRICH TIMME KRAGH

EARLY BUDDHIST THEORIES OF  
ACTION AND RESULT

*A Study of Karmaphalasambandha*

Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā, Verses 17.1-20



ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

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# Abbreviations, Sigla and Editorial Signs

α	archetype alfa	LVP	Louis de LA VALLEE
β	archetype beta		POUSSIN
γ	archetype gamma	Mav	<i>Madhyamakāvatāra</i>
δ	archetype delta	MavBh	<i>Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya</i>
ε	archetype epsilon	Mmk	<i>Mūlamadhyamakakārikā</i>
χ	autograph ksi	MN	<i>Majjhimanikāya</i> , PTS
a	folio recto or first <i>pāda</i> in verse.		edition
AK	<i>Abhidharmakośa</i>	ms	manuscript
AKBh	<i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i>	mss	manuscripts
AN	<i>Aṅguttanikāya</i> PTS edition	N	<i>snar than bstan 'gyur</i> ; catalogued by MIBU (1967).
b	verso folio or second <i>pāda</i> in verse	N <sup>k</sup>	<i>snar than Mmk</i>
c	third <i>pāda</i> in verse.	NGMPP	Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project
C	<i>Co ne bstan 'gyur</i>	o	orthographic variant
Chin.	Chinese	o1	gemination
CŚ	<i>Catuḥśataka</i> by Āryadeva	o2	external <i>anusvāra</i> in lieu of homorganic nasal
CŚV	* <i>Catuḥśatakavṛtti</i> by Can- drakīrti.	o3	internal <i>anusvāra</i> in lieu of homorganic nasal
d	fourth <i>pāda</i> in verse.	o4	alternative orthography
D	<i>sde dge bstan 'gyur</i> ; numbers according to catalogue by UI <i>et al.</i> (1934)	Q	Peking edition of <i>bstan 'gyur</i> ; facsimile-print by SUZUKI (1955-1961).
DN	<i>Dīghanikāya</i> (in the Tibetan edition DN, however, stands for D and N separately)	p	punctuation variants
fn.	footnote	p1	ekadaṇḍa in lieu of dvidaṇḍa
G	dga' ldan or "Golden Manuscript" <i>bstan 'gyur</i>	p2	dvidaṇḍa in lieu of ekadaṇḍa
		p3	no punctuation in lieu of any form of daṇḍa

p4	insertion of daṇḍa	V	the vulgate edition of Pras
p5	any punctuation other than double dvidanda with circle	v	referring to LVP's Sanskrit edition (1903-1913). significant variant reading
p6	ardhadaṇḍa	v1	variant in verbal form
Pras	<i>Prasannapadā</i> <i>Madhyamakavṛtti</i>	v2	variant in nominal negation
PTS	The Pali Text Society	v3	variant in upasarga
s	solecism	v4	variant caused by omission of <i>akṣaras</i> or parts of <i>akṣaras</i>
s1	bad nominal case-ending	v5	variant caused by changes of <i>akṣaras</i> or parts of <i>akṣaras</i>
s2	corruption partly or fully due to change of <i>akṣaras</i> or parts of <i>akṣaras</i>	v6	variant caused by change of nominal case-ending
s3	corruption partly or fully due to insertion of <i>akṣaras</i> or parts of <i>akṣaras</i>	v7	omission of word(s)
s4	corruption partly or fully due to omission of <i>akṣaras</i> or parts of <i>akṣaras</i>	v8	complete variant reading
s5	corruption partly or fully due to transposition of <i>akṣaras</i> or parts of <i>akṣaras</i>	v9	interpolation or insertion
s6	non-application of <i>sandhi</i>	v10	variant sandhi due to differences in punctuation
s7	bad verbal-form	v11	transposition
s8	complete variant solecism	प	Sanskrit Pras-ms प, Bodleian Palm-leaf ms.
SN	<i>Samyuttanikāya</i> , PTS edition.	द	Sanskrit Pras-ms द, NGMPP C 19/8
ŚSV	<i>Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti</i> by Candrakīrti.	ब	Sanskrit Pras-ms ब, NGMPP E 1294/3
stand.	standardisation of spelling into Sanskrit form.	ज	Sanskrit Pras-ms ज, Tokyo University Library no. 251
T	Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō	ल	Sanskrit Pras-ms ल, Cambridge University Library add. 1483.
Tib	Tibetan	[ ]	Brackets indicate lacuna in ms or words inserted into
transl.	translation		

	the translation. When the size of a lacuna is estimated, the approximate number of missing syllables is indicated by a digit, e.g., [7] means lacuna having the size of seven <i>akṣaras</i> .	Ω	omega represents all manuscripts.
		*	reconstruction.
		·	a dot in the middle-height of the line indicates end of folio in the text-editions.
		→	arrow indicates transformation
[ ]	half-brackets indicate syllables, which are partly damaged but still reasonably legible.	】	lemma-sign, indicates that the word preceding the sign is the reading adopted in the critical edition.
{ }	braces indicate readings not attested either by the Sanskrit edition or by the Tibetan edition.		



## Chapter 3: Translation and Commentary

This chapter offers a literal translation of the selected passage from the seventeenth chapter of *Prasannapadā* along with an interspersed commentary discussing points of interest. The translation is given with Sanskrit words in parenthesis after each word or phrase in order to facilitate easy comparison with the original text. Sanskrit nomina are given with their proper case endings but without the external sandhi-modifications. In the case of Sanskrit phrases, the external sandhi between words is maintained. Words implied by the Sanskrit text, which need to be supplied in the translation, have been added in braces. The translation is set in a slightly larger font and each section begins with a page-reference to the Sanskrit text using the pagination and line-breaks of LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's edition (as also indicated in the critical edition given above). The interspersed commentary is set in smaller script to distinguish it clearly from the translation. Sanskrit nomina supplied in the interspersed commentary are usually given in the stem form.

(V302<sub>2</sub>): [The 17<sup>th</sup> (*saptadaśamam*) Chapter (*prakaraṇam*) called (*nāma*) The Analysis of Action and Result (*karma-phalaparīkṣā*)]

### 3.1 The Interlocutor's Objection<sup>214</sup>

(Pras 302<sub>3</sub>): Here (*atra*) [the interlocutor] says (*āha*): “*Saṃsāra* (*saṃsāraḥ*) really does exist (*vidyata eva*) because of its being the basis for the connection between action and result (*karmaphalasambandhāśrayatvāt*). Here in this context (*iha*),<sup>215</sup> if (*yadī*), through the uninterrupted progression of the series [of the five *skandhas*] (*santānāviccheda-*

<sup>214</sup> It should be noted that all headings are inserted by the me and are not found in the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts.

<sup>215</sup> The word *iha*, lit. ‘here’, may either be interpreted as meaning ‘here in this context’ but could, for example, also be interpreted as meaning ‘here in this world.’

*krameṇa*), [which is] a succession of birth and death (*janma-maraṇaparamparayā*) [and which is] a continuation of entities that are cause and result (*hetuphalabhāvapravṛtṭyā*), the transmigration (*saṃsara-ṇam*) of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskārāṇām*) or (*vā*) of a Self (*ātmanaḥ*) would exist (*syāt*), then (*tadānīm*) a connection between action and result (*karmmaphalasambandhaḥ*) would exist [as well] (*syāt*).

The chapter begins with an unnamed interlocutor raising an objection to the explanations given by Candrakīrti in the preceding chapter. This is indicated by the phrase *atrāha* (Tib. *'dir smras pa*), which is used throughout Pras for this purpose.<sup>216</sup> It is the typical beginning of a chapter in Pras, since chapters 2-12 and 14-26 all begin in this manner, although the objections raised by the interlocutor, of course, vary. In general, Candrakīrti tends to use the verb *āha* (Tib. *smras pa*) to indicate questions and objections raised by the interlocutor,<sup>217</sup> whereas he tends to use the verb *ucyate* (Tib. *bśad pa*) to indicate the answer given by the *Mādhyamika*, i.e., himself, to these questions and objections.<sup>218</sup>

The interlocutor's objection links the present chapter with the topic of the preceding chapter called "The Analysis of Bondage and Liberation" (*bandhanamokṣaparīkṣā*).<sup>219</sup> This feature of beginning each chapter with an objection associated with the preceding chapter, as is also found in the earlier commentaries on Pras, constitutes the commentarial tradition's

<sup>216</sup> For the expression *atrāha*, cf. e.g., Pras 39<sub>8</sub> (STCHERBATSKY, 1927:129), 54<sub>9</sub> (op.cit:140), 81<sub>6</sub> (op.cit:179), 83<sub>3</sub> (op.cit:129), 87<sub>4</sub> (op.cit:186), 88<sub>5</sub> (op.cit:188), 89<sub>10</sub> (op.cit:189), 92<sub>3</sub> (MAY, 1959:51), 93<sub>16</sub> (tatrāha; op.cit:55), 97<sub>3</sub> (op.cit:59), 97<sub>10</sub> (op.cit:60), 98<sub>6</sub> (op.cit:61), 99<sub>10</sub> (op.cit:62), 99<sub>13</sub> (ibid.), 101<sub>13</sub> (op.cit:66), 102<sub>5</sub> (op.cit:67), 102<sub>11</sub> (ibid.), 103<sub>1</sub> (ibid.), 105<sub>12</sub> (op.cit:71), 113<sub>3</sub> (op.cit:78), 117<sub>1</sub> (op.cit:82), 117<sub>11</sub> (op.cit:83), 118<sub>7</sub> (op.cit:84), 119<sub>7</sub> (op.cit:85), 123<sub>3</sub> (op.cit:88), etc. This list is not exhaustive but merely illustrative.

<sup>217</sup> Within chapter 17 of Pras, this is attested at Pras 304<sub>10</sub>, 305<sub>10</sub>, 315<sub>13</sub>, 317<sub>3</sub>, 323<sub>15</sub>, 326<sub>12</sub>, 327<sub>6</sub>, 327<sub>9</sub>, 327<sub>15</sub>, 327<sub>10</sub> and 329<sub>10</sub>. There are, however, also some exceptions to this rule in Candrakīrti's own prose; cf. Pras 323<sub>17</sub> and 334<sub>4</sub>. The rule does not apply to quotations from other texts.

<sup>218</sup> Thus, the verb *ucyate* is used in this sense in at least nine cases at Pras 303<sub>3</sub>, 315<sub>4</sub>, 320<sub>7</sub>, 323<sub>11</sub>, 324<sub>3</sub>, 326<sub>15</sub>, 327<sub>8</sub>, 328<sub>10</sub> and 329<sub>13</sub>. It is also sometimes used when defining terminology: Pras 303<sub>7</sub>, 304<sub>2</sub>, 304<sub>5</sub>, 304<sub>6</sub>, 304<sub>8</sub>, 307<sub>2</sub>, 308<sub>12</sub>.

<sup>219</sup> Pras 280-301, German translation by SCHAYER (1931:81-109).

interlocutor involves a *santāna*-theory, in which no stable or permanent element transmigrates but what transmigrates (*saṃsarati*) is rather a series of ever changing instances of the conditioned phenomena that constitute an individual.

Alternatively, the word transmigration may also mean that it is not just the impermanent constituents of an individual that transmigrate, because these constituents perish as conditioned, impermanent phenomena. Instead, what transmigrates is the sentient being itself (*sattva*), that is to say a Self (*ātman*) or an individual (*pudgala*).<sup>226</sup> This possibility is also rejected by Candrakīrti in chapter sixteen of Pras.<sup>227</sup> Given the explanation of the transmigration of the conditioned phenomena in chapter sixteen quoted above, it should be noted that the arguments in the interlocutor's opening statement of chapter seventeen that there is an interrupted progression of their series, etc., refers specifically to the transmigration of conditioned phenomena but does not refer to the transmigration of a Self.

The interlocutor thus states that if there would be transmigration of conditioned phenomena or of a Self, there would also be a connection between action and result. The theory of action and result (*karmaphala*) necessitates transmigration, because – as stated in Mmk 17.1 – action is taught in the Buddhist scriptures to yield its result in the present or a future life.<sup>228</sup> Hence, without transmigration the theory of action and result becomes impossible as is explained by what the interlocutor says next:

(V302<sub>6</sub>):When, on the one hand (*tu*), *saṃsāra* is non-existent ( *°saṃsārābhāve*) in the manner that has been depic-

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understood as an interpolation or variant in the Tibetan translation. A similar translation of *parampara* is attested at Pras 218<sub>4</sub> (MAY, 1959:218, 390 (critical Tibetan edition); D3860.75a<sub>5</sub>) and Pras 314<sub>3</sub> (D3860.104a<sub>4</sub>).

<sup>226</sup> For a general discussion of rebirth, action, Self and no-Self in Buddhism, cf. LVP (1902:255-256, 287-288; 1917:57-66), SASAKI (1956), McDERMOTT (1980:165-172), VETTER (1988:41-44) and KRITZER (1998). For a summary and discussion of LVP's writings on this issue, cf. FALK (1940:647-663).

<sup>227</sup> Pras 283<sub>7</sub>-287<sub>15</sub> (SCHAYER, 1931b: 87-95). In this discussion, the words *sattva*, *ātman* and *pudgala* seem to be used interchangeably; for the occurrence of the word *ātman* in this context, cf. Pras 284<sub>1</sub> (SCHAYER, 1931b:88) and 284<sub>9</sub>ff. (SCHAYER, 1931b:89).

<sup>228</sup> Cf. the commentary to Mmk 17.1 below (Pras 305<sub>9-10</sub>), at which point this issue will be discussed.

ted [by you] (*yathopavarṇṇita*), the connection between action and result (*karmaphalasambandha*) would be (*syāt*) entirely (*eva*) non-existent (*°abhāva*), because of the perishability (*°vināśītvāt*) of the mind (*cittasya*) immediately upon [its] arising (*utpattyanantara*) and (*ca*) because of the non-existence (*asadbhāvāt*) of the ripening (*vipākasya*) [of the result] at the time when the action is executed (*karmākṣepakāle*). When, on the other hand (*tu*), there is (*satī*) real existence of *saṃsāra* (*saṃsārasadbhāve*), the connection of actions (*karmaṇām*) to [their] results (*phalasambandhaḥ*) is not contradicted (*na virodhito bhavati*), because an action done here [in this life] (*iha kṛtasya karmaṇaḥ*) has a connection to a result (*°phalasambandhāt*), which ripens even in another life (*janmāntare 'pi vipāka*). Therefore (*tasmāt*), *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāraḥ*) really does exist (*vidyata eva*) because of its being the basis for the connection between action and result (*karmaphalasambandhāśrayatvāt*)” (*iti*).

The interlocutor then states the counter-premise (*vyatirekavyāpti*) of his argument, namely that if *saṃsāra* is denied existence in the manner that has been depicted by Candrakīrti in chapter sixteen,<sup>229</sup> there cannot be a

<sup>229</sup> This is a basic theme in the discussion of chapter sixteen; cf. Pras 280<sub>6,8</sub>: *ucyate | syād bhāvānām svabhāvo yadi saṃsāra eva bhavet, na tv asti | iha yadi saṃsāraḥ syāt sa niyataṃ saṃskārāṇām vā bhavet sattvasya vā*; SCHAYER (1931b:81): “[Darauf] erwidert [der Mādhyamika:] Wenn der *saṃsāra* wirklich wäre, so würde es allerdings den *svabhāva* in den *bhāvas* geben. Das ist aber nicht der Fall. Wenn nämlich der *saṃsāra* wirklich wäre, dann müßte er notwendigerweise entweder ein *saṃsāra* der *saṃskāras*, oder ein *saṃsāra* des *sattva* (= des ganzen Individuums) sein. Nun ist aber beides falsch.” English translation: “[The Mādhyamika] answers [to this]: if *saṃsāra* were real, then there would indeed be a *svabhāva* in the *bhāvas*. This is, however, not the case. That is, if *saṃsāra* were real, then it would necessarily have to be a *saṃsāra* of the *saṃskāras*, or a *saṃsāra* of the *sattva* (= of the whole individual). However, neither is the case.” And further, Pras 287<sub>14-18</sub>: *yadā ca saṃskārāṇām ātmanaś ca saṃsāro nāsti, tadā nāsty eva saṃsāra iti sthitam | atrāha | vidyata eva saṃsāraḥ pratidvandvisadbhāvāt | iha yo nāsti na tasya pratidvandvī vidyate tadyathā vandyāsūnor iti | asti ca saṃsārasya pratidvandvi-nirvāṇam, tasmād asti saṃsāra iti | ucyate | syāt saṃsāro yadi tatpratidvandvinirvāṇam syāt | na tv astīty āha*; SCHAYER (1931b:95): “[Zusammenfassend] stellen wir fest: weil weder der *saṃsāra* der *saṃskāras*, noch der *saṃsāra* des *ātman* wirklich

whose speech in most cases is identified by the verb *āha*. Since the passage at V304<sub>10</sub> belongs to the explanation of Mmk 17.1-5, the present *īti* will here not be interpreted as the end of the interlocutor's speech, but verses Mmk 17.1-5 will be interpreted as belonging to the interlocutor's speech, which would also be in accordance with the other commentaries. This calls for a different interpretation of the present *īti*, and there are two possibilities. First, the *īti* could indicate that the preceding text is an explication of the interlocutor's first general statement, viz. that "saṃsāra really does exist because of its being the basis for the connection between action and result" (*vidyata eva saṃsāraḥ karmaphalasambandhāśrayatvāt*, V302<sub>3</sub>). Secondly, the *īti* could indicate that the last piece of the interlocutor's speech, starting with *yathopavarṇita*<sup>o</sup>, is an explication of his general statement that "a connection between action and result would exist, if the transmigration of conditioned phenomena or of a Self would exist" (*yadīha santānāviccheda-kremeṇa janmamaraṇaparamparyā hetuphalabhā-vappravṛtṭyā saṃskārāṇām ātmano vā saṃsaraṇaṃ syāt syāt tadānīṃ karmaphalasambandhaḥ*, V302<sub>4-5</sub>). Either way, the *īti* indicates the end of a subsection of the interlocutor's speech, but does not indicate the end of his entire speech.

### 3.2 A Brief Presentation of Karmaphala

(V303<sub>3</sub>): [One might ask] (*īti*): "but (*punaḥ*) what (*kānī*) [are] those (*tānī*) actions (*karmāṇī*)?" or (*vā*), "what (*kim*) [is] that result (*tat phalam*)?" Wishing to express their divisions (*tatprabhedavivakṣayā*), the following (*idam*) is stated (*ucyate*):

*"Which (yat) state of mind (cetas) [leads to being] self-restraining (ātmasaṃyamakam) and (ca) benefiting others (parānugrāhakam) [and] friendly (maitram), that (saḥ) [is] dharma (dharmah). It (tat) [is] a seed (bījam) for a result (phalasya) both (ca) after passing away*

*(pretya) and (ca) in this world (iha). ”<sup>236</sup> (Mmk 17.1)*

The verses Mmk 17.1-5 introduce the theory of *karmaphala* by presenting various divisions of actions. Thus, Mmk 17.1 is introduced in *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403), Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* (Saito, 1984.II:220) and Pras (as well as partially in *Chung lun*, T1564.21b<sub>21</sub>) with an introductory question asking what these actions and their results are.

The first verse (Mmk 17.1) presents the state of mind or attitude (*cetas*) which can be designated as *dharma*, literally ‘that which is to be upheld or kept’ and further ‘that which holds or keeps’ (cf. the commentary below for an analysis). As Candrakīrti indicates below (V305<sub>4</sub>), the verse also indicates presents its opposite, ‘unrighteous action’ (*adharmā*). The verse is, in fact, very compact, since it in essence explains the whole principle of *karmaphala* in a most brief form. This is also reflected in Candrakīrti’s commentary to this verse, which is rather extensive.

Candrakīrti (V305<sub>11</sub>) considers the verse to present a single rightful action, which is of a mental nature (*cittātmaka eko dharma*).<sup>237</sup> This

<sup>236</sup> It should be noted that this translation agrees with Candrakīrti’s interpretation of the verse below, in which *ātmasaṃyamakam*, *parānugrāhakam* and *maitram* are taken as three adjectives modifying *cetas*, and the word *ca* ‘and’ is read as implied after *maitram* (as indicated by the square-bracket in my translation). If Candrakīrti’s interpretation is disregarded, it is, however, also possible to read the verse in a way, in which *maitram* is not taken as an adjective but, more normally, as a noun. In that case, *dharma* would refer to both *ātmasaṃyamakam cetas* and *parānugrāhakam maitram*, and so the translation would be: “What (*yat*) [is] a self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamakam*) state of mind (*cetas*) and (*ca*) friendliness (*maitram*) benefiting others (*parānugrāhakam*), that (*saḥ*) is *dharma* (*dharmāḥ*).” Alternatively, *yat* may be taken with *parānugrāhakam*, in which case *saḥ* must be understood as a singular collective pronoun referring to two nouns, viz. *cetas* and *maitram*. If so, the translation would be: “The self-restraining state of mind and friendliness, which (*yat*) is benefiting others (*parānugrāhakam*), that (*saḥ*) is *dharma*.” I am indebted to Claus OETKE for making me aware of these alternatives. I will again underline that these alternatives do not represent how the verse is read by Candrakīrti. Regarding the interpretations by the other commentators, *Chung lun* along with both Chinese translations of this verse do not follow Candrakīrti’s interpretation, and the earlier commentaries *Akutobhayā*, *Buddhapālita* and *Prajñāpradīpa*, are far less explicit than Candrakīrti in stating *maitram* to be an adjective with an implied *ca*. These details are discussed below at the relevant points in relation to Candrakīrti’s commentary.

<sup>237</sup> Avalokitavratā argues, however, in *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.18b<sub>1</sub>) that verbal and bodily actions also are implied by this verse: ‘dir tshig le’ur byas pa sems pa zés bya bas yid kyi las ’ba’ zīg bstan pa ni mtshon pa tsam du zad kyi | des kun nas bsalān ba’i lus dañ ṅag gi las dag

this translation, the last word of *pada c* in the verse is the Chinese word *shan* (T1564.21b<sub>6</sub>: 善), which normally and throughout this text is used as a translation for *kuśala* ‘wholesome action’. There are four possibilities for interpreting this word. First, it may simply be a free Chinese rendering of Sanskrit *dharma* that the translator Kumārajīva here interpreted as carrying the meaning of *kuśala*. Secondly, it may be that it should be read together with the preceding syllable, i.e., *tz’u shan* (慈善), a compound that in Middle Chinese may mean ‘charitable, benevolent, philanthropic’, in which case the word *dharma* has been omitted in the Chinese translation. Thirdly, it may truly represent the standard Chinese translation of Sanskrit *kuśala*, which would then be an early variant reading in the Sanskrit text that perhaps could be reconstructed as *\*maitraṃ tad kuśalaṃ bījam*, although such a variant is completely unknown in the Indic commentarial tradition. Fourthly, it may constitute a variant reading that occurred in the later Chinese transmission of *Chung lun*. I consider the first or fourth possibility more likely, and the second or third possibility less likely.

(V303<sub>6</sub>): In that [verse] (*tatra*), [it is called] ‘self’ (*ātman*), because (*iti*) egocentrism (*ahaṃmānaḥ*) is placed (*āhita*), [i.e.,] generated (*utpāditaḥ*), on to it (*asmin*). The individual (*pudgalaḥ*) being conceptualised (*prajñāpyamānaḥ*), having taken the aggregates (*skandhān*) as [its] basis (*upādāya*), is called (*ucyate*) ‘the Self’ (*ātmety*).

Candrakīrti begins his commentary on the verse by explaining its first word in Sanskrit, namely ‘self-restraining’ (*ātmasaṃyamakam*). First, only the word Self (*ātman*) is explained. Such an explanation is not found in the other commentaries. Candrakīrti first defines the Self as the object of egocentrism (*ahaṃmāna*). In fact, this definition seems to be a semantic analysis (*nirukti*), in which the definition forms an epigram of the word *ātmā*. The first syllable, *āt*, is implied as meaning *āhitaḥ* (where *ā* and *t* spell *āt*), i.e., ‘placed’. The word *āhitaḥ* is further glossed with the word ‘generated’ (*utpāditaḥ*). The second syllable, *mā* (starting from its nominative form *ātmā* and not its stem-form *ātman*), is implied as meaning *ahaṃmānaḥ*, i.e., ‘self-conceit’, ‘I-notion’, ‘self-assertion’ or ‘egocentrism’. To indicate *ātman* to be the object of such



are the substratum for the designation of an individual (*pudgalaprajñapti-kāraṇa*).<sup>248</sup>

(V303<sub>7</sub>) To be “*self-restraining*” (*ātmasaṃyamakam*) is (*iti*) to restrain oneself (*ātmānaṃ saṃyamayati*), [i.e.,] to be controlled (*asvatantrayati*) in relation to the sense-objects (*viṣayeṣu*), to avoid (*nivārayati*) behaviour (*pravṛttim*) urged by the defilements, such as passion and so forth (*rāgādī-kleśavaśena*).

Having separately defined the word ‘Self’, Candrakīrti goes on to explain the meaning of the word ‘self-restraining’ (*ātmasaṃyamaka*). This is done by glossing the term with three phrases. The first phrase, “to restrain oneself” (*ātmānaṃ saṃyamayati*), is simply a grammatical analysis (*vigraha*) of the compound, where the adjectival form *saṃyamaka* is verbalised to its causative form *saṃyamayati*, and the compound-member ‘self’ (*ātman*) is given as its direct object, thus indicating that the compound should be interpreted as an accusative *tadpuruṣa*-compound. The same phrase occurs with minor variants in Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:220) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; T15566.99a<sub>20</sub>). *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403), on the other hand, explains *ātmasaṃyamaka* as meaning ‘that which holds back the Self’ (*\*nirdharati; bdag ñid ñes par ’dzin par bstan to*).

The second gloss, “to be controlled with regard to the sense-objects” (*viṣayeṣv asvatantrayati*), further clarifies the relevant sense of *to restrain* (*saṃyamayati*): it is to limit indulgence in the sense-fields or sense-objects, i.e., with regard to what is seen, heard, smelled, tasted or felt.<sup>249</sup> Self-restraint thus means to avoid sensual addictions. This gloss is not found in

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lack of the *upādāna*, that condition the pseudo-concept [that is the individual]. [Such a *ātman*] that is free of the *upādāna*, that does not at all manifest (*nirāñjana*) itself in the sphere of the empirical reality, that does not become apparent (*avyakta*) as an individual existence and that is without a cause, what is it? A nobody! It does not at all exist, that is the meaning. Since such an [*ātman*] is unreal, therefore also the *upādāna* is unreal, since it indeed cannot exist without the *upādātar*.”

<sup>248</sup> AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1987:1193; D4090.II.82b<sub>4</sub>).

<sup>249</sup> For a list of the *pañca viṣayāḥ* (*yul lnga*), cf. e.g., Candrakīrti’s *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (LINDTNER, 1979:95<sub>27-28</sub>).

(V303<sub>8</sub>): [It is called] a state of mind (*cetas*), because (*iti*) [it] collects (*cinoti*), [i.e.,] accumulates (*upacinoti*), [i.e.,] causes a pure (*śubham*) or (*ca*) impure (*aśubham*) action (*karma*) to be retained (*niyamayati*) as a capacity for yielding a ripening (*vipākadānasāmarthyē*). ‘Mind’ (*cittam*), ‘intellect’ (*manas*) [and] ‘consciousness’ (*vijñānam iti*) [are] merely (*eva*) synonyms (*paryāyāḥ*) of precisely that [word *cetas*] (*tasya*).

To recapitulate the verse (Mmk 17.1), being self-restraining (*ātma-saṃyamaka*) is one of the three qualities attributed to the state of mind (*cetas*), which is *dharma*. Candrakīrti next explains the word *cetas*, unlike the other commentaries, which omit any explanation of this word. Generally speaking, *Cetas* may be explained as a derivative from the verbal root *cit* ‘to perceive or think’ (*cetati*) or from the verbal root *ci* ‘to gather’ (*cinoti*). In agreement with the semantic analysis (*nirukti*) of both *cetas* and *citta* most common in Buddhist texts, Candrakīrti begins his explanation with indicating that *cetas* is derived from the root *ci* ‘to gather’ (*cinoti*).<sup>259</sup> To gloss the meaning of *cinoti*, the word *upacinoti* ‘to hoard together, heap up, accumulate’, that is to say an intensified form of *cinoti*, is given. Candrakīrti elsewhere uses derivatives of *upa-√ci* (Tib. *ñe bar sogs*) in the sense of ‘hoarding’ wealth<sup>260</sup> and of ‘accumulating’ the collection (*saṃbhāra*) of the roots of

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janam| ete karmapathāḥ] śuklā daśa kṛṣṇā viparyayāt|| I.9 ||. Translation: “Non-violence, abstention from theft, desisting other’s wives, being restrained (*saṃyamah*) with regard to falsehood, slander, (*pāruṣya*) and talking nonsense; avoidance of covetousness, ill will and views of nihilism, these [are] the ten white actions and their paths. Otherwise, [they should be known as] the [ten] black [actions and their paths].” Regarding the translation of *karmapathāḥ*, cf. AYMORE (1995:33-34, especially note 42). For an example speaking of restraint (*saṃyama*) in body, speech and mind, cf. AN I.155 (MORRIS, 1885:155; transl. WOODWARD 1932:139).

<sup>259</sup> For a discussion of and scriptural references to this definition, cf. SCHMITHAUSEN (1987:536, note 1433).

<sup>260</sup> Having just explained in CŚV on CŚ 1.10 (cf. LANG, 1986:28-29) that everything is transitory and remains but for a moment, Candrakīrti says (D3865.38a<sub>7</sub>-38b<sub>1</sub>): de’i phyir ‘dus byas thams cad kyi chos ñid de ltar rnam par gnas pa na kha cig dag yun riñ du gson pa re bas śin tu yun riñ por yul loñs spyad par bya ba’i phyir sdig pa’i bya ba khas blañs nas yul ñe bar

synonymous.<sup>264</sup>

(V304<sub>1</sub>): Since (*iti*) precisely this (*tad etat*) wholesome (*kuśalam*) self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamakam*) state of mind (*cetas*), which keeps one away from engaging (*pravṛt-tividhāarakam*) in killing and so forth (*prāṇātipātādiṣu*), keeps one [away] (*dhārayati*) from going on a bad course [of rebirth]<sup>265</sup> (*durgatigamanāt*), [it] is called (*ucyate*) ‘*dharma*’ (*dharma iti*).

Having explained the words ‘self-restraining’ (*ātmasaṃyamaka*) and ‘state of mind’ (*cetas*), Candrakīrti next explains that this state of mind is *dharma*.<sup>266</sup> While the other commentators do not elaborate on this word, Candrakīrti provides a longer analysis of it. The literal meaning of *dharma* (derived from the verbal root *dhṛ* ‘to hold, bear, keep’) is here used to justify why a self-restraining state of mind may be called *dharma*.<sup>267</sup> As explained above, this

<sup>264</sup> Similarly, in AK II.34ab (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:208): *cittaṃ mano ’tha vijñānam ekārthaṃ*. Translation by LVP (1923:176): “34 a-b. Pensée (*citta*), esprit (*manas*), connaissance (*vijñāna*), ces noms désignent une même chose.” English translation: “34 a-b. Thought (*citta*), mind (*manas*), consciousness (*vijñāna*), these names designate the same.” Likewise, at *Vimśatikā* 1.3 (SCHMITHAUSEN, 1967:119) and partly in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (LAMOTTE, 1936:204<sub>6</sub>, 261; MUROJI, 1985:55<sub>15</sub>). As indicated by LVP (*ibid.*), this statement finds scriptural authority in DN 1.21 and SN 2.94. It also appears to be the view of the later *Theravāda*-tradition (cf. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1910:234-235). SCHMITHAUSEN (1967:119-121) explicates that this view is, on the contrary, not fully adopted by the *Yogācāra*-texts, where the three terms are separated as referring to different entities (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*, PRADHAN, 1950:11<sub>25ff.</sub>): *citta* then refers to the *ālayavijñāna*, *manas* to the seventh consciousness called *kliṣṭaṃ manas*, and *vijñāna* refers to the five kinds of sense-consciousness and the thought-consciousness (*manovijñāna*). Candrakīrti’s state-ment thus aligns his view of consciousness with that of the *Abhidharma*-genre and sets it apart from the view of the *Yogācāra*-texts, which would also be in agreement with his detailed critique of the *Yogācāra*-concept of *ālayavijñāna* in Mav (6. 46ff.).

<sup>265</sup> Literally, the terms *durgatī* and *sugatī* respectively mean ‘a bad going’ or ‘a bad path’ and ‘a good going’ or ‘a good path’. As will be explained below, they refer to specific states of rebirth and, therefore, they have here been translated respectively as ‘a bad course of rebirth’ and ‘a good course of rebirth’.

<sup>266</sup> As indicated by LINDTNER (1982:100), verses I.6-24 of Nāgārjuna’s *Ratnāvalī* also present *dharma* in this ethical sense.

<sup>267</sup> Candrakīrti’s decision to comment on *dharma* as *dhāraṇa* and *vidhāraṇa* may in part have been inspired by *Akutoḥayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:403), which, on the one hand, defines

wholesome state of mind (*kuśalaṃ cetas*) thus keeps one away (*dhārayati*) from going on a bad course of rebirth (*durgatigamana*) and in that sense it is literally, ‘that which keeps [one]’ (*dharma*). The ‘courses of rebirth’ (*gati*) will be discussed below.

(V304<sub>3</sub>): This (*ayam*) word *dharma* (*dharmaśabdaḥ*) is distinguished (*vyavasthāpitaḥ*) in three ways (*tridhā*) in the teachings (*pravacane*): in the sense (*°arthena*) holding (*°dhāraṇa*) its own characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*); in the sense (*°arthena*) of keeping one away (*vidhāraṇa*) from going on a wrong course [of rebirth] (*kugatigamana*); and in the sense (*°arthena*) of keeping one away (*vidhāraṇa*) from going into *saṃsāra* consisting of the five courses [of rebirth] (*pāñcagatikasaṃsāragamana*).

Candrakīrti next distinguishes three meanings of the word *dharma* in the

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ou bien parce qu’il fait atteindre le Nirvāṇa et, par conséquent, protège définitivement de la souffrance (: c’est l’acte bon pur). L’acte mauvais (*akuśala*, *aśubha*) est pernicieux: c’est l’acte de rétribution dés-agréable. L’acte dont Bhagavat ne dit pas qu’il est bon ou mauvais, l’acte non-défini (*avyākṛta*), n’est ni salutaire, ni pernicieux.” English translation: “Good action is wholesome, bad action is harmful, action that is neither good nor bad is neither wholesome nor harmful. Such is the definition of good action, etc. Good action (*kuśala*, *śubha*) is wholesome (*kṣema*), because it is of a pleasant outcome (*iṣṭavipāka*) and consequently protects temporarily against suffering (: it is an impure good action, *kuśalasāsrava*); or, because it makes one achieve Nirvāṇa and, consequently, protects definitely against suffering (: it is a pure good action). Bad action (*akuśala*, *aśubha*) is harmful: it is action that is of an unpleasant outcome. Action that the Bhagavat did not declare either good or bad, indeterminate action (*avyākṛta*), is neither wholesome nor harmful.” For similar definitions, cf. SCHMITHAUSEN (1998:10-11, incl. notes 71, 72, 73). For glosses on *kuśala* in the Pāli-sources, cf. COUSINS (1996:139-143). Candrakīrti’s explanation of pure actions (*śubha*) in CŚV (D3865.93a-7) agrees more or less with this definition: dge ba yaṅ bde ba daṅ bde ’gro’i rnam par smin pa’i ’bras bu can yin du zin kyaṅ skye ba daṅ | rga ba daṅ ’chi ba la sogs pa’i sdug bsñal sgrub par byed pa ṅid kyi phyir na dge legs ma yin no | |. Translation: “Moreover, a pure action (*śubha*) is endowed with a result of ripening in the form of happiness and a good course of rebirth, but is, nevertheless, not the ultimate good (*\*kuśala?*, *dge legs*; the word *kuśala* for *dge legs* is attested in AKBh), since it produces the suffering of birth, aging, death and so forth.” The word *śubha* is attested in the mūla-verse (CŚ 5.5), on which this passage is a comment (cf. LANG, 1986:54).

teachings: as meaning ‘phenomenon’, ‘wholesome action’ and ‘nirvāṇa’.<sup>272</sup> The provenance of this threefold distinction of *dharma* remains unknown. Elsewhere, Candrakīrti only distinguishes two senses of *dharma*, viz. ‘phenomenon’ and ‘nirvāṇa’,<sup>273</sup> which corresponds to the explanation given on the word *abhidharma* in AKBh.<sup>274</sup> Now each of the three meanings of *dharma* distinguished by Candrakīrti in the present context will be explained in more detail:

(V304<sub>4</sub>): In the [teachings] (*tatra*),<sup>275</sup> all (*sarve*) factors associated with negative influences (*sāśravāḥ*) and (*ca*) fac-

<sup>272</sup> This passage of Pras is summarised by PĀSĀDIKA (1996:64-67) in the context of discussing ‘universal responsibility’.

<sup>273</sup> Pras 457<sub>1-2</sub> (cf. text-critical note by DE JONG, 1978b:238; D3860.149b<sub>5-6</sub>; MAY, 1959: 402): svalakṣaṇādhāraṇān nirvāṇāgradharmādhāraṇād dharmāḥ|. Translation (MAY, 1959: 186): “Les dharma, de ce qu’ils comportent un caractère propre, ou de ce qu’ils comprennent le dharma suprême, l’extinction.” English translation: “Dharmas, because they hold their own characteristics, or because they consist of the supreme dharma, the extinction.”

<sup>274</sup> In AKBh (PRADHAN, 1967:2; ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:12; D4090.27a<sub>3ff</sub>; T1558.1b<sub>3ff</sub>), the word *abhidharma* is defined as follows: *yaḥ ca śāstram* [from the *mūla*-text] *asyāḥ prāptyarthaṁ anāsravāyāḥ prajñāyāḥ tad api tatsambhārabhāvād abhidharmaḥ ity ucyate*| *nirvacanaṁ tu svalakṣaṇādhāraṇād dharmāḥ*| *tad ayaṁ paramārthadharmāṁ vā nirvāṇaṁ dharmalakṣaṇaṁ vā pratyabhimukho dharma ity abhidharmaḥ*| *ukto hy abhidharmaḥ*|. Translation by LVP (1923:4): “On donne aussi le nom d’Abhidharma au Traité, car le Traité aussi fait obtenir la prajñā pure: il est donc un facteur de l’Abhidharma au sens propre. Dharma signifie: qui porte (*dhāraṇa*) un caractère propre (*svalakṣaṇa*). L’Abhidharma est nommé *abhi-dharma* parce qu’il envisage (*abhimukha*) le *dharma* qui est l’objet du suprême savoir, ou le suprême dharma, à savoir le Nirvāṇa; ou bien parce qu’il envisage les caractères des dharmas, caractères propres, caractères commun”. English translation: “The name *Abhidharma* is also given to this treatise, because it enables one to achieve the pure prajñā and is thus a factor of *Abhidharma* in its proper sense. Dharma signifies: that which holds (*dhāraṇa*) its own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*). The *Abhidharma* is called *abhidharma*, because it is directed towards (*abhimukha*) the *dharma* that is the object of highest knowledge, or the highest *dharma*, the knowledge of Nirvāṇa; Or, else, because it is directed towards the characteristics of *dharmas*, the own characteristics and the common characteristics.” The passage is explained in some detail in the AK-commentaries *\*Abhidharmakośaṭīkā Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* (D4093.13a-14a) by Pūrṇavardhana and *Sputārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* by Yaśomitra (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:12-13). The other extant AK-commentaries (D4091, D4094, D4095, D4096, D4421.17a) do not provide any further explanation of this definition. However, none of these texts provides any other etymology or definition of *dharma* than *svalakṣaṇādhāraṇa*. For a Theravāda distinction of four meanings of *dharma* given by Buddhaghosa as doctrine (*pariyatti*), cause (*hetu*), good quality (*guṇa*) and absence of essence (*nissattanijjivatā*), cf. *Atthasālinī* (MÜLLER, 1897:38; Transl. by TIN & RHYS DAVIDS, 1920:49).

<sup>275</sup> Or *Among these [three usages]*.

tors without negative influence (*anāśravāḥ*) are called (*ucyante*) ‘*dharmaś*’ (*dharmā iti*) on account of the sense of holding their own characteristics (*svalakṣaṇadhāraṇārthena*).

The word *dharma* may first refer to all entities (*bhāva*) or simply everything, here subsumed under two mutually exclusive, all-encompassing terms: *sāśrava* and *anāśrava* (as spelled in the mss used for this edition, but otherwise often spelled *sāsrava* and *anāsrava*).<sup>276</sup> SCHMITHAUSEN (1987:74-75, especially note 539) explains that a factor associated with a negative influence (*sāśrava*) is anything, which is an object (*ālambana*) or basis (*\*vastu*) for a negative influence (*āśrava*).<sup>277</sup> As shown by *\*Miśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra* (*Tsa a-p'i-t'an hsin lun* 雜阿毘曇心論),<sup>278</sup> the ‘negative influences’ or ‘can-  
kers’ (*āśrava* or *āsrava*) equal the defilements (*kleśa*, *fan-nao* 煩惱).<sup>279</sup>

<sup>276</sup> Cf. AK 1.4 (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:16): *sāsravā 'nāsravā dharmāḥ*. Translation (LVP, 1923:6): “Les *dharmaś* sont ‘impurs’, ‘en relation avec les vices’ (*sāsrava*), ou ‘purs’, ‘sans relation avec les vices’ (*anāsrava*).” English translation: “*Dharmaś* are ‘impure’, ‘connected with the vices’ (*sāsrava*), or ‘pure’, ‘without connection to the vices’ (*anāsrava*).”

<sup>277</sup> A semantic explanation (*nirukti*) is given in AK 5.40 (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1972:835): *āsayanty āsravānty ete haranti śleṣayanty atha | upagrhṇanti cety eṣām āsravādiniruktayaḥ ||* 5.40 ||. Translation (LVP, 1925:79): “Ils fixent et coulent, ils enlèvent, ils attachent, ils saisissent: telle est l’étymologie des termes *āsravaś*, etc.” English translation: “They fixate and flow, they carry away, they attach, they seize: such are the etymology of the terms *āsravaś*, etc.”

<sup>278</sup> Various Sanskrit reconstructions have been proposed for the title of this text: *\*Saṃyuktābhīdharmahṛdaya*, *\*Kṣudrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra*, *\*Abhidharmasārapratikīrṇakaśāstra*, *\*Miśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra* and *\*Saṃyuktābhīdhar-masāra*. What may be a reference to this text in Candrakīrti’s *\*Pañcaskandhapraka-raṇa* (Tib. text in LINDTNER, 1979:145; D3866.266b<sub>5</sub>) could suggest the reconstruction *\*miśraka* (Tib. *bsres pa*) “mixed” for the first part of the title (雜 *tsa* “mixed”) to be correct: *rgyas par dbye ba ni chos mñon pa dañ bsres pa las śes par bya’o*. Translation: “More detailed [sub]divisions can be learned from *Mixed [Selections] from the Abhidharma*.” This argument presupposes that the Sanskrit words *\*saṃ-yukta*, *\*kṣudraka* and *\*pratīkīrṇaka* probably would be rendered into Tibetan respectively as *\*dus pa*, *\*bsdus pa* and *\*thor bu* or the like, whereas the Tibetan word *bsres pa* very well could reflect the Sanskrit word *\*miśraka*. However, the argument also presupposes that the reference in Candrakīrti’s *\*Pañcaskandhapraka-raṇa* is to a concrete title and *not* just a general reference to be translated as “More detailed [sub]divisions can be learned from a mixture of *Abhidharma*-[works].”

<sup>279</sup> T1552.28.871a<sub>2</sub>: 以彼漏名故 惠者說煩惱. Translation by DESSEIN (1999.I:13): “The wise One speaks of defilement by means of this name ‘impurity’.” For an explanation of three types of *āśrava*, viz. *kāmāśrava*, *bhavāśrava* and *avidyā-śrava*, cf. Candrakīrti’s *\*Pañcaskandhapraka-raṇa* (D3866.263a<sub>1-4</sub>; LINDTNER, 1979:137-138).

unique trait or defining character of a phenomenon as opposed to the general traits it shares with all other phenomena. For example, the *svalakṣaṇa* of matter (*rūpa*) is ‘being breakable’ (*rūpaṇa*), the *svalakṣaṇa* of feel-ing (*vedanā*) is ‘experience’ (*anubhava*), etc.<sup>283</sup> When ‘*dharma*’ is used in this sense, it is usually translated with ‘phenomenon’ or ‘factor’.<sup>284</sup>

(V304<sub>5</sub>): The ten wholesome actions and so forth (*daśakuśalādayaḥ*) are called (*ucyante*) ‘*dharma*s’ (*dharmā ity*) on account of the sense of keeping one away from going on a wrong course [of rebirth] (*kugatigamanavidhāraṇārthena*); [for example, as in] “The *dharma*-practitioner (*dharmacārī*) rests (*śete*) happily (*sukham*) [both] in this (*asmin*) world (*loke*) and (*ca*) the next (*paratra*)”.

after having come into existence (*bhūtvā*) [is] non-existent (*asaṃbhavaḥ*), does not exist (*na*) ultimately (*paramārthataḥ*).” Thus, I would take the first two *pādas* as qualifying *rañ gi ño bo*, whereas SORESEN takes these lines as qualifying the predicate *mi brjod do*. I find that SORESEN’s interpretation forces the sense of the instrumental particle in ‘*dzin pas*’.

<sup>283</sup> Cf. Mav 6.202-215, where Candrakīrti in connection with explaining the emptiness of own characteristics (*svalakṣaṇasūnyatā*) enumerates the *svalakṣaṇas* of a long list of phenomena: *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃskāra*, *vijñāna*, *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *pratītyasamutpāda*, *dāna-pāramitā*, *śīlapāramitā*, *kṣānti*, *vīrya*, *dhyāna*, *prajñā*, *dhyāna*, *apramāṇa*, *ārupyasamāpatti*, *bodhipākṣikadharma*, *sūnyatā*, *ānimitta*, *apraṇihita*, *vimokṣa*, *bala*, *vaiśāradya*, *pratisamvid*, *pratibhāna*, *hitopasaṃhāra*, *mahākaraṇā*, *muditā*, *upekṣa*, *āveṇikabuddhadharma*, and *sarvākārajñātājñāna*. Occasionally, MavBh provides elucidation of these categories. For a translation, see TAUSCHER (1981:79-99). In AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1972:902), *svalakṣaṇa* is equated with own-being (*svabhāva*): *svabhāva evaiśaṃ svalakṣaṇam*]; Translation (LVP, 1925:159): “Le caractère propre, c’est-à-dire la nature propre (*svabhāva*)”; English translation: “Own characteristic, that is to say own nature (*svabhāva*).”

<sup>284</sup> This would, for example, be the sense of *dharma* in the following passage from *Dhyāyitamustisūtra* quoted at Pras 517<sub>16-17</sub> (D3860.173a<sub>1</sub>), although the words *kuśala* and *akuśala* are also mentioned: *yena mañjuśrīr evaṃ catvāry āryasatyāni dṛṣṭāni sa na kalpayati | ime dharmāḥ kuśalāḥ, ime dharmāḥ akuśalāḥ, ime dharmāḥ prahātavyāḥ, ime dharmāḥ sākṣātkartavyāḥ, dukhaṃ parijñātavyaṃ, samudayaḥ prahātavyaḥ, nirodhaḥ sākṣātkartavyaḥ, mārgo bhāvayitavya itī |*. Translation by MAY (1959:250): “Mañjuśrī, celui qui voit ainsi les quatre vérités saintes ne crée ni hypostases ni distinctions, *dharma* favorables, *dharma* défavorables, *dharma* à éliminer, *dharma* à réaliser; douleur à connaître parfaitement, origine à éliminer, arrêt à réaliser, chemin à créer psychiquement.” English translation: “Mañjuśrī, he who thus sees the four Noble Truths is produces neither hypostasizations nor distinctions, favorable *dharma*s, unfavourable *dharma*s, *dharma*s to be eliminated, *dharma*s to be realised, suffering to be completely recognized, an origin to be eliminated, a stoppage to be realized, a path to be psychologically created.”



both in this world and the next.”<sup>294</sup> The second occurrence is *Udānavarga* 30.5: “One should practise *dharma*, which is good conduct. One should not practise that, which is bad conduct. For the *dharma*-practitioner rests happily both in this world and the next.”<sup>295</sup> In both these verses, *dharma* is equated with ‘good conduct’ (*sucarita*) and is thus used in the sense of ‘right action’. However, as the first use of the word *dharma* was not illustrated with an example and only the second and third uses are illustrated in this manner, it is not certain whether these illustrations are interpolations or were originally placed in the text by Candrakīrti. However, they are attested by both the Sanskrit manuscripts and Tibetan translation.

(V304<sub>8</sub>) *Nirvāṇa* (*nirvāṇam*) is called (*ucyate*) ‘*dharma*’ (*dharma ity*) on account of the sense (°*arthena*) of keeping one away (°*vidhāraṇa*°) from going into *saṃsāra* consisting of the five courses [of rebirth] (*pāṃcagatikasaṃsāragama-na*°), [as] in this case (*ity atra*): “he goes (*gacchati*) for refuge (*śaraṇam*) in the *dharma* (*dharmam*).” In the present context (*iha*), however (*tu*), the word *dharma* (*dharmasāb-*

<sup>294</sup> *Udānavarga* 4.35 (BERNHARD, 1965:137): uttiṣṭen na pramādyeta dharmam sucaritam caret | dharmacārī sukham sete hy asmiṃ loke paratra ca ||. Omitted in the older Tibetan translation (D326) but attested by the later Tibetan translation (D4099.6b<sub>5</sub>): brtson ’grus ldan žiñ bag yod dañ | |chos spyod legs par spyod byed pa | |’jig rten ’di dañ pha rol du | |chos spyad pa yis bde ba ’thob | |. The verse has a parallel in *Dhammapada* 168 (HINÜBER & NORMAN, 1995:48): uttiṣṭhe na ppamajjeyya dhammam sucaritam care, dharmacārī sukham seti asmiṃ loke paramhi ca. Transl. by CARTER & PALIHAWADANA (1987:233): “One should stand up, not be neglectful, follow dhamma, which is good conduct. One, who lives dhamma, sleeps at ease in this world and also in the next.” As remarked by CARTER & PALIHAWADANA (ibid.), the commentary interprets *uttiṣṭhe* as ‘standing for alms’, i.e., the monk’s going on his daily alms-round. For an example of a similar use of *sukham supati* ‘he sleeps happily’, cf. AN 4.150 (HARDY, 1899; transl. by HARE, 1935:103).

<sup>295</sup> *Udānavarga* 30.5 (BERNHARD, 1965:303): dharmam caret sucaritam nainam duścaram caret | dharmacārī sukham sete hy asmiṃ loke paratra ca ||. Attested by both the Tibetan translations in the same wording (D326.240b<sub>6</sub>; D4099.29b<sub>6</sub>): chos spyod legs par spyad bya žiñ | |ñes par spyad pa de mi spyad | |’jig rten ’di dañ pha rol du | |chos spyad pas ni bde ba ’thob | |. The verse has a parallel in *Dhammapada* 169 (HINÜBER & NORMAN, 1995:48): dhammam care sucaritam na nam duccharitam care, dharmacārī sukham seti asmiṃ loke paramhi ca. Transl. by CARTER & PALIHAWADANA (1987:233): “One should follow dhamma, which is good conduct, not that which is poor conduct. One, who lives dhamma, sleeps at ease in this world and also in the next.”

*daḥ*) is intended (*abhipretaḥ*) only (*eva*) in the [second] sense of keeping one away from going on a wrong course [of rebirth] (*kugatigamanavidhāraṇārthena*).

Thirdly, the word *dharma* may be used to signify *nirvāṇa*, the Buddhist *summum bonum*. The semantic interpretation provided by Candrakīrti in this case is that *nirvāṇa* keeps one away (*vidhāraṇa*) from going into *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāragamana*) consisting of the five courses of rebirth (*pāñcagatika*), and hence *nirvāṇa* is ‘something that keeps or holds’ (*dharma*). Similar references to *dharma* as designating *nirvāṇa* were mentioned above (see footnotes 273 and 274). While the first and possibly also the second use of *dharma* include phenomena, which are both *sāśrava* and *anāśrava*, this third use of *dharma* only includes phenomena that are *anāśrava*. It, therefore, seems that Candrakīrti would include the use of *dharma* in the common sense of the ‘teachings’ of Buddha within this third category of *dharma*. This interpretation would also agree with the definitions of *dharma* quoted in footnotes 273 and 274 above.

To illustrate this use, the example given is: “he goes for refuge in the *dharma*” or perhaps “he goes for the refuge which is the *dharma*” (*dharmam śaraṇam gacchati*).<sup>296</sup> Thus, according to Candrakīrti’s interpretation (or, as mentioned above, these illustrations could also be interpolations) the word *dharma* should – when speaking of taking refuge – be interpreted as *nirvāṇa*, perhaps also including the Buddhist teachings leading to *nirvāṇa*, because the *dharma* is that, which keeps one away from going into *saṃsāra*. If the word *dharma* is restricted in meaning to the three senses given here by Candrakīrti, clearly the case of taking refuge would thus have to belong to this third category, because *dharmasāraṇa* not merely leads away from the bad courses of rebirth but also leads to and represents *nirvāṇa*. This would agree with the statement in *\*Trisāraṇasaptati* that “knowledge of the *dharma* of phenomena (*dharma*) is explained precisely as liberation from aging and death.”<sup>297</sup> It would also agree with what is said in AKBh (LVP,

<sup>296</sup> Moreover, mss ब्रज attest a somewhat unusual compounded form *dharmasāraṇam gacchati*.

<sup>297</sup> D3971.252a<sub>1</sub> (SORENSEN, 1986:30): rga śi dag las grol ba ñid | chos rnam kyī ni chos śes bśad.

*pañcagati* in all his writings (however, his commentator, Jayānanda, alternates between both forms).<sup>302</sup> Candrakīrti, finally, comments that the word *dharma* in Mmk 17.1 is used in the second sense, i.e., that of ‘wholesome action’, such as the ten wholesome actions, etc.

(V304<sub>10</sub>): Moreover (*punaḥ*), is (*kim*) the state of mind (*cetas*) *dharma* (*dharmah*) only in as much as (*eva ekam*) it is self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamakam*)? No (*na*), [the interlocutor]<sup>303</sup> says (*ity āha*). What (*kim*) then (*tarhi*)? What (*yat*) state of mind (*cetas*) [is] benefiting others (*parānugrāhakam*) and (*ca*) friendly (*maitrañ ca*), that (*asau*) [is] also (*api*) *dharma* (*dharmah*). In the case of ‘*maitram*’ (*maitram ity atra*), one should understand (*veditavyaḥ*) that the word ‘and’ (*caśabdaḥ*) is elided yet implied (*lupta-nirdiṣṭaḥ*).

The commentary then turns to the other two aspects of the state of mind that is *dharma*, viz. the state of mind, which is ‘caring for others’ or ‘benefiting others’ (*parānugrāhaka*) and ‘kind’ or ‘friendly’ (*maitra*). It is further clarified that the word ‘and’ (*ca-śabda*) is elided (*lupta*) after *maitra* in pāda c omitted metri causa.<sup>304</sup> That is to say, the word *maitram* should be read as a third attribute to *cetas*, i.e.: “which (*yat*) state of mind (*cetas*) [leads to being] self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamakam*) and (*ca*) benefiting others

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starving ghosts (*pettivisaya*). As indicated by MCDERMOTT (1980:172), the *asuras* are, however, mentioned as a separate category in-between the *pettivisaya* and the *manussā* at DN 3.264. As a digression, it may further be remarked that *Jaina*-texts speak of 4 *gati*: *devagati*, *manuṣyagati*, *tiryaggati* and *narakagati* (GLASENAPP, 1915:27, 63-74).

<sup>302</sup> Attested at Pras 218<sub>3</sub>, 269<sub>9</sub>, 304<sub>4</sub>, 323<sub>5</sub>, 328<sub>3</sub>, MavBh D3862.329b<sub>2</sub>, \**Yuktiṣaṣṭhikāvṛtti* D3864.6a<sub>4</sub>, D3864.21b<sub>2</sub>, CŚV D3865.76a<sub>3,7</sub>. As noted by SCHERRER-SCHAUB (1991:134, fn. 89), there is also a single occurrence of *śadgati* at MavBh (D3862.274b<sub>7</sub>; LVP, 1907-1912:175), but this occurs in a quotation from a *sūtra* (which LVP (1910:356) tentatively identifies as *Tattvanirdeśasamādhi*).

<sup>303</sup> Cf. discussion on the interlocutor’s speech on p. 173 above.

<sup>304</sup> In *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.60 (VASU, 1891:55-56), Pāṇini defines elision (*lopa*) as something in the sentence, which is not seen (*adarśanam*) but which is still operational or exerting an influence, for example, on the syntax, etc. That is to say, an elided word or part of a word is an implied word or part of a word.

(*parānugrāhakam*) [and (*ca*)] friendly (*maitram*), that (*saḥ*) [is] *dhar-ma*.” The other commentaries do not comment on this point of the syntactical analysis of the verse. Candrakīrti probably found it necessary to add this explanation to prevent the reader from wrongly joining *maitram* into the correlative clause *saḥ dharmah*, which could be provoked by the *pāda*-break between *pādas* b and c. This is exactly an interpretation found in both the Chinese translations of the verse: (a) “when someone can restrain the mind [and] bring benefit to sentient beings, it is called friendliness [and] wholesome action”<sup>305</sup> and (b) “self-restraint in body, speech and mind and this care for others [are] friendliness [and] dharma.”<sup>306</sup> This interpretation is also attested in *Chung lun*’s prose-commentary,<sup>307</sup> which either would indicate that *Ching-mu*, its author, had committed the same error or that *Kumārajīva*, its translator, modified the prose-commentary in his translation to suit his interpretation of the verse.<sup>308</sup>

(V305<sub>1</sub>): Among these [two] (*tatra*), ‘to benefit (*anugṛhṇāti*) others (*param*)’ is (*iti*) a state of mind (*cetas*) benefiting others (*parānugrāhakam*). Which (*yat*) state of mind (*cetas*) has the four bases for gathering (*catuḥsaṃgrahavastu*) as its activity (*°pravṛttam*) and (*ca*) protection from fear (*bhayaparitrāṇa*) as its activity (*°pravṛttam*), that (*asau*) [is] also (*api*) *dharma* (*dharmah*).

First, the compound *parānugrāhaka* is explained by dividing it into its components and verbalising the verbal-adjective *anugrāhaka*; thus, *parānu-*

<sup>305</sup> *Chung lun*, T1564.21b<sub>25-26</sub>: 人能降伏心。利益於眾生。是名為慈善。

<sup>306</sup> *Pang jo teng lun*, T1566.99a<sub>18-19</sub>: 自護身口思。及彼攝他者。慈法為種子。

<sup>307</sup> *Chung lun*, T1564.21c<sub>1</sub>: “[They] are also called kindness, wholesome action [and] beneficence”; 亦名慈善福德。

<sup>308</sup> Instead of Candrakīrti’s interpretation of the verse requiring the reading of an implied ‘and’ (*ca*) with *maitram* in *pada* c, it is also possible simply to take *maitram* as an adjective modifying *cetas*, thus reading “Which benevolent (*maitram*) state mind (*cetas*) [is] self-restraining and benefiting others, that is *dharma*.” However, this is not the interpretation preferred by Candrakīrti.

similar yet slightly different terms: “Benefiting others means almsgiving, holding to the precepts, patience, humility, etc. and not harming others” (BOCKING, 1995:257).<sup>317</sup> Finally, Pras states that a state of mind benefiting others in this way is also to be considered *dharma*.

(V305<sub>3</sub>): Which (*yaṭ*) state of mind (*cetas*) [is] existing (*bhavam*) in a friend (*mitre*), [i.e.,] that is without hostility (*aviruddham*) towards sentient beings (*sattveṣu*), that (*taṭ*) [is] a friendly (*maitram*) state of mind (*cetas*). Or (*vā*), friendly (*maitram*) [means] exclusively (*eva*) a friend (*mitram*); [for] which (*yaṭ*) state of mind (*cetas*) [is] benefiting oneself (*ātmānugrāhakam*), that (*taṭ*) is a friendly (*maitram*) state of mind (*cetas*).

Candrakīrti then explains the word ‘friendly’ (*maitra*). First, this is done by a grammatical explanation (*vyutpatti*) taken from Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:220), which is also repeated in *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507; *om.* in T1566).<sup>318</sup> According to this *vyutpatti*, the adjective *maitra* is a derivative from the noun *mitra* ‘friend’ formed by the *taddhita*-affix ‘-a’ (causing *vṛddhi* of the first syllable), which is here used in the function of showing location: *maitra* is ‘that, which exists in a friend’ (*mitre bhavam*).<sup>319</sup> Buddhapālita’s

<sup>317</sup> T1564.21b<sub>28-29</sub>: 利益他者。行布施持戒忍辱等不惱眾生。

<sup>318</sup> It should be noted that the Tibetan translation of Pras as well as the Tibetan translations of *Prajñāpradīpa* and Avalokitavṛata’s *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.19b<sub>1,2</sub>) all contain a corruption or misinterpretation of this phrase. Given the Pāṇinian rule cited below (cf. fn. 319), the form of the phrase must clearly be *mitre bhavam* with *mitre* in the locative case. Nevertheless, almost all the Tibetan translations attest a form involving the ablative case: *mdza’ bśes las ’byuñ ba* (\**mitrād bhavam*). Only the transmitted text of Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* attests the correct form *mdza’ bśes la ’byuñ ba*. The occurrence of this corruption could perhaps be explained by the fact that the verb *’byuñ ba* often is constructed with an ablative particle and thus it could be understood as a corruption in the Tibetan transmissions of the texts or simply be explained by the possibility that the Pāṇinian background for this *vyutpatti* was not recognized by any these translators and their informants. It could also be based on a corruption in the Sanskrit originals for the Tibetan translations of *mitre bhavam* into the compound *mitrabhavam* as, for example, attested by ms ㊦ of Pras.

<sup>319</sup> For this affix-function, cf. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.3.53 (VASU, 1891:767): *tatra bhavaḥ* | |. The word *tatra* indicates the locative case (*saptamī vibhakti*). VASU (ibid.) explains that *bhava* here is used in the sense of ‘existence’ and not in the sense of ‘arising’. VASU cites an example

*pa chen po*) is defined as ‘what brings benefit (*hitopasaṃhāra*, *phan pa ñer sgrub pa*) to sentient beings’.<sup>323</sup> The word ‘benefiting oneself’ (*\*ātmānugrāhaka*, *bdag la phan ’dogs pa*) is also used to contrast *maitra* with the word *parānugrahaka* from the root-verse.

(V305<sub>4</sub>): And (*ca*), thus (*etaṭ*), what (*yaṭ*) threefold (*trividham*) state of mind (*cetas*) has been shown (*nir-diṣṭam*), that (*saḥ*) is called (*ucyate*) ‘*dharma*’ (*dharma iti*). On account of being opposite (*viparyayāt*), unrighteous

wisher simply due to his own thought of benevolence. Likewise, as the venerated person has passed away, a gift made to a *Caitya* with devotion for this person is meritorious due to one’s own thought.” In *\*Miśrakābhīdharmahṛdaya-śāstra* (T552.932a<sub>3</sub>; transl. by DESSEIN, 1999.I: 503), a similar explanation is given on making gifts to a *caitya*, where the words *\*ātmānu-grāhaka* (*tsu-she* 自攝) and *\*parānugrāhaka* (*she-ta* 攝他) probably were used in the original text. In CŠV (D3865.118b<sub>2-5</sub>) commenting on CŚ 6.23 (cf. LANG, 1986:68), it is said that cultivation of friendliness results in eight qualities: bzod pa ni phra rgyas khro ba’i gñen po ste| de khro ba’i gnas la bsgoms pa na byams pa’i tiñ ñe ’dzin sgom pa ’dren par ’gyur ro|| de la gal te ba ’jos tsam gyi dus su bsgoms pas goms par byed na de’i tshe sgom pa po la yon tan bryad ’dren par ’gyur ro|| ’di lta ste| lha dan mi rnams la sdug par ’gyur ro|| de rnams kyis bsruñ bar yañ ’gyur ro|| bde ba dan yid bde ba mañ bar ’gyur ro|| de’i lus la dug gis mi tshugs so|| mtshon gyis mi tshugs so|| de’i nor rnams ’bad pa med par rgyas par ’gyur ro|| lus žig nas ši ba’i ’og tu bde ’gro tshañs ma’i ’jig rten du skye bar yañ ’gyur ro|| de ltar byams pa’i yon tan bryad thob par ’gyur ro|| phra rgyas khro ba spañs pas rñed par bya ba bsam gtan dan tshad med pa dan| gzugs med pa dag kyañ ’thob par ’gyur ro||. Translation: “Patience is the remedy against anger. If it has been cultivated with regard to the causes of anger, it will lead to the cultivation of the absorption of friendliness (*maitra*). With regard to that, if one cultivates [it] with cultivation just for the time it takes to milk a cow (*ba ’jo tsam gyi dus su*), then it will cause eight qualities for the practitioner. These are as follows: one will be pleasing to gods and men; they will also protect one; one will have many pleasures and much happiness; one’s body cannot be harmed by poison; it cannot be harmed by weapons; one’s wealth will grow effortlessly; after the body has been destroyed, one will, when dead, also be born in a good course of rebirth, [such as] the world of Brahman; thus, eight qualities of friendliness will be obtained. By abandoning the disposition of anger, one will also attain the meditation, the immeasurable states and [the absorptions belonging to] the immaterial states, which are to be acquired.” Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:220) also makes a brief reference to these eight qualities of *maitrī* in his *Vṛtti*.

<sup>323</sup> Mav 6.211cd (D3861.214b<sub>3</sub>; LVP, 1907-1912:321): ’gro la phan ñer sgrub pa|| byams pa chen po žes bya’o|| “What brings benefit to sentient beings is called great friendliness.” As indicated by TAUSCHER (1981:153, note 281), this definition is based on *Śatasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* (GHOSA, 1902:1411,1): hitopasaṃhāralakṣaṇā mahāmaitrī| “Great friendliness has the characteristic of bringing benefit.”

action (*adharmah*) should be furnished (*yojyah*) [with a corresponding definition].

The explanation of the three aspects of a wholesome state of mind that constitute *dharma* is then completed. Finally, Candrakīrti states that one should furnish its opposite, unrighteous action (*adharmā*), with a correspondingly opposite explanation. This statement derives from *Prajñāpradīpa* (Ames, 1986:507; T1566:99a<sub>26</sub>). It means that *adharmā* should be defined as an unwholesome state of mind leading to not being self-restraining, not benefiting others and being unfriendly (according to Avalokitavratā D3859.III. 18b<sub>3-4</sub>). That such states of mind do not correspond to the Buddhist path may be shown by AN 5.222-223 (transl. by WOODWARD, 1936:155): “And what are not-dhamma and not aim? Wrong view, wrong thinking, [wrong] speech, [wrong] action, [wrong] living, [wrong] effort, [wrong] mindfulness, [wrong] concentration, wrong knowledge and [wrong] release. These are called ‘not-dhamma and not-aim’.”<sup>324</sup> In *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:507-508; T1566.99a<sub>26</sub>-99b<sub>2</sub>), Bhāvaviveka adds a small presentation of wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) actions, which is not found in the other commentaries.

(V305<sub>5</sub>): And thus (*caitat*): which (*yaṭ*) state of mind (*cetas*), whose divisions have been shown [above] (*nirdiṣṭaprabhedam*), “**that (*tat*) [is] the seed (*bījam*) for a result (*phalasya*).**” Which (*yaṭ*) [is] the specific (*asādhāraṇam*) cause (*kāraṇam*) in the production of a result (*phalābhiniṣṭau*), that (*tat*) alone (*eva*) is called (*ucyate*) the ‘seed’ (*bījam iti*), just like (*tadyathā*) a rice-seed (*śālī-bījam*) for a rice-sprout (*śālyaṅkurasya*); but (*tu*) what (*yaṭ*) [is] common (*sādhāraṇam*), such as the earth and so forth (*kṣityādī*), that (*tat*) is not (*na*) a seed (*bījam*), that (*tat*) [is]

<sup>324</sup> AN 5.222-223 (HARDY, 1900): Katamo ca bhikkhave adhammo ca anatto ca? Micchādīṭṭhi micchāsāṅkappo micchāvācā micchākammanto micchā-ājīvo micchāvāyāmo micchāsati micchāsamādhī micchāñāṇaṃ micchāvimutti. Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave adhammo ca anatto ca.



only (*eva*) a cause (*kāraṇam*). Like this (*yathaitad*), so (*evam*) in this case as well (*ihāpi*), the threefold (*trividham*) state of mind (*cetas*) is (*bhavati*) the seed (*bījam*) in the production (*abhinirvṛtau*) of a desired (*iṣṭasya*) ripening (*vipākasya*), whereas (*tu*) the effort by the person and so forth (*puruṣakārādayaḥ*) [is] only (*eva*) a cause (*kāraṇam*).

Candrakīrti then comments on the last *pādas* of the root-verse (Mmk 17.1), which say that this state of mind is a seed (*bījam*) for a result (*phalasya*). From this statement, it is also clear that Candrakīrti takes the word *cetas* as the subject of the pronoun *tat* in the root-text and not the noun *dharma*. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:220) and Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:507; T1566.99a<sub>25-26</sub>) both say that a state of mind is called a seed, because it arouses the bodily and verbal actions. Buddhapālita adds a *Sūtra*-reference of unknown provenance stating that the intellect ( *\*manas, yid*) precedes a *dharma* (*chos kyi sñon du 'gro*). This explanation, however, is not adopted by Candrakīrti. On the other hand, Buddhapālita (ibid.) and Bhāvaviveka (ibid; T1566.99a<sub>23</sub>) equate the word ‘seed’ with the word ‘cause’ ( *\*kāraṇa, rgyu*), which is adopted in Pras. While neither Buddhapālita nor Bhāvaviveka elaborate on this point, Candrakīrti discusses the meaning with which the word ‘cause’ should be understood here.

Candrakīrti defines a ‘seed’ as the specific cause of something (*asādhāraṇam kāraṇam*). It should be noted that this terminology does not correspond to the standard *Sarvāstivāda*-terminology of six causes (cf. AK 2.49; LAMOTTE, 1980:2163-2164). As indicated by LVP (1923:293, fn. 3), *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* remarks that the comparison of a cause with a seed is associated with the *Sautrāntika*-school.<sup>325</sup> As an example for a specific

<sup>325</sup> ŚĀSTRĪ (1970:339): tasya bījabhāvopagamanād iti | tasya hetubhāvo-pagamanād ity upamā | sautrāntikaprakriyāiṣā | kvacit pustake nāsty evam pāṭhaḥ |. Translation: “‘because of becoming the seed-entity thereof’ is a comparison meaning ‘because of becoming the cause-entity thereof’. This [comparison] is a *Sautrāntika*-use, [and] thus it is not a reading found in any book.” Perhaps Yaśomitra intends to say that the seed-comparison of a cause is not commonly found in the *Sarvāstivāda-Abhidharma*-literature, but has been introduced by the *Sautrāntikas*, who are known to have relied solely on the *Sūtras*, from a *Sūtra*-source, such as the *Sūtra*-passages quoted above on p. 177. Cf. also the use of *bīja* with reference to the ‘dispositions’ (*anuśaya*) in AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:215; LVP, 1923:185).

Kombination von Ursache u. Bedingungen [gemeint] ist.<sup>327</sup>

Besides the parallels in the simile of the rice-seed, rice-sprout and earth, which this passage of ŚSV shares with the present passage of Pras, it must also be noted that Candrakīrti in the ŚSV-passages uses the term ‘common condition’ ( *\*sādhāraṇaḥ pratyayaḥ*) in lieu of the expression ‘common cause’ ( *sādhāraṇaḥ kāraṇam*) used in Pras.

(V305<sub>9</sub>): [Someone] says (*āha*): When (*kasmin kāle*), moreover (*punaḥ*), [is] there emergence of the result (*phalanispattiḥ*) of the seed (*bījasya*)? **“Both (ca) after passing away (pretya) and (ca) here (iha).”** “After passing away” (*pretyeti*) means (*ity arthaḥ*) ‘in a future life’ (*adṛṣṭe janmani*); “here” (*iheti*) [means] ‘in the present life’ (*dṛṣṭe janmani*). And (*ca*) this (*etat*) is to be understood (*boddhavyam*) in detail (*vistareṇa*) from the scriptures (*āgamāt*).

Candrakīrti finally explains the last words of verse Mmk 17.1 as meaning that

<sup>327</sup> English translation: “In this [verse] a cause [means] that which produces ( *\*niṣpādaka*) an effect; and in [only] producing an effect similar to itself, it is specific ( *\*asādhāraṇa*); e.g., a rice-seed [is only the cause] of the a rice-sprout. A condition, on the other hand (*ni*), is common, such as the earth, etc., is a common condition for the growth on a rice-sprout. Because as [the earth, etc.] functions as a factor in the production of a rice-sprout, [it functions] likewise in [the production] of a barley-sprout, etc. The fruit [in the form of the ripe rice-grain], which [at the end] arises (*skyes pa*) from the [rice]-sprout, etc., does not agree in form with [the conditions, such as] earth, etc., but agrees in form with the rice-seed. As (*žes bya'o*) [the earth] only functions as causal factor (*rgyu'i dños po*) [in the production of the effect], it is defined as a condition (*pratyaya*). If, to begin with, something (*gañ*) functions as the cause and condition for something ( *'di'i*), then it is determined as the cause, in that it produces it [i.e., the effect]. On the other hand (*..la/ gañ du...ni*), a condition [in general] is not the determining (*ñes pa*) cause [i.e., the decisive cause that produces the effect]; for example, in the saying “There are two causes, two conditions [for the engendering of the right view],” the words ‘cause’ (*hetu*) and/or ‘condition’ (*pratyaya*) are used with regard to the same object (*yul*). Concerning the combination, it arises from the complete availability (*ñe bar gnas pa \*sāmnidhya*) of both these categories [of factors] (*dños po*), but not, even directly, from the availability of other [factors as causes and conditions]. One should, therefore, understand that in this [verse] the combination of cause and condition is [intended].” For a critical edition of the Tibetan text, see ERB (1997:233-234). For detailed annotations to this passage, see ERB (1997:68, 168-169). Regarding ERB’s note 676, see also my fn. 325.

as happiness in the future, and, finally, (4) that, which is suffering in the present and also suffering in the future.

HINÜBER (1994:41-42) explains that a threefold classification of action also occurs in the canon (MN 3.214, AN 1.134, AN 5.292 and AN 3.415) into (1) that, which is to be experienced in this life (*diṭṭhadhamma-vedaniya*), (2) that, which is to be experienced in the next life (*upapajjavedaniya*) and (3) that, which is to be experienced in some subsequent period (*aparāpariyavedaniya*). This threefold distinction is also taught in several post-canonical sources.<sup>329</sup> In several post-canonical *Theravāda* -sources (cf. references in HINÜBER, 1994:39-40), a fourth member called *ahosikamma* is added to this threefold list.<sup>330</sup>

(V305<sub>11</sub>): Thus (*evam*), first (*tāvat*), having established (*vyavasthāpya*) *dharma* (*dharmam*) [which is] the one only (*evaikam*) of a mental nature (*cittātmakam*), also (*punar api*) a twofold (*dvividham*)

*“action (karma) was taught (uktam) as intention (cetanā) and (ca) [action] following intention (cetaṃ) by the highest seer (paramarṣiṇā),”* the Exalted one (*bhagavatā*). (Mmk 17.2ab)

Because of [his] understanding (*°gamanāt*) of the highest object (*paramārtha*°), [he is] *“a seer” (ṛṣiḥ)*. Since (*iti*) he (*asau*) [is] both (*ca*) highest (*paramaḥ*) and (*ca*) a seer (*ṛṣiḥ*), [he is] *“the highest seer” (paramarṣiḥ)*. Because of surpassing (*utkrṣṭatvāt*) even (*api*) the listeners and the self-awakened ones (*śrāvakaḥ*) due to [his] understanding of the highest object (*paramārthagama-nāt*) in each and every aspect (*sarvvākāratayā*), the fully

<sup>329</sup> HINÜBER (1994:40-41) mentions *Nettipakaraṇa*. It is also found in the *Sarvāstivāda*-text *\*Mīśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra* (T1552.895c<sub>15ff.</sub>; transl. by DESSEIN, 1999.I.207).

<sup>330</sup> For a discussion of this fourfold division with several illustrations from the canon, see LVP (1927:177-179).

Awakened one (*sambuddhaḥ*), the Exalted one (*bhagavān*), [is] the highest seer (*paramarṣiḥ*). By that (*tena*) “**highest seer (*paramarṣiṇā*) action (*karma*) was taught (*uktam*)**” in a *sūtra* (*sūtre*) “**as intention**”-action (*cetanākarma*) “**and (*ca*)**” action “**following intention**” (*cetayitvā karma*).

In Mmk 17.1, Nāgārjuna established what constitutes *dharma* in the sense of wholesome action. It was shown that *dharma* in this sense is strictly of a mental nature (*cittātmakam*) and refers to the state of mind (*cetas*) having three qualities. In Mmk 17.2ab, action is then explained as twofold.

The obvious distinction that Mmk 17.2 teaches action as twofold is already introduced by Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:221) and Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:508; T15566. 99b<sub>2-3</sub>).<sup>331</sup> This twofold division is indicated to be canonical, since it is said to have been taught by the Exalted one (*Bhagavant*) in a *sūtra*. The *Bhagavant* is here called ‘the highest seer’ (*paramarṣi*), an epithet of Buddha, which Candrakīrti also uses at V159<sub>6</sub> (D3860.53b<sub>7</sub>). The word *ṛṣi* (Pāli *isī*) is occasionally used in the canon with reference to the Buddha, and so it is not surprising that it is used as an accolade in this verse by Nāgārjuna.

Candrakīrti gives a semantic explanation (*nirukti*) for the word *ṛṣi*: ‘because of understanding the highest object’ (*paramārthagamanāt*). As also indicated by the Tibetan translation (D101b<sub>7</sub>: *thugs su chud pas na*), the word *gamana* should here be taken in the sense of ‘understanding’. In *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:508), the word *ṛṣi* is explained in slightly different

<sup>331</sup> In the Chinese translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, it is said that this twofold division was taught “in [Abhidharma]kośaśāstra” (T1566.99b<sub>2-3</sub>: *chü-she-lun chung i yo erh chung* 俱舍論中亦有二種), a specification not attested by the Tibetan translation. Given that *Pang jo teng lun* is the earliest witness of *Prajñāpradīpa*, it is, of course, technically possible that this statement would have belonged to the original Sanskrit text from which *Pang jo teng lun* was translated. Nevertheless, the division into *cetanā* and *cetayitvā* is, as will be shown below, canonical and is thus only repeated in *Abhidharmakośa* from its canonical sources. Hence, it would seem strange if a scholar as learned as Bhāvaviveka would state this division to be taught in *Abhidharmakośa*. The phrase *chü-she-lun chung* (俱舍論中) “in [Abhidharma]-kośaśāstra” must, therefore, rather be taken as an interpolation in the Chinese transmission of the text, most likely a marginalia from a learned hand that has subsequently been copied into the text itself. Perhaps the marginalis was inspired by *Chung lun*, which states that this twofold division has been explained in the *Abhidharma* (T1564.21c<sub>5-6</sub>).

suggests is a rather late passage.<sup>343</sup> The division between *cetanā* and *cetayitvā* recurs in all the subsequent *Abhidharma*-literature, which would be too lengthy to investigate here. It here suffices to say that Nāgārjuna includes this division in his brief presentation of *karman*, and its meaning will become clearer by the following verse-lines.

(V306<sub>3</sub>): And (*ca*) as to (*yat*) this (*etat*) action (*karma*) said (*uktam*) to be twofold (*dvividham*),

*“A manifold division (anekavidhaḥ) of that (tasya) action (karmanah) is made known (parikīrtitaḥ).”*  
(Mmk 17.2cd)

How (*katham kṛtvā*)?

*“Among these (tatra), which (yat) action (kamma) was called (uktam) intention (cetaneti), that (tat) is traditionally taught (smṛtam) as mental (mānasam), and (ca) which (yat), on the other hand (tu), was called (uktam) following intention (cetayitvā), that (tat) [traditionally taught] oppositely (tu) as bodily and verbal (kāyikavācīkam).”* (Mmk 17.3)

*“Mental” (mānasam)* [means] that, which exists (*bhavam*) in the mind (*manasī*). Because of its (*tasya*) being completed (*niṣṭhāgamanāt*) only (*eva*) by means of the mind (*mano-dvāreṇa*) and (*ca*) because of [its] being independent (*°nirapekṣatvāt*) of the activity of body and speech (*kāyavāk-pravṛtti°*), *“intention” (cetanā)*, which only (*eva*) is concomi-

<sup>343</sup> AN 3.415 (Hardy, 1897): Cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā. Translation by HARE (1934:294): “Monks, I say that determine thought is action. When one determines, one acts by deed, word or thought.”

For further references, see Vetter (2000:30). For a passage speaking of *manas* preceding actions, cf. AN 1.11 (MORRIS, 1885).

tant with the mental consciousness (*manovijñānasampratyuktā*), is said to be (*ity ucyate*) ‘mental (*mānasam*) action (*karma*)’. The word “*tatra*” (*tatraśabdaḥ*) [is used] in [the sense of] specifying (*nirddhāraṇe*).

“*And (ca),*” which (*yat*) second type (*dvitīyam*), “*on the other hand (tu),*” is called (*ity ucyate*) action (*karma*) “*following intention (cetayitvā), that (tat),*” again (*punaḥ*), is to be understood (*veditavyam*) as “*bodily (kāyikam)*” and (*ca*) “*verbal (vācikam).*” What (*yat*) is done (*kriyate*) after having thought (*sañcintya*) with the mind (*cetasā*) like this (*ity evam*): “I will act (*pravarttiṣye*) in this or that way (*evam caivaṇ ca*) with the body and speech (*kāyavāgbhyām*)”, that (*tat*) is said to be (*ity ucyate*) action following intention (*cetayitvā karma*). That (*tat*) [is] again (*punaḥ*) twofold (*dvi-vidham*), [namely] bodily (*kāyikam*) and (*ca*) verbal (*vācikam*), because of existing (*bhavatvāt*) in the body and speech (*kāyavācoḥ*) and (*ca*) because of being completed (*niṣṭhāgamanāt*) by means of them (*taddvāreṇa*). And (*ca*) thus (*evam*) [it is] threefold (*trividham*): bodily (*kāyikam*), verbal (*vācikam*) and (*ca*) mental (*mānasam*).

Having presented the twofold division of action into intention and action following intention, Mmk 17.2cd states that a variety of divisions of action has been taught. This statement has a parallel in the *\*Karmaprajñapti*-section of *Prajñaptiśāstra*, where a *sūtra*-passage (*āgama*) is quoted stating that the Buddha taught various kinds of action.<sup>344</sup> Likewise, in *\*Mīśrakābhi-dharmahṛdayaśāstra* (which most likely is a work later than Mmk), it is said that “such actions have been divided in manifold [forms] by the world-

<sup>344</sup> *Prajñaptiśāstra* (D4088.185a<sub>2-3</sub>): ‘dul mchog kha lo sgyur ba tshañs ba’i gsuñ dañ ldan||sku mdog gser ‘dra kha lo sgyur ba rnams kyi mchog||rnam par ‘dren par mdzad pa byuñ ba gañ yin te||’jigs pa med par las rnams tha dad ston par mdzad||. Transl.: “The supreme subduer, the charioteer endowed with pure speech, whose body is like gold, the best among charioteers, who has appeared as a guide, fearlessly teaches various kinds of action.”

this, Candrakīrti shows that intention precedes a bodily or verbal action, since one first mentally decides that one will act in a particular manner with the body and speech. What is consequently carried out by the body and speech is then called the ‘action following intention’ (*cetayitvā karman*, as mentioned above, literally meaning ‘action after having intended’). This is an explanation introduced by Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:221) and repeated in modified form by Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:509; *om.* T1566). Since the action following intention is completed by either the body or speech, it is further subdivided into these two types: bodily (*kāyika*) and verbal (*vācika*). Candrakīrti applies the same grammatical explanation (*vyutpatti*) to these terms as he did to mental action (*manas*): ‘bodily’ and ‘verbal’ means respectively that, which exists or resides (*bhavam*) in the body and in the speech (*kāyavācoḥ*). This argument and grammatical explanation is also found in *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:509; T1566.99b<sub>17</sub>).

(V307<sub>4</sub>): Subdividing (*bhidyamānam*) further (*punaḥ*) also (*api*) this (*etat*) threefold (*trividham*) action (*karma*), a sevenfold [action] (*saptavidham*) is brought about (*saṃjāyate*). In this manner (*ity evam*), the division (*bhedaḥ*) of that (*tasya*) action (*karmanāḥ*) has been explained (*anuvārṇṇitāḥ*) by the Exalted One (*bhagavatā*) as being of many types (*bahuprakāraḥ*). How (*katham kṛtvā*)?

*“Speech (vāc), motion (viṣpandaḥ) and (ca) those without abstinence (aviratayaḥ), which (yāḥ) [are] designated non-intimation (avijñaptisaṃjñitāḥ), those others (anyāḥ) [involving] abstinence (viratayaḥ), [which] likewise (tathā) are taught (smṛtāḥ) [to be] just (eva) non-intimation (avijñaptayaḥ);”* (Mmk 17.4)

*“beneficence (puṇyam) that is an issue of utilization (paribhogānvayam) and (ca) non-beneficence (apuṇyam) of a similar kind (tathāvidham), and (ca) intention (cetanā) – (iti) these (ete) seven (sapta) pheno-*



*mena (dharmāḥ) are taught (smṛtāḥ) as having action as their mark (karmāñjanāḥ).” (Mmk 17.5)*

Having explained the threefold division of action into bodily, verbal and mental action, the text continues with presenting a sevenfold division of action. Candrakīrti remarks that the Exalted One thus has presented various divisions of action. This refers back to Mmk 17.2cd.

If put into a simple scheme, this sevenfold division of action may be said to consist of the following elements: (1) (intimation that is a) verbal action (*vāgvijñapti*), (2) (intimation that is a) bodily action (*kāyavijñapti*), (3) non-intimation not involving abstention from what is unwholesome (*avīratyavijñapti*), (4) non-intimation involving abstention from what is unwholesome (*viratyavijñapti*), (5) beneficence (*punya*), (6) non-beneficence (*apunya*) and (7) intention (*cetanā*). It does not seem that this division occurs elsewhere in the extant Buddhist scriptures. There are, however, certain clues in this division that indicate that it belongs to the *Sammatīya*-tradition, namely the use of the words ‘motion’ (*viṣpanda*) and ‘issue of utilization’ (*paribhogānvaya*). The statement that non-intimations (*avijñapti*) can be both with and without abstinence involves, however, a problem in terms of ascribing these verses to the *Sammatīya*-tradition. To avoid repetition, these details will be discussed below when analysing Candrakīrti’s commentary.

(V307<sub>10</sub>): Among these (*tatra*), “**speech**” (*vāc*) [is] the distinct articulation of phonemes (*vyaktavarṇṇoccāraṇam*). Movement of the body (*śarīraceṣṭā*) [is] “**motion**” (*viṣpandah*). As to these (*tatra*), each and every (*sarvaiva*) wholesome (*kuśalā*) or (*vā*) unwholesome (*akuśalā*) speech (*vāc*) that brings about non-intimation having abstinence or non-abstinence as its trait (*viratyaviratilakṣaṇāvijñaptisamutthāpikā*)<sup>354</sup> is included (*grhyate*) generally (*sāmānyena*) [in the category] ‘speech’ (*vāg itī*). In the same way (*evam*), [each

<sup>354</sup> Alternatively, it could also be read: “As to these, each and every wholesome or unwholesome speech having abstinence or non-abstinence as its trait (*viratyaviratilakṣaṇā*) [and] that brings about non-intimation (*avijñaptisamutthāpikā*)...”

and every] wholesome (*kuśalaḥ*) or (*vā*) unwholesome (*akuśalaḥ*) motion (*viṣpandaḥ*) that brings about non-intimation having abstinence or non-abstinence as its trait (*viratyaviratilakṣaṇāvijñaptisamutthāpakāḥ*) is included (*grhyate*) generally (*sāmānyena*) [in the category ‘motion’].

The first aspect among the sevenfold action is ‘speech’ (*vāc*). Candrakīrti explains speech as the distinct (*vyakta*) articulation (*uccāraṇa*) of phonemes (*varṇa*). This is an explanation first found in Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:222) and which is repeated in *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:510; T1566.99b<sub>22</sub>). *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405) and *Chung lun* (T1564.21c<sub>17</sub>), on the other hand, explain speech as the four kinds of verbal action, i.e., either the unwholesome actions lying, slander, hurtful words and talking nonsense (cf. fn. 268 above) or the wholesome actions of avoiding these four (cf. fn. 286 above). The definition of *vāc* as *vyaktavarṇaprocāraṇa* does not seem to be found elsewhere. In AKBh, for example, *vāc* is defined variously as ‘the articulation of speech’ (*vāgdhvani*; AK 4.3d, ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:578), ‘sounding’ (*ghoṣa*; ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:271), ‘purposeful sounding’ (*ghoṣaṇārtha*; op.cit.:272) or ‘that, which produces a phoneme’ (*vyañjanaṃ janayati*; op.cit.:273).<sup>355</sup> Thus, the exact source for Buddhapālita’s definition remains unknown. The meaning of the definition should, however, be clear enough: speech has the function of articulating (*uccāraṇa*); that, which is articulated, consists of phonemes (*varṇa*), i.e., vowels and consonants; the way, in which these are articulated, is distinct (*vyakta*), i.e., clearly so that nonsense is avoided (*vyakta* could thus also be translated with ‘intelligible’).

The second type among the sevenfold action is ‘motion’ (*viṣpanda*). Candrakīrti explains motion to mean ‘movement of the body’ (*śarīraceṣṭā*). In the Mmk-commentaries, this explanation ultimately derives from *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405). *Akutobhayā* (ibid.) adds to this explanation that motion refers to the three kinds of bodily action, i.e., either the unwholesome actions of killing, taking what is not given and sexual

<sup>355</sup> In *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (LAMOTTE, 1936:203-204, 260; MUROJI, 1985:55), one also finds the definition “La voix (*vāc*) est une prononciation de sons (*ghoṣoccarāṇa*)” (English translation: “Speech (*vāc*) is an articulation of sounds (*ghoṣoccarāṇa*)”): *ñag ni tshig ste | dbyaṅs kyi khyad par gaṅ gis don go bar byed pa’o |*.

also be used with regard to intimations.<sup>369</sup> In that case, wholesome speech would have the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) that it involves abstention (*virati*) from the four unwholesome types of speech, i.e., abstention from lying, slander, hurtful words and speaking nonsense. This is reflected in the four kinds of verbal, wholesome actions, which all are affixed with the word abstention (*virati*; cf. fn. 286 above). Oppositely, unwholesome speech would have the characteristic that it involves non-abstention (*avirati*) from the four unwholesome types of speech, i.e., it can be defined in contradistinction to wholesome speech. Likewise, the same distinctions may be applied to bodily action.<sup>370</sup>

(V308<sub>3</sub>): And (*ca*), just as (*yathā*) this (*eṣaḥ*) two-fold (*dvidhā*) division (*bhedah*) of intimation (*viññāpteḥ*) [has been made], in the same way (*evam*) [a twofold division] has likewise (*api*) been made (*kṛtvā*) of non-intimation (*aviññāp-*

<sup>369</sup> First, cf. ŚĀSTRĪ (1971:673): *api khalu kāyavākkarmaṇī viratisvabhāvam, na manas-karma; cittāviññāptyabhāvāt* |; transl. by LVP (1924:134): “Mais, dirons-nous, l’acte du corps, l’acte de la voix propres à l’Arhat (*āśaikṣa*) sont ‘abstention’ (*virati*) de leur nature, tandis que l’acte de l’esprit n’est pas ‘abstention’ de sa nature, parce qu’il n’y a pas d’*aviññāpti* de la pensée.” English translation: “But we will say that actual bodily and verbal action for the Arhat (*āśaikṣa*) are ‘abstention’ (*virati*) in their nature, whereas mental actions are not ‘abstention’ in their nature, because there is no *aviññāpti* of the mind.” Secondly, cf. ŚĀSTRĪ (1971:749): *sa punar viratiḥ - dvidhā | yayā ca viramyate viññāptyā, yac ca tadviramaṇam aviññāptiḥ* |; transl. by LVP (1924:247): “Le renoncement (*virati*) est *viññāpti*, l’acte par lequel on renonce, et *aviññāpti*, le fait de s’abstenir.” English translation: “Abstention (*virati*) is *viññāpti*, namely the action through which one abstains, and *aviññāpti*, the fact of abstaining.”

<sup>370</sup> Candrakīrti does actually not specify what the object for the abstention is. Here its object has been interpreted in a general sense as meaning ‘unwholesome action’ (*akuśala*) and would thus refer to the bodily and verbal unwholesome actions. However, as will be shown below in the discussion of non-intimations (*aviññāpti*), the word abstention (*virati*) is strongly connected with the concept of a religious vow (*saṃvara*). Hence, as appears in AK 4.15 along with AKBh, abstention (*virati*) may also be taken in the sense of referring to abstention from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, alcohol, perfume, garlands, dance, music and so forth, i.e., in the sense of *saṃvara* (cf. ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:608-609; transl. by LVP, 1924:46-47). As a digression, it may be mentioned that the term *avirati* also occurs in Jainism (cf. GLASENAPP, 1915:73); GLASENAPP translates *avirati* as ‘mangelnde Selbstzucht, d.h. Nichtbeachten der Gebote’ (English translation: ‘lacking self-discipline, i.e., not keeping the vows’). In the *Jaina*-scriptures, *avirati* is one of the four causes for *karman* to be bound (*bandha*) to the soul; the four causes are: wrong beliefs (*mithyātva*), non-abstention (*avirati*), passion (*kaṣāya*) and activity (*yoga*) (ibid.).

*teḥ*), namely (*iti*) the non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having non-abstention as their trait (*aviratilakṣaṇāḥ*) and (*ca*) [those] having abstention as their trait (*viratilakṣaṇāḥ*).

Among these (*tatra*), the non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having non-abstention as their trait (*aviratilakṣaṇāḥ*) [are] for example (*tadyathā*) [to think] (*iti*) “from today on (*adyaprabhṛti*), I (*mayā*) shall earn (*parikalpayitavyā*) a livelihood (*jīvikā*) by killing (*hatvā*) living beings (*prāṇinam*) [and] committing (*kṛtvā*) theft (*cauryam*).” Starting (*prabhṛti*) from the moment of assenting to [such] unfortunate actions (*pāpakarmābhyupagamakṣaṇāt*), non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*), which have assent to [those] unwholesome actions as their cause (*akuśalakarmābhyupagama-hetukāḥ*), are continuously (*satatasamitam*) generated (*samupajāyante*) even (*api*) for someone, who [eventually] does not perform that [action] (*tadakāriṇaḥ*).

And (*ca*), starting (*prabhṛti*) from the moment of the preparatory action, such as fishermen and so forth [making their] nets (*kaivarttādīnām jālādiparikarmakālāt*), which (*yāḥ*) non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) are generated (*upajāyante*) even (*api*) for those, who [eventually] do not perform that [action] (*tadakāriṇām*), precisely these (*tā etā*) are called (*ity ucyante*) ‘non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having non-abstention as their trait (*aviratilakṣaṇā*)’.

And (*ca*) similar to (*yathā*) these (*etāḥ*), so also (*tathā*) [are] those other (*anyāḥ*) non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having abstention as their trait (*viratilakṣaṇāḥ*), [i.e., those] having a wholesome nature (*kuśalasvabhāvāḥ*). For example (*tadyathā*), [one might think] (*iti*) “from today on (*adyaprabhṛti*) I abstain (*prativiramāmi*) from killing and so forth (*prāṇātīpātādibhyaḥ*).” Which (*yāḥ*) non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having an accumulation of what is wholesome as their nature (*kuśalopacayasvabhāvāḥ*) that are

generated (*upajāyante*) throughout the time (*taduttarakālam*) starting (*prabhṛti*) from the moment in time when a [wholesome] intimation of body or speech has been completed (*kāyavāgvijñaptiparisamāptikālakṣaṇāt*), even (*api*) when [the person] is in a state of distraction and so forth (*pramattādyavasthasya*), precisely these (*tā etāḥ*) are called (*ity ucyante*) ‘non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*) having abstention as their trait (*viratilakṣaṇāḥ*)’.

(V309<sub>1</sub>): Just these (*tā etāḥ*) [are] thus (*evam*) non-intimations (*avijñaptayaḥ*), because (*iti*) although (*api*) they have (*satyaḥ*) matter and action as their nature (*rūpakriyā-svabhāvāḥ*), they do not (*na*) make themselves known (*vijñaptayanti*) to others (*parān*), as intimations [do] (*vi-jñaptivat*).

Similar to the possible division of bodily and verbal intimations into two kinds, namely those characterised by non-abstention and those characterised by abstention, the next two elements of the sevenfold list of action, viz. non-intimations (*avijñapti*), are divided into two kinds, namely those characterised by non-abstention (*aviratilakṣaṇa*) and those characterised by abstention (*viratilakṣaṇa*).

The explanation found thereon in *Chung lun* (T1564.21c<sub>18-20</sub>) is very rudimentary and in that way differs from the explanations given in the other commentaries. *Akutoḥmayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405) provides a simple definition of non-intimation characterised by non-abstention: it is other instances of body and speech, which arise beginning from the time of having fabricated an unwholesome action, yet the non-intimation is without motion. The non-intimation characterised by abstention is defined oppositely.<sup>371</sup>

<sup>371</sup> For another very early definition of *avijñapti*, cf. *Prajñaptiśāstra* (D4088.189b<sub>5</sub>): rnam par rig byed ma yin pa gañ yin že na | smras pa | srog gcog pa las phyir mi log ciñ phyir ma nur la ma btañ ma spañs pas | ji ste na lus kyis kyañ rnam par rig par mi byed pa 'di ni | rnam par rig byed ma yin pa zes bya'o | |. Transl.: “What is *avijñapti*? Answer: For example, what is not made evident with the body in that killing is not turned away from and is not withdrawn from and [thus] is not abandoned, [i.e.,] not abstained from, that is called non-intimation (*avijñapti*).”

(BAREAU, 1955:70, 125, 226). However, elsewhere in the commentary to *Kathāvatthu* (VIII.9 and XVI.7), the opposite is stated, namely that the *Mahāsaṅghikas* and *Saṃmatīyas* assert that intimations (*viññatti*) can be both wholesome and unwholesome (cf. AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:221, 308). From this it may be supposed that the *Mahāsaṅghikas* and *Saṃmatīyas* also asserted *avijñapti* (as did the *Sarvāstivādins*), but the precise nature of their assertion remains vague. It must also here be underlined that the philological basis for connecting this assertion to particular schools is again very weak, since it is only found in the commentarial literature, which is rather late (cf. HINÜBER, 2000:73). Thus, the mention of *avijñapti* in the sevenfold list of action in Mmk 17.4-5 might be a *Mahāsaṅghika*-, *Saṃmatīya*- or *Sarvāstivāda*-list of terms, but concrete evidence is unfortunately wanting.

(V309<sub>2</sub>) So also (*tathā*), “**beneficence (*puṇyam*) that is an issue of utilization (*paribhogānvayam*)**,” i.e., (*arthah*), ‘wholesome action’ (*kuśalam iti*). “**An issue of utilization (*paribhogānvayam*)**” means (*ity arthaḥ*) ‘[there is] succession (*anvayaḥ*) of it (*asya*) due to utilization (*paribhoga*)’.  
**“Utilization” (*paribhogaḥ*)** [is] the use (*upabhogaḥ*) by the monastic community and so forth (*saṅghādibhiḥ*) of a donated article (*parityaktasya vastunaḥ*). **“Issue” (*anvayaḥ*)** means (*ity arthaḥ*) ‘succession (*anugamaḥ*), [i.e.,] an accumulation of wholesome action (*kuśalopacayaḥ*) generated in the series of the giver (*dāyakasantānajaḥ*)’.

The fifth element in the sevenfold list of action is ‘beneficence’ (*puṇya*).<sup>384</sup> *Akutoḥhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405) simply states that ‘beneficence that is an issue of utilization’ (*paribhogānvayam puṇyam*) means an issue ( *\*anvaya*,

<sup>384</sup> Although such a translation of *puṇya* does not agree with the semantic explanation (*nirukti*) provided here by the commentaries (to be discussed immediately below), it agrees with the canonical and pre-canonical sense of the word; cf. FILLIOZAT (1980:101-108), COUSINS (1996:153-156) and SCHMITHAUSEN (1998:12) for semantic analyses. For a presentation of threefold *puṇya* derived from giving, discipline and mental cultivation, cf. AN 4.239-241 (HARDY, 1899; transl. by HARE, 1935:164-167) and *Saṅgītiparyāya* (STACHE-ROSEN, 1968:81).

(V310<sub>2</sub>): “*And non-beneficence of a similar kind*” (*apuṇyaṅ ca tathāvidham*) [also] means (*arthaḥ*) ‘issue of utilization’ (*paribhogānvayam iti*). For example (*tadyathā*), the erection of a temple or the like (*deva-kulādi pratiṣṭhāpanam*), wherein (*yatra*) sentient beings (*sattvāḥ*) are killed (*hanyante*); for (*hi*) to the extent (*yathā yathā*) that living beings (*prāṇinaḥ*) are killed (*hanyante*) in a memorial [temple built in the name of] someone (*tatkīrttau*), to that extent (*tathā tathā*) non-beneficence (*apuṇyam*) that is an issue of utilization (*paribhogānvayam*) is generated (*upajāyate*) in the series (*santāne*) of the makers of that [memorial] (*tatkarttṛṇām*) due to the use of their temple and so forth (*taddevakulādyupabhogāt*). Thus (*ity evam*), there is (*bhavati*) [root-text] “and non-beneficence of a similar kind (*apuṇyaṅ ca tathāvidham*).”

The sixth element in the list of seven-fold action is non-beneficence (*apuṇya*), which is said to be of a similar kind, i.e., also an issue of utilization (*paribhogānvaya*).<sup>402</sup> *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405), Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:222) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:511; T1566.99c<sub>8-11</sub>) hardly explain this point. Candrakīrti, on the other hand, provides an illustration, namely the erection of a temple for animal-sacrifice.<sup>403</sup> Someone has such a temple built as a memorial (*kīrtti*) for himself or his family.<sup>404</sup> This

<sup>402</sup> This explanation of *tathāvidham* from the root-text is found in all the commentaries from *Akutobhayā* onwards, except *Chung lun*.

<sup>403</sup> In *\*Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D3866.243a<sub>1</sub>; LINDTNER, 1979:101<sub>20</sub>), Candrakīrti specifically mentions the construction of a temple for the goddess *Durga* as an example of this type of *apuṇya*. This could perhaps fit well with SCHERRER-SCHAUB’s assertion that Candrakīrti was born in the Bengal (SCHERRER-SCHAUB, 1991:xxxi-xxxii), where *Durga*-worship at least nowadays is widespread.

<sup>404</sup> As indicated by DE JONG (1978b:220), VOGEL (1906) has shown the meaning of the words *kīrti* (or *kīrtti*) and *kīrtana* in such contexts to be ‘a memorial’. VOGEL (1906) refers to a private communication from BHANDAKAR, who has given the meaning of *kīrti* as ‘a temple’ or ‘any work of public utility calculated to render famous the name of the constructor of it’ (op.cit.:345). According to VOGEL (op.cit.), this would correspond to the basic meaning of *kṛt* ‘to mention, commemorate, praise’. *Kīrti* must thus be derived from the roots *kar* or *kṛ* ‘making mention of’, homonymous but not synonymous with the root *kṛ* ‘to do’. From the



action would constitute an intimation (and probably also involve a non-intimation from the time at which the founder decides to build the temple and then orders his workers to carry out the construction). It is not quite clear whether Candrakīrti would consider the intimations and non-intimations involved in constructing the temple to be beneficence or non-beneficence, but they would presumably be considered non-beneficence given the intention to use the temple for animal-sacrifice. Once the memorial temple is put to use and animals are sacrificed therein, non-beneficence is continuously produced for the persons, who originally caused this temple to be erected (as a memorial for them), to the extent to which animals are being slaughtered therein (the killing as such constitutes unwholesome intimations on behalf of the priests and their assistants). Thus, there is a successive production of non-beneficence for the temple-founders, even after constructing the temple, due to the unwholesome utilization of that temple and no matter whether or not the founders participate in the ceremonies (or, for that matter, are still alive). The mention of the word *memorial* (*kīrti*) in this context probably only serves to underline the illustration that there remains some sort of relationship between the temple and its founders. It must be presumed that Candrakīrti would still consider the erection of the temple for animal-sacrifice to entail non-beneficence for the founders of the temple, even if the temple had not specifically been declared as a memorial for its founders.

(V311<sub>1</sub>): “*And (ca) intention (cetanā)*” [is] characterised as a mental action, which conditions the mind (*cittābhisamāskāramanaskarmalakṣaṇā*).

In brief (*saṃkṣepeṇa*), this (*etat*) action (*karma*) is (*bhavati*) sevenfold (*saptavidham*): (1) wholesome and unwholesome (*kuśalākuśalā*) speech (*vāc*), (2) {wholesome and unwholesome (*kuśalākuśalaḥ*)} motion (*viṣpandaḥ*), (3) wholesome action (*kuśalam*) characterised as non-intimation (*avijñāptilakṣaṇam*), (4) unwholesome action (*akuśa-*

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latter root one also finds the word *kṛti* ‘creation, work’, which could also be related to *kīrti* as ‘memorial’. For references to inscriptions attesting this use of *kīrti*, cf. VOGEL (op.cit.).

*lam*) characterised as non-intimation (*avijñaptilakṣaṇam*), (5) beneficence (*puṇyam*) that is an issue of utilization (*paribhogānvayam*), (6) non-beneficence (*apuṇyam*) that is an issue of utilization (*paribhogānvayam*), and (7) intention (*cetanā ceti*).

And (ca) “*these (ete) seven (sapta) phenomena (dharmāḥ) are taught (smṛtāḥ) as having action as their mark (karmāñjanāḥ)*,” [i.e.,] distinct (*abhivvyaktāḥ*) by being actions (*karmatvena*), having action as their characteristic (*karmalakṣaṇāḥ*).

The seventh aspect of the sevenfold action is intention (*cetanā*), which was already explained above (cf. the exegesis to Mmk 17.2 above). Candrakīrti here explains *cetanā* as ‘that which conditions the mind’ (*cittābhisamṣkāra*), a gloss also found in *Akutoḥbhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:405-406), Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:222) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986: 511; T1566.99c<sub>11-13</sub>).<sup>405</sup> *Cetanā* is also characterised as mental action (*°manas-karmalakṣaṇā*), a gloss which Candrakīrti probably adopts from *Prajñāpradīpa* (ibid.).<sup>406</sup>

Having summed up the sevenfold action in the form of a list, the final line of the root-verse (Mmk 17.5) is quoted saying that these seven phenomena are taught as being marked by action (*karmāñjanāḥ*). The use of the word *añjana* in the verse is unusual, and LAMOTTE (1936:269), therefore, emends it to *vyañjana* in his translation probably based on the Tibetan translation (*las su mñon pa*), and translates it with *des modes d’acte*. It is, of course, possible that *vyañjana* was shortened to *añjana* in the verse *metri causa*.

The general meaning of *añjana* is ‘ointment’, ‘pigment’ or

<sup>405</sup> The gloss *cittābhisamṣkāra* for *cetanā* is a standard explanation also occurring, for example, in AKBh and *Abhidharmasamuccaya*; cf. fn. 339 above. In Avalokitavratā’s *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III25a<sub>5-6</sub>), intention is explained as *abhisamṣkāra* in the sense that it conditions the mind (*citta*) to assume a positive nature (*rañ bñin*) of being without covetousness, ill will and wrong views or a negative nature of having covetousness, ill will and wrong views.

<sup>406</sup> For intention explained as mental action, cf. Mmk 17.3 and commentary above.

remains unknown why Nāgārjuna chose to use the expression *karmāñjana* to characterise this sevenfold division of action.<sup>410</sup>

So ends the brief presentation of *karmaphala* in Mmk 17.1-5. As noted above, these verses could be seen as belonging to the interlocutor's objection raised at the beginning of this chapter. Candrakīrti, however, does not mark the text at this point with an *īti* or the like to indicate the end of the *pūrvapakṣa*. In *Akutoḥayā* and *Chung lun*, one also does not find any explicit mention of the end of the interlocutor's speech at this point, but Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka clearly indicate this to be the case. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:223) remarks that because these seven kinds of action are connected with a result, *saṃsāra* is justifiable and the faults of eternality and cutting off are not incurred. In this manner, he refers back to the interlocutor's position outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:512) formulates the same idea in a slightly longer passage, which in *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (D3859.III.25b<sub>4-5</sub>) explicitly is stated to constitute the concluding summary of the interlocutor's argument.

### 3.3 A Critique of Karmaphalasambandha

Having completed the compact overview of *karmaphala* presented in Mmk 17.1-5, the text now turns to a debate on the connection between action and result (*karmaphalasambandha*), which is the topic of the rest of the chapter.

<sup>410</sup> Given the similarity of the words *añjana* 'mark' and *cihna* 'mark', it could perhaps be conjectured that Nāgārjuna's use of *karmāñjana* is somehow related to the 'result-mark' (*phalacihnabhūta*) said by some to exist as a non-concomitant phenomenon in the mind-series, apparently functioning as a *karmaphalasambandha*; cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:345): anye punar āhuḥ - phalacihnabhūtaḥ sattvānāṃ santatau cittaviprayuktaḥ saṃskāraviśeṣo 'sti, yaṃ vyavalokya bhagavān āgataṃ jānāty asammukhī-kṛtvāpi dhyānam abhijñāṃ ceti; transl. by LVP (1923:304): "D'après d'autres maîtres, il y a dans la série des êtres certain *dharma* qui est l'indice (*cihna=liṅga*) des fruit qui naîtront dans l'avenir, à savoir certain *saṃskāra* dissocié de la pensée. Bhagavat le contemple et il connaît les fruits futurs, sans qu'il doive pour cela pratiquer les *dhyānas* et les *abhijñās*." English translation: "According to other masters, there is in the continua of beings a certain *dharma*, which is the indication (*cihna=liṅga*) of the result that will come into being in the future, viz. a certain *saṃskāra* non-associated with the mind. The Bhagavat contemplates it and knows the future results without having to practice the *dhyānas* and the *abhijñās*." For further references, cf. LVP (ibid. fn. 2) and LAMOTTE (1936:230, fn. 57). LAMOTTE (ibid.) suggests that this phenomenon might be a form of the *aviprapāśa* postulated by the *Sāṃmatīyas*, which is to be discussed below.

An objection is first raised in the form of a question concerning how it may be possible for the action to be connected with its future result.

(V311<sub>6</sub>): Here (*atra*) some (*eke*) object (*paricodayanti*): This (*etat*) action (*karma*), which (*yat*) was explained (*uktam*) to be of many kinds (*bahuvīdham*), does it (*tat kim*) remain (*avatiṣṭhate*) until the time of the ripening (*āvīpākakālam*) or (*atha*) does [it] not (*na*) remain (*tiṣṭhati*) due to perishing right after arising (*utpattyanantaravināśitvāt*)?

*“If (yadi...cet),” in the first case (tāvat), “the action (karmma) remains (tiṣṭhati) until the time of ripening (ā pākakālāt), it (tat) would continue (iyāt) eternally (nityatām). If (cet) [it has] ceased (niruddham), [then,] having (sat) ceased (niruddham), how (kim) could [it] produce (janayiṣyati) the result (phalam)?” (Mmk 17.6)*

Candrakīrti introduces Mmk 17.6 as an objection raised by some unnamed scholars (*eke*). While all the commentaries introduce the verse as an objection, none of the texts identify by whom this objection is raised. In *Akuto-bhayā*, Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:512; T1566.99c<sub>18</sub>), the objection is introduced with the verb *ucyate* (*bśad pa*), thus indicating that this passage is not spoken by the interlocutor.<sup>411</sup> Conversely, this would indicate that the verse is to be interpreted as spoken by the *Mādhyamika*. This is also confirmed by Avalokitavratā (D3859.III.28b<sub>7</sub>), who explains this objection to be raised by the author of the [*Madhyamaka*]/*vṛtti* (*\*vṛttikāra*, *’grel pa byed pa*), thereby either indicating Nāgārjuna or Bhāvaviveka. As suggested above (p. 179), verses Mmk 17.1-5 could be interpreted as spoken by the same *santāna*-proponent, who below is going to present his view in verses Mmk 17.7-11. If that is accepted, this proponent is here interrupted by an unnamed opponent (perhaps a *mādhyamika*), who

<sup>411</sup> Cf. discussion of the verbs *āha* and *ucyate* above, p. 164.

ternal dependent arising] is not eternalism.

How is [it] not annihilation? The sprout is not born from a seed that has already ceased, nor is [the sprout] born from [a seed] that has not ceased. However, at the precise time the seed ceases, the sprout arises in the manner of the high and low [ends] of a balance beam. Therefore, [external dependent arising] is not annihilation.<sup>413</sup>

The causal relationship between a seed and a sprout is here compared to the movement of the balance beam of a scale (*tulādaṇḍa*): as there is upward movement (*unnāma*) of the beam's one end, there is downward movement (*avanāma*) of its other end; likewise, as the result comes into existence, the cause simultaneously disappears. Such a model for causality functions only when the cause exists immediately before the result and thus ceases to exist simultaneously with the coming into existence of the result. However, in the case of action and result, the action, which is the cause, is separated from its result by a long time span, possibly even an extremely long time (cf. fn. 233). Therefore, the problem is here raised how it can be possible to unite the causality of the action and the result with the duration of time involved in the process of transmigration (*saṃsāraṇa*).

(V311<sub>10</sub>): If (*yadi*) it is thought (*parikalpyate*) that (*iti*) “**the action (*karma*)**” having (*sat*) arisen (*utpannam*) “**remains (*avatiṣṭhate*) until the time of the ripening (*āvipākakālam*)**” by its own-nature (*svarūpeṇa*), [then] “**eternality (*nityatā*)**” thereof (*asya*) would result (*āpadyate*) throughout the time

<sup>413</sup> The Sanskrit text of this passage from the *Śālistambasūtra* is partly quoted in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* and *Madhyamakāśālistamba* (SCHOENING, 1995:706): *katham na śāśvatata iti? yasmād anyo 'ṅkuro 'nyad bījam, na ca yad eva bījaṃ sa evāṅkuraḥ | atha vā punaḥ - bījaṃ nirudhyate, aṅkuraś cotpadyate | ato na śāśvatataḥ | katham nocchedataḥ? na ca pūrvaniruddhād bījād aṅkuro niṣpadyate, nāpy aniruddhād bījāt, api ca, bījaṃ ca nirudhyate, tasminn eva samaye 'ṅkura utpadyate, tulādaṇḍonnāmāvanāmavāt | ato nocchedataḥ |*. For the Tibetan translation, cf. SCHOENING (1995:405). The passage continues with discussing three other aspects of the causal relationship: that it is not transmigration (*na saṃkrāntitaḥ*), that a great result is produced from a small cause (*parīttahetuto vipulaphalābhi-nirvṛttitaḥ*) and that there is a continuity in that there is similarity in kind between the cause and the result (*tatsadrśānuprabandhataḥ*).

(*kālam*) “*it (tad) continues (īyantam)*,” because it is devoid of perishing (*vināśarahitatvāt*).

All the commentaries comment on the verse by expressing its idea in prose-form. The first *pāda* presents the first option, namely that the action remains until the time of its ripening. Candrakīrti gives this option in the form of a hypothetical thought: “if it is thought that the action having arisen remains until the time of the ripening due to its own-nature.” Obviously, intimation is only seen to exist for the brief moment in which it is being performed. Nevertheless, if the theory of *karmaphala* is accepted, the action is somehow required to exist as a cause for its result at a much later time. Hence, it may be necessary to posit that the action itself continues to exist as a causal entity, although no longer perceptible, as the causal relationship requires the simultaneous presence of the cause and effect, as illustrated above.

In principle, a view of this kind was formulated early in the history of Buddhism by the *Sarvāstivādins* (later also referred to as *Vaibhāṣikas*), who segregated themselves from the *Śthavira*-tradition in ca. 244 or 243 BCE (BAREAU, 1955:131).<sup>414</sup> In order to account for causal relationships, such as the relationship found in perception and *karmaphala*, the *Sarvāsti-vādins* posited that all past, present and future phenomena coexist. A phenomenon remains in existence throughout the three times without any change to its own-nature (*svarūpa*) or own-being (*svabhāva*).<sup>415</sup> This is also expressed by Candrakīrti, who says above that the action remains due to its own-nature

<sup>414</sup> For a general overview of the history and theses of the *Sarvāstivādins*, cf. BAREAU (1955:131-152). For a study of the *Sarvāstivāda*-thesis that past, present and future phenomena exist simultaneously as presented in *Vijñānakāya*, cf. LVP (1925b). For a study of this thesis according to two later *Sarvāstivāda*-sources, viz. *Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545.27.393a<sub>9</sub>-396b<sub>23</sub>) and *\*Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562.29.621c<sub>5</sub>-636b<sub>16</sub>), cf. LVP (1937) and COX (1995:134-158). LVP (1937) provides further references to primary and secondary literature. For a summary of their theses as presented in AKBh, cf. SANDERSON (1994).

<sup>415</sup> *Svabhāva* thus constitutes the enduring nature of a phenomenon. It is identified with the phenomenon's own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*); cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1972:602; transl. LVP, 1925:159): *svabhāva evaiṣaṃ svalakṣaṇam* |. For example, the *svalakṣaṇa* of earth is support (*dhṛti*), the *svalakṣaṇa* of water is cohesion (*saṃgraha*), etc. (AKBh, ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:42; transl. LVP, 1923:22). Other partial synonyms for *svabhāva* (*tzu-hsing* 自性) attested in *\*Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545. 27.393c<sub>5-6</sub>, transl. LVP, 1937:11) are *\*ātman* (wo 我), *\*dravya* (wu 物), *\*svarūpa* (*tzu-t'i* 自體), *\*ālabhāna* (*hsiang-fen* 相分); LVP (1937:130) further lists *vastu*, *artha*, *ātmabhāva*, *ātmalābha* and *mūlabhāva* as other synonyms.

what is not devoid of perishing for as long as it remains, that is not eternal. The premise and counter-premise would be acceptable to Candrakīrti, whereas the property of the proposition is clearly only acceptable to the opponent holding the view that the action remains.<sup>421</sup> Thus, the undesirable consequence of the view that the action remains in order to act as the direct cause for its result is that the action becomes eternal, which gives rise to further negative consequences to be explained below.<sup>422</sup>

(V311<sub>11</sub>): If (*ceṭ*) it is thought that (*itī*) there is no (*na*) eternality (*nityatvam*), because there later (*paścāt*) is

<sup>421</sup> Cf. e.g., *\*Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562.29.632a<sub>7-8</sub>): 以體雖同而性類別。Transl. by LVP (1937:97): “La nature propre est constante, mais les manières d’être (*sing-lei* 性類) sont différentes.” English transl.: “The own-nature is constant, but its modes of being are different.” Also, cf. *\*Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (T1562.29.632c<sub>20-25</sub>): 我宗亦爾法體雖住而遇別緣。或法爾力於法體上差別用起本無今有有已還無。法體如前自相恒住。此於理教有何相違。前已辯成體相無異。諸法性類非無差別。體相性類非異非一。故有爲法自相恒存。而勝功能有起有息。Transl. by LVP (1937:103-104): “De même dans ma doctrine: la nature propre du *dharma* dure (*tiṣṭhati*); cependant, soit par la rencontre de conditions différentes, soit par la force de la nature des choses, « sur » cette nature propre se produit une activité spécifique qui d’abord n’existe pas, ensuite existe, retourne enfin à la non-existence après avoir existé; cependant que la nature propre reste, comme devant, immuable en son caractère propre. – Rien, dans cette théorie, qui contredise l’Écriture ou la raison. Nous avons ci-dessus établi que le caractère de la nature propre (*t’i-siang* 體相) ne subit pas de modification; que la manière d’être (*bhāva*, *sing-lei* 性類) du *dharma* n’est pas sans différenciations; que le caractère de la nature propre et la manière d’être ne sont ni différents ni identiques (*eka*, *anya*). Le caractère propre des conditionnés est permanent, mais le pouvoir éminent [qu’on nomme activité] a commencement et fin.” English transl.: “Similarly in my doctrine: a *dharma*’s own-nature remains (*tiṣṭhati*); however, either by encountering different conditions or by force of the nature of things, ‘above’ this own-nature a specific activity takes place, which did not exist before, then exists and in the end returns to non-existence after having existed; nevertheless, the own-nature remains, as before, immutable in its own character. –Nothing in this theory contradicts scripture or reason. We established above that the character of the own-nature (*t’i-siang* 體相) does not undergo modification; that a *dharma*’s mode of being (*bhāva*, *sing-lei* 性類) is not without differentiations; that the character of the own-being and the mode of being are neither different nor identical (*eka*, *anya*). The own character of what is conditioned is permanent, but the eminent capacity [that one calls activity] has a beginning and an end.”

<sup>422</sup> Although the consequence of eternality may logically be implied by the *Sarvāstivāda*-view, the *Sarvāstivādin* does not accept this consequence and hence does not abandon his view. The consequence of eternality is thus rejected in *\*Mahāvibhāṣā* and *\*Nyāyānusāraśāstra* with reference to the change in the mode of existence (*bhāva*) due to the phenomenon’s loss of performing its operation (cf. LVP, 1937:131-132).

perishing (*vināśasadbhāvāt*), [then] this is not (*naitat*) so (*evam*), because what earlier (*pūrvam*) has avoided perishing (*vināśarahitasya*), like space and so forth (*ākāśādīvat*), does also (*api*) not have a connection (*sambandhābhāvāt*) with perishing (*vināśena*) later on (*paścāt*).

Moreover (*ca*), since what is devoid of perishing (*vināśarahitasya*) entails the consequence of unconditionality (*asaṃskṛtatvaprasaṅgāt*) and (*ca*) it would [thus] remain (*avasthānāt*) forever (*sadaiva*) without any ripening (*avipākatvena*) because ripening (*vipāka*<sup>o</sup>) of unconditioned phenomena (*asaṃskṛtānām*) is not seen (*°adarśanāt*), [therefore] a full admission of the eternality (*nityatābhyupagama eva*) of actions (*karmaṇām*) follows (*āpadyate*). Thus (*ity evam*), in the first case (*tāvat*), [there is] the fault of eternality (*nityatvadoṣaḥ*).

While the earlier commentaries do not provide any further explanation for the first two lines of the verse, Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:512-513; T1566.99c<sub>24</sub>-100a<sub>7</sub>) and Candrakīrti contribute with further discussion of the logic of these lines. Candrakīrti does so in the form of presenting further consequences (*prasaṅga*), whereas Bhāvaviveka provides a series of independent reasonings (*svatantrānumāna*).

First Candrakīrti mentions a variant of the opponent's position: the action is not eternal, although it remains until the time of its ripening, because it perishes after having acted as the cause for its ripening. This view could possibly be identified with the *Vibhajyavādin*-position stating that only the present and certain past phenomena exist, namely those past actions, which have not yet brought about their results. Having generated its result, the past action perishes.<sup>423</sup> Bhāvaviveka presents a similar objection by the

<sup>423</sup> Cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1972:805; D4090.I.239b<sub>2-4</sub>): ye hi sarvam astīti vadanti atītam anāgataṃ pratyutpannaṃ ca, te sarvāstivādāḥ | ye tu ke cid asti yat pratyutpannam adattaphalaṃ cātītaṃ karma, kiñ cin nāsti yad dattaphalam atītam anāgataṃ ceti vibhajya vandanti, te vibhajyavādināḥ |. Transl. LVP (1925:52): "Le docteur qui affirme l'existence de tout, passé, présent, futur, est tenu pour *Sarvāstivādin*. Celui qui affirme l'existence du présent et d'une partie du passé, à savoir de l'acte qui n'a pas donné son fruit; et l'inexistence du futur et d'une



Any version of this view thus involves the fault of eternality (*nityatvadoṣa*).

(V311<sub>15</sub>): But if (*atha*) the perishing (°*vināśītvam*) of actions (*karmaṇām*) right after [their] arising (*utpādānantara*°) is admitted (*abhyupeyate*), then [this] being (*satī*) so (*evam*), it may be asked (*nanu*):

*“if (cet) [it has] ceased (niruddham), [then,] having (sat) ceased (niruddham), how (kim) could [it] produce (janayiṣyati) the result (phalam)?”* (Mmk 17.6cd)

The sense (*abhiprāyaḥ*) is that (*iti*) the action (*karmma*) having become (*sat*) something non-existent (*abhāvībhūtam*) by no means (*naiva*) can produce (*janayiṣyati*) a result (*phalam*), because of the non-existence of [its] own-being (*avidyamānasvabhāvatvāt*).

Having shown the consequence of eternality connected with the first logical option that the action would remain until the ripening of its result, the second option is now rejected in the form of a rhetorical question. If the action does not remain, it must cease. Since it must be impermanent by itself as explained above, it perishes by itself as soon as it arises (*utpādānantara-vināśītvam*). Although this option would avoid the undesirable consequence of eternality, it entails another problem. If the action has ceased or gone out of existence right after being performed, it can no longer act as the direct cause for its future ripening. Hence, the consequence of this view would be that either the ripening never arises at all, because it has no cause, or – if it would arise – it would arise causelessly and thus be completely unrelated to whatever action the person might have done in the past. This would constitute the fault of cutting off or ‘nihilism’ (*uccheda*), viz. a denial of *karma-phala*, which will be explained in more detail below. Candrakīrti here presents this option only briefly. Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:513-514; T1566.100a<sub>7-13</sub>), on the other hand, further considers and rejects two variations of

this view, namely that the action might be in the process of ceasing (*\*nir-udhyamāna*, *'gag b'zin pa*) or that it is not possible to say whether the action has ceased or not (*\*avaktavya*, *brjod par bya ba ma yin pa*).

### 3.4 Santāna as Karmaphalasambandha

The latter view that the action ceases upon having been performed agrees with the Buddhist doctrines of impermanence and momentariness, and is the view adopted by several Buddhist schools. Although the action ceases and therefore cannot function as the direct cause for its ripening, it is still possible to maintain that a third phenomenon can function as a connection or link (*sambandha*) between the action and its ripening.<sup>433</sup> This is what has here been called 'the problem of *karmaphalasambandha*': how can *karmaphala* function, when the action is impermanent and must cease immediately upon arising?<sup>434</sup>

As shown above, it was not necessary for the *Sarvāstivādins* to posit a phenomenon that could act as the *sambandha* between the action and its result, because they considered the action to be the direct cause of its result due to their particular doctrine that all future, present and past phenomena coexist. Discussions on *karmaphalasambandha*, therefore, are not found in the numerous extant *Sarvāstivāda*-sources. The problem of *karmaphalasambandha* also does not seem to have attracted any interest in the *Theravāda*-commentarial literature; at least, discussions of it do not occur in these sources. Yet for a number of Buddhist schools, which did not accept the *Sarvāstivāda*-doctrine of the coexistence of phenomena in the three times,

<sup>433</sup> For a brief presentation of the term *sambandha* based on Dharmakīrti's *Sambandha-parīkṣa* with Prabhācandra's commentary, cf. JHA (1990).

<sup>434</sup> The term *karmaphalasambandha* is attested nine times in the writings of Candrakīrti: Pras 302<sub>3</sub> (D3860.100b<sub>6</sub>), Pras 302<sub>6-7</sub> (D3860.D100b<sub>7-101a<sub>1</sub></sub>), Pras 303<sub>2</sub> (D3860.101a<sub>1</sub>), Pras 360<sub>4</sub> (D3860.116b<sub>3</sub>), MavBh D3862.260a<sub>3</sub>, MavBh D3862.260a<sub>6</sub>, MavBh D3862.261b<sub>5</sub>, MavBh D3862.298a<sub>4</sub> and *\*Yuktiṣaṣṭhikāvṛtti* D3864.4a<sub>5</sub>. The problem of *karmaphalasambandha* is also briefly discussed in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 6.71-72 along with its various commentaries, such as Prajñākaramati's *Pañjikā* (LVP, 1901-1914:467-471; D3872.232b<sub>1</sub>ff.) and Vibhūticandra's *Pañjikā* (D3880.269a<sub>5</sub>ff.), as well as in chapter 14 of Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgrahakārikā* (D4266.-19a<sub>3</sub>-21b<sub>3</sub>) along with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1968:207-230; D4267.246a<sub>6</sub>-257a<sub>4</sub>; transl. by JHA, 1937:283-317).

the problem of *karmaphalasambandha* was an important issue.<sup>435</sup> Three theories are attested in the extant Buddhist sources that propose solutions to this problem: (1) the theory of a ‘series’ (*santāna*), (2) the theory of an indestructible phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*), and (3) the theory of ‘seeds’ (*bīja*) or ‘impressions’ (*vāśana*).

The theories of *santāna* and *avipraṇāśa* are presented in Mmk (Mmk 17.7-12 and 17.13-20 respectively). The *santāna*-theory is in other sources ascribed to the *Sautrāntika*-school, but only seems to be attested as a developed theory by sources later than Mmk (cf. below for a brief discussion). The *avipraṇāśa*-theory is in other sources ascribed to the *Sammatīya*-school, of whose literature only a small portion is extant. Thus, in both cases Mmk is an early and important source for the study of these theories. Candrakīrti’s commentary, of course, post-dates the extant *Sautrāntika*-sources, such as the descriptions of this view found in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* and AKBh, and is thus of less importance in the study of the *santāna*-theory. Nevertheless, it provides a welcome support for interpreting the Mmk-verses and can occasionally provide historical information when its comments are based on the explanations given in the earlier Mmk-commentaries. In the case of the *avipraṇāśa*-theory, the Mmk-commentaries, including Pras, are all of great importance given the severe difficulty in reconstructing this theory from the available bits of information found in Mmk and the few other extant sources.

The *bīja*-theory, which is here distinguished from the *santāna*-theory for reasons, which will become apparent below, is associated with the late *Sautrāntika*-school (as presented in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*) and the *Yogācāra*-tradition. It seems to be a later development of the *santāna*-theory and involves an *ālayavijñāna* posited as the locus for the *karmaphalasambandha*. What is here referred to as the *bīja*-theory is not presented in Mmk and, therefore, is also not discussed in Pras. Candrakīrti, however, has discussed this theory in detail in Mav and MavBh, which will be briefly referred to

<sup>435</sup> As a digression, it may be mentioned that the problem of *karmaphala-sambandha* also was treated in the Brāhmanical sources. To solve this problem, the *Vaiśeṣika* and *Nyāya*-schools posited an ‘invisible force’ (*adṛṣṭa*; cf. HALBFASS, 1980:284-290; and KRISHAN, 1997:149-151), while the *Mīmāṃsa*- and *Vedānta*-schools postulated an ‘unprecedented efficacy’ (*apūrva*; cf. POTTER, 1980:258; HALBFASS, 1980:274-284; and KRISHAN, 1997:163-165).

below.

It is noteworthy that Mmk first presents the *santāna*-theory and thereafter presents the *aviprañāśa*-theory. This order of presentation is the opposite of that found in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, the other important source for these theories. The order in *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* may be explained by the fact that this text propagates some form of the *santāna*- or *bīja*-theory, and therefore considers this theory superior to the *aviprañāśa*-theory. Mmk, on the other hand, explicitly rejects the *santāna*-theory, but does not explicitly reject the *aviprañāśa*-theory. The order of presentation in Mmk could thus indicate that Nāgārjuna considered the *aviprañāśa*-theory superior to the *santāna*-theory. This point will also be raised again below. Now follows the discussion of the *santāna*-theory presented as first in Mmk.

(V312<sub>1</sub>): Now (*atra*) some (*eke*) followers of another school (*nikāyāntarīyāḥ*) express (*varṇayanti*) a response (*parihāram*): “First (*tāvat*), the fault of eternality (*nityatva-doṣaḥ*) does not apply (*nāpadyate*) to us (*asmākam*),<sup>436</sup> because conditioned phenomena (*saṃskārāṇām*) perish immediately upon arising (*utpattyanantaravināśitvāt*).

Secondly (*cāpi*), also with regard to (*ity atrāpi*) [the lines], which (*ya*) said (*uktam*) “if (*ce*) [it has] ceased (*niruddham*), [then] having (*sa*) ceased (*niruddham*), what (*kim*) could produce (*janayiṣyati*) the result (*phalam*)”, we give (*brūmaḥ*) the response (*parihāram*):

**“Which (*yaḥ*) series (*saṃtānaḥ*), beginning with a shoot (*aṅkuraprabhṛtiḥ*), evolves (*abhipravarttate*) from a seed (*bījāt*), thence (*tataḥ*) [evolves] the fruit (*phalam*); but (*ca*) without (*ṛte*) the seed (*bījāt*) it (*saḥ*) does not evolve (*nābhipravarttate*).”** (Mmk 17.7)

<sup>436</sup> LAMOTTE (1936:271) here translates *anītyatvadoṣaḥ* «l'impermanence des conditionnés» based on LVP's Pras edition, but this Sanskrit reading has been rejected by DE JONG (1978b:221) and in the present edition. DE JONG's and my edition both read *nītyatvadoṣaḥ* “the fault of eternality” rather than *anītyatvadiṣaḥ* “the fault of impermanence”.

In this case (*iha*), although (*api*) being (*sat*) momentary (*kṣaṇikam*), the seed (*bījam*) ceases (*nirudhyate*) after having become the cause (*hetubhāvam upagamya*) for a series (*santānasya*) called shoot, internode, tiller, panicle and so forth (*aṅkurakāṇḍanālapattrādyabhīdhānasya*), which alone (*eva*) is endowed with the {unique} ability of producing a particular future fruit of its own kind (*svajātīya-bhāviphala viśeṣaṇiṣpattisāmārthya {viśeṣa} yuktasya*).

And (*ca*) just (*ayam*) “**which (*yaḥ*) series (*santānaḥ*), beginning with a shoot (*aṅkuraprabhṛtiḥ*), evolves (*pravarttate*) from the seed (*bījāt*),**” even (*api*) “**from that (*tas-māt*)**” tiny (*svalpāt*) cause (*hetoḥ*) a mass of abundant “**fruits**” (*vipulaphalapracayaḥ*) is gradually (*krameṇa*) born (*upajāyate*), when there is (*satī*) no deficiency in the co-operative causes (*sahakārikāraṇāvaikalye*).

“**But (*ca*) without the seed (*ṛte bījāt*),**” [i.e.,] with no seed (*vinā bījāt*), **it (*saḥ*),** [i.e.,] the series of the shoot and so forth (*aṅkurādisantānaḥ*), “**does not evolve (*nābhipravarttate*).**” Thus (*tad*), by the fact that [the shoot] comes into existence (*bhāvitvena*) when it (the seed) exists (*tadbhāve*) and (*ca*) by the fact that [the shoot] does not come into existence (*abhāvitvena*) when it does not exist (*tadabhāve*), it is in this manner (*evam*) demonstrated (*upadarśitaṃ bhavati*) that the seed is the cause (*bījahetukatvam*) for the fruit (*phala-sya*) belonging to the series beginning with the shoot (*aṅkurādisantānasya*).

Candrakīrti introduces the next verse (Mmk 17.7) as a response (*parihāra*) raised by ‘some followers of another school’ (*eke nikāyāntarīyāḥ*). None of the commentaries identify to which school these proponents might belong. Avalokitavratā (D3859.III.29b<sub>1</sub>) merely echoes the expression used by Candrakīrti (*sde pa gzan dag rnam pa gzan*). The Chinese translation of *Prajñā-*

In the *śāstra*-literature, the growth-stages also appear as illustrations in contexts other than dependent arising. Thus, in the *\*Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā* attributed to Nāgārjuna,<sup>450</sup> they appear as an illustration of the arising of the ten *bhūmis*.<sup>451</sup> In *\*Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545.27.51b<sub>3</sub>), they are used as an illustration for the workings of conditions (*pratyaya*). Moreover, in *\*Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545.27.217b<sub>15-16</sub> & 941a<sub>6-8</sub>) and *\*Buddhadhātuśāstra* (T1610.31.793a<sub>25</sub>), they are used as an illustration for the process of listening to, contemplating and cultivating the teachings. In none of these cases are the growth-stages said to constitute a series (*santāna*). An exception is found in *Yogācārabhūmi* (T1579.30.501c<sub>1-2</sub>; T1581.30.903a<sub>25-26</sub>), where they are mentioned as a series (*santāna*) and are used as an external illustration when explaining the ten types of causes (*hetu*).<sup>452</sup> Although the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as one of the few early sources, speaks of the growth-stages as a series, it does not mention this series as an illustration of the mind-series (*cittasantāna*), as does Nāgārjuna below. The use of the series of the growth-stages as an illustration for the *cittasantāna* is attested, for example, in chapter nine of AKBh (cf. ŚĀSTRĪ, 1987:1229<sub>14ff</sub>), but it does not seem to be attested in any source earlier than Mmk. Thus, it remains very problematic to explain the provenance of Nāgārjuna's presentation of the *santāna*-view.

(V312<sub>12</sub>) Therefore (*tad*), in the same way (*evam*):

particular [stages] of the shoot, the seedling, the leaf, the internode, the node, the tiller, the flower, the fruit and the awns. Likewise, that, which has the nature of arising as outer and inner phenomena, is arisen from ignorance..."

<sup>450</sup> LINDTNER (1982:14) classifies this attribution as dubious, yet gives four arguments indicating that the authorship could be authentic.

<sup>451</sup> Cf. *\*Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā* (T1521.26.90c<sub>12-14</sub>): 十地道亦如是。根名深心所愛。如有根故則生芽莖枝葉等及諸果實。 Transl.: "The path of the ten *bhūmis* is also like this: a root (*ken* 根) called the profound mind, which is tenderness (*\*vatsala?*, *ai* 愛). Thus, due to the presence of this root, there arises a shoot (芽), an internode (莖), a tiller (*chih* 枝), a leaf (葉) and all the fruit and grain (諸果實)." For the use of the word *bīja* in *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, cf. KRITZER (1999: 159-160, especially fn. 413; for another possible canonical source to the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*-passage not mentioned by KRITZER, cf. my fn. 242 above). Regarding the further development of the *bīja*-image away from its literal, botanical meaning, cf. KRITZER (1999:162).

<sup>452</sup> For a discussion of the ten *hetus* in *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, cf. KRITZER (1999:155-165, particularly fn. 415).

*“Both (ca) since (yasmāt) the series (santānaḥ) [arises] from the seed (bījāt) and (ca) [since there is] arising of the fruit (phalodbhavaḥ) from the series (santānāt), [and] the fruit (phalam) [is thus] preceded by the seed (bījapūrvvam), therefore (tasmāt) [the seed] is neither (na) cut off (ucchinnaṃ) nor (nāpi) eternal (śāśvatam).” (Mmk 17.8)*

{In this case (*iha*)}, if (*yadī*) the seed (*bījam*) due to the presence of an obstructing condition (*°virodhipratyaya-sānnidhyāt*), such as a flame or embers (*jvālāṅgārādī°*), should cease (*nirudhyeta*) without having brought forth (*aprasūya*) the series beginning with the shoot (*aṅkurādisantānam*), then (*tadā*) there would be (*syāt*) the viewpoint of cutting off (*ucchedadarśanam*), because there is not seen the development of a series, which results from it (*tatkārya-santānapravṛttyadarśanāt*).

If (*yadī*), on the other hand (*ca*), the seed (*bījam*) would not cease (*na nirudhyeta*) and (*ca*) the series beginning with the shoot (*aṅkurādisantānaḥ*) evolves (*pravarttate*), then (*tadā*) there would be (*syāt*) the viewpoint of eternal[ity] (*śāśvatadarśanam*), because [there would be] admission of the non-ceasing (*anīrodhābhyupagamāt*) of the seed (*bījasya*). But (*ca*) since (*iti*) this (*etaṭ*) is not (*na*) so (*evam*), therefore (*atas*) there is no (*nāsti*) consequence {of the viewpoints} of eternal[ity] and cutting off (*śāśvatocchedaprasaṅgaḥ*) for the seed (*bījasya*).

Having presented the illustration of the series of growth-stages of a plant in Mmk 17.7, verse 17.8 explains how this illustration does not involve either of the undesirable consequences raised in Mmk 17.6, namely that if the seed remains until the ripening of its result, it would be eternal or if the seed ceased upon arising, there would remain no cause for the arising of its result.

admit the consequence of the seed being cut off, if the seed would cease without having generated a series, just as if the seed had been damaged by fire or heat. Oppositely, the *santāna*-proponents would have to admit the consequence of eternality, if the series of the growth-stages of the plant would arise without the ceasing of the seed. However, neither of these scenarios is accepted by the *santāna*-proponents. According to their view, the series does arise from the seed, and, therefore, the seed is not cut off. Oppositely, the seed ceases simultaneously with generating its series, and, therefore, the seed is not eternal. In this way, the *santāna*-proponents show that their illustration of the series of the growth-stages of a plant is a causal model that does not involve the undesirable consequences raised in Mmk 17.6. Having thus explained their illustration, the *santāna*-proponents present their interpretation of *karmaphalasambandha*, which corresponds to their illustration of the growth-stages of a plant.

(V313<sub>6</sub>): Just as (*yathā*) this (*ayam*) procedure (*kramah*) has been explained (*anuvārṇṇitah*) with regard to a seed (*bīje*), in the same manner (*evam*):

*“Which (yaḥ) mind-series (cittasantānaḥ) evolves (abhipravarttate) from that (tasmāt) state of mind (cetasah), thence (tataḥ) [evolves] the result (phalam); but (ca) without (rte) the mind (cittāt) it (saḥ) does not evolve (nābhipravarttate).”* (Mmk 17.9)

*“Which (yaḥ) mind-series (cittasantānaḥ),”* having that [state of mind] as its cause (*taddhetukaḥ*), *“evolves (pravarttate) from that (tasmāt)”* mind (*cittāt*), [i.e.,] [one which is] concomitant with a particular wholesome {or unwholesome} intention (*kuśal{ākuśal}acetanāviśeṣasaṃpratyuktāt*), *“from that (tasmāt)”* mind-series (*cittasantānāt*), [i.e., one which is] impregnated by the wholesome {or unwholesome} intention (*kuśal{ākuśal}acetanāparibhāvitāt*), a desired (*iṣṭam*) {[or] undesired (*aniṣṭam*)} *“result (pha-*



*lam*)” is born (*upajāyate*) {in [the form of] good and bad courses of rebirth (*sugatidurgatiṣu*)} when there is (*satī*) no deficiency with regard to the presence (*°saṃnidhānāvai-kalye*) of [the necessary] co-operative causes (*sahakārikā-raṇa*). Without (*ṛte*) that (*tasmāt*) mind (*cittāt*), [i.e.,] devoid of (*antareṇa*) that (*tat*) mind (*cittam*), it, [i.e., the series],<sup>455</sup> does not evolve (*nābhipravarttate*).

Similar to how a series of growth-stages evolves from a seed and results in a fruit as presented in Mmk 17.7, likewise Mmk 17.9 presents how a mind-series (*cittasantāna*) evolves from the state of mind (*cetas*), by which the action is performed. The result of the action (*phala*) derives from this mind-series. It is established that the state of mind (*cetas*) is the cause of the mind-series, because the mind-series does not come into existence without it.

In *Akutobhayā*, the state of mind (*\*cetas, sems pa*)<sup>456</sup> from which the mind-series evolves is said to be the state of mind ‘designated as action’ (*\*karmoktam, las su brjod pa*).<sup>457</sup> In *Chung lun* (T1564.22a<sub>22</sub>), this state of mind is called ‘the initial mind’ (*ch’u-hsin* 初心). Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:515; T1566.100a<sub>29</sub>) adds to the explanation given by *Akutobhayā* that ‘the state of mind designated as action’ is a state of mind being friendly or not friendly (*byams pa dañ byams pa ma yin pa’i sems pa, tzu-hsin pu-tzu-hsin* 慈心不慈心). Avalokitavratā (D3859.III.30b) does not offer any comment on this expression, and so it remains a question precisely what Bhāvaviveka has in mind with this gloss. He may be referring to *cetas* in Mmk 17.1, where *cetas* was explained as having three aspects, viz. a state of mind being self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamaka*), benefiting others (*parānugrahaka*) and friendly (*maitra*). If this is the case, one wonders why he only mentions

<sup>455</sup> Attested by the Tibetan translation (D104a<sub>3</sub>: *rgyun de yañ*).

<sup>456</sup> It seems that *sems pa* in all the earlier Tibetan commentaries in this instance is not a translation for ‘intention’ (*cetanā*) but rather stands for ‘state of mind’ (*cetas*), because *sems pa* reproduces the word *cetas* from the *mūla*-verse (Mmk 17.9).

<sup>457</sup> *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:408): “sems kyi rgyun gañ yin pa ni sems pa las su brjod pa gañ yin pa ’gag bzin pa de las mñon par ’byuñ zin...” Transl.: “As the state of mind, which was designated as an action, is ceasing, that which is the mind-series evolves therefrom...” The comments of *Akutobhayā* are repeated verbatim in Buddhapālita’s *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:225) throughout this passage.

The decisive point in the theory that a *cittasantāna* constitutes the *karmaphalasambandha* is that the mind itself is the link between the action and its result. Thus, although the concrete action disappears as soon as one stops performing it, continuity may be postulated in the form of the *cittasantāna*, which ensures the ripening of the future result of the action. Since this series is of a mental nature, it does not terminate at the person's death. Rather, since the *cittasantāna* continues after death and into the next life of the person, continuity can be maintained without admitting any permanent phenomenon, such as a Self (*ātman*). The *cittasantāna* is not permanent in itself, because it consists of numerous individual moments of mind. In this way, the *santāna*-proponents present a viable *karmaphalasambandha* as will now be explained.

(V313<sub>12</sub>): Therefore (*tad*), in the same way (*evam*):

*“Both (ca) since (yasmāt) the series (santānaḥ) [arises] from the mind (cittāt) and (ca) [since there is] arising of the result (phalodbhavaḥ) from the series (santānāt), [and] the result (phalam) [is thus] preceded by the action (karmapūrvam), therefore (tasmāt) [the action] is neither (na) cut off (ucchinnaṃ) nor (nāpi) eternal (śāśvatam).”* (Mmk 17.10)

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skad cig gis rnam par śes pa skad cig ma yin no ||. Transl.: “Destructibility in the form of the moments of the mind in that it transpires faster than perception is not extremely difficult to understand. It is like this: if one says a series of letters, such as the letter ā and so forth, very quickly, each letter would be different with regard to its time and kind. Therefore, the mind that perceives each [letter] is [also] understood to be different with regard to its time and kind. And merely from this difference in time and kind, the mind is established to be momentary. A ‘moment’ (\**kṣaṇa*, *skad cig*) refers to the ultimate diminution of time. There are more than 65 moments within [the time of] a fingersnap [produced by] a strong person. By this type of moment, the moment of mind is [explained].”

If (yadi) that (*tat*)<sup>462</sup> wholesome (*kuśalam*) mind (*cittam*) were to cease (*nirudhyeta*), like (*iva*) the final [moment of] mind of an arhant (*arhaccarama-cittam*), without having become the cause (*hetubhāvam anupagamyā*) for a future (*bhāvinah*) mind-series (*cittasamtānasya*), which proceeds as an uninterrupted progression of successive causes and results (*hetuphalapāraṃparyāvicchinna-kramavarttinah*), then (*tadā*) that (*tat*) action (*karma*) would be (*syāt*) cut off (*ucchinnaṃ*).

If, however (*athāpi*),<sup>463</sup> [the action] would be (*syāt*) undeprived (*apraciyutam*) of its own-nature (*svarūpāt*) after having become the cause (*hetubhāvam upagamyā*) for the future series (*anāgatasamtānasya*), then (*tadānīm*) the action (*kamma*) would indeed be (*syāt*) eternal (*śāśvatam*).

But (*ca*) since (*iti*) this (*etat*) is not (*nā*) so (*evam*), therefore (*tasmāt*), even (*api*) when there is admission of the action as being momentary (*kṣaṇikakarmābhyupagame*), there is not (*nāsti*) the consequence of the {twofold} [wrong]

<sup>462</sup> The *tat* is problematic. It is difficult to make sense of it, if it is connected as a part of the following compound. Eventually, it could then be interpreted as meaning ‘of that mind’ (*tasya cittasya*) and connect it with *pāraṃparyā*, i.e., ‘...of a succession of causes and results of that [mind]’. On the other hand, in the Tibetan translation *tat* is not attested in the compound but is attested as a definite pronoun connected with *kuśalaṃ cittam* later in the sentence. There seems to be two possible explanations for this. First, it is possible that the Tibetan translator chose to interpret a *tat* located in the same place as in the extant Sanskrit manuscripts as a definite pronoun to be connected with *kuśalaṃ cittam* later in the sentence. Of course, this would be a problematic construction, given the distance in the sentence between the pronoun and the phrase to which it refers, and could thus reflect the difficulty, which the Tibetan translator had with interpreting this construction. Secondly, it is possible that the *tat* was placed elsewhere in the Sanskrit text that was used as the basis for the Tibetan translation, which would justify the Tibetan interpretation of the *tat*. In that case, it remains a problem to explain why the *tat* was then moved to its present location in the extant Sanskrit mss. It could perhaps have been omitted in the mss-tradition and then added as a marginalia, which later was re-inserted in the wrong place. In the English translation above, the Tibetan interpretation of *tat* as connected with *kuśalaṃ cittam* has been adopted.

<sup>463</sup> The word *atha* or the phrase *athāpi* is commonly used in the writings of Candrakīrti to introduce a second alternative.

view of cutting off and eternal[ity] (*ucchedaśāśvatadarśana-  
{dvaya}prasaṅga*)(*{īti}*).<sup>464</sup>

Just like in Mmk verse 17.8, where the consequences of being cut off and being eternal did not apply to the seed in the illustration of the growth-stages of plant, so also here the same reasoning is applied to the mind, which is the cause for the *cittasantāna*. The verse presents the same two arguments, which were already discussed above: (1) the mind is not cut off, because its result arises from its series, and (2) the mind is not eternal, because its result is only *preceded* by the mind. The earlier commentaries discuss Mmk 17.10 in the same way as Mmk 17.8. Likewise, Candrakīrti's comments on Mmk 17.10 resemble those on Mmk 17.8.

In his commentary on Mmk 17.8, Candrakīrti compared the seed that would cease without first giving rise to a series of growth-stages to a seed that has been damaged by an obstructing condition, such as a flame or hot embers. Now when commenting on Mmk 17.10, he compares the mind that would cease without giving rise to another moment of mind to the last moment of mind of an *arhant*. The *arhant* has eradicated the required co-operative causes, the defilements (*kleśa*) and in particular craving (*tṛṣṇā*), for the mind to function as the direct cause of another moment of mind. Therefore, when the *arhant* passes into *nirvāṇa*, his mind-series ends and he is thus liberated from *saṃsāra*.<sup>465</sup>

<sup>464</sup> The *īti* at the end of the sentence, which is not attested by the Tibetan translation, most likely indicates the end of the explication of the two verses presenting the illustration (Mmk 17.7-8) and the two parallel verses presenting the *cittasantāna* based thereon (Mmk 17.9-10). Or else, it might indicate the end of the *santāna*-proponents' statement begun at Pras 312<sub>1</sub> "Now some followers of another school express a response: "First, since [we admit] the perishing of conditioned phenomena..." (*atraiḥ nikāyāntarīyāḥ parihāraṃ varṇayanti | utpattyanantaravināśītvāt...*). The latter possibility, however, is contradicted by the fact that the following verse (Mmk 17.11) also expresses the doctrine set forth by the *santāna*-proponents.

<sup>465</sup> This is also stated in AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1987:1230; D4090.II.94b<sub>6-7</sub>): *akliṣṭānāṃ cittasantānāntaviniṣṭṭer yadā parinirvāti* |. Transl.: "...because there is a complete end of the mind-series for those, who are without defilements, at which point one passes into parinirvāṇa." It is not quite clear from the explanation given by Candrakīrti whether he by the expression 'last moment of the mind of an *arhant*' refers to the attainment of *nirvāṇa* with remainder (*sopadhiśeṣa*) or without remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣa*); that is to say, does the *saṃsāric* mind-series terminate when the *arhant* attains the state of an *arhant* but is still alive

In his comments to Mmk 17.10, Candrakīrti also clarifies what constitutes the *cittasantāna*. It is an uninterrupted progression (*avicchinna-krama*) of moments of mind, wherein each moment is the successive result of the preceding moment and becomes the cause of the next moment. The mind, by which the action is performed, is thus admitted to be momentary and, therefore, the consequence of eternality does not obtain. Nevertheless, since the mind-series evolving from that moment of mind ensures the arising of the result of the action, the consequence of cutting off also does not obtain.

(V314<sub>7</sub>): Thus (*tad*), the ten wholesome courses of action (*daśa kuśalāḥ karma-pathāḥ*) have {also}<sup>466</sup> been explained (*vyākhyātāḥ*) here (*atra*) in the explanation of the divisions of action as they have been described [above] (*yathoditakarmaprabhedavyākhyāne*), and (*ca*) these (*te*)

*“ten white courses of action (śuklāḥ karmmapathā daśa) [are] the means for the accomplishment (sādhanaopāyāḥ) of dharma (dharmasya). The fruit (phalam) of dharma (dharma-masya) [is] the five (pañca) kinds of sensual pleasure (kāmaguṇāḥ) both after passing away and in this world (pretya ceha ca).”* (Mmk 17.11)

The meaning is (*ity arthaḥ*) that just these (*ta ete*) “ten” wholesome “courses of action” (*daśa kuśalāḥ karma-pathāḥ*) [are] “the means for the accomplishment (*sādhanaopāyāḥ*),” [i.e.,] constitute the cause for the production (*niṣ-pattihetubhūtāḥ*), “of dharma (*dharmasya*).”

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yet without any defilements or does it terminate when he dies and passes into *parinirvāṇa*? For a debate on whether an *arhant* can fall down from his state due to having earlier calumniated an *arhant*, cf. *Kathāvatthu* VIII.11 (TAYLOR, 1897:398-399; transl. by AUNG & RHYS DAVIDS, 1915:228-229).

<sup>466</sup> The word ‘also’ is attested only by the Tibetan translation (*yañ*).

(V314<sub>10</sub>): Moreover (*punaḥ*), what (*kaḥ*) [is] this (*asau*) so-called (*nāma*) *dharma* (*dharmah*), which is distinct from the wholesome courses of action (*kuśalakarmāpathavyatiriktaḥ*), [and] of which (*yasya*) these [wholesome courses of action] (*ete*) are established (*vyavasthāpyante*) as the means for the accomplishment (*sādhanoṣāyatvena*)?

It is answered (*ucyate*) that a particular mind alone (*cittaviśeṣa eva kaś cid*) is meant (*uktaḥ*) by the word ‘*dharma*’ (*dharmasābdena*), {because it was said}<sup>470</sup> by this [verse] (*ity anena*): “*Which (yat) state of mind (cetas) [leads to being] self-restraining (ātmasaṃyamakam) and (ca) benefiting others (parānugrāhakam) [and] friendly (maitram), that (saḥ) [is] dharma (dharmah)*” (Mmk 17.1ac).”

The ten wholesome courses of action are the three bodily, the four verbal and the three mental wholesome actions.<sup>471</sup> The verse (Mmk 17.11) states that these courses of action are the means for the accomplishment (*sādhanoṣāya*) of *dharma*. In that case, the word ‘*dharma*’ does not refer to the same phenomenon as ‘the ten wholesome courses of action’, and this naturally raises the question of what the difference between these terms might be. Candrakīrti first explains the difference by giving a reference to Mmk 17.1. In that verse, *dharma* was defined as a threefold state of mind (*cetas*), namely a state of mind leading to being self-restraining (*ātmasaṃyamaka*), benefiting others (*parānugrāhaka*) and friendly (*maitra*).

Above it was said that the seed (*bīja*) for the result of the action is not the bodily or verbal action carried out following intention (*cetayitvā*), but it is the mind (*citta*), which is concomitant with the wholesome intention (*kuśalacetanāsaṃprayukta*) of deciding to do a particular wholesome action. Therefore, the word *dharma* here refers to this mind, which is concomitant with the wholesome intention, and in that sense “it is a seed for result both after passing away and in this world” (*tad bījam phalasya pretya ceḥ ca*, Mmk 17.1cd).

<sup>470</sup> This phrase is inserted in the Tibetan translation (*brjod pa'i phyir ro*).

<sup>471</sup> For a list, cf. fn. 286.

(V315<sub>1</sub>): Or rather (*atha vā*), [when] having the nature of having been accomplished (*pariniṣṭhitarūpāḥ*) these (*ete*) ten wholesome courses of action (*daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathā*) are (*bhavanti*) what is meant by the word ‘*dharma*’ (*dharmaśabdavācyaḥ*), whereas (*tu*) [when] having the nature of being in the process of being performed (*kriyamāṇarūpāḥ*) [they] are (*bhavanti*) what is meant by the words ‘wholesome courses of action’ (*kuśalakarmmapathaśabdavācyaḥ*).

{Therefore (*tad*),} these (*ete*) ten wholesome courses of action (*daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*) are established (*vya-vasthāpyante*) as the cause (*hetutvena*) in the production (*niṣpattau*) of this [dharma] (*asya*) having the mentioned characteristics (*uktalakṣaṇasya*).

Clearly, the *santāna*-proponent’s explanation of *dharma* (as interpreted by Candrakīrti) is somewhat unusual given that *dharma* in this case would not refer to any concrete wholesome action, such as abstaining from killing and so forth, but only to a state of mind. Hence, in order to underline that this explanation does not directly exclude the ten wholesome courses of action from what is signified by the word *dharma*, the *santāna*-proponent adds a clarification to this point. Since the ten wholesome courses of action are the means for the accomplishment of *dharma*, i.e., the wholesome state of mind, they must precede the *dharma*. Thus, when the ten wholesome courses of action are in the process of being performed, they are referred to as ‘the ten wholesome courses of action’ (*daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*), whereas when they have been accomplished, i.e., brought to completion, they are referred to as *dharma*.

The need for such an explanation illustrates a fundamental problem in the theory of *karmaphala*. A wholesome action involves a physical aspect, such as the bodily or verbal action. How can a physical action be aligned with a theory, in which a result is produced in a future life? What aspect of the physical wholesome action would be accumulated in order to produce its

future result? The *santāna*-proponent answers these questions by saying that it is the mind, by which the physical action is done, which is responsible for generating the future result, not the physical action itself, which perishes immediately after having been executed. Based on such a theory, it is therefore necessary to clarify which terms refer to which aspect of the action. Since the terms *kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ* include the physical aspects of action, it is taken as referring to the concrete performance of the action. The word *dharma*, on the other hand, then refers to the mental aspect. The interpretation of the word *dharma* as referring to the mind thus becomes an hermeneutical strategy, whereby the *santāna*-theory may be secured a canonical basis, because the word *dharma* in the sense ‘wholesome action’ has numerous occurrences in the *sūtras*.

The explanation of *kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ* and *dharma* thus indicates the nuance in meaning, with which each term is imbued. The phrase *kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ* is taken as emphasizing the concrete performance of a wholesome action, whereas the term *dharma* is seen as underlining the accumulative aspect of the wholesome action in the sense that it carries a desirable result in the future, thus setting it akin to the term ‘beneficence’ (*puṇya*).

(V315<sub>3</sub>): Furthermore (*punaḥ*), how (*katham*) [do] the ten wholesome courses of action (*daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*) [fit] into the division of action (*karmavibhāge*) laid out (*prakrānte*) here?

It is answered (*ucyate*): The three (*trayaḥ*) bodily (*kāyikāḥ*) [and] the four (*catvāraḥ*) verbal (*vācikāś*) {courses of action (*karmapathāḥ*)} have been explained (*vyākhyātāḥ*) by [the verse] beginning with (*ity ādinā*) “**Speech (*vāc*), motion (*viṣpandāḥ*) and (*ca*) those without abstinence (*aviratayaḥ*), which (*yāḥ*) [are] designated non-intimation (*avijñaptisaṃjñitāḥ*)...**” (Mmk 17.4). The three (*trayaḥ*) mental [courses of action] (*mānasāḥ*) termed non-covetousness, non-ill-will and right view (*anabhidhyāvyāpādāsamyagdrṣṭyākhyāḥ*) have been explained (*vyākhyātāḥ*) by this



[line] (*ity anena*) “**and intention**” (*cetanā ca*) (Mmk 17.5c). Thus (*ity evam*), all the ten wholesome courses of action (*daśāpi kuśalāḥ karmaṣāḥ*) have in this case been explained (*atra vyākhyātāḥ*), and (*ca*) they (*te*) are (*bhavanti*) the causes for the production (*niṣpattihetavaḥ*) of *dharma* (*dharmasya*), as has been described above (*yathoditasya*).

Having shown how *dharma* was explained as the threefold state of mind in Mmk 17.1, the *santāna*-proponent goes on to show how *kuśalāḥ karmaṣāḥ* have likewise already been explained in Mmk 17.2-5. The tenfold *kuśalāḥ karmaṣāḥ* consists of three groups of action: three bodily (*kāyika*), four verbal (*vācika*) and three mental (*mānasa*). This threefold division of action was presented in Mmk 17.3, where the mental actions were explained as equalling ‘intention-action’ (*cetanākarmaṇ*) and the bodily and verbal actions were explained as equalling ‘action following intention’ (*cetayitvā karmaṇ*). If this threefold division of the tenfold *kuśalāḥ karmaṣāḥ* were further joined with the sevenfold division of action presented in Mmk 17.4-5, the divisions would interrelate as follows. The three bodily and the four verbal wholesome courses of action are included in the elements (1) speech and (2) motion, being actions that constitute intimations (*vijñāpti*) as well as in the element (4) abstention being a non-intimation (*viratayo ’vijñāpti*). Since (5) ‘beneficence’ (*puṇya*) was also explained as a type of wholesome action (*kuśala*), it may be presumed that the three bodily and four verbal wholesome courses of actions would also be included therein. Of course, these wholesome courses of action would not be included in the elements (3) non-abstention being a non-intimation (*aviratayo ’vijñāpti*) and (6) ‘non-beneficence’ (*apuṇya*), because these were explained as unwholesome actions (*akuśala*). The three mental wholesome courses of actions are included in the element (7) intention (*cetanā*).

In this manner, the *santāna*-proponent subsumes all the ten *kuśalāḥ karmaṣāḥ* under the categories listed and explained in Mmk 17.2-5. According to this interpretation, Mmk 17.1 would therefore constitute a presentation of *dharma* referring to the mind by which the wholesome action is done and from which the mind-series (*cittasantāna*) evolves eventually bringing about the result. Mmk 17.2-5, on the other hand, would constitute a

presentation of the concrete actions carried out by this mind, which as such are not responsible for the generation of the action's result but which only represent various forms in which the wholesome mind displays itself in action. These actions are not just 'actions following intention' (*cetayitvā*), but they are also means (*upāya*) by which a wholesome state of mind (*kuśalacetas*) is accomplished. Thus, these actions are the causes for the production of a wholesome state of mind called *dharma* and it is this *dharma*, which brings about the future desirable result via the mental series (*cittasantāna*).

(V315<sub>9</sub>): And (*ca*) “*the result (phalam)*” of this (*asya*) “*dharma (dharmasya)*” [is] “*the five (pañca) kinds of sensual pleasure (kāmaguṇāḥ)*,” characterised as form, sound, smell, taste and physical sensation (*rūpaśabdagandharasa-spraṣṭavyalakṣaṇāḥ*), [which] is enjoyed (*upabhujiyate*) “*both after passing away (pretya ca)*,” i.e., (*ity arthaḥ*) in another, invisible world (*adrṣṭe paraloke*), “*and here (iha ca)*,” i.e., (*ity arthaḥ*) here in [this] world (*ihaloke*)(*iti*).”<sup>472</sup>

Finally, Candrakīrti turns to explaining what constitutes the result of the wholesome state of mind called *dharma*. If related to the presentation of *karmaphala* in Mmk 17.1-5, this would be an explanation of Mmk 17.1cd, in which it was said that the wholesome state of mind called *dharma* is a seed for a result both after passing away and in this world (*tad bījam phalasya pretya ceha ca*). This explanation thus rounds off the *santāna*-proponent's position by completing his cross-referencing to Mmk 17.1-5.

While the result (*phala*) of *dharma* was not specified in Candrakīrti's commentary on Mmk 17.1, it is here defined as the five kinds of sensual pleasure (*pañca kāmaguṇāḥ*). This fivefold division refers to the five

<sup>472</sup> The *iti* at the end of the sentence indicates the end of the answer, which began at Pras 315<sub>4</sub>ff “It is answered: “the three bodily [and] the four verbal...” (*ucyate| vāg viṣpando viratayo...*) and simultaneously indicates the end of the presentation by the *santāna*-proponent, which began at Pras 312<sub>1</sub>.

sense-objects, i.e., form, sound, smell, taste and physical sensation.<sup>473</sup> In CŚV, Candrakīrti likewise defines the desirable sense-objects (*viśaya iṣṭaḥ*), which are attained by means of wholesome action (*śubha*), as referring to the afore-mentioned five sense-objects.<sup>474</sup> As already explained in the commentary to Mmk 17.1, the result of *dharma* ripens in both the present life as well as in future lives. This is more clearly defined in *Chung lun*: “[Some]one who produces such results in body, speech and mind attain name and wealth in this world, and in the next world is born into a place of honour amongst gods and men” (transl. by BOCKING, 1995:262).<sup>475</sup>

### 3.5 A Refutation of Santāna as Karmaphalasambandha

(V315<sub>12</sub>): In that such (*evam*) a response to the objection (*ākṣepaparihāre*) has first (*tāvat*) been expressed (*varṇṇite sati*) by some (*ekīyair*), others (*apare*), who are going to extend (*varṇṇayantaḥ*) a response to the objection in another way (*anyathākṣepaparihāram*) after having [first] revealed (*udbhāvya*) the fault (*doṣam*) to them (*tān prati*), say (*ahuḥ*):

*“The faults (doṣaḥ) would be (syuḥ) both (ca) many (bahavaḥ) and (ca) great (mahāntaḥ), if (yadi) this*

<sup>473</sup> For a detailed presentation of the five sense objects, cf. AK 1.10 with AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:32-37; transl. LVP, 1923:16-18).

<sup>474</sup> Cf. CŚV (D129a<sub>7</sub>) commenting on CŚ 7.20 (cf. LANG, 1986:76), where he, however, also underlines the need for those seeking liberation to abandon these: yul yid du 'oñ ba gzugs dañ sgra dañ dri dañ ro dañ reg bya zes bya ba 'dod pa'i yon tan lña'i bdag ñid can gañ yin pa de ni dge ba'i las kyis 'thob na | de ñid thar pa 'dod pa'i sems can rnam kyis mi gtsaṅ ba bskus pa'i khyim ltar smad par 'gyur ro ||. Transl.: “Although (*na*) the desirable objects called form, sound, smell, taste and physical sensation, which have the five kinds of sensual pleasure as their trait, will be attained by means of wholesome action, they are looked down upon by persons seeking liberation, just like a house stained with impurity.” A longer explanation of why they are rejected along with an illustrative story follows in the text. In certain other sources, the five sensual pleasures are understood as dancing (*nāṭya*), singing (*gīta*), speaking (*vāḍita*), playing instruments (*tūrya*) and [enjoying] women (*striyo*) (cf. EDGERTON, 1953.II:177 s.v.).

<sup>475</sup> *Chung lun* (T1564.22b<sub>2-4</sub>): 從身口意生是果報者。得今世名利。後世天人中貴處生。For canonical references to similar explanations, cf. p. 217 above.

*(eṣā) idea (kalpanā) would be [the case] (syāt). Therefore (tena), this (eṣā) idea (kalpanā) does not at all (naiva) obtain (upapadyate) here (atra).” (Mmk 17.12)*

*“If (yadi) there would be (syāt)”* a response to the consequences of the faults {consisting of the two faults} of eternal[ity] and cutting off (*śāśvatoccheda*{*doṣadvaya*}*doṣa-prasaṅgaparihāraḥ*) in the form of a mind-series (*citta-santāne*) due to similarity with a seed and a shoot (*bījāṅkurasādharmyeṇa*), then (*tadā*) *“faults (doṣāḥ)”* are found in the opponent’s position (*parapakṣe prāpnuvanti*) that are *“both (ca) many (bahavaḥ),”* due to being numerous (*saṃkhyābahutvena*), *“and (ca) great (mahāntaḥ),”* due to contradicting what is seen and what is not seen (*drṣṭādrṣṭa-virodhena*).

The *santāna*-theory was introduced at V312<sub>1</sub> as a response (*parihāra*) to the objection (*ākṣepa*) in Mmk 17.6, which shows the consequences (*prasaṅga*) that if the action remains until the time of the ripening of the result, it will go on eternally, whereas if it ceases, it is cut off and cannot produce the result. The *santāna*-theory provided a response to this objection by admitting that the action ceases immediately upon arising but, as it ceases, the mind by which the action is performed produces a mind-series, which ensures the ripening of the result. Its presentation used the growth-stages of a plant as an analogy.

This response will now be refuted by another group of opponents, who are going to give their own response to the objection. None of the commentaries specifies which opponents are intended, but they all merely refer to these opponents as ‘others’ (*apare, gṛāṇaḥ*).<sup>476</sup> LAMOTTE (1936: 274) identifies them as belonging to the *Sammatīya*-tradition given that they

<sup>476</sup> Except the Chinese translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, where the following refutation is attributed to the author of the [*Madhyamaka*]-*śāstra* (T1566.100b<sub>26</sub>: 論者).

an oral commentarial tradition on text. In the latter case, one would expect to find at least a hint thereto in the earliest commentaries. However, both *Akutoḥhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:410) and *Chung lun* (T1564.22b<sub>8-9</sub>) state that they are not going to explain these faults. Two faults are, nevertheless, explained in some detail in *Chung lun* (possibly as a later interpolation?). The two faults stated by *Chung lun* differ from the faults mentioned in the later commentarial tradition. The first fault mentioned in *Chung lun* (T1564.22b<sub>10-13</sub>) is that the example does not apply, because a seed is tangible, has shape, is visible and involves a series, but this does not apply to the mind. Secondly, a consequence (*prasaṅga*) is raised (T1564. 22b<sub>13-18</sub>), stating that the problem of whether the cause remains or has ceased at the time of the arising of its result also applies to the example of a seed and shoot.<sup>479</sup>

(V316<sub>5</sub>): How (*katham kṛtvā*)? For (*hi*) if (*yadī*) in the example of the seed-series (*bījaśaṃtānadṛṣṭānte*) only (*eva*) a series of the rice-shoot and so forth (*śālyañkurādisantānaḥ*) evolves (*pravarttate*) from the rice-seed (*śālibījāt*) [and] not (*na*) a [series] of a different kind (*viśātīyaḥ*), and (*ca*) only (*eva*) the rice-fruit (*śāliphalam*) is produced (*upajāyate*) from the series of the rice-shoot and so forth (*śālyañkurādisantānāt*) [and] not (*na*) a *nimba*-fruit (*nimbaphalam*), since it is of a different kind (*bhinnaśātīyatvāt*), [then] in the same manner (*evam*) also in this case [of the mind-series] (*ihāpi*) there would be (*syāt*) only (*eva*) a wholesome series (*kuśalaśantānaḥ*) from a wholesome mind (*kuśalacittāt*), because [they are] of the same kind (*samānaśātīyatvāt*), [and] not (*na*) an unwholesome or indeterminate series (*akuśalāvyākṛtaśantānaḥ*), because [they are] of a different kind (*viśātīyatvāt*). Likewise (*evam*), there would be (*syāt*) only (*eva*) an unwholesome or indeterminate series (*akuśalāvyākṛtaśantānaḥ*) from an unwholesome or indeterminate mind

<sup>479</sup> The latter argument occurs in a number of *Madhyamaka*-texts in other contexts, cf. LVP (1931:295).

(*akuśālāvyākṛtacittāt*), [and] not (*na*) any other (*anyaḥ*), on account of it being of a different kind (*bhinnajātīyatvāt*).

Candrakīrti then provides a longer explanation of the faults that follow from the *santāna*-view. This explanation combines the comments found in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* and Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:226-227) criticises the *santāna*-theory by pointing to the similarity of species that is required in the illustration of the seed and the shoot. Thus, he says, if one plants a mango-seed (*āmra*), there will be a mango-tree and mango-fruits, whereas if one plants a *nimba*-seed, there will be a *nimba*-tree and *nimba*-fruits. The same explanation is adopted by Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:517-518; T1566.100c<sub>9-14</sub>).<sup>480</sup> In this manner, there are two different kinds of fruit: the mango, which is sweet and delicious, and the *nimba*, which is bitter coming from the *Azadirachta Indica*.<sup>481</sup> The seed thus always belongs to a particular species and will always produce its fruit accordingly.<sup>482</sup> Candrakīrti gives the same explanation, but changes the example of a mango-seed to that of a rice-seed (*śālibīja*). This is undoubtedly done to align the explanation with the illustration used by the *santāna*-proponents above, although it somewhat disturbs the clear botanical contrasts between a mango and a *nimba* found in Buddhapālita's explanation.

In Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* this explanation of the illustration is first applied to the species of the mind-series, i.e., whether the *cittasantāna* is that of a human or another being, whereafter it is stated also to apply to whether the *cittasantāna* is wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate. In *Prajñāpradīpa*, the order of this application is reversed, so that the explanation of the illustration is first applied to whether the *cittasantāna* is wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate. Candrakīrti has adopted *Prajñāpradīpa*'s order of explanation.

<sup>480</sup> In *Pang jo teng lun*, the explanation attested in *Chung lun* is interpolated before the actual explanation of *Prajñāpradīpa*.

<sup>481</sup> For the *nimba*-plant used as a bitter illustration of *akuśala*, cf. AN 5.211-212 (HARDY, 1900; transl. WOODWARD, 1936:150), echoed at AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:749; transl. LVP, 1924:246). For a botanical description of this tree with illustrations, cf. <http://www.hear.org/pier/azind.htm>

<sup>482</sup> Cf. also the statement of the identity in species of the seed and the sprout in \**Miśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra* (fn. 240 above).

mind and the variety of states in which these result.<sup>486</sup>

(V316<sub>9</sub>): From the minds of [beings in] the desire-, material or immaterial world-spheres or those that are without negative influence (*kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravacittebhyaḥ*) there would be (*syāt*) arising (*utpādaḥ*) only (*eva*) of similar (*sadṛśānām*) minds (*cittānām*) of the desire-, material or immaterial world-spheres or that are without negative influence (*kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravāṇām*), not (*na*) [arising] of those of a different kind (*bhinnajātīyānām*).

Having explained, as the first consequence, that the *santāna*-theory would contradict the distinction of *kuśala*, *akuśala* and *avyākṛta*, Candrakīrti mentions, as a second consequence, that it would also contradict the change between states of mind associated with each of the three spheres (*dhātu*) of *saṃsāra* as well as states of mind not associated with *saṃsāra*, i.e., states without negative influence (*anāśrava*).<sup>487</sup> In other words, the *santāna*-view would contradict transmigration and liberation. Candrakīrti adopts this consequence from Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:518; T1566.100c<sub>14-16</sub>), who added it to the explanation given by Buddhapālita.

The logic applied to this consequence is the same as that applied to the first consequence of *santāna*. Since the cause and result must be of a similar kind, a *cittasantāna* evolving from a mind belonging to the desire-world-sphere (*kāmadhātu*) can only belong to the desire-world-sphere; a *cittasantāna* evolving from a mind belonging to the material world-sphere (*rūpadhātu*) can only belong to the material world-sphere, and so forth. This consequence again implies the premise that an individual can only have a single mind-series at any given moment.

<sup>486</sup> JAINI (1959:238-239) also raises this problem in general terms, but then – without taking the *santāna*-problem into account – explains what he calls the *Sautrāntika*-theory of seeds (*bīja*) as their solution to this problem.

<sup>487</sup> For a list of the three world-spheres of *saṃsāra* along with their subdivisions, cf. Candrakīrti's *\*Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (D259a<sub>6</sub>-259b<sub>6</sub>; LINDTNER, 1979:131<sub>1-29</sub>).

(V316<sub>11</sub>): From a human mind (*manuṣyacittāt*) there would be (*syāt*) only (*eva*) a human mind (*manuṣyacittam*) [and] not (*na*) the mind of another [kind of being], such as a god, hell-being, starving ghost or an animal (*devanāraṅkapretatiryagādyanyacittam*).

A third consequence applying the same logic is that a *cittasantāna* evolving from the mind of a human can only be human, etc. That is to say, the *santāna*-view would also contradict transmigration within the five or six courses of rebirth (*gati*) within the desire-world-sphere (*kāmadhātu*).

Candrakīrti adopts this consequence from *Prajñāpradīpa*, where it is mentioned in the same order as found in Pras. Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:227), which is the first among the extant commentaries to mention this consequence, explains it as its first consequence.

(V316<sub>11</sub>): And (*ca*), therefore (*tataḥ*), who (*yaḥ*) [is] a god (*devaḥ*), he (*saḥ*) would be (*syāt*) only (*eva*) a god; who (*yaḥ*) [is] a human (*manuṣyaḥ*), he (*saḥ*) would be (*syāt*) only (*eva*) a human (*manuṣyaḥ*) and so forth (*ityādiḥ*). And (*ca*), therefore (*tataḥ*), even (*api*) for gods and men (*devamanuṣyāṇām*), who are doing (*kurvatām*) what is unwholesome (*akuśalam*), there would be (*syāt*) neither (*na*) diversity in terms of [their] course of rebirth, type of birth, class, intelligence, faculties, strength, beauty, wealth and so forth (*gatiyonivarṇṇabuddhīndriyabalarūpabhogādivaicitryam*) nor (*ca*) downfall into a state of misery (*apāya-patanam*).

Summing up the undesired consequences, Candrakīrti then states that each kind of sentient being would always have to remain the same, life after life, because his or her *cittasantāna* would always be of that particular kind. This would contradict the entire doctrine of *karmaphala*, because even someone committing unwholesome actions would neither experience any change in his next lives with regard to his course of rebirth (*gati*), type of birth (*yoni*), class (*varṇṇa*), intelligence (*buddhi*), sense- and other faculties (*indriya*),



physical strength (*bala*), beauty (*rūpa*), wealth (*bhoga*) and so forth nor would he experience downfall into a state of misery (*apāyapatana*), i.e., a bad course of rebirth (*durgati*).<sup>488</sup> This list of diversity (*vaicitrya*) is based on a similar list found in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:227). It is not given by Bhāvaviveka, but is interestingly mentioned by Avalokitavrata (D3859.III.33b<sub>5-6</sub>) in the same form as found in Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti*.

(V316<sub>14</sub>): However (*ca*), all this (*etat sarvam*) is not (*na*) accepted (*iṣyate*). Hence (*iti*), since (*yasmāt*) in this manner (*evam*) both (*ca*) many (*bahavaḥ*) and (*ca*) great (*mahāntaḥ*) faults (*doṣāḥ*) follow (*prasajyante*) when one conceives [of a mind-series] as analogous to the series [coming from] a seed (*bijasantānasādharmyakalpanāyām*), therefore (*tasmāt*) “*this (eṣa) idea (kalpanā) is not (na) tenable (upapadyate) in this case (atra).*”

Such consequences, which contradict fundamental tenets of *karmaphala*, transmigration and the various states of *saṃsāra*, are obviously unacceptable to Buddhists. Hence, since the *santāna*-theory would entail such consequences, the root-verse states that it is untenable.

As stated above, the root-text and the earliest commentaries do not specify the faults incurred by the *santāna*-theory. It is, therefore, not possible to know for sure, whether the consequences described by Buddhapālita and elaborated by Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti are the faults intended by Nā-

<sup>488</sup> For an explanation of *gati*, cf. above fn. 290. There are four types of birth (*yonī, skye gnas*). These are listed in the *Saṅgītisuttanta* (DN 3.230; transl. RHYS DAVIDS, 1921:222): egg-born (*aṇḍaja*), womb-born (*jalābujā*), moisture-born (*saṃsedaja*) and spontaneous [birth] (*opapātika*). For some further references to the Pāli-literature, cf. RHYS DAVIDS & STEDE (1921-1925:559). For an explanation of these four types of birth, cf. *Saṅgītiparyāya* 4.29 (STACHE-ROSEN, 1968:110). As indicated by DIETZ (1994:303-304), the explanation found in *Saṅgītiparyāya* is repeated in *Kāraṇaprajñāptiśāstra* (D4087.159b<sub>2</sub>-160b<sub>2</sub>) and AK 3.8cd with AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:401-402; transl. LVP, 1926:26-28). ‘Class’ (*varṇa*, lit. ‘colour’) may both signify race or species within a given kind of rebirth, such as various kinds of animals, or social group (caste) within the human realm (cf. RHYS DAVIDS & STEDE, 1921-1925:596-597, s.v. *vaṇṇa*).

*phalasambandha*. This seems to be a reference to Candrakīrti's *karmaphala-sambandha*-critique in Mav 6.39-97 (MavBh, D3862.260a<sub>2</sub>-283a<sub>4</sub>; LVP, 1907-1912:125<sub>19</sub>-202<sub>5</sub>). The major part of the critique found in Mav concerns the *bīja*-theory and a refutation of the *ālayavijñāna*.

### 3.6 Avipraṇāśa as Karmaphalasambandha

(V317<sub>1</sub>): “*I will instead (punah) explain (pravak-  
syāmi) the following (imām) idea (kalpanām), which  
(yā) [can be] applied (yojyate) in this case (atra) [and  
which is] taught (anuvartitām) by the awakened  
ones (buddhaiḥ), the self-awakened ones (pratyeka-  
buddhaiḥ) and (ca) the listeners (śrāvakaiḥ).*” (Mmk  
17.13)

Having refuted the *santāna*-theory, it is stated in Mmk 17.13 that the proper explanation now will be given. This is the explanation, which was taught by the *buddhas*, *pratyekabuddhas* and *śrāvakas*. None of the commentaries comments on this verse. However, it seems that it may be interpreted in at least two ways. First, it could be presumed that this verse is spoken by the opponent, i.e., the *avipraṇāśa*-proponent, who is probably a *Sāṃmatīya* as stated above. This is how the verse is interpreted by all the commentaries, because all the commentaries introduce Mmk 17.21 as a refutation of the preceding verses presenting the *avipraṇāśa*-view. In that case, it may be asked why the opponent needs to refer to the *buddhas*, *pratyekabuddhas* and *śrāvakas* when introducing his view. A reasonable explanation would be that he makes this reference to lend authority to his view, since he could not allow himself simply to take it for granted that the reader knew this view to be taught in the *sūtras*. In other words, the opponent's reference to scriptural authority (*āgama*) could indicate that his view was not commonly accepted. This would also be supported by the extreme lack of sources describing this view, which will be discussed below.

Secondly, it could be presumed that this verse is not spoken by an

opponent but by Nāgārjuna himself.<sup>505</sup> Such an interpretation could be supported by the use of the first person in this verse, but this is not supported by the commentaries. The verse-structure in the remaining part of the chapter does not necessarily imply a refutation of the *avipraṇāśa*-view as it is interpreted by the commentaries. Verses Mmk 17.13-20 merely present the *avipraṇāśa*-concept in general terms. Mmk 17.21 onwards show that actions can be non-perishing only if they are unarisen. It is thus possible to read the latter part of the chapter in such a way that the *avipraṇāśa*-view is not rejected but merely (re)interpreted in a way, which agrees with the *Madhyamaka*-view. In that case, the reference to the *buddhas*, *pratyekabuddhas* and *śrāvakas* in the present verse (Mmk 17.13) would merely serve to alert the reader that the author now is going to present his own view. However, such an interpretation is quite conjectural. It is very difficult to interpret the verses of Mmk as to who says what and perhaps it is also of little consequence. It may be established as a fact that all the commentaries imply verses Mmk 17.13-20 to be spoken by an opponent and this was the interpretation, which became important for the ensuing textual tradition.

(V317<sub>3</sub>) [The interlocutor] says (*ity āha*): “And (*ca*) what (*kā*) [is] this (*asau*) idea (*kalpanā*)?”

*“As (yathā) a promissory note (patram),<sup>506</sup> so (tathā) [is] the non-perishing (avipraṇāśaḥ), and (ca) the action (karma) [is] like (iva) a debt (ṛṇam). It (saḥ) [is] fourfold (caturvidhaḥ) in terms of world-sphere (dhātutaḥ) and (ca) it (saḥ) [is] indeterminate (avyākṛtaḥ) by nature (prakṛtyā).”* (Mmk 17.14)

All the commentaries introduce verse Mmk 17.14 with a phrase similar to that found in Pras, namely that the verse is an answer to the question of what this idea (*kalpanā*) could be. The verse introduces the term ‘the non-peri-

<sup>505</sup> This is, for example, how the verse is interpreted by KALUPAHANA (1986:249).

<sup>506</sup> On its own, *patra* or *pattra* only means ‘document’ but it is explained in the commentary below to have the specified meaning of ‘promissory note’ (*ṛṇapatra*).

planation, found in Mmk and Pras, will now be given, but it must be borne in mind that it suffers greatly from the lack of extant sources. The discussion of this passage, therefore, must rest almost solely on the information provided by the extant Mmk-commentaries.

(V317<sub>6</sub>): In this case (*iha*), a wholesome (*kuśalam*) action (*karma*) being (*sad*) done (*kṛtam*), ceases (*nirudhyate*) just (*eva*) immediately upon arising (*utpādānantaram*), and (*ca*) there is not (*na*) the consequence that there will be no result (*phalābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ*) when it (*tasmin*) has ceased (*niruddhe*), since (*yasmāt*) just when (*yadaiva*) that (*taṭ*) action (*karma*) arises (*utpadyate*), right then (*tadaiva*) a non-concomitant (*viprayuktaḥ*) phenomenon (*dharmaḥ*) called ‘the non-perishing’ (*avipraṇāśākhyāḥ*), comparable to a promissory note (*ṛṇapatrasthānīyaḥ*), is born (*samupajāyate*) of that (*tasya*) action (*karmaṇaḥ*) in the series (*santāne*) of the doer (*kartuḥ*).

In Pras, the *avipraṇāśa*-proponent begins by addressing the objection raised in Mmk 17.6. First, this proponent admits that the action ceases immediately upon arising, i.e., that the action is impermanent. The *avipraṇāśa*-proponent, therefore, does not hold the view that the action remains until the time of the ripening of its result, which would entail the consequence of eternity of the action, as explained above.

Although the action is admitted to cease, there is not the consequence that it is cut off without giving rise to its result due to the action having ceased, because the action generates a separate phenomenon (*dharma*) called ‘the non-perishing’ (*avipraṇāśa*), which can function as the connection between the action and its result (*karmaphalasambandha*). Pras does not ex-

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[arisen] from ‘the non-perishing [phenomenon]’», they are the *Sāṃmatīyas*. «Others say that it is [arisen] from ‘accumulation’», they are the *Mahāsaṅghikas*. «A separate phenomenon not associated with the mind» means that it is established as being non-concomitant with the mind, because it is a conditioned phenomenon not consisting of matter, mind or mental factors, which is not concomitant with the mind, because it is its opposite. «Or that, which ensues until the yielding of the result» means a separate phenomenon non-concomitant with the mind.”

Candrakīrti then states that the *avipraṇāśa* arises just when the action is born. This statement is not directly supported by any of the other sources, but, of course, would be in line with the momentary nature of the action. It is also said in Pras that the *avipraṇāśa* arises in the series (*santāna*) of the doer (*kartr*). That is to say, it remains connected with the doer of the action, which echoes the *Sarvāstivāda*-doctrine of *prāpti* that ensures that the action and its result remain connected with the particular individual, who performed that action. It also indicates that this series is the locus for the *avipraṇāśa*.

Candrakīrti does not specify which type of series (*santāna*) is intended. It could refer specifically to the mind-series (*cittasantāna*), but could also be taken more broadly to refer to the series of the five aggregates (*skandhasantāna*) or the series of name and matter (*nāmarūpasantāna*). *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (cf. fn. 517 above) supports an interpretation as *skandhasantāna* (*phuñ po'i rgyud, yün hsiang-hsü* 蘊相續) as well as *cittasantāna* (*sems kyi rgyud, hsin hsiang-hsü* 心相續). It is noteworthy that neither text in this context mentions the *pudgala*, which is also asserted by the *Sāṃmatīyas*, but each speaks of a series (*santāna*). To sum up, the *avipraṇāśa*-proponent thus asserts a separate, non-concomitant phenomenon called *avipraṇāśa*, which is caused to arise in the series of doer through his actions, ensuring the arising of the action's result. In this way, it functions as a *karmaphalasaṃbandha*.

(V317<sub>8</sub>): Therefore (*tad*), in this manner (*evam*), “*as (yathā) a promissory note (patram) so also (tathā) the non-perishing (avipraṇāśaḥ)*” should be understood (*veditavyaḥ*), “*and (ca)*” that (*tat*) “*action (karma)*,” of which (*yasya*) this (*asau*) phenomenon (*dharmah*) called ‘the non-perishing’ (*avipraṇāśākhyo*) arises (*utpadyate*), should be understood (*veditavyam*) [to be] “*like (iva) a debt (ṛṇam)*.” Further (*ca*), just as (*yathā*), due to the remaining of the promissory note (*ṛṇapatrāvasthānāt*), a creditor (*dhaninaḥ*) does not (*na*) have (*bhavati*) a loss of [his] money (*dhananāśaḥ*) even (*api*) when the money (*dhane*) has been spent (*upayukte*), [but]

he (*saḥ*) surely (*eva*) [stays] connected (*sambadhyate*) with the amount of money (*dhanaskandhena*) together with the interest (*sopacayena*) until some other time (*kālāntare*), so also (*tathā*), due to the remaining of the separate phenomenon called ‘the non-perishing’ (*avipraṇāśākhyadharmāntarāvasthānāt*), the doer (*karttā*) surely (*eva*) [stays] connected (*abhisambadhyate*) with a result (*phalena*) having that [non-perishing] as its cause (*tannimittakena*), even (*eva*) when the action (*karmaṇi*) has ceased (*vināṣṭe*).

Candrakīrti then explains the comparison given in Mmk 17.14. The non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*) is like a promissory note (*ṛṇapatra*), i.e., an instrument of debt. The action, which creates the *avipraṇāśa*, is like a debt (*ṛṇa*).<sup>526</sup> Candrakīrti explains this comparison in terms of a creditor. This raises a question about the intent of the illustration. If action is a debt, does it mean that the doer is like a debtor or a creditor? It would seem that Candrakīrti considers the doer to be like a creditor (in opposition to the verse from *\*Sīṃhacandrajātaka*, where the doer is clearly viewed as a debtor; cf. fn. 513 above), because he only mentions the creditor in the following explanation. Perhaps both interpretations are possible: if the action is wholesome, the doer could be viewed as a creditor, because he receives a desirable result, whereas if the action is unwholesome, the doer could be viewed as a debtor, because he receives an undesirable result. If that is the case, Candrakīrti’s explanation, which only mentions the creditor, would be in line with his explanations throughout chapter 17, where he always uses positive examples of wholesome action (of course, apart from his explanations of *aviratyavijñapti* and *apuṇya* in Mmk 17.4-5, where negative examples were called for by the *mūla*-verse).

<sup>526</sup> As a digression, it may be mentioned that in AK 4.39cd, a monk’s transgression of his vows is also compared to a debt (*ṛṇa*); ŚĀSTRĪ (1971:644): *dhanarṇavat tu kāśmīrair āpannasyesyate dvayam* ||; transl. by LVP (1924:95): “Le Kāśmīrien croit que le pêcheur possède moralité et immoralité, comme un homme peut avoir des richesses et des dettes.” English translation: “The Kāśmīrians believe that the sinner possesses morality and imorality just like a person has wealth and debts.” Although this verse contains such a comparison between action and debt, it seems unrelated to the *Sāṃmatīya*’s use of this comparison.

The explanation of the illustration given in Pras stems from *Akuto-bhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411), and is repeated by Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:228) and Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:519; T1566100c<sub>26-28</sub>). In Avalokita-vrata's citation of *Prajñāpradīpa* (D3859.III.34a<sub>6</sub>), the word action (*las*) appears as 'the seal, which is action' (*\*karmamudrā, las kyi phyag rgya*). However, this seems either to be an interpolation using tantric terminology or *phyag rgya* is a corruption for *dpañ rgya* (*pattra*). If taken as it stands, the interpolation would seem to mean that the action is like the stamp (*\*mudrā, phyag rgya*) that seals the promissory note (*ṛṇapatra*), which is the non-perishing phenomenon (*avipraṇāśa*).

Just as a promissory note ensures the return of the loan even after the borrowed money is spent and gone, the *avipraṇāśa* ensures the ripening of the result after the action has perished. The promissory note constitutes the creditor's connection with his money until the money is returned along with an interest (*upacaya*, literally 'increase' or 'accumulation'). Likewise, the *avipraṇāśa* constitutes the *karmaphalasambandha* until the abundant result of the action is yielded.<sup>527</sup> A wholesome action is thus like lending money and its doer is like a creditor. The wholesome action generates a non-perishing phenomenon stored in the series of the doer, which is like a promissory note stored in a safe. As the promissory note ensures the creditor the return of his money along with interest, the *avipraṇāśa* ensures the ripening of the abundant desirable result of the wholesome action. Oppositely, an unwholesome action is like borrowing money and its doer is like a debtor. In this manner, the commercial illustration of a promissory note could be interpreted with regard to the *avipraṇāśa*.

(V318<sub>2</sub>): Moreover (*ca*), just as (*yathā*) the promissory note (*ṛṇapatram*) having been honoured (*nirbhuktaṃ sat*)<sup>528</sup> after having caused the return of the creditor's (*dātuḥ*)

<sup>527</sup> The accrued interest in the comparison may perhaps reflect the statement that a great result may ripen from a small action given the right circumstances. When describing five points of external dependent arising, the *Śālistambasūtra* also says that a great result can be obtained from a small cause, namely that abundant fruit is obtained from a small seed (cf. SCHOENING, 1995:285, 287, 406, 495, and my earlier fn. 413 above on this *sūtra*).

<sup>528</sup> Literally, 'being used up' (*nirbhuktaṃ sat*).

money (*dhanābhyāgamam kṛtvā*) is not (*na*) capable (*samartham*) of returning the money (*dhanābhyāgame*) once again (*punar api*) whether [still] existing or not existing (*vidyamānaṃ vā 'vidyamānaṃ vā*), thus (*evam*) also the non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*) having yielded a ripening (*dat-tavipākaḥ saṃ*) is not (*na*) able (*śaknoti*) once again (*punar api*) to create (*kartum*) a connection with a ripening (*vipā-kasambandham*) for the doer (*kartuḥ*) whether [still] existing or not existing (*vidyamāno vā 'vidyamāno vā*), just like an honoured promissory note (*nirbhuktapatravat*).

Next, Candrakīrti raises the question whether the *avipraṇāśa* would not repeatedly yield the result of the action, because it is non-perishing. This discussion stems from *Akutoḥayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411) and is repeated by Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:228) and Bhāvaviveka (AMES, 1986:519; T1566.100c<sub>26f</sub>).

The answer to the question is that it only has the power to yield a ripening once and it is, therefore, irrelevant whether or not it continues to exist after having yielded its ripening. This is explained by means of the promissory note-comparison. A promissory note only has the legal force to ensure the return of the debt once. Even if the annulled promissory note would still exist after the return of the debt, it can no longer be used to reclaim the money. Similarly, the *avipraṇāśa* can only yield its ripening once. Yet, the details as to what constitutes the power of the *avipraṇāśa* to yield its result and how this power is annulled when its result is yielded are not explained here.

(V318<sub>6</sub>): Further (*ca*), this (*ayam*) non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*), which (*yaḥ*) was spoken of by us (*asmābhir uktaḥ*), “*that (saḥ)*” was mentioned in another *sūtra* (*sūtrāntaroktaḥ*)<sup>529</sup> “*as fourfold (caturvidhaḥ) in terms of*

<sup>529</sup> It is a question how to interpret the phrase ‘spoken of in another sūtra’ (*sūtrāntaroktaḥ*). The first question is whether *antara* should be understood as ‘another’ or as a ‘certain’ and whether *sūtra* should be taken as singular or plural: ‘in another *sūtra*’, ‘in other



*world-sphere (dhātutaḥ),*” because of being divided into those associated with the desire-, material or immaterial [world-spheres] and those without negative influence (*kāmarūpārūpyāvacarānāśravabhedāt*).

*Pāda c* of the verse (Mmk 17.14), wherein it was said that *avipraṇāśa* is fourfold in terms of world-sphere (*dhātu*), is then explained. All the commentaries starting from *Akutoḥbhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:411-412) and *Chung lun* (T1564.21c<sub>6</sub>) enumerate this fourfold division in the same way, namely that *avipraṇāśa* is associated with the three world-spheres of *saṃsāra* (*dhātu*) called the desire-world-sphere (*kāmadhātu*), the material world-sphere (*rūpadhātu*) and the immaterial world-sphere (*ārūpyadhātu*),<sup>530</sup> or *avipraṇāśa* is without negative influence (*anāśrava* or *anāśrava*). Candrakīrti says that this fourfold division is mentioned in another *sūtra*, although it is not clear which *sūtra* he may have had in mind (cf. fn. 529).

As the *mūla*-text (Mmk 17.14c) states that *avipraṇāśa* is fourfold in terms of world-sphere (*dhātutaḥ*), it may be considered whether the *Sāṃmatīyas* would possibly assert a fourth world-sphere without negative influence (*\*anāśravadhātu* or *anāśravo dhātuḥ*). LAMOTTE (1936:162-163) indicates that this division would indeed entail four world-spheres: “Elle [viz. *avipraṇāśa*] est quadruple, car elle peut exiger le fruit de l’acte dans un des quatre mondes: monde du désir, de la forme, de la non-forme, ou monde pur.”<sup>531</sup>

SCHMITHAUSEN (1969b:82-83, fn. 7) explains that the word *dhātu* in

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*sūtras*, ‘in a certain *sūtra*’ or ‘in certain *sūtras*’. If interpreted as ‘another *sūtra*’, it remains unclear which *sūtra* is intended. If interpreted as ‘a certain *sūtra*’ or ‘certain *sūtras*’, it could refer back to the canonical reference made in Mmk 17.13. Secondly, another question is whether *sūtrāntaroktaḥ* should be linked with *asmābhir uktaḥ* in the relative clause or inserted into the correlative clause as done above. The Tibetan translation links it with the relative clause and inserts ‘and’ (*śin*), which would have to be translated: “Further, this *avipraṇāśa*, which was spoken of by us and in another *sūtra*...” If linked with the relative clause, the Sanskrit text could also be interpreted: “...mentioned by us [as] taught in certain *sūtras*...”

<sup>530</sup> For an explanation of these three world-spheres or ‘realms’ of *saṃsāra*, cf. AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:379-386; transl. LVP, 1926:1-5).

<sup>531</sup> English translation: “It (viz. *avipraṇāśa*) is fourfold, because it can assure the result of the action in either of the four worlds: the world of desire, the world of form, the world of no form, or the pure world.”

would be determined in terms of world-sphere by the present existence of the actor, i.e., that an actor belonging to the desire-world-sphere only could produce *avipraṇāśas* belonging to that world-sphere. Why such a premise should be accepted is, however, not clear. In response to such a *prasaṅga*, it would then be necessary for the *avipraṇāśa*-proponent to assert that the actions performed by an individual in a given world-sphere as well as the *avipraṇāśas* created thereby may be associated with other world-spheres. In that case, the *avipraṇāśas* would be fourfold: (1) a wholesome or unwholesome action yielding a result that ripens in relation to the desire-world-sphere (*kāmadhātu*) would generate an *avipraṇāśa* associated with this world-sphere (*\*kāmadhātv-avacarāvipraṇāśa*); (2-3) an immovable action (*aniṇṇjakarman*) yielding a result that ripens in relation to the material or immaterial world-spheres (*rūpārūpyadhātū*) would generate an *avipraṇāśa* associated with either of these world-spheres (*\*rūpārūpyadhātvavacarāvipraṇāśa*); (4) a wholesome action associated with the Buddhist path leading to *nirvāṇa* would generate an *avipraṇāśa* free of negative influence (*\*anāśravāvipraṇāśa*).

Otherwise, the fourfold division of *avipraṇāśa* in terms of *dhātu* could be explained as related to the stages of the Buddhist path. As will be explained below in Mmk 17.15ab, *avipraṇāśa* can be eradicated by means of the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*) or by transcending a world-sphere (*dhātusamatikramaṇa*). On the path of cultivation, the practitioner attains the level of a non-returner (*anāgāmin*), whereby the practitioner no longer will be born in *kāmadhātu*. Hence, the *avipraṇāśa* yielding rebirth in this world-sphere must be completely eradicated at this stage. This would presuppose a distinction between *avipraṇāśa* associated with *kāmadhātu*, *rūpadhātu* and *ārūpyadhātu*, which perhaps could explain the fourfold division mentioned here.

However, it must be underlined that any such explanation for this fourfold division at the present stage neither can be confirmed nor rejected; both explanations are offered here merely as logical possibilities without any philological basis.

(V318<sub>7</sub>): “*And (ca) it (saḥ) [is] indeterminate (avyākṛtaḥ) by nature (prakṛtyā)*,” [i.e.,] the non-perishing

(*avipraṇāśaḥ*) is only (*eva*) indeterminate (*avyākṛtaḥ*), because it is not determined (*avyākaraṇāt*) as wholesome or unwholesome (*kuśalākuśalatvena*).

If (*yadī*) it (*asau*) would be (*syāt*) unwholesome (*akuśalaḥ*) [when arising] of unwholesome (*akuśalānām*) actions (*karmaṇām*), then (*tadā*) [it] would not exist (*syāt*) for those detached from the desire-[world-sphere] (*kāma-vītarāgāṇām*). And (*ca*) if (*yadī*) [it] would be (*syāt*) wholesome (*kuśalaḥ*) [when arising] of wholesome [actions] (*kuśalānām*), [then] it (*saḥ*) would not exist (*na syāt*) for those in whom the roots for the wholesome have been cut (*samucchinna kuśalamūlānām*). Therefore (*tasmāt*), it (*asau*) [is] just (*eva*) indeterminate (*avyākṛtaḥ*) by nature (*prakṛtyā*).

Finally, *pāda* d of Mmk 17.14, which stated that *avipraṇāśa* is indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) by nature (*prakṛtyā*), is explained. All the commentaries explain that ‘indeterminate’ here means that *avipraṇāśa* is not distinguished in terms of being wholesome or unwholesome. *Akutobhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:412) and *Chung lun* (T1564.22c<sub>7-8</sub>) remark that the meaning of ‘indeterminate’ has been taught in the *Abhidharma*-treatises.<sup>538</sup> As mentioned above, *Akutobhayā* also adds that *avipraṇāśa* is taught as indeterminate to avoid ‘these faults’, which presumably refers to the objections raised against the *santāna*-theory in Mmk 17.12. Otherwise, the extant Mmk-commentaries other than Pras do not provide any further explanation.

An indeterminate *avipraṇāśa* is a radically different concept from the *santāna* posited by the *Sautrāntikas* or the *prāpti* posited by *Sarvāstivādins*, both of which are considered to be wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate depending on the action.<sup>539</sup> An indeterminate *avipraṇāśa* means that the *avipraṇāśa* would be indeterminate, whether it is produced by a wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate action and whether it is going

<sup>538</sup> For an explanation of *avyākṛta* in AKBh, cf. fn. 271 above.

<sup>539</sup> Regarding *santāna*, cf. the critique raised above in connection with Mmk 17.12. Regarding *prāpti*, cf. AK 2.37 and AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:220-221; transl. LVP, 1923:186-187).

which denies actions and their results (*karmaphala*).<sup>545</sup> If the *avipraṇāśa* generated by a wholesome action would be wholesome, the ripening of desirable results could never again arise for the *samucchinnaakuśalamūlāḥ*, because what is wholesome has been destroyed in them. To avoid such consequences, the *avipraṇāśa* is asserted to be indeterminate (*avyākṛta*), i.e., morally neutral and it can, therefore, exist equally for all beings.

(V318<sub>10</sub>): Moreover (*kiñ ca*),

*“[It] is not (na) something to be abandoned (praheyah) through abandonment (prahāṇataḥ); [it is] just (eva) something to be abandoned by cultivation (bhāvanāheyah) or [otherwise] (vā).”* (Mmk 17.15ab)

(V319<sub>2</sub>): Also, such (*sa cāyam*) a non-perishing [phenomenon] (*avipraṇāśaḥ*) *“is not (na) something to be abandoned (praheyah) through abandonment (prahāṇataḥ).”* The actions (*karmāṇi*) belonging to an ordinary being (*pārthagjanikāṇi*) are abandoned (*prahīyante*) precisely (*eva*) by means of the path of seeing (*darśanamārgaṇa*), lest (*mā bhūt*)<sup>546</sup> a noble being (*āryaḥ*) should be (*itī*) someone

the wholesome, however, are not completely negated in the *samucchinnaakuśalamūlāḥ*, because their seeds still exist (cf. AKBh, ŚĀSTRĪ, 1970:216; transl. LVP, 1923:184).

<sup>545</sup> Cf. AK 4.79c and AKBh (ŚĀSTRĪ, 1971:698; transl. LVP, 1924:171).

<sup>546</sup> In the Tibetan translation (D3860.105b<sub>7</sub>), the *mā bhūt* construction is not translated literally, but is replaced with a *gyur du ’oñ bas* construction. Such a way of translating *mā bhūt* constructions into Tibetan is amply attested, e.g., in the Tibetan translation of AKBh (cf. HIRAKAWA, 1978.III:34 s.v.). In the Tibetan translation of Pras, it is also attested in one other instance, viz. at Pras 154<sub>4</sub> (D3860.52b<sub>1</sub>, critical edition by MAY, 1959:352<sub>7</sub>): *tathā ’pi tattva-vicāre ’vatāryā mā bhūt paramārthato ’pi nirupapattikapakṣābhīyupagama ity = de lta na yañ don dam par yañ thad pa dañ bral ba’i phyogs khas blañs par gyur du ’oñ bas de kho na űid rnam par dpyod pa na gzug par bya ba yin no* ||; transl. by MAY (1959:117): “gardons-nous néanmoins d’introduire la dite question dans la discussion de la réalité vraie (*tattva*): ce serait admettre, sur le plan même de la réalité absolue, une thèse irrationnelle.” English translation: “Lest we were to introduce the stated question into the discussion of the true reality (*tattva*), that would be to admit an irrational thesis even on the level of the ultimate reality.” In his Sanskrit edition of this passage from chapter seven, LVP (Pras 154 fn. 2) notices the difference between the Sanskrit text and the Tibetan translation and conjectures a Sanskrit

endowed with the actions of an ordinary being (*prthag-janakarmasamanvāgataḥ*).

The non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*), on the other hand (*tu*), is not (*na*) abandoned (*prahīyate*) by means of the path of seeing (*darśanamārgeṇa*) even though (*api*) there is abandonment of its action (*tatkarmaprahāṇe*), but (*kin tu*) its (*tasya*) abandonment (*prahāṇam*) is effected (*bhavati*) by means of the path of “**cultivation**” (*bhāvanāmārgeṇa*) “**or [otherwise]** (*vā*).” The word ‘or’ (*vāśabdaḥ*) denotes an alternative (*vikalpārthaḥ*): “or (*vā*) [it is] just (*eva*) something to be abandoned by means of transcending a world-sphere (*dhātusamatikramaṇapraheyāḥ*)” (*iti*).

And, thus (*caivam*), since (*yataḥ*) the non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*) neither perishes (*api na naśyati*) when the action perishes (*karmavināśe*) nor is abandoned (*api na prahīyate*) when the action is abandoned (*karmaprahāṇe*),

**“therefore (*tasmāt*), the result (*phalam*) of actions (*karmaṇām*) is produced (*jāyate*) due to the non-perishing (*avipraṇāśena*).”** (Mmk 17.15cd)

Since the *avipraṇāśa* does not perish before yielding the result of the action, the question may be raised when it disappears. In answer to this, Mmk 17.15 first states that the *avipraṇāśa* is not something that can be abandoned or eradicated (*praheya*) by means of abandonment (*prahāṇa*). *Akutobhayā*

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reconstruction based on the Tibetan, which, however, is slightly misconstrued. A Tibetan ‘gyur du ’on ba construction is a periphrastic futurum construction, which here has an optative character of potentialis (cf. HAHN, 1996:171) in the sense of a consequence that would have to happen, but which obviously must be wrong. This sense is amplified in the Tibetan translation of the present passage by the insertion of *yañ* after ‘*phags pa*. Thus, the Tibetan translation should be translated: “Since [otherwise] even (*yañ*) a noble being (‘*phags pa*) would [falsely] turn out to be (‘gyur du ’on bas) someone endowed with the actions of an ordinary being, only (*kho na*) actions (*las dag*) belonging to an ordinary being (*so so skye bo’i*) are abandoned (*spoñ*) by means of the path of seeing (*mthoñ ba’i lam gyis*).” Notice also the transference in the Tibetan translation of *kho na* (*eva*) to the word *las dag* rather than *mthoñ ba’i lam gyis* as in the Sanskrit original.

a world-sphere (*dhātusamatikramaṇa*) and may be applied to Candrakīrti's use of this term. Nevertheless, it is spurious that Avalokitavratā uses this explanation with regard to transcendence to the result (*phalavyatikrama*), because one should expect the *avipraṇāśas* associated with a world-sphere to be abandoned forever when attaining the results of the liberation-path, since one thereby is permanently liberated from this world-sphere. One would not expect the *avipraṇāśas* to arise again within the new world-sphere as explained here by Avalokitavratā. This would only be expected if the transcendence of the world-sphere takes place via the mundane path, whereby a return to the lower world-sphere is still possible. In this manner, Avalokitavratā's explanation seems to differ slightly from Candrakīrti's explanation. Candrakīrti distinguishes two alternatives for the abandoning of *avipraṇāśas*: the first is the definite abandoning of *avipraṇāśas* by means of the path of cultivation, i.e., when transcending to the result; the second is the temporary abandoning of *avipraṇāśas* by means of the mundane path, i.e., when transcending a world-sphere. In Avalokitavratā's explanation, these two aspects are not distinguished.

Having thus discussed when the non-perishing phenomenon may perish, Mmk 17.15cd concludes that the result of an action is ensured due to the presence of an *avipraṇāśa*. Candrakīrti explains these lines to mean that the *avipraṇāśa* can function as the *karmaphalasambandha*, because it neither perishes when the concrete action perishes, i.e., immediately upon having been performed, nor does it perish when all the actions of an ordinary being are abandoned during the path of seeing. Since the *avipraṇāśa* remains until liberation from a world-sphere of *saṃsāra* is attained, it ensures the ripening of the action's result within that world-sphere.

(V320<sub>5</sub>): Again (*punaḥ*), [the interlocutor asks]: “***If (yadi) there would be (syāt)***” abandonment (*prahāṇam*) of this (*asya*) non-perishing (*avipraṇāśasya*) “***through abandonment (prahāṇataḥ)***” in that it were abandoned (*prahāṇāt*) due to abandonment (*prahāṇena*) of the action (*karmaṇaḥ*), [i.e.,], and (*ca*) [if] there would be (*syāt*) perishing (*vināśaḥ*) [of it] by transition (*saṃkramaṇa*) of the action (*karmaṇaḥ*), [i.e.,] by the perishing (*vināśena*) of the action

(*karmaṇaḥ*), [i.e.,] by another action becoming actualised (*karmāntarasamṣukhībhāvena*), [then] what (*kaḥ*) would be (*syāt*) the fault (*doṣaḥ*)(*iti*)?” It is answered (*ucyate*):

*“If (yadi) [it] would be (syāt) something to be abandoned (praheyah) through abandonment (prahānataḥ) or (vā) by transition (saṃkrameṇa) of the action (karmaṇaḥ), in that case (tatra) faults (doṣāḥ), beginning with the annihilation of action (karmavadhādayaḥ), would ensue (prasajyeraṇ).”* (Mmk 17.16)

If (*yadi*) the non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*), just like the actions belonging to an ordinary being (*pārthagjanika-karmavat*), would be abandoned (*praḥīyeta*) by means of the path of seeing (*darśanamārgeṇa*), then (*tadā*) there would be (*syāt*) precisely (*eva*) the perishing (*nāśaḥ*) of the action (*karmaṇaḥ*), and (*ca*) due to this perishing of the actions (*karmavināśāt*) there would for noble beings (*āryāṇām*) not be (*na syāt*) [any] desired or undesired ripening of the result of an action (*iṣṭāniṣṭakarmaphala-vipākāḥ*), having the former action as its cause (*pūrvvakar-mahetukaḥ*), [or] there would be (*syāt*) occurrence of a result (*phalodayaḥ*) of an action (*karmaṇaḥ*) that had never been performed (*akṛtasyaiva*). And (*ca*) since result of action [would thus] be seen as non-existent (*karmaphalābhā-vadarśanāt*), there would be (*syāt*) a wrong view (*mithyādarśanam*).

In this manner (*ity evam*), *“faults (doṣāḥ), such as the annihilation of action and so forth (karmavadhādayaḥ), ensue (prasajyante),”* when there is (*sati*) admission (°*abhyupagame*) of that the non-perishing (*avipraṇāśasya*) is something to be abandoned (*praheyatva*°) through abandonment (*prahānataḥ*). [The argument] should also (*api*) be

applied (*yojyam*) in the same manner (*evam*) in the case of transition (*saṃkrame*) of the action (*karmaṇaḥ*).

Having defined when the *avipraṇāśa* is eradicated in Mmk 17.15, the next verse shows the undesirable consequence that would occur, if the *avipraṇāśa* would disappear before the path of cultivation. Candrakīrti introduces this verse by letting an interlocutor raise a question: if the non-perishing would cease either by the abandonment associated with the path of seeing or would cease when the action that generates the *avipraṇāśa* ceases, what would be the faults? To this question the *mūla*-verse answers that there would be faults, such as the annihilation of *karmaphala*.

*Akuto bhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:413) and *Chung lun* (T1566.22c<sub>11-12</sub>) here state that if the *avipraṇāśa* would cease in either of these cases, there would be no result of the action, and therefore there would be the fault of the annihilation of the action. They also state that this has already been explained in the *Abhidharma*. Buddhapālita (SAITO, 1984.II:229) further explains that when an ordinary being attains the path of seeing, the dispositions (*anuśaya*) that are to be abandoned by this path are abandoned along with the actions of an ordinary being.<sup>563</sup> If the actions of an ordinary being were not to be abandoned on the path of seeing, there would be the unacceptable consequence that a noble being would be endowed with the actions of an ordinary being. Although these actions are thus abandoned on the path of seeing, the *avipraṇāśas* that hold the ripening of the results of these actions are not abandoned thereby, and thus there is continued ripening of the results of actions for the person, who has attained the path of seeing. When are the *avipraṇāśas* then abandoned? Buddhapālita (ibid:230) here explains that the *avipraṇāśas* are abandoned by transcendence to the result of the path (*\*phalavyatikrama*). Thus, the *avipraṇāśas* associated with *kāmadhātu* are abandoned when completely transcending this world-sphere (i.e., when attaining the levels of one, who has entered the stream (*srotāpanna*), once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmin*) and non-returner (*anāgāmin*)). The *avipraṇāśas* associated with the *rūpārūpyadhātus* are abandoned when com-

<sup>563</sup> As explained above, this particularly refers to unwholesome actions, since wholesome actions are first abandoned on the path of cultivation. This is also confirmed by *Prajñāpradīpa*, which here specifies the actions of an ordinary being as unwholesome actions (*\*akuśala*).



(V321<sub>4</sub>): “Now (*tu*), at transition (*pratisandhau*) it (*saḥ*) arises (*utpadyate*) as [just] a single one (*ekaḥ*) for all (*sarveṣām*) the dissimilar (*viṣabhāgānām*) and (*ca*) similar (*sabhāgānām*) actions (*karmanām*) belonging to the same world-sphere (*sadhātūnām*).” (Mmk 17.17)

Dissimilar (*viṣabhāgāni*) actions (*karmāṇi*) [are] those that are of different kinds (*bhinnajātīyāni*); similar (*sabhāgāni*) [actions are] those that are alike (*sadṛśāni*). “Of all” (*sarveṣām eva*) these (*teṣām*) “similar (*sabhāgānām*) and (*ca*) dissimilar (*viṣabhāgānām*) actions (*karmanām*)” only (*eva*) “a single (*ekaḥ*)” non-perishing [phenomenon] (*avipranāśaḥ*) “arises (*utpadyate*)” during transition to [a new birth in] the desire-, material or immaterial world-spheres (*kāmarūpārūpyadhātupratisandhiṣu*) when there is destruction of all actions (*sarvakarmopamardane*). And also (*cāpi*), it (*saḥ*) arises (*utpadyate*) only (*eva*) of those belonging to the same world-sphere (*sadhātūnām*), [i.e.,] of those associated with the same world-sphere (*samānadhātukānām*), not (*na*) of those related to dissimilar world-spheres (*viṣabhāgadhātukānām*).

Having explained when the *avipraṇāśas* are abandoned and the undesirable consequences that are incurred if the *avipraṇāśas* would be abandoned before the path of cultivation, the present verse (Mmk 17.17) explains how the *avipraṇāśas* operate at the time of transition to a new rebirth (*pratisandhi*).

Actions may be of a similar kind (*sabhāga*) or a dissimilar kind (*viṣabhāga*). Candrakīrti does not explain what these kinds might be, but *Akutoḥhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:414) suggests that the kinds of action are wholesome (*\*kuśala*), unwholesome (*\*akuśala*), indeterminate (*\*avyākṛta*) and those without negative influence (*\*anāśrava*). This division of action is also mentioned by Avalokitavrata (D3859.III.36b<sub>4-5</sub>). Thus, all wholesome

consciousness. In this manner, it could perhaps be explained why it is said that a single *avipraṇāśa* replaces the numerous *avipraṇāśas* at the time of death. Of course, it must be firmly underlined here that this explanation is just a logical suggestion without any philological support in the available sources.

(V321<sub>10</sub>): *“But (tu) in the present life (dṛṣṭe dharme) it (saḥ) is produced (utpadyate) of every (sarvasya) single action (karmaṇaḥ karmaṇaḥ), which are of two kinds (dviprakārasya), and (ca) remains (tiṣṭhati) even (api) when having ripened (vipakve).”* (Mmk 17.18)

Moreover (*ca*), in the present life (*dṛṣṭe dharme*), [i.e.,] right here (*ihaiva*) in [this] birth (*janmani*), such (*sa ayam*) a phenomenon (*dharmah*) called the non-perishing (*avipraṇāśākhyah*) is produced (*utpadyate*) as a separate (*ekaikah*) non-perishing [phenomenon] (*avipraṇāśaḥ*) of each and every (*sarvasyaiva*) single action (*karmaṇaḥ karmaṇaḥ*), [namely] action (*karmaṇaḥ*) being divided into two kinds (*dviprakārabhinnasya*) [by] being [either] of the nature of intention and [action] following intention (*cetanā-cetayitvāsvabhāvasya*) or (*vā*) due to the division into those with and without negative influence (*sāśravānāśravabhedenā*).

And such (*sa cāyam*) a non-perishing (*avipraṇāśaḥ*) does not (*na*) necessarily (*avaśyam*) cease (*nirudhyate*) even (*api*) when having ripened (*vipakve*), [i.e.,] in the case of ripening (*vipāke*), but (*ca*) just like an honoured promissory note (*nirbhuktapatravat*), it is not able (*na śaknoti*) to ripen (*vipaktum*) yet again (*punar api*), even though it still exists (*vidyamāno 'pi san*).

lines that this refers to the second alternative for the cessation of the *avipraṇāśa*, which according to Bhāvaviveka was indicated by the particle *vā* in Mmk 17.16 (cf. discussion above p. 331).

(V322<sub>4</sub>): *“It (saḥ) ceases (nirudhyate) either (vā) because of transcending to the result (phalavyatikramāt) or (vā) because of death (maraṇāt). In that case (tatra), [one] should characterise (lakṣayet) [its] division (vibhāgam) as with and without negative influence (anāśravaṃ sāsraṇ ca).”* (Mmk 17.19)

In this case (*tatra*), [that it] ceases (*nirudhyate*) because of transcending to the result (*phalavyatikramāt*) [is] as has been said (*yathoktam*): *“[it is] just (eva) something to be abandoned by cultivation (bhāvanāheyaḥ)”* (*iti*; Mmk 17.15b). [That it] ceases (*nirudhyate*) because of death (*maraṇāt*) [is] as has been said (*yathoktam*): *“Now (tu), at transition (pratisandhau) it (saḥ) arises (utpadyate) as [just] a single one (ekaḥ) for those belonging to the same world-sphere (sadhātūnām)”* (*iti*; Mmk 17.17cd).

Moreover, [in the case] of those [actions] associated with negative influence (*sāśravānām*), such a [non-perishing] (*sa cāyam*) [is] associated with negative influence (*sāśravaḥ*), [and in the case] of those [actions] without negative influence (*anāśravānām*), [it is] without negative influence (*anāśravaḥ*). In this way (*ity evam*), should [one] in that case (*tatra*) characterise (*lakṣayet*) [its] division (*vibhāgam*).

While Mmk 17.17-18 explained how the *avipraṇāśa* arises during transition (*pratisandhau*) and during the present life (*dṛṣṭe dharme*), Mmk 17.19 explains how it ceases. An *avipraṇāśa* ceases (*nirudhyate*) in two ways. First, it ceases by transcendence to the result of the path (*phalavyatikrama*), viz. by obtaining the result of one, who has entered the stream (*srotāpanna*), once-

factors associated with negative influence.<sup>575</sup> Thus, for the *srotāpanna*, *sakṛdāgāmin* or *anāgāmin*, there is gradual cessation of *aviprañāśas* associated with negative influence (*sāśrava*). For the *arhant*, when entering the *nirvāṇa* without a remainder of the aggregates, there is cessation of the *aviprañāśas* free of negative influence.

*Akutoḥbhayā* (HUNTINGTON, 1986:415-416), Buddhapālita's *Vṛtti* (SAITO, 1984.II:231) and *Prajñāpradīpa* (AMES, 1986:523; T1566.101b<sub>20-23</sub>) end their comments on this verse by stating that due to the existence of such *aviprañāśas*, the results of actions ripen in various forms in relation to a person's course of rebirth, social status, family, body, faculties, etc. This statement is not adopted by Candrakīrti.

(V322<sub>9</sub>) Therefore (*tad*), in this way (*evam*),

*“[That there is], on the one hand (ca), emptiness (śūnyatā) but no cutting off (na cocchedaḥ); [that there is], on the other hand (ca), the succession of births (saṃsāra) but no eternality (ca na śāśvataḥ); [that there is] also (ca) non-perishing (aviprañāśaḥ) of action (karmaṇaḥ), [this is] the Dharma (dharmāḥ) taught (deśitaḥ) by the Awakened One (buddhena).”*  
(Mmk 17.20)

Since (*yasmāt*) the action (*karma*) that has been performed (*kṛtaṃ sat*) ceases (*nirudhyate*) [and] does not (*na*) remain (*avatiṣṭhate*) with an own-being (*svabhāvena*),

<sup>575</sup> T1564.22c<sub>17-18</sub>: 於此中分別有漏及無漏者。從須陀洹等諸賢聖。有漏無漏等應分別。Alternatively, the sentence could be interpreted that “...as for the noble persons beginning with *srotāpanna*, *sāśrava* and *anāśrava* should be distinguished.” This would then mean that all noble persons have both *sāśrava* and *anāśrava* (including the *arhant*, who while still alive experiences the results of *sāśrava* actions performed earlier). BOCKING (1995:446f, fn. 269), however, seems to misconstrue the correlation of the text, when he states that *arhants* and ordinary beings here are said to be associated with negative influence, whereas the *srotāpanna* is without negative influence, which he notes as a possible corruption of the text.

therefore (*tasmāt*) “*also (ca) emptiness (śūnyatā)*” is appropriate (*upapadyate*), because of the action’s (*karmaṇaḥ*) non-remaining (*anavasthānāt*) with an own-being (*svabhāvena*).

Even so (*caivam*), “*there is not (na)*” the consequence of the [wrong] view of “*cutting off*” (*ucchedadarśanaprasaṅgaḥ*) due to the non-remaining (*anavasthānāt*) of the action (*karmaṇaḥ*), because the ripening of the [result] of action exists (*karmavipākasadbhāvāt*) due to the acquisition of the non-perishing [phenomenon] (*avipraṇāśaparigraheṇa*). For (*hi*) [only] in the case of the non-existence of a ripening (*vipākābhāve*) of an action (*karmaṇaḥ*) would there be (*syāt*) the [wrong] view of cutting off (*ucchedadarśanam*).

Since the non-perishing phenomenon exists (*avipraṇāśādharmasadbhāvāt*) and (*ca*) there is not the idea of similarity to the series of a seed (*bījasantānasādharmyaparikalpanābhāvāt*), “*also (ca)*” the manifold (*vicitraḥ*) “*saṃsāra (saṃsāraḥ)*” consisting of the five courses of rebirth (*pāṃcagatikāḥ*), which is divided into various divisions in terms of distinct courses [of rebirth], species, birth-places and natural dispositions (*nānāgatijātiyonidhātubhedabhinnāḥ*), is established (*siddho bhavati*).

“*And (ca) there is not (na)*” the consequence of propagating “*eternal[ity]*” (*śāśvatavādaprasaṅgaḥ*), because of the admission (*°abhyupagamāt*) of the action’s (*karmaṇaḥ*) non-remaining (*anavasthāna*) by an own-nature (*svarūpeṇa*).

“*Also (ca)*,” [there is] “*the non-perishing (avipraṇāśaḥ) of actions (karmaṇām)*,” because of the existence of the non-perishing [phenomenon] (*avipraṇāśasadbhāvāt*). Thus (*ity evam*), since (*yasmāt*) such a (*ayam*) “*Dharma (dharmah) was taught (deśitah)*” by the Exalted One (*bhagavatā*), “*the Awakened One (buddhena)*,” [i.e., the

one] who has awakened (*vibuddhena*) due to completely leaving the sleep of ignorance (*niravaśeṣāvidyānidrāpaga-māt*), therefore (*tasmāt*) that (*tat*), which (*ya*) was expressed earlier (*pūrvvam uktam*) by the opponent (*pareṇa*), is not applicable (*nopapadyate*) in the case of our position (*asmatpakṣe*), namely (*iti*):

*“If (cet) the action (karma) remains (tiṣṭhati) until the time of ripening (ā pākakālāt), it (tat) would continue (iyāt) eternally (nityatām). If (cet) [it has] ceased (niruddham), [then,] having (sat) ceased (niruddham), how (kim) could [it] produce (janayi-syati) the result (phalam)?”* (Mmk 17.6)

Thus (*iti*), therefore (*tasmāt*) precisely (*eva*) the idea explained by us (*asmābhir upavarṇṇitakalpanā*) [is] appropriate (*nyāyyā*)(*iti*).<sup>576</sup>

According to the division of the chapter presented by the commentaries,<sup>577</sup> this verse of the root-text (Mmk 17.20) constitutes the final verse in the presentation of the *avipraṇāśa*-position. It concludes this view by showing that it is due to the *avipraṇāśa* that the extremes of cutting off and eternality are avoided.

The verse presents three essential points in the teaching (*dharma*) of the Buddha. First, there is emptiness (*śūnyatā*) without involving the view of cutting off (*uccheda*). Secondly, there is *saṃsāra* without the view of eternality. Thirdly, these two points are possible, because the Buddha taught the imperishability (*avipraṇāśa*) of actions.

There are two verses in *\*Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, which bear resemblance to this verse. This text, being a *Madhyamaka*-work, is based in part on Mmk, and so the resemblance may very likely have been adopted

<sup>576</sup> The *iti* after *nyāyyā* indicates the end of the pūrvapakṣa expounding the *avipraṇāśa*-theory, which began at Pras 315<sub>12-13</sub>.

<sup>577</sup> Apart from *Chung lun*, cf. p. 354.

quences. Therefore, *karmaphala* cannot be justified when based on an ontological model that presupposes the independent existence of the action and its result.

This, however, does not mean that the *Mādhyamikas* deny the theory of *karmaphala*. As shown above (p. 325), a denial of *karmaphala* would amount to a wrong view leading to the cutting off of the roots of what is wholesome along with all the negative consequences that this entails. Instead, Candrakīrti shows that *karmaphala* is only justifiable when it is explained without resorting to the assertion of existence from an own-being. When phenomena are understood to be dependently arisen (*pratītyasamutpāda*) without separate, independent existence, *karmaphala* can be established as a functioning causal relationship in the same manner that other causal relationships are found in the world. Such an explanation does not require the postulation of any *karmaphalasambandha*, because a *sambandha* always presupposes the separate, independent existence of two phenomena to be connected (*sambandhin*). In this way, Candrakīrti argues that the theories of *karmaphalasambandha* presented here are based on a mistaken mode of thought and shows that it is only by admitting the dependent arising of phenomena, which are empty of any own-being, that causality may be established. The *Madhyamaka*-presentation of *karmaphala* in chapter 17 of Pras is thus a rejection of the metaphysical theories of *karmaphala* presented in the *Abhidharma*-literature of the early schools of Buddhism and argues for an acceptance of *karmaphala* in terms of dependent arising.

# YOGA PHILOSOPHY OF PATAÑJALI

CONTAINING HIS YOGA APHORISMS WITH VYĀSA'S COMMENTARY  
IN SANSKRIT AND A TRANSLATION WITH ANNOTATIONS  
INCLUDING MANY SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF YOGA

BY

Sāṃkhya-yogāchārya

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RENDERED INTO ENGLISH

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तत्र नारकाणां नास्ति दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः कर्माशयः, क्षीयाक्षेशानामपि नास्ति  
अदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयः कर्माशय इति ॥ १२ ॥


**Karmāśaya Or Latent Impression of Action Based On Afflictions, Becomes Active In This Life Or In A Life To Come (1). 12.**

Merit and demerit in latent impressions of action arise from desire, greed, delusion or anger. They become operative in the present life or in a future life. Out of these the impressions of pious actions gathered from repetition of Mantras, observation of Tapas or attainment of Samādhi—all performed with deep detachment or through worship of God, the Devas, Maharṣis or saints, fructify quickly. Similarly the impressions of vicious actions repeatedly performed with excessive Kleśas, in regard to creatures who are frightened, diseased or pitiable or to those who have come for refuge, or are noble-minded or engaged in austerities, bear fruit immediately. For example, young Nandīśvara was transferred from the human form into a Deva; while Nahuṣa, a ruler in heaven, was transferred from the divine form into a reptile. Amongst these, those who are in purgatory do not gather any such merit or demerit to be experienced in that life, while those who have thinned their afflictions (*e.g.* Jīvanmuktas, *i.e.* freed while alive) do not carry with them any such latent impressions which might fructify in a future life (2).

(1) Karmāśaya—latent impressions of actions. The latent impressions of virtuous and vicious actions are Karmāśayas. Any manifest state of the mind leaves a like imprint on it and this is its latent impression. Saṁskāra or latent impression may be either Savija, *i.e.* potent or Nirvija, *i.e.* impotent. Potent Saṁskāras are of two kinds—those which are born of afflictions and those which are their opposites; in other words, Saṁskāras based on wrong knowledge, and those based on true knowledge. The potent Saṁskāras based on Kleśas are called Karmāśayas. They are classed as white, black, and black-and-white, or divided into two classes, virtuous and vicious, or white and black only. Saṁskāras based on

knowledge realised through concentration are known as neither black nor white.

Karmāśaya brings about three consequences, *viz.* birth, span of life and experience (of pleasure or pain) in that life. In other words, the Saṁskāra which brings about such results is Karmaśaya. When the consequences take place, the Saṁskāra based on the feeling experienced thereby is called Vāsanā or subconscious latency. Vāsanā does not of itself produce any consequence or result, but for any Karmāśaya to produce result the appropriate Vāsanā is necessary. Karmāśaya is like a seed, Vāsanā is like a field, the birth or embodiment is like a tree and experience (of pleasure or pain) is like its fruits. For the convenience of the reader, Saṁskāra is being shown below in a tabular form :—



**How to effect destruction of latent impressions**

1. By Nivṛtti-dharma (the spirit of renunciation) Pravṛtti-dharma (spirit of inclination to-worldliness) is weakened.
2. Thereby Karmāśaya is weakened and consequently Vāsanā no longer serves any purpose.

3. Afflictive Saṃskāras are thereby reduced, and this is what is known as the attenuated state.

4. From latencies of true knowledge, the afflictive Saṃskāras become weak and unproductive like parched seed.

5. The thinned or subtle afflictive Saṃskāras are annihilated by the latency of the arrested state of the mind.

(2) Deeds performed with Kleśas like Avidyā etc., produce afflictive latent impressions which bear fruit in this life, or in some future life. The time for fruition becomes imminent or otherwise according to the intensity of the impression. The commentator has explained by citing examples. In purgatory creatures suffer from the effects of their past actions and on termination of their sufferings they pass into another state. In purgatory their (involuntary) mental state is most dominant and because they are then suffering from great distress, they have not the ability to do any voluntary actions. Therefore it is impossible for them to exercise free-will to produce any effect in their lives. On the other hand, having only obscured organs, they continue to suffer mental anguish, being unable to do anything with the help of latencies which will be effective in that life. That is why their purgatorial life is called a life of only oppressive experience. Similarly, celestial beings with the mental states predominant and steeped in bliss have little free-will for voluntary action which would produce result in that very life.

The senses of the celestial beings, however, are developed on the Sāttvika, i.e. enlightened basis, and they can, if they so wish, make effort by those senses, with the help of previous latencies, to bring about happy result in that life. Devas or celestial beings who have previously attained perfection in Samādhi, and have control over their minds can act in a manner as would bear fruit in that life and contribute to their further advancement.

सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगः ॥ १३ ॥

भाष्यम्—सत्सु क्लेशेषु कर्माशयो विपाकारम्भी भवति, नोच्छिन्नक्लेशमूलः। यथा तुषावनद्धाः शालितगडुलाः अदग्धवीजभावाः प्ररोहसमर्था भवन्ति नापनीत-  
तुषा दग्धवीजभावा वा, तथा क्लेशावनद्धः कर्माशयो विपाकप्ररोही भवति, नापनीतक्लेशो न प्रसंख्यानदग्धक्लेशवीजभावो वेति। स च विपाकस्त्रिविधो जातिरायुर्भोग इति।

तत्रेदं विचार्यते किमेकं कर्मैकस्य जन्मनः कारणम्, अथैकं कर्मानेकं जन्माक्षिपतीति। द्वितीया विचारणा किमनेकं कर्मानेकं जन्म निर्वर्तयति, अथानेकं कर्मैकं जन्म निर्वर्तयतीति। न तावदेकं कर्मैकस्य जन्मनः कारणम्, कस्मात्, अनादिकालप्रचितस्यासंख्येयस्यावशिष्टकर्मणः साम्प्रतिकस्य च फलक्रमानियमादनाश्वासो लोकस्य प्रसक्तः स चानिष्ट इति। न चैकं कर्मानेकस्य जन्मनः कारणम्, कस्मात्, अनेकेषु कर्मस्वेकैकमेव कर्मानेकस्य जन्मनः कारणमित्यवशिष्टस्य विपाककालाभावः प्रसक्तः, स चाप्यनिष्ट इति। न चानेकं कर्मानेकस्य जन्मनः कारणम्, कस्मात्, तदनेकं जन्म युगपन्न सम्भवतीति, क्रमेण वाच्यम्? तथा च पूर्वदोषानुषङ्गः। तस्माज्जन्म-प्रायणान्तरे कृतः पुण्यापुण्यकर्माशयप्रचयो विचित्रः प्रधानोपसर्जनभावेनावस्थितः प्रायणाभिव्यक्त एकप्रघट्टकेन मिलित्वा मरणां प्रसाध्य संमूर्च्छित एकमेव जन्म करोति। तच्च जन्म तेनैव कर्मणा लब्धायुष्कं भवति, तस्मिन्नायुषि तेनैव कर्मणा भोगः सम्पद्यत इति। असौ कर्माशयो जन्मायुर्भोगहेतुत्वात् त्रिविपाकोऽभिधीयत इति। अत एकभविकः कर्माशय उक्त इति।

दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्त्वेकविपाकारम्भी भोगहेतुत्वात्, द्विविपाकारम्भी वा आयुर्भोगहेतुत्वान्द्विधवन्नहुषवद्वा इति। क्लेशकर्मविपाकानुभवनिमित्ताभिस्तु वासनाभिरनादिकालसंमूर्च्छितमिदं चित्तं चित्रीकृतमिव सर्वतो मत्स्यजालं ग्रन्थिभिरिवाततमित्येता अनेकभवपूर्विका वासनाः। यस्त्वयं कर्माशय एष एवैकभविक उक्त इति। ये संस्काराः स्मृतिहेतवस्ता वासनास्ताश्चानादिकालीना इति।

यस्त्वसावेकभविकः कर्माशयः स नियतविपाकश्चानियतविपाकश्च। तत्र दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्य नियतविपाकस्यैवायं नियमः, न त्वदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्यानियतविपाकस्य, कस्मात्, यो ह्यदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयोऽनियतविपाकस्तस्य त्रयी गतिः कृतस्याविपक्वस्य नाशः, प्रधानकर्मण्यावापगमनं वा, नियतविपाकप्रधानकर्मणाऽभिभूतस्य वा चिरमवस्थानमिति। तत्र कृतस्याऽविपक्वस्य नाशो यथा शुक्लकर्मोदयादिहैव नाशः कृष्णस्य, यत्रेदमुक्तम्, 'द्वे द्वे ह वै कर्मणी वेदितव्ये पापकर्मैको राशिः पुण्यकृतोऽपहन्ति। तदिच्छस्व कर्माणि सुकृतानि कर्तुमिहैव ते कर्म कवयो वेदयन्ते'।

प्रधानकर्मण्यावापगमनम्, यत्रेदमुक्तम्, 'स्यात्स्वल्पस्संकरः सपरिहारस्सप्रत्ययमर्षः, कुशलस्य नापकर्षायालं कस्मात्, कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति यत्रायमावापं गतस्त्वर्गोऽप्यपकर्षमल्पं करिष्यति' इति।

नियतविपाकप्रधानकर्मणाभिभूतस्य वा चिरमवस्थानम्, कथमिति, अष्ट-  
जन्मवेदनीयस्यैव नियतविपाकस्य कर्मणः समानं मरणमभिव्यक्तिकारणमुक्तम्,  
नत्वदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्यानियतविपाकस्य । यत्त्वदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयं कर्मानियतविपाक-  
तन्नश्येदावापं वा गच्छेदभिभूतं वा चिरमप्युपासीत यावत्समानं कर्माभिव्यक्त-  
निमित्तमस्य न विपाकाभिमुखं करोतीति । तद्विपाकस्यैव देशकालनिमित्तानव-  
धारणादियं कर्मगतविचित्रा दुर्विज्ञाना चेति न चोत्सर्गस्यापवादान्निवृत्तिरिति  
एकभविकः कर्माशयोऽनुज्ञायत इति ॥ १३ ॥

**As Long As Kleśa Remains At The Root, Karmāśaya Produces  
Three Consequences In The Form Of Birth,  
Span Of Life And Experience (1). 13.**

Karmāśaya begins to fructify when there is Kleśa at its root ; but it does not do so when Kleśa is uprooted. As rice when in the husk and not reduced to the burnt condition, can germinate but does not do so when the chaff is removed or reduced to a parched state, so Karmāśaya when based on Kleśa, is capable of producing consequences, but it does not produce any consequence when Kleśa is removed or is reduced to a burnt state through acquisition of knowledge. The consequence is of three kinds : birth, span of life and experience of pleasure or pain in life.

In this respect (2) it is to be considered :—whether one action is responsible for one birth or one action brings about many births. The second point is :—do many actions bring about many births or do they bring about only one birth ? Now, a single action can never be the cause of one birth ; because in that case, there being no regularity of succession in the fruition of present actions and of innumerable actions that have been stored up as Karmāśaya from time without beginning—some of which still remain unfructified—people would lose faith in the performance of actions. This is therefore untenable. Again, a single action cannot account for many births. Because in that case if one out of many actions brings about many births then the remaining actions would

have no time to bear fruit. This view, therefore, is also untenable. Again, many actions are not responsible for many births ; because the many births cannot take place at the same time, and if it is said that they take place gradually, then also the difficulty mentioned before arises. For these reasons the accumulation of diverse latencies of actions, whether of merit or demerit, done between birth and death, whether dominant or in a subordinate state, is brought into action through death and massed together in one effort which simultaneously effecting death causes a single birth. That birth gets its span of life from the accumulated Karmāśaya and in that span the experiences are felt as a result of that Karmāśaya. Karmāśaya, being the cause of birth, of the span of life and of affective experience, is called 'Trivipāka' or that which has three consequences. For the same reason Karmāśaya has been called 'Eka-bhavika' or gathered in one birth (life) only.

When Karmāśaya becomes operative in the present life and is responsible for affective experience only it is said to be 'of single consequence' ; while if it is responsible for the span of life as well as for experience, it is 'of double consequence'—as in the cases of Nandīśvara and Nahuṣa (of double effect and of a single effect). Mind nourished from time immemorial on latencies (Vāsanā) of Kleśas and the execution of actions, is like a variegated picture or like a fishing net with knots all over. That is why Vāsanā is derived from many previous births, while Karmāśaya is derived from one birth or life. Those subconscious latent impressions, which give rise to memory only, are known as Vāsanās and they are without beginning.

Karmāśaya, which is of one life only, has either certain fruition or uncertain fruition. Of these two classes, the rule that Karmāśaya is active in one life only, is (fully) applicable to Karmāśaya of certain fruition ; while those of uncertain fruition which can bear fruit in some future life cannot be held to be active only in one life. This is because Karmāśaya



of uncertain fruition, to be operative in a future life, has three kinds of outcome :—first, unfructified Karmāśaya may be destroyed through atonement before it becomes operative ; secondly, it may be mixed up with the dominant Karmāśaya as a subordinate element ; thirdly, it may be overshadowed by the dominant Karmāśaya and may remain for a long time in a dormant state. Of these, the first is illustrated by the extinction in this life of dark deeds by the performance of pious ones. In this connection it has been said : “Know the action to be of two kinds of which a series of virtuous actions nullifies one of vicious actions. Therefore resolve to do good deeds. Those good deeds are to be done in this life ; so have the sages demonstrated to you.”

Regarding fruition of minor Karmāśayas as subsidiary to dominant Karmāśayas it has been said by Pañchaśikha : “In sacrificial rites, along with the principal Karmāśaya of virtue is also produced the Karmāśaya of sin. In the principal Karmāśaya of virtue that sin is small, mixed with virtue, and removable by atonement. But if no atonement is done it brings a touch of suffering as in the midst of profuse enjoyment a man feels the pangs of hunger if he goes without food. That sin is, however, unable to reduce the Karmāśaya of virtue, because it might be said : ‘I have many virtuous deeds to my credit, which will overwhelm the sinful Karmāśayas and will greatly reduce their effectiveness in causing distress in heaven.’ ” How it remains dormant for a long time overpowered by the chief unrestricted Karmāśaya is being explained here. Death has been said to be the general cause of manifestation of the unrestricted Karmāśaya operative in future life ; but this rule does not always hold good, because death is not always the cause of complete manifestation of limited Karma operative in future life. Karmas which are to be operative in a future life and which have not yet become mature enough to bear fruits can be destroyed ; or they may get mixed up or stand overpowered and may not fructify for a long time, until similar actions favourable to their manifesta-

tion incline them towards fruition. Since the time, the place and the cause of such manifestation cannot be determined, the course of Karma is regarded as variegated and undiscernible. But (in such a case) this being an exception the general rule is not broken. Therefore, it has been held that Karmāśaya is uni-genital, *i.e.* of one birth (life) only.

(1) Fluctuations due to nescience are the general states of the manifested mind. When through knowledge, nescience is destroyed, the ‘*me-mine*’ feeling, from which springs the identification of the self with the body, is destroyed completely and consequently the fluctuations of the mind also cease. When the mind remains completely arrested there can be no birth, nor span of life nor experience of pleasure or pain as they are co-existent with fluctuations only. Therefore when there is Kleśa at the root, *i.e.* a deed is done under Kleśa and latency thereof is stored in the mind, it produces birth, span of life and experience, unless it is nullified by insight which can counteract that latency. Jāti = Form assumed at birth of various species, *e.g.* man, cattle, etc., Āyus = Period of existence of that body, Bhoga = Pleasure or pain experienced in the life. Karmāśaya is the cause of all these three. Nothing takes place without a cause. When an action conducive to longevity or its opposite is done, the span of life is found to be increased or diminished in this very life. Pleasure or pain is also experienced as a result of action done in this very life. There are many instances of human babies, stolen and reared by wild animals, having been changed almost into animals, imitating their ways of life.

Thus it is seen that the cumulative latencies of actions done in this very life change the nature of the mundane body and yield results in the shape of longevity and experience. Therefore, actions are the cause of birth in a particular species, of span of life and of experience therein. The birth, span of life and experience which are not the result of action in this life must, therefore, have been caused by some action done in a previous life which had not fructified in that life.

What are the reasons for birth, span of life and experience therein ? Men have so far discovered three answers to that question : first, ordained by God ; secondly, the reason is not known to man, *i.e.* man has no means of knowing it ; and thirdly, Karma or action is their cause.

There is no proof that these have been ordained by God. Those who hold this view say that it is a matter of faith and not of reason. In their view, God is unknowable and as a corollary, the reason for birth etc. must

also be unknowable. If such people say that the matter is 'unknown to us' then that would be reasonable. But when they say that it is unknown to all men, they cannot offer adequate justification for that statement. The doctrine of Karma therefore appears to be more rational than the other two theories.

(2) The commentator has explained some general rules relating to the principle of Karma. The commentary can be better followed if those rules are clearly understood. They are :—

A. One Karmāśaya is not responsible for many births. If it were so, there would be no chance for the fruition of all Karmas. In every birth many Karmāśayas are accumulated and it would then be difficult to find time for the fruition of all these. Therefore such statements as 'killing of one animal will involve millions of birth as animal' etc. are untenable.

B. For the same reason the proposition that one Karma brings about one birth cannot also be correct.

C. Many Karmas do not cause many births simultaneously, because many births at the same time is an impossibility.

D. That many Karmāśayas go to bring about one birth appears to be the correct rule. In fact it is seen that in one life the fruits of many actions are experienced. Therefore many Karmas would appear to be the cause of one birth.

E. The Karmāśayas responsible for a birth also determine its span of life, and the experience of pleasure and pain therein.

F. Karmāśaya is Eka-bhavika, i.e. is mainly accumulated in one life. Take X = previous birth and Y = the subsequent birth. The Karmāśayas responsible for Y have been mainly collected in X. Therefore Karmāśaya is Eka-bhavika or of one birth. This is the general rule. The exception to this will be mentioned later. How Karmāśaya gathered in one life causes a subsequent life can be seen in the commentary.

G. The outcome of Karmāśaya which will bear fruit in a future life is threefold, viz. birth, duration of existence, and experience of pleasure and pain. But as the outcome of Karma, which becomes operative in that very life, does not entail another birth (i.e. its fruits are experienced in that life), it involves only Bhoga or Bhoga and Āyus. Therefore Karmāśaya which is operative in the same life brings about either one or two results.

H. Karmāśaya is mainly of one birth but Vāsanā [Matrix latency—see II.12(1)] is of many births. The three consequences experienced in the chain of births coming down from time without a beginning, have

produced latencies in the shape of Vāsanās, which are thus eternal, i.e. of various births.

I. Karmāśayas are of two kinds—those which must mature and those which may not. Those which must produce results are called Niyata-vipāka, while those which being influenced by others cannot produce complete results are called Aniyata-vipāka.

J. Uni-genital birth (life) is the general rule for Karmāśayas but there are exceptions.

K. In respect of Niyata-vipāka Karmāśayas which are operative in that birth, the rule being operative in one life, holds good fully. They are fully gathered in that life. Therefore they are Eka-bhavika.

L. In respect of Aniyata-vipāka Karmāśayas which are to bear fruit in some future life, that rule does not apply, for there are three courses which such Karmas may take :—

(a) The unfructified Karma may be nullified, e.g. virtue destroyed by vice and vice versa. The vicious Karmāśaya born of latency of sin arising out of anger, is neutralized by the constant practice of non-anger. Therefore it cannot be said that there is no exception to the rule that when a Karma is done its result must be borne. Karma, however, inevitably bears fruit unless it is destroyed by a contrary action or by proper insight.

The uni-genital rule does not fully apply to Karmāśaya, due to be operative in some future life because Karmāśaya gathered in one life can, to some extent, be destroyed in that very life.

(b) When a minor Karmāśaya matures with a chief Karmāśaya it is manifested feebly ; hence the rule that it would fructify in the following birth, does not apply in this case.

Dominant or chief Karmāśaya = that which is capable of bearing fruit independently.

Minor Karmāśaya = that which is slow in action or is there in a secondary position.

The latency of Karma done under intense lust, anger, spirit of forgiveness, charity, etc. is dominant Karmāśaya. It is always ready to fructify. Its opposite, the minor Karmāśaya, does not become operative independently ; it acts as secondary to the chief Karmāśaya. The Karmāśaya responsible for future births, is thus an aggregate of primary and secondary ones. The minor Karmāśayas do not fructify completely ; so the rule that 'the result of all actions in this life will come about in the following life' is not fully applicable in the case of minor ones.

(c) When a very strong or primary Karmāśaya bears fruit, the opposite secondary one remains subdued. It does not bear fruit at the time,

but it can fructify at some future time if roused by some kindred Karmāśaya. Here also as some minor Karmas of one life remain suppressed the ungenital rule does not apply. An example of this is as follows :—A man performs pious deeds in his boyhood. Then in his youth he commits many beastly acts through greed. At the time of his death, the fully mature latencies of sin form the appropriate Karmāśayas. As a result, the life of a beast that he gets, does not show the result of the pious actions done previously ; but such of the pious deeds as are enjoyable in a human life, remain stored up, and they will become operative when he is again born as a man. These will be helpful when he does pious acts in his subsequent human life. In this illustration the pious and vicious actions should be understood to be not mutually antagonistic. If they had been so, the vice would have destroyed the effect of the virtuous deeds. Suppose, forgiveness is a virtue and stealing a vice. Larceny does not destroy forgiveness, but only anger or non-forgiveness will do it.

ते ह्यादपरितापफलाः पुण्यापुण्यहेतुत्वात् ॥ १४ ॥

भाष्यम्—ते जन्मायुर्भोगाः पुण्यहेतुकाः सुखफलाः, अपुण्यहेतुकाः दुःखफला इति । यथा चेदं दुःखं प्रतिकूलात्मकमेवं विषयसुखकालेऽपि दुःखमस्त्येव प्रतिकूलात्मकं योगिनः ॥ १४ ॥

**Because Of Virtue And Vice These (Birth, Span And Experience) Produce Pleasurable And Painful Experiences. 14.**

These, i.e. the species in which birth takes place, the span of life and the experience therein, produce happiness if caused by virtue and misery if caused by vice (1). Just as misery is undesirable (to ordinary beings) so to a Yogin's mind even the enjoyment of pleasant objects is undesirable since this eventually involves pain also.

(1) The causes of misery are nescience, Asmitā, attachment, aversion and fear. Consequently actions which are opposed to them or weaken them are considered virtuous, while actions which support them are vicious.

Contentment, forgiveness, self-restraint, non-covetousness, cleanliness, discipline of the senses, wisdom, discriminative learning, truth and non-anger, these ten are regarded as pious acts. Amity and kindness as well as benevolence and charity based on them, are also regarded as virtues because these are partially opposed to nescience. Actions opposed to virtue, e.g. anger, greed, violence based on ignorance, untruth, incontinence are sinful actions. According to Āchārya Gauḍapāda : Yama, Niyama, (vide II.29) compassion and charity constitute virtuous acts.

भाष्यम्—कथं तदुपपद्यते ?—

परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः ॥ १५ ॥

सर्वस्यायं रागानुविद्धश्चेतनाचेतनसाधनाधीनः सुखानुभव इति तत्रास्ति रागजः कर्माशयः । तथा च द्वेष्टि दुःखसाधनानि मुह्यति चेति द्वेषमोहकृतोऽप्यस्ति कर्माशयः । तथा चोक्तम् । नानुपहृत्य भूतानि उपभोगः सम्भवतीति हिंसा-कृतोऽप्यस्ति शारीरः कर्माशय इति, विषयसुखं चाविद्येत्युक्तम् । या भोगेष्विन्द्रियाणां तृप्तेरुपशान्तिस्तत्सुखम्, या लौल्यादनुपशान्तिस्तदुःखम् । न चेन्द्रियाणां भोगाभ्यासेन वैतृष्यं कर्तुं शक्यं, कस्मात् ? यतो भोगाभ्यासमनु विवर्द्धन्ते रागाः कौशलानि चेन्द्रियाणामिति, तस्मादनुपायः सुखस्य भोगाभ्यास इति । स खल्वयं वृश्चिकविषभीत इवाशीविषेण दष्टो यः सुखार्थी विषयानुवासितो महति दुःखपङ्के निमग्न इति । एषा परिणामदुःखता नाम प्रतिकूला सुखावस्थायामपि योगिनमेव क्लिभाति ।

अथ का तापदुःखता ? सर्वस्य द्वेषानुविद्धश्चेतनाचेतनसाधनाधीनस्तापानुभव इति तत्रास्ति द्वेषजः कर्माशयः । सुखसाधनानि च प्रार्थयमानः कायेन वाचा मनसा च परिस्पन्दते ततः परमनुगृह्यात्युपहन्ति च, इति परानुग्रहपीडाभ्यां धर्माधर्मावुपचिनोति, स कर्माशयो लोभान्मोहाच्च भवति । इत्येषा तापदुःखतोच्यते ।

का पुनस्संस्कारदुःखता ? सुखानुभवात्सुखसंस्काराशयो दुःखानुभवादपि दुःखसंस्काराशय इति, एवं कर्मभ्यो विपाकेऽनुभूयमाने सुखे दुःखे वा पुनः कर्माशयप्रचय इति । एवमिदमनादि दुःखस्रोतो विप्रसृतं योगिनमेव प्रतिकूलात्मकत्वादुद्वेजयति, कस्मात् ? अक्षिपात्रकल्पो हि विद्वानिति । यथोर्णातन्तुरक्षिपात्रे न्यस्तः स्पर्शेन दुःखयति नान्येषु गात्रावयवेषु, एवमेतानि दुःखानि अक्षिपात्रकल्पं योगिनमेव



क्लिशन्ति नेतरं प्रतिपत्तारम् । इतरन्तु स्वकर्मोपहतं दुःखमुपात्तमुपात्तं त्यजन्तं त्यक्तमुपाददानमनादिवासनाविचित्रया चित्तवृत्त्या समन्ततोऽनुविद्धमिवाविद्यया हातव्य एवाहंकारममकारानुपातिनं जातं जातं बाह्याध्यात्मिकोभयनिमित्तास्त्रिपरीणास्तापा अनुरूपवन्ते । तदेवमनादिदुःखस्रोतसा व्युद्भयमानमात्मानं भूतग्रामं च दृष्ट्वा योगी सर्वदुःखक्षयकारणं सम्यग्दर्शनं शरणां प्रपद्यत इति ।

गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः । प्रख्याप्रवृत्तिस्थितिरूपा बुद्धिगुणाः परस्परानुग्रहतन्त्रा भूत्वा शान्तं घोरं मूढं वा प्रत्ययं त्रिगुणमेवारभन्ते । चलं च गुणवृत्तिमिति क्षिप्रपरिणामि चित्तमुक्तम् । 'रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुद्ध्यन्ते सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते ।' एवमेते गुणा इतरेतराश्रयेणोपाजितसुखदुःखमोहप्रत्यया इति सर्वे सर्वरूपा भवन्ति, गुणप्रधानभावकृतस्त्वेषां विशेष इति । तस्माद् दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिन इति ।

तदस्य महतो दुःखसमुदायस्य प्रभववीजमविद्या, तस्याश्च सम्यग्दर्शनमभावहेतुः । यथा चिकित्साशास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहं रोगो रोगहेतुरारोग्यम्भैषज्यमित्येवमिदमपि शास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहमेव, तद्यथा संसारस्संसारहेतुर्मोक्षो मोक्षोपाय इति । तत्र दुःखबहुलः संसारो हेयः, प्रधानपुरुषयोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः, संयोगस्यात्यन्तिकी निवृत्तिर्हानिं, हानोपायः सम्यग्दर्शनम् । तत्र हातुः स्वरूपमुपादेयं हेयं वा न भवितुमर्हति इति, हाने तस्योच्छेदवादप्रसङ्गः, उपादाने च हेतुवादः, उभयप्रत्याख्यानं च शाश्वतवाद इत्येतत्सम्यग्दर्शनम् ॥ १५ ॥

How is it possible (that the Yogins do not find satisfaction even in the pleasant, enjoyable objects of the world) ?

**The Discriminating Persons Apprehend (By Analysis And Anticipation)  
All Worldly Objects As Sorrowful Because They Cause Suffering  
In Consequence, In Their Afflictive Experiences And In Their  
Latencies And Also Because Of The Contrary Nature  
Of The Guṇas (Which Produces Changes  
All The Time). (1) 15.**

Experience of happiness is due to attachment to objects, animate (e.g. wife and family) or inanimate. From such feeling of happiness arises Karmāśaya based on attachment. Similarly, objects which cause suffering are hated by all and

men are stupefied by them. This is how Karmāśaya is born of hatred and stupefaction. This has been explained before. No enjoyment is possible without injury to another. Thus in the enjoyment of objects, bodily Karmāśaya based on malevolence is also formed. The enjoyment of objects has, therefore, been called nescience. In other words when through gratification of the thirst for enjoyables, the senses are calmed and do not go after the objects—that is happiness ; while restlessness due to thirst for enjoyment is unhappiness (2). Through practice (or continuance) of enjoyment the senses cannot be inclined to renunciation, for enjoyment increases attachment as well as the adroitness of the senses. That is why enjoyment is not the means of attaining spiritual happiness. A seeker of happiness gets into slough of misery through enjoyment of objects and longing for them. This is similar to the suffering of a person who, unable even to stand the sting of a scorpion gets bitten by a serpent. These adverse experiences entailing misery in the end, even though pleasant for the time being, cause only unhappiness to Yogins (i.e. things that cause unhappiness in the long run to a non-Yogin are regarded as unhappiness by a discriminating Yogin even when they are producing pleasure).

What is afflictive misery ? Everyone is afflicted with pain when pursuing animate and inanimate objects with aversion. This gives rise to Karmāśaya of aversion. Again, when (to overcome this afflictive misery) men seek pleasure with body, mind and words, they either favour or cause pain to others, which results in accumulation of piety and impiety. This Karmāśaya is the result of greed and infatuation. This is called afflictive misery.

What is the painfulness of Saṃskāra (subconscious impressions) ? Experiences of pleasure and pain give rise to corresponding latencies. Thus from experience of pleasure and pain resulting from Karma, fresh Karmāśaya is accumulated (through corresponding Vāsanā) (3). In this way the eternal stream of misery causes distress only to a Yogin, because the

mind of a wise man is as sensitive as the surface of an eye-ball. As the touch of a falling cobweb hurts only the eye-ball, but no other part of the body, so these miseries (due to the mutative nature of things) affect only a Yogin who is as sensitive as an eye-ball and not others. Others, under the influence of nescience in their mind, eternally variegated by *Vāsanā* and subject to the mistaken notions of 'me' and 'mine', which are to be given up eventually for obtaining correct knowledge of Self, suffer from the misery due to their own deeds. They go on giving up this misery and regaining it over and over again with the result that they are born again and again and are thus overwhelmed by three-fold sorrow produced by external and internal causes. The Yogin, however, seeing himself and others carried away by this eternal flow of misery takes refuge in right knowledge for the elimination of all sorrows.

Also on account of the mutual opposition of the modifications of the *Guṇas*, everything is sorrowful to a discriminating person. "The phases of *Buddhi* in the shape of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, reacting on one another, give rise to tranquil, intense or stupefied experience. The products of the *Guṇas* are in a state of flux, *i.e.* always mutating, and that is why the mind has been called fast-changing. When any of the forms of *Buddhi* (these are eight in number, *viz.* merit and demerit, right and wrong apprehensions, the spirit of detachment and attachment, supremacy and its opposite) and its states (these are three in number, *viz.* tranquillity, misery and stupor) become more intense, it opposes the weaker ones, while feebler forms and states co-operate with the stronger ones." Thus by admixture the *Guṇas* produce experience of pleasure, pain and stupor. So all experiences have the aspects of all the *Guṇas*, *viz.* *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, but their specific characters, *e.g.* the *Sāttvika*, the *Rājasika* and the *Tāmasika* ones are caused by the preponderance of one or other of the *Guṇas*. For that reason (*viz.* that nothing can be purely *Sāttvika* or producer of pleasure only), to a discriminating person everything (even worldly pleasure) is full of misery.

Nescience is the root cause of the prevalence of extensive misery and sorrow, while true knowledge is the cause of disappearance of nescience. As medical science has four divisions : illness, cause of illness, recovery and therapeutics—so this philosophy of salvation has four parts, *viz.* cycle of births, its cause, liberation and the means of liberation. Of these the cycle of births is *Heya*, *i.e.* to be discarded ; the association of *Puruṣa* and *Pradhāna* (*Prakṛti*) is *Heyahetu* or the cause of *Heya* (which is to be discarded) ; perpetual stoppage of this association is *Hāna* or liberation ; and right knowledge is the means of liberation (*Hānopāya*). Of these the real nature of *Puruṣa*, who witnesses the liberation, can neither be discarded nor attained for it would entail its elimination in the former case and its generation (*i.e.* its having a cause) in the latter. Rejecting both the views we arrive at the doctrine of eternal immutability which is right knowledge (4).

(1) Worldliness entailing births is full of misery. Enlightened Yogins of pure character finding this cycle of births to be full of sorrow, try to bring about its cessation. Attachment brings about sorrow in the end. Aversion brings about direct mental distress resulting in sorrow, while out of latencies of experience of pleasure and pain arise sorrows due to those latencies. Although attachment arises from pleasure and pleasure is derived from attachment, yet in the long run much misery arises therefrom ; this has been clearly shown by the commentator.

Aversion is felt towards painful things and so a feeling of misery is inevitable where there is hatred. When pleasure and pain are experienced, they produce subconscious latencies in the shape of *Vāsanā*. But *Vāsanā* being the mould of *Karmāśaya*, is the source of misery, because the latencies of *Vāsanā* cause the accumulation of the *Karmāśaya*.

Aversion is a form of misapprehension, that is why it causes suffering. It might be asked : 'Does not pleasure arise from hatred towards sin ? It does not cause misery.' That is true. Hatred towards sin means hatred towards sorrow. If misery is remedied thereby, it would bring happiness. In effecting the remedy, however, there is sorrow but it is very small, while in the end happiness is greater. Hatred towards sin arises out of experience of misery in it ; so misery out of hatred and hatred out of misery are the two unmistakable signs of hatred.



The ultimate misery arising out of attachment is a future contingency, the affliction due to hatred is for the present, while the latency of sorrow relates to the past. This is the opinion of the author of Mañiprabhā which is very much like the statement of the commentator, the purport of which is that there is pleasure in attachment, but it brings pain in the long run, while in hatred there is misery both in the present and in the future. From latencies of past experience of pleasure and pain, there is misery in the future. Thus from all the three aspects there is inevitable misery in the future, which should be avoided.

From an analysis of the character of effects it is understood that worldliness is responsible for all miseries. From an examination of the basic cause also it would appear that it is impossible to get pure, uninterrupted pleasure out of the cycle of births. The three Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, constitute the basic ingredient of the mind. By their nature, they work together. If in any state the preponderance of one particular Guṇa is noticed, it is called after that Guṇa, e.g. Sāttvika, Rājasika or Tāmasika. A Sāttvika state includes Rajas and Tamas also. Happiness, misery and stupor are respectively Sāttvika, Rājasika and Tāmasika modifications. As in every modification all the three Guṇas are present, there cannot be uninterrupted happiness free from Rajas and Tamas, and on account of the 'subversive' character of the Guṇas their modifications go on dominating one another. That is why misery and stupor are inevitable after happiness. Therefore, it is impossible to get uninterrupted pleasure in this world.

(2) Attempts to derive pleasure by sensuous enjoyment sharpen the senses and intensify attachment, which in the long run cause great unhappiness.

(3) Latency here refers to subconscious impressions of experiences in the shape of Vāsanā—not the latent impressions of pious and impious actions. These latter have been referred to in connection with consequent and afflictive miseries. Vāsanā only produces memory. That memory is of births, longevity and experience. Vāsanā does not produce pain by itself but it being the receptacle of the latent impressions of pious and vicious Karmāśaya becomes the cause of unhappiness. The case is like that of an oven which is not the direct cause of burn but which burns on account of stored burning fuel which causes the burn. Vāsanā is like that. In the oven of Vāsanā the Karmāśaya fuel is stored which causes the burn of misery.

(4) The real nature of the agent which destroys misery cannot be realised because Puruṣa, the destroyer of misery, is neither the cause nor

the effect. Otherwise, Puruṣa becomes mutable and the unalterable state of liberation becomes impossible. Nevertheless the existence of the agent cannot be eliminated altogether, i.e. the theory that there is no Puruṣa beyond the mind is not tenable. If that were so, there would be no inclination towards elimination of misery. Cessation of misery and dissolution of the mind are the same thing. If there were no basic entity beyond the mind, there could be no effort for its dissolution. In fact we practise for liberation with the resolution 'let me be free from misery by suspending the activities of the mind.' It is rational to think that 'I shall be free from misery when the activities of the mind are stopped,' i.e. there will then remain a pure 'I' free from the pangs of misery. The Self beyond the mind is the real nature of the agent. If the existence of that agent is not admitted, then the question 'for whose sake is liberation being sought?' cannot be answered.

Therefore both the viewpoints,—that the agent is an object of attainment and that it is not existent, are untenable. The view that the agent in its real nature, i.e. the Self, is eternal and immutably existent, embodies right knowledge.

भाष्यम्—तदेतच्छास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहमित्यभिधीयते ।

हेयं दुःखमनागतम् ॥ १६ ॥

दुःखमतीतमुपभोगेनातिवाहितं न हेयपक्षे वर्तते, वर्तमानं च स्वक्षणे भोगारूढमिति न तत् क्षणान्तरे हेयतामापद्यते । तस्माद् यदेवानागतं दुःखं तदेवाक्षिपात्रकल्पं योगिनं छिन्नाति, नेतरं प्रतिपत्तारं, तदेव हेयतामापद्यते ॥ १६ ॥

That is why this Śāstra has been described as consisting of four parts of which

#### Pain Which Is Yet To Come Is To Be Discarded (1). 16.

Past suffering cannot be avoided as it has already been undergone through experience. Present suffering is operative at the present moment, and cannot therefore be forsaken in the next moment. Hence that pain alone, which has not yet been experienced, troubles the Yogin who is as sensitive

as an eye-ball, and not any other perceiver. Therefore that alone is the avoidable pain.

(1) 'What is avoidable' : the most logical and clear answer to that is 'the pain that has not come yet.'

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भाष्यम्—तस्माद् यदेव हेयमित्युच्यते तस्यैव कारणं प्रतिनिर्दिश्यते—

द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ॥ १७ ॥

द्रष्टा बुद्धेः प्रतिसंवेदी पुरुषः, दृश्याः बुद्धिसत्त्वोपारूढाः सर्वे धर्माः । तदेतद् दृश्यमयस्कान्तमणिक्लृप्तं सन्निधिमित्रोपकारि दृश्यत्वेन भवति पुरुषस्य स्वं दृशिरूपस्य स्वामिनः । अनुभवकर्मविषयतामापन्नमन्यस्वरूपेण प्रतिलब्धात्मकं स्वतन्त्रमपि परार्थत्वात् परतन्त्रम् । तयोर्दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरनादिरर्थकृतः संयोगो हेयहेतुः दुःखस्य कारणमित्यर्थः । तथा चोक्तम् 'तत्संयोगहेतुविवर्जनात् स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः', कस्मात् ? दुःखहेतोः परिहार्यस्य प्रतिकारदर्शनात्, तद्यथा, पाद-तलस्य भेद्यता, कण्टकस्य भेद्यत्वं, परिहारः कण्टकस्य पादानधिष्ठानं, पादत्राण-व्यवहितेन वाऽधिष्ठानम् । एतत्तृयं यो वेद लोके स तत्र प्रतिकारमारभमाणो भेदजं दुःखं नाप्नोति, कस्मात्, त्रित्वोपलब्धिसामर्थ्यादिति । अत्रापि तापकस्य रजसः सत्त्वमेव तप्यं कस्मात्, तपिक्रियायाः कर्मस्थत्वात् सत्त्वे कर्मणि तपिक्रिया नापरिणामिनि निष्क्रिये क्षेत्रज्ञे । दर्शितविषयत्वात् सत्त्वे तु तप्यमाने तदाकारानु-रोधी पुरुषोऽनुतप्यत इति दृश्यते ॥ १७ ॥

For that reason the cause of that which has been mentioned as avoidable is being described.

**Uniting The Seer Or The Subject With The Seen Or The Object, Is The Cause Of That Which Has To Be Avoided. 17.**

The Seer is Puruṣa who is the reflector of Buddhi (or pure I-sense) and all that are experienced by Buddhi are the objects (knowables). Like a magnet, the objects of experience act on that which is near them (1) by virtue of proximity.

By their character of being knowables they become the property of Puruṣa whose nature is Awareness ; the knowable (here knowable means Buddhi) becoming the object of experience or action is naturally revealed as something else, i.e. like Puruṣa (2), and though independent in itself, it becomes dependent in serving as the object of another, i.e. Puruṣa (3). That beginningless alliance between Consciousness and the object is the cause of the avoidable, i.e. misery. That is why it has been said (by Āchārya Pañchaśikha) : "By giving up the cause of correlation with Buddhi, this absolute remedy of affliction can be effected," because it is seen that the avoidable cause of trouble can be remedied. For example, the sole of the foot being susceptible to damage from thorn, the piercing power of the thorn can be avoided by not putting the foot on the thorn, or by having a shoe on. One who knows these three can avoid the trouble arising from a thorn by adopting a remedy. How ? By the ability to know the nature of these three. In spiritual experience also the afflictive Guṇa, Rajas, can disturb the Sattva. Why ? Because affliction must operate on an entity which is amenable to mutation. Sattva being amenable to mutation can be disturbed while the Self who is beyond action and mutation cannot be so affected. Since the objects presented by Buddhi are witnessed by Puruṣa, when these are fraught with pain, Puruṣa also appears to be aware of their painful nature (4).

(1) The comparison with the magnet means that although Puruṣa undergoes no change and does not come into contact with the knowable, the object (knowable) on account of its proximity to Puruṣa becomes cognisable. Proximity here does not indicate spatial nearness, but it implies the type of close relationship that exists between the knower and the known, for instance, in the proposition—'I am the knower of it.' In this proposition 'it' or a knowable, is seen or understood by experience as the object of action. The object of action and experience is of three kinds—perceptible, usable (i.e. property of being used), and retentive. The usable objects are those of the organs of action, that is, of tangible actions. Retentiveness lies in the action of the Prāṇas and in the latent impressions.

meaning, are no doubt made by convention. 'That so many alphabets will form this word and it will indicate this object' is fixed by someone and followed by others. Although it is not known who has done this, it is certain that it has been fixed by somebody.

(j) The recollection of the overlapping of a word and its meaning, is convention. On account of this overlapping of word, object and memory or knowledge, they are inseparable. When the Yogin becomes conversant with their difference, or through concentration comes to know them individually, he can, through Nirvitarka knowledge, understand the subject referred to by all words.

(k) A sentence generally indicates a noun with a verb, or in other words, it implies a proposition. The capacity of the word implies its property of conveying a meaning. The word 'pot' taken by itself is a term but it implies 'the pot exists' when it is a proposition. Every term contains the essence of a proposition. When it is pronounced it implies the existence of something, *i.e.* a noun with a verb conveying an idea. When the word 'tree' is pronounced it implies that it exists, or existed or will exist, involving an implication of its states of existence.

There are words which have many meanings. When they are used by themselves, they are not comprehensible by ordinary knowledge but their meanings are revealed in Yogic knowledge.

(l) Here the difference between a word, its implied object and significance, is being illustrated by examples.

Having thus established the distinction among the three, the commentator is describing the benefits of practising Samyama.

संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वजातिज्ञानम् ॥ १८ ॥

भाष्यम्—द्वये खल्वमी संस्काराः स्मृतिक्लेशहेतवो वासनारूपाः, विपाकहेतवो धर्माधर्मरूपाः। ते पूर्वभवाभिसंस्कृताः परिणाम-चेष्टा-निरोध-शक्ति-जीवन-धर्मवदपरिदृष्टाश्चित्तधर्माः। तेषु संयमः संस्कारसाक्षात्क्रियायै समर्थः, न च देशकालनिमित्तानुभवैर्विना तेषामस्ति साक्षात्करणम्, तदित्थं संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वजातिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते योगिनः। परत्राप्येवमेव संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्परजातिसंवेदनम्। अत्रेदमाख्यानं श्रूयते, भगवतो जैगीषव्यस्य संस्कारसाक्षात्करणाद्दशसु महासर्गेषु जन्मपरिणामक्रममनुपश्यतो विवेकजं ज्ञानं प्रादुरभवत्। अथ भगवानावद्व्यस्तनुधरस्तमुवाच, दशसु महासर्गेषु भव्यत्वादनभिभूतबुद्धिसत्त्वेन

त्वया नरकतिर्यग्भवं दुःखं संपश्यता देवमनुष्येषु पुनः पुनरुत्पद्यमानेन सुखदुःखयोः किमधिकमुपलब्धमिति। भगवन्तमावद्व्य जैगीषव्य उवाच, दशसु महासर्गेषु भव्यत्वादनभिभूतबुद्धिसत्त्वेन मया नरकतिर्यग्भवं दुःखं संपश्यता देवमनुष्येषु पुनः पुनरुत्पद्यमानेन यत् किञ्चिदनुभूतं तत्सर्वं दुःखमेव प्रत्यवैमि। भगवानावद्व्य उवाच, यदिदमायुष्मतः प्रधानवशित्वमनुत्तमं च सन्तोषसुखं किमिदमपि दुःखपक्षे निक्षिप्तमिति। भगवान् जैगीषव्य उवाच, विषयसुखापेक्षयैवेदमनुत्तमं सन्तोषसुखमुक्तं, कैवल्यापेक्षया दुःखमेव। बुद्धिसत्त्वस्यायं धर्मस्त्रिगुणः, त्रिगुणश्च प्रत्ययो हेयपक्षे न्यस्त इति। दुःखस्वरूपस्तृष्णातन्तुः, तृष्णादुःखसन्तापापगमात्तु प्रसन्नमबाधं सर्वानुकूलं सुखमिदमुक्तमिति ॥ १८ ॥

By The Realisation Of Latent Impressions, Knowledge Of Previous Birth Is Acquired (1). 18.

The latent impressions referred to in this Sūtra are of two kinds, *viz.* those appearing as Vāsanās causing memory and (indirectly) afflictions, and those responsible for fruition of right or wrong deeds (2) done in previous births. Like change, effort, arrested state, power, life and impressions of virtuous and vicious actions, they are unseen characteristics of Chitta. If Samyama is practised on impressions, they are realised, and since such realisation cannot arise without an idea of the place, time and cause of the incident concerned, the Yogin practising it comes to know of the previous birth. Knowledge of previous births of others can also be acquired in the same way. There is a story prevalent in this connection in the Śruti. Bhagavān Jaigīṣavya after having acquired knowledge of ten cycles of creation and the sequence of births therein through realisation of subliminal impressions, obtained discriminative knowledge. Then Bhagavān Āvatya, having assumed a corporeal form created at will, asked him : 'You have lived through ten cycles and because of enlightenment your intellect has not been clouded ; you have experienced sorrows of hell and animal life, and have repeatedly enjoyed pleasures as a De-



(celestial) and as a human being. Of these what have you enjoyed best ?' To this Bhagavān Jaigīṣavya replied : 'I have lived through ten cycles of creation and my mental essence has not been overpowered. I have experienced the sorrows of hell as well as of animal life. I have been born again and again as a Deva and as a man. But I consider all that I have been through, as pain.' Then Āvaṭya said : 'Oh long-lived one, tell me whether you count your mastery over the constituent principles and the unsurpassable pleasure of contentment amongst sorrows.' Jaigīṣavya replied : 'Pleasure of contentment has been ranked as superior to other enjoyments, but it is nothing but pain compared to the bliss of the state of liberation. This characteristic of contentment of mind is nothing but a composition of the three Guṇas, and everything connected with the Guṇas has been counted as that to be avoided. The state of desire is nothing but pain. When pain-producing desire is removed, contentment is said to become pleasant, unrestricted, and all-embracing (3).'

(1) Perception of latent impressions means memory or recollection of subliminal impressions. It is clear that if latent impressions are perceived it will bring forth knowledge of the previous life. Latent impressions have been gathered in previous lives. If, therefore, through concentration, the power of perception is directed exclusively to subliminal impressions, then their particulars will be revealed, i.e. where, in which life, and how they were gathered will be recollected.

(2) The subject of subliminal impressions has been dealt with in the comments on Sūtras II.12 and 15. Latent impressions are, like mutation etc., the result of an unseen characteristic of Chitta. For the purpose of perceiving latent impression, a particular personal latent impression has to be thought of. If that latent impression is forceful, the result of such thinking will be its vivification. Therefore, fixing the mind on any particular tendency or on any faculty of reception and getting engrossed thereon, will bring about a recollection of the cause of such latent impression in a previous birth and that is perception of the latent impression. In the case of a man, the particular latent impressions of the human species are the memory-producing Vāsanās. If the peculiarities

of the human form, its sense-organs, mind, etc. are thought upon and engrossed in, this will bring about a knowledge of their causes, i.e. it will be known why they have been cast into this particular mould and why they have adopted the virtuous or vicious ways in this life. Vāsanā has been explained before. Vāsanā is like a mould and actions of virtue and vice are like molten metal.

(3) The story of the conversation between Jaigīṣavya and Āvaṭya quoted above is not found in any extant literature. It might have been quoted from some obsolete Śruti.

Pleasant—unaffected by material pains.

Unrestricted—unbroken by any obstacle.

All-embracing—liked by everybody and favourably situated in all circumstances.

प्रत्ययस्य परचित्तज्ञानम् ॥ १६ ॥

भाष्यम्—प्रत्यये संयमात् प्रत्ययस्य साक्षात्करणान्ततः परचित्तज्ञानम् ॥ १६ ॥

(By Practising Samyama) On Notions, Knowledge Of Other Minds Is Developed. 19.

By practising Samyama on notions and thus realising them, knowledge of other minds can be acquired (1).

(1) Notions here refer to the notions prevailing in one's own mind as well as in other minds. Unless an idea in one's own mind can be isolated and perceived, how can the idea in another mind be realised ? First realising one's own idea, the mind has to be made vacant for the reception of the idea prevalent in another mind and then effort should be made to realise that. We come across many thought-readers, but they have not always acquired the power through Yoga ; many of them are born with that power. Keeping in view the person whose thought is to be read, the reader's mind has to be made vacant and when other thoughts rise therein they are the thoughts of the other person. Thought-readers cannot say how the thought is transferred, but they just feel that the thoughts are not their own. Some can read other people's thought without any effort when the other person is in the process of thinking

those who have acquired supernormal powers in other ways, have the latent impressions of their previous actions still left in their minds.

(1) The constructed minds referred to here, stand for minds which have acquired supernormal powers through incantation etc. The words 'through meditation' used in the Sūtra refer to minds acquired through Yogic concentration. No latent impression of Yoga or concentration can exist in a present mind because the very fact of being born indicates that Samādhi had not been attained in a previous birth. Therefore, a mind perfected through Yoga cannot be produced by impenetration of nature, based on past latent impressions but it appears through the impenetration of a nature not experienced before. Other attainments are derived from impressions of previous actions, but Samādhi cannot be had as a result of any action in a previous birth because if anyone attains Samādhi in his lifetime he will not be born again. When Samādhi is attained, liberation is secured in that birth and there is no further birth with a gross body. Thus acquisition of powers through Yogic concentration is not the outcome of previous latent impressions. In powers acquired through other means, i.e. by virtue of birth etc., the person having them exercises those powers involuntarily, whereas in powers acquired through Yogic concentration the case is different as each exercise of power is completely voluntary. In this case the power is employed for the purpose of destroying afflictions such as desires, hatred, etc. and is thus destructive of latent impressions. This attainment, therefore, is not the result of previous impressions, nor does it accumulate impressions. This latter function has been referred to by the commentator.

भाष्यम्—यतः—

कर्माशुक्लाकृष्णं योगिनस्त्रिविधमितरेषाम् ॥ ७ ॥

चतुष्पातखल्वियं कर्मजातिः—कृष्णा शुक्लकृष्णा शुक्ला अशुक्लाकृष्णा चेति । तत्र कृष्णा दुरात्मनां, शुक्लकृष्णा वहिःसाधनसाध्या तत्र परपीडानुग्रहद्वारेण कर्माशयप्रचयः, शुक्ला तपःस्वाध्यायध्यानवतां, सा हि केवले मनस्यायतत्वादवहिःसाधनाधीना न परान् पीडयित्वा भवति, अशुक्लाकृष्णा सन्नासिनां क्षीणकेशानां

चरमदेहानामिति । तत्राशुक्लं योगिन एव फलसन्नासाद्, अकृष्णं चानुपादानात् । इतरेषान्तु भूतानां पूर्वमेव त्रिविधमिति ॥ ७ ॥

Consequently (that is, in view of the fact that a Yogin's mind is free from impressions whereas minds of others are full of them)—

**The Actions Of Yogins Are Neither White Nor Black, Whereas  
The Actions Of Others Are Of Three Kinds. 7.**

Karma is of four kinds—black, black-and-white, white and neither white nor black. Of these the action of villains is black, while black-and-white Karma is brought about by external means and gathers latencies, as it hurts or benefits others. White Karma is of those who are engaged in austerities, religious study and meditation, which being mental are free from external action and thus not likely to injure or benefit others. The last variety, viz. neither white nor black Karma is the last phase in the bodily existence of Yogins who have reduced their afflictions. The action of such Yogins is not white (1) on account of their spirit of renunciation, and not black as they refrain from all prohibited actions. In respect of others, the actions are of the other three varieties.

(1) The actions of villains are black. The actions of ordinary men are black-and-white, because they do good as well as evil. It is difficult to conduct a household without either. Even in the harmless occupation of tilling the soil, lives of insects have to be taken or cattle have to be tortured. In trying to save one's wealth others have to be denied. In these and in many other ways domestic life entails pain to others. At the same time good work can also be done. That is why the action of ordinary men is regarded as black-and-white. The actions of those who are engaged in austerities and meditation alone, or in activities independent of external means, are purely white, because causing pain to others is not inevitable in such cases.

The type of work Yogins do brings about a cessation of the fluctuations of the mind, and consequently, of piety and impiety of the mind.

In other words, the latencies of piety or impiety and corresponding conduct having ceased, actions of the Yogins are neither white nor black. As a matter of fact they not only do not do any evil, but the good deeds they perform are done without any hope of reward and in a spirit of renunciation in order to shut out the spirit of enjoyment. The austerities and religious studies etc. of Yogins are for attenuating afflictions, while their renunciation is not for enjoying the fruits of their labour but for developing a spirit of detachment from pleasure and pain and thus stopping the fluctuations of the mind. On the attainment of discriminative enlightenment, actions of the body cease to be the cause of bondage and being directed towards arrest of the fluctuations of the mind, are neither white nor black.

ततस्तद्विपाकानुगुणानामेवाभिव्यक्तिर्वासनानाम् ॥ ८ ॥

भाष्यम्—तत इति त्रिविधात् कर्मणः । तद्विपाकानुगुणानामेवेति यज्जातीयस्य कर्मणो यो विपाकस्तस्यानुगुणा या वासनाः कर्मविपाकमनुशेते तासामेवाभिव्यक्तिः । न हि दैवं कर्म विपच्यमानं नारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्यवासनाभिव्यक्तिनिमित्तं भवति, किन्तु दैवानुगुणा एवास्य वासना व्यज्यन्ते । नारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्येषु चैवं समानश्चर्चः ॥ ८ ॥

**Thence (From The Other Three Varieties Of Karma)  
Are Manifested The Subconscious Impressions  
Appropriate To Their Consequences. 8.**

The word 'thence' refers to the other three varieties of Karma. Tadvipākānugūṇa = the after-effects of an action give rise to subconscious impressions which follow the pattern of feeling produced by the experience arising out of such action. These remain collected in the mind and become manifest in due course. Action of a divine being does not result in bringing out the subconscious impressions of actions performed in previous births in hell or in animal or in human forms, but only brings out the appropriate divine impressions. Such rule applies also to the subconscious impres-

sions of actions performed in hell or in animal or human forms(1).

(1) Latent impressions of actions which produce results are called Karmāśaya ; while the latent impression of feelings arising out of the threefold consequences of action, e.g. birth, life-span, and experience of pleasure and pain, is called Vāsanā or subliminal imprint. The comments in Sūtra II.12 should be seen in this connection. Take, for instance, a human being who is born as such as a result of his previous actions ; he goes over his allotted span, enjoying various pains and pleasures. The impressions acquired in the course of his existence as a human being, i.e. of the human body and its organs, of its span of life, and of its pleasures and pains go to form the human Vāsanā. The latent impressions of actions performed in that birth are Karmāśaya. Suppose, he acts like a beast in the lifetime as a result of which he is next born a beast. He, however, retains his human Vāsanā. In this way innumerable Vāsanās accumulate in the mind, including some Vāsanās acquired in previous animal births. The animal-like actions in this human life will impel the manifestation of those animal Vāsanās. That is why it has been said that Karmāśaya or latent impression of action manifests the appropriate Vāsanā. The nature of that Vāsanā regulates the birth and enjoyment of pleasure and pain therein. For example, a dog enjoys licking, a man enjoys similar pleasure differently. If on account of good work done in human life, pleasure is vouchsafed in a dog-life that pleasure will be enjoyed in a dog's way. The outcome of Vāsanā is memory. Memory here refers to the memory of births, longevity and experience of pleasure and pain. Memory of birth means memory of the body and of the nature of its organs in a particular species. Memory of longevity refers to the memory of the duration of existence in a particular form. The last named refers to the memory of experience of pleasure and pain in a particular life. Memory is a sort of knowledge or modification of the mind. For each modification there is an associated feeling. Therefore, each memory of experience of pleasure and pain is shaped by a corresponding latent impression of previous experience which is the Vāsanā or subconscious impression of that feeling. Same is the case with longevity-Vāsanā and Vāsanā of particular births.



जातिदेशकालव्यवहितानामप्यानन्तर्यं स्मृतिसंस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात् ॥ ६ ॥

भाष्यम्—वृषदंशविपाकोदयः स्वव्यञ्जकाञ्जनाभिव्यक्तः स यदि जातिशतेन वा दूरदेशतया वा कल्पशतेन वा व्यवहितः पुनश्च स्वव्यञ्जकाञ्जन एवोदियाद् द्रागित्येव पूर्वानुभूतवृषदंशविपाकाभिसंस्कृता वासना उपादाय व्यज्येत । कस्मात्, यतो व्यवहितानामप्यासां सदृशं कर्माभिव्यञ्जकं निमित्तीभूतमित्यानन्तर्यमेव, कुतश्च, स्मृतिसंस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात्, यथानुभवास्तथा संस्काराः, ते च कर्मा वासनानुरूपाः । यथा च वासनास्तथा स्मृतिः, इति जातिदेशकालव्यवहितेभ्यः संस्कारेभ्यः स्मृतिः स्मृतेश्च पुनः संस्कारा इत्येते स्मृतिसंस्काराः कर्माशयवृत्तिलाभ-वशात् व्यज्यन्ते । अतश्च व्यवहितानामपि निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावानुच्छेदा-दानन्तर्यमेव सिद्धमिति ॥ ६ ॥

**On Account Of Similarity Between Memory And Corresponding  
Latent Impressions, The Subconscious Impressions  
Of Feelings Appear Simultaneously Even  
When They Are Separated By Birth,  
Space And Time (1). 9.**

The fruition of actions involving birth as a cat, when put in motion by the causes of their manifestation, will take place simultaneously even though they might have taken place after an interval of a hundred births, at a great distance or many eons before, because, although separated from each other, all actions of the same nature involving birth as a cat will be set in motion. Their simultaneous appearance happens on account of affinity between memory and latent impressions. As the feelings are, so are the latent impressions. These again correspond to the subconscious impressions of Karma-vāsanā. And as the subconscious impression of the feeling produced by an action is, so is its memory. Thus from latent impressions, though separated by births, space and time, memory arises and from such memory again arise latent impressions. That is how memory and impressions manifest themselves, being brought into play by Karmāśaya or latent impressions of actions. Thus even though

separated by births, there is sequential non-interruption because there is no break in the relation of cause and effect.

(1) As the impression of a feeling experienced long ago at a far off place, emerges in the mind at once when there is an exciting cause, so does Vāsanā. Even though much time might have elapsed since the collection of a latent impression, its recollection does not take time at all but rises immediately. Effort to recollect might take time but when the memory comes, it comes at once. The intervening impressions do not cause any intervention in the memory. This has been explained by the commentator with the help of an illustration. For example, in the case of intervention of births in different species one is born as a man and then, on account of evil deeds done, he is born as an animal a hundred times, and then he is born again as a man. In spite of the intervention of a hundred animal births, the human Vāsanā will come up to the surface when he is born a man. The same rule applies in the case of intervention of space and time. The reason for this is the affinity between latency and memory. As the latency is, so is the memory. Memory is the re-cognition of the latent impression. As memory is only cognitive transformation of latent impression, there cannot be any gap between the two.

The manifestation of Vāsanā is caused by Karmāśaya. From that arises clear memory. Karmāśaya is the unfailing cause of memory. Thus from latency arises memory, and from memory latency is formed, and so the cycle goes on.

तासामनादित्वं चाशिषो नित्यत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

भाष्यम्—तासां वासनानामाशिषो नित्यत्वाद्नादित्वम् । येयमात्माशीर्मा न भूवं भूयासमिति सर्वस्य दृश्यते सा न स्वाभाविकी, कस्मात्, जातमात्रस्य जन्तोर्ननुभूतमरणधर्मकस्य द्वेषदुःखानुस्मृतिनिमित्तो मरणात्तासः कथं भवेत् ? न च स्वाभाविकं वस्तु निमित्तमुपादत्ते तस्मादनादिवासनानुविद्धमिदं चित्तं निमित्तवशात् काश्चिदेव वासनाः प्रतिलभ्य पुरुषस्य भोगायोपावर्तत इति ।

घटप्रासादप्रदीपकल्पं संकोचविकाशि चित्तं शरीरपरिमाणाकारमात्रमित्यपरे प्रतिपन्नाः, तथा चान्तराभावः संसारश्च युक्त इति । वृत्तिरेवास्य विभूतः संकोच-

विकाशिनी इत्याचार्यः। तच्च धर्मादिनिमित्तापेक्षम्। निमित्तं च द्विविधं  
वाह्यमाध्यात्मिकं च, शरीरादिसाधनापेक्षं वाह्यं स्तुतिदानाभिवादानादि, चित्त-  
मात्राधीनं श्रद्धाद्याध्यात्मिकम्। तथा चोक्तम्, 'ये चैते मैत्रादयो ध्यायिना  
विहारास्ते वाह्यसाधननिरनुग्रहात्मानः प्रकृष्टं धर्ममभिनिर्वर्तयन्ति'। तयोर्मानसं  
बलीयः, कथं, ज्ञानवैराग्ये केनातिशय्यते, दण्डकारणं चित्तबलव्यतिरेकेण कः  
शारीरेण कर्मणा शून्यं कर्तुमुत्सहेत्, समुद्रमगस्त्यवद्वा पिबेत् ॥ १० ॥

**Desire For Self-Welfare Being Everlasting It Follows That**

**The Subconscious Impression From Which It Arises**

**Must Be Beginningless. 10.**

In every creature there is a desire for self-welfare such as 'I may not be non-existent, let me live for ever.' This desire cannot be spontaneous, *i.e.* without a cause. How can a creature just born, which has not experienced death before, have fear of death, which is due to a memory of aversion and sorrow regarding death? What is natural does not require a cause to come into being (1). This shows that the mind is filled with eternal Vāsanās. Being impelled by an appropriate situation, the mind becomes manifest, following one such Vāsanā, for experience of the individual. Some (2) hold that mind is shaped by the dimensions of the body like the light of a lamp which contracts if the lamp is placed in a pot and spreads if placed in a palace (hall). In their opinion this explains how there may be a middle state or how the mind gives up one body, takes up another and fills up the gap between them (between death and rebirth). It also explains Samsāra or the cycle of births. Āchārya (sage) says that it is the modification of the all-pervading mind (and not the mind itself) which contracts and expands and the cause of such contraction and expansion is virtue and its other similar attributes. This exciting cause is twofold, *viz.* external and internal (or relating to the self). The external ones presuppose actions by the body etc., *e.g.* worship, charity, adoration, etc. The internal ones depend only on the

mind. Reverence etc. illustrate them. It has been said by Āchārya in this connection: "Friendliness etc., which the contemplative (Yogins) cherish as congenial pursuits, are not contingent on the achievement of something outside, and they are productive of the highest merit." Of the two causes, the mental ones (3) are stronger, because nothing can be superior to true knowledge and renunciation. Whoever can by physical force alone, without the help of will-power, empty out Daṇḍakāraṇya (a forest) or drink off a sea like sage Agastya?

(1) What is natural does not require a cause to arise. It is seen that fear is caused through recollection of sorrows. Horror of death is a sort of fear. There must be a cause for it. Therefore, it cannot be a natural occurrence. To explain fear of death, previous experience of sorrow at the time of death must be admitted. Thus previous births have also to be admitted. The knower, instruments of reception and the knowables are inherent in any creature. They are not produced by any cause during its life-time.

‘Āśiḥ’ or desire for self-welfare is a feeling arising out of a desire to live and not to be non-existent. It is eternal and exists in all creatures, past, present and future. As ‘Āśiḥ’ is eternally present in all creatures without exception, Vāsanā is also eternal. As there was ‘Āśiḥ’ in the past, there must have been corresponding births, and we must therefore admit that the cycle of births and Vāsanā are eternal. Some people explain that fear of death is the result of an instinct. Instinct means untaught ability or a faculty which is noticeable from birth. But this does not say anything about the origin of instincts. Evolutionists hold that it is inherited. According to them in the beginning life takes the form of a unicellular creature called amoeba. After all, it is not denied that there is such a thing as instinct or untaught ability, but that does not explain whence it has come. This has been gone into in greater detail in connection with Sūtra II.9 (2).

(2) Incidentally, the magnitude of the mind has been spoken of. According to some, the mind is like a lamp in a pot or in a palace (hall). It assumes the form of the body it inhabits. Vijñāna-bhikṣu says that it is the view of some Sāṃkhya philosophers. Yogāchārya says that it is all-pervading as it has no spatial extent. Mind which has acquired super



normal powers through knowledge of discernment can take in everything knowable at the same time and therefore it is regarded as all-pervading. Mind is not all-pervading like the sky, because the sky is only external space. Mind on the other hand is only power of knowing without any extension in space. Since its connection with innumerable external things which are potentially clearly knowable is ever existing, the mind and its faculty of knowing are limitless. Only the modifications of the mind contract and expand. That is why the mind appears as limited. With ordinary persons knowledge is acquired in small instalments while with Yogins of supernormal powers it dawns in its entirety. Thus it follows that mind itself is all-pervading, but its modifications admit of contraction and expansion.

(3) The causes which bring about the manifestation of Vāsanā have been analysed by the commentator. The cause in this case is the latent impression of actions. The actions produced by the effort, i.e. the activities of the sense-organs, of the organs of action and of the body, as also their latencies, are the external causes, while the activity of the internal organs and latent impressions thereof are the internal causes or mental acts. The commentator has emphasised the point that mental action is the stronger of the two.

हेतुफलाश्रयालम्बनैः संगृहीतत्वादेषामभावे तदभावः ॥ ११ ॥

भाष्यम्—हेतुः धर्मात् सुखमधर्माद्दुःखं सुखाद्रागो दुःखादद्वेषः, ततश्च प्रयत्नः, तेन मनसा वाचा कायेन वा परिस्पन्दमानः परमनुगृह्णात्युपहन्ति वा, ततः पुनः धर्माधर्मौ सुखदुःखे रागद्वेषौ इति प्रवृत्तिमिदं षडरं संसारचक्रम्। अस्य च प्रतिक्षणमावर्त्तमानस्याविद्या नेत्री मूलं सर्वकेशानाम् इत्येष हेतुः। फलन्तु यमाश्रित्य यस्य प्रत्युत्पन्नता धर्मादेः, न ह्यपूर्वोपजनः। मनस्तु साधिकारमाश्रयो वासनानां, न ह्यवसिताधिकारे मनसि निराश्रया वासनाः स्थातुमुत्सहन्ते। यदभिमुखीभूतं वस्तु यां वासनां व्यनक्ति तस्यास्तदालम्बनम्। एवं हेतुफलाश्रया-लम्बनैरेतैः संगृहीताः सर्वा वासनाः, एषामभावे तत्संश्रयाणामपि वासनानाम-भावः ॥ ११ ॥

**On Account Of Being Held Together By Cause, Result, Refuge  
And Supporting Object, Vāsanā Disappears  
When They Are Absent. 11.**

From a cause like virtue, pleasure or happiness results ; from impiety, pain or misery ; from happiness, attachment ; and from misery, hatred. Thence (from attachment and hatred) ensues effort ; and from effort results action of speech, mind or body, whereby creatures benefit or injure others ; from that again arise piety and impiety, happiness and misery, attachment and hatred. Thus revolves constantly the six-spoked wheel of births. Nescience which is at the root of all misery is the motive power of this perpetually moving wheel. Thus the process mentioned above serves as the cause. Result is the motive or purpose of an action which determines its moral value as virtuous or vicious. (In reply to a question, how it is possible for Vāsanā as cause to be held together by its effect, the commentator says—) Nothing which did not exist can come into being (i.e. effect is present in a subtle form in the cause and that is how the effect can be the receptacle of a cause). A mind prone to fluctuation is the refuge of Vāsanā, which for want of a supporting substratum, cannot reside in a Chitta in which this proneness is destroyed. The object which induces or calls forth Vāsanā, is its inciting cause. Thus the basic cause (Avidyā), result, refuge and inciting object together hold Vāsanā. When they disappear Vāsanās collected by them also disappear.


(1) Vāsanās are collected by or associated with cause, result, refuge and support. The fluctuations rooted in nescience, i.e. the wrong cognitions are the cause of Vāsanā. The latent impression of experience derived from the feeling created by being born in a particular species, living therein for a particular period of time, and the pleasure and pain experienced therein, is Vāsanā. The cause of birth, span of life and experience of pleasure and pain is good or evil action. The cause of actions is nescience in the shape of attachment, aversion, etc. Thus nescience is the root cause and this is how the root cause has kept together the Vāsanās. The consequence of Vāsanā is memory, i.e. some

modification of the mind. By being cast in the mould of Vāsanā it gives rise to pleasure or pain which leads to an effort towards good or evil actions. The commentator has stated earlier that the latent impression of the memory of a feeling is Vāsanā. Virtuous action or its opposite arises from memory shaped by Vāsanā of previous births, longevity and experience. Since memory gives rise to fresh Vāsanā, memory helps to sustain Vāsanā. For instance, memory of happiness leads to accumulation of Vāsanā of happiness. The expression 'Puruṣārtha' means that which serves the objective of Puruṣa. It may be the experience of pleasure or pain, or it may be liberation. This is not the outcome of Vāsanā alone, but of knowing the knowables as well. Birth, longevity and experience of pleasure and pain are the results of Karmāśaya and not of Vāsanā. Thus only memory results from Vāsanā.

Chitta prone to fluctuations is the abode of Vāsanā. When that prone-ness is destroyed through acquisition of discriminative enlightenment, the mind remains full of that knowledge alone and thus there is no room for Vāsanās of nescience. When the knowledge that Puruṣa is nothing but absolute Consciousness fills the mind, memory of such modifications as 'I am a man' or 'I am a cow' being impossible, all such Vāsanās are destroyed because they can no longer beget memory of wrong cognitions. Thus a mind which has finished its activity cannot be the abode of Vāsanā while an active mind with normal functions, i.e. a mind which has not acquired discriminative enlightenment is its abode.

Although Karmāśaya is the cause of appearance of Vāsanā, it appears with objects like light, sound, etc. and in the form of birth, longevity and experience; that is why those objects are considered as the props of Vāsanā. Sound reveals the subconscious impression of hearing; that is why sound is the prop of the Vāsanā of hearing. Thus Vāsanā is sustained by nescience, memory, an active Chitta and objects. When they disappear, Vāsanā also disappears. Uninterrupted discriminative knowledge is the cause of the cessation of nescience etc. With the dawning of discriminative knowledge, cognition of objects, inclination of the mind to Guṇa-induced activities, memory of Vāsanās and nescience disappear, consequently Vāsanā is destroyed. It might be questioned why it is necessary to mention all the other aspects such as Guṇas and the like when the destruction of nescience alone brings about their cessation. It should be understood in this connection that nescience is not destroyed outright. After shutting out knowables etc. one has to get to the root cause in the form of nescience and then destroy it. That is why it is necessary to know the different elements which sustain Vāsanā, and try to attenuate them from the very beginning.

*The six-spoked wheel of the round of birth and death, i.e. worldliness*



A creature does an act of piety or impiety prompted by attachment or aversion. From attachment to pleasure one does a pious act or an impious act in the form of oppressing others. Similarly, from aversion, seeking relief from pain, one does both pious and impious acts. From pious acts one gets more pleasure and less pain, while impious acts result in more pain and less pleasure. From pleasure arises attachment to objects which give pleasure and hatred towards things which hinder pleasure. Pain gives rise to hatred towards objects which cause pain and attachment towards objects which are antagonistic to pain. At the root of all is nescience or delusion in the shape of wrong knowledge. This is how the cycle of births is revolving.

there is no nescience (Avidyā), Puruṣa who is pure, would not be affected by the attributes of the mind. Thus for the spiritually proficient person (one who has attained discriminative enlightenment) inquiry about the Self would disappear.

(1) After having established fully the distinction between the mind and Puruṣa, the author in this Sūtra, in order to explain what liberation is, indicates the type of mind conducive to it.

One who realises the existence of Puruṣa—the 'another' mentioned in the previous Sūtra—ceases pondering on the self. Queries about the self means pondering on matters relating to self. Persons ignorant about Puruṣa, who is beyond the mind, are incapable of resolving such queries. It is stated in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad: "For him who has seen the supreme Brahman and the manifest Brahman and is engrossed in their thought, his heart-strings of attachment and bondage are snapped, his doubts are removed and the results of his previous actions are eliminated."

(2) Special distinction (between the mind and Puruṣa) can be realised only if the seed of that knowledge has been carefully nurtured in numerous previous births. This can be conjectured by observing one's inclination towards the philosophy of liberation. If concentration is practised with the aid of that taste (or reverence), energy and carefully cultivated memory, one gains knowledge of the special distinction. After the Puruṣa-principle is realised, it becomes clear through discriminative enlightenment that the ordinary conceptions about the self are but modifications of the mind and that the mind appears to be related to Puruṣa on account of nescience. Therefore, all queries about the self cease and nothing remains obscure about it. 'What I am' and 'what I am not' become perfectly clear. Of course, in the initial stage misgivings about the self are allayed by true knowledge derived through inference and from the study of scriptures. Once the truths are realised through concentration, the doubts cease for ever.

तदा विवेकनिम्नं वल्यप्राग्भारं चित्तम् ॥ २६ ॥

भाष्यम्—तदानीं यदस्य चित्तं विषयप्राग्भारम् अज्ञाननिम्नमासीत्तदस्यान्यथा भवति, कैवल्यप्राग्भारं विवेकज्ञाननिम्नमिति ॥ २६ ॥

**(Then) The Mind Inclines Towards Discriminative Knowledge And Naturally Gravitates Towards The State Of Liberation (1). 26.**

At that time (when it is filled with knowledge of the special distinction) the mind of the devotee, which was so long occupied with the experience of objects of senses and roaming along paths of ignorance, takes a different turn. Then it directs itself towards liberation and moves in the path of discriminative knowledge.

(1) When through a knowledge of the special distinction self-questionings cease, the mind starts flowing along the channel of discriminative knowledge. The flow terminates in liberation. When a canal inclining downwards terminates at the foot of a mound, the water flowing in that channel disappears on being sucked in under the mound. Similarly, the mind flowing downwards along the channel of discrimination disappears on reaching the foot of the mound of liberation.

तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः ॥ २७ ॥

भाष्यम्—प्रत्ययविवेकनिम्नस्य सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्रप्रवाहिणश्चित्तस्य तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि अस्मीति वा ममेति वा जानामीति वा न जानामीति वा, कुतः ? क्षीयमाणवीजेभ्यः पूर्वसंस्कारेभ्य इति ॥ २७ ॥

**Through Its Breaches (i.e. Breaks In Discriminative Knowledge) Arise Other Fluctuations Of The Mind Due To (Residual) Latent Impressions. 27.**

In a mind full of discriminative knowledge, such thoughts as 'I' and 'mine', 'I am knowing' or 'I am not knowing', arise through breaks in that knowledge. Where do these come from? From previous latent impressions which are being eliminated (1).



(1) On the attainment of discriminative enlightenment, the mind treads primarily the path of discrimination, yet other modifications born of nescience arise therein at times until the latencies are completely attenuated through attainment of the ultimate stage of enlightenment. All latent impressions born of nescience do not die out as soon as discriminative knowledge is acquired, but they are gradually thinned. From the residual latent impressions of wrong cognition which still linger, modifications born of nescience arise occasionally.

हानमेषां क्लेशवदुक्तम् ॥ २८ ॥

भाष्यम्—यथा क्लेशा दग्धवीजभावा न प्ररोहसमर्था भवन्ति तथा ज्ञानाग्निना दग्धवीजभावः पूर्वसंस्कारो न प्रत्ययप्रसूयति । ज्ञानसंस्कारास्तु चित्ताधिकार-समाप्तिमनुशेते इति न चिन्त्यन्ते ॥ २८ ॥

**It Has Been Said That Their Removal (i.e. Of Fluctuations) Follows The Same Process As The Removal Of Afflictions. 28.**

Kleśas burnt as roasted seeds become unproductive ; similarly latencies burnt out by the fire of (true) knowledge, do not cause any fluctuation of the mind, i.e. they do not emerge into a state of knowledge. The latent impressions of (true) knowledge, however, wait for the termination of the functioning of the mind (i.e. they automatically die out when the mind ceases to act), and no special effort is necessary for this (1).

(1) The emergence of disturbing fluctuations fully ceases only when both contra-discriminative modifications and latencies thereof are destroyed. When the mind inclines to discriminative knowledge, nescience etc. become infructuous like roasted seeds. Further accumulation of afflictive latencies cannot take place as they are overpowered by discriminative knowledge as soon as they are formed (see II.26). But even then the undestroyed latent impressions give rise to contra-discriminative modifications such as, 'I', 'mine', etc. To stop that, the latent impressions responsible for such modifications have to be rendered infructuous. This

can be done through latent impressions of the ultimate insight which is the highest form of knowledge.

Latent impressions of the sevenfold ultimate stage of knowledge (see II.27) such as 'I have come to know all the knowables, there is nothing more to know,' etc. render infructuous the latent impressions of contra-discriminative knowledge. When no more contra-discriminative knowledge is gathered through fresh actions or through impressions of previous actions, it can be held that all grounds for formation of fluctuations have been destroyed. When causes of fluctuations are destroyed, the fluctuations cannot rise again. Cognition or modification is a function or manifestation of the mind. When cognition ceases altogether and there is no more chance of its resurgence, the mind ceases to exist as such, i.e. gets dissolved. That is the end of the play of the Guṇas—the three constituent principles. Thus do latent impressions of knowledge terminate the activities of the mind. Therefore, for the permanent disappearance of the mind, no means other than gathering latent impressions of knowledge need be thought of. If the functioning of the mind can be stopped by one's becoming averse to all its actions, then the mind will cease to work, or disappear. According to the Sāṅkhya philosophy mind does not then become non-esse, but merges into its causal substance and remains there unmanifest. Everything undergoes change through adequate cause. Cause in the form of knowledge destroys nescience. Mind similarly reverts from the manifest to the unmanifest state but does not become non-existent.

प्रसंख्यानेऽप्यकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातेर्धर्ममेघस्समाधिः ॥ २९ ॥

भाष्यम्—यदायं ब्राह्मणः प्रसंख्यानेऽप्यकुसीदः—ततोऽपि न किञ्चित्प्रार्थयते, तत्रापि विरक्तस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातिरेव भवतीति संस्कारवीजक्षयान्नस्य प्रत्ययान्तराययुत्पद्यन्ते । तदास्य धर्ममेघो नाम समाधिर्भवति ॥ २९ ॥

**When One Becomes Disinterested Even In Omniscience One Attains Perpetual Discriminative Enlightenment From Which Ensues The Concentration Known As Dharmamegha (Virtue-Pouring Cloud). 29.**

When the discriminating Yogin is disinterested even in Prasaṅkhyāna (1), viz. omniscience, i.e. does not want

anything therefrom, he attains perpetual discriminative enlightenment. Thus on account of the destruction of the seeds of latent impressions, no other cognition arises in his mind. He then attains the concentration called Dharmamegha (cloud that pours virtue).

(1) Prasamkhyāna here means omniscience resulting from knowledge of discernment (see III.54). When the Yogin who has realised Brahman becomes indifferent even to omniscience, perpetual discriminative enlightenment prevails and the Samādhi that follows is called the Samādhi of the highest knowledge. It is so called because it renders easy the realisation of the Self, and because it keeps the mind fully saturated in that cognition it is known as virtue-pouring cloud. As cloud pours rain so this Samādhi pours the highest virtue, i.e. success is then attained without effort. That concentration is the highest achievement through devotional practice and constitutes perpetual discriminative enlightenment. It marks complete stoppage of all activities.

ततः क्लेशकर्मनिवृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

भाष्यम्—तद्भावादविद्यादयः क्लेशाः समूलकाश्च कषिता भवन्ति, कुशला-  
कुशलाश्च कर्माशयाः समूलघातं हता भवन्ति । क्लेशकर्मनिवृत्तौ जीवन्नेव विद्वान्  
विमुक्तो भवति, कस्मात्, यस्माद् विपर्ययो भवस्य कारणं, न हि क्षीणविपर्ययः  
कश्चित् केनचित् कचिज्जातो दृश्यत इति ॥ ३० ॥

From That Afflictions And Actions Cease. 30.

On attainment of that, afflictions arising out of nescience are uprooted and all Karmāśayas of virtuous and vicious actions are eradicated. On the cessation of those afflictive actions, the enlightened person is liberated even in his lifetime. Erroneous knowledge being the cause of rebirth, no one with attenuated nescience (i.e. nescience reduced to an unproductive state) is born again (1).

(1) When through Dharmamegha concentration, the Yogin is freed from afflictions and consequent actions, he is called Jīvanmukta, i.e. liberated though alive. Such proficient Yogin does not do anything, nor does he assume any corporeal form under the influence of previous latent impressions. If he does anything, he does it with a Nirmāṇa-chitta (constructed mind).

Yogins who have acquired discriminative enlightenment but have not fully attained an arrested state of mind can also be regarded as Jīvanmukta. They continue to have bodily existence on account of residual latent impressions. They do not perform any new act but only wait for the disappearance of all latent impressions. They attain liberation on the cessation of those latencies which go out like a lamp without supply of fresh oil.

The word 'Mukti' means freedom from sorrows. He who can, at will, detach himself from his knowing faculty, is not touched by the miseries which exist only in the mind. The cycle of births of which nescience is the cause and which is responsible for all miseries comes to a stop in his case. It is impossible for a person who has acquired discriminative knowledge to be born again. Those who have been born are all (more or less) deluded. One who is free from delusion is not known to have been reborn.

According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy, a Jīvanmukta is one who has attained the highest stage of devotional practice. One who is not the least perturbed even by the severest sufferings, can be regarded as free from sorrow.

तदा सर्वावरणमलापेतस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याज्ज्ञेयमल्पम् ॥ ३१ ॥

भाष्यम्—सर्वैः क्लेशकर्मावरणैर्विमुक्तस्य ज्ञानस्यानन्त्यं भवति । आवरणेण  
तमसाभिभूतमावृतज्ञानसत्त्वं कचिदेव रजसा प्रवर्तितमुदघाटितं ग्रहणसमर्थं भवति ।  
तत्र यदा सर्वैरावरणमलैरपगतमलं भवति तदा भवत्यस्यानन्त्यं ज्ञानस्यानन्त्याज्ज्ञेय-  
मल्पं सम्पद्यते, यथा आकाशे खद्योतः । यत्रेदमुक्तम् 'अन्धो मणिमविध्यत्  
तमनङ्गुलिरावयत् । अग्नीवस्तं प्रत्यमुञ्चत् तमजिह्वोऽभ्यपूजयद्' इति ॥ ३१ ॥

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# THE BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ

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अधिभूत क्षरो भावः

*adhibhūtaṁ kṣaro bhāvaḥ*  
the adhibhūta perishable existence

पुरुषश्चाधिदैवतम् ।

*puruṣaścādhidāivatam*  
and the Spirit (is the) Supreme Divine Agent

अधियज्ञोऽहम् एवात्र

*adhiyajño 'ham evātra*  
the adhiyajña I here

देहे देहभृतां वर ॥

*dehe dehahṛtām vara*  
in the body, O Best of the Embodied.

The Adhibhūta is the perishable nature of being (or the sphere of the Supreme Spirit in acting on the individual, i.e. nature)\*

The Adhidāivata is the Supreme Divine Agent itself (the puruṣa)

The Adhiyajña (Basis, or Lord of Sacrifice) is Myself,  
Here in this body, O Best of the Embodied.

\* All the terms here are technical and sometimes puzzling. Edgerton regards the language of these stanzas as grandiloquent. But native commentators take it very seriously, and some of their definitions are included here.

Rāmānuja identifies the *Adhyātman* with *svabhāva* (inherent disposition) or *prakṛti* (material nature) – “that which is not the self, but is conjoined with the self.” The *Adhibhūta*, according to him, is “the transitoriness of the elements, ether, etc., of which elements sound, touch, etc., are developments.” The *Adhidāivata* “connotes the *puruṣa*; it means ‘being beyond the pantheon of Indra, Prajāpati, etc.’ The *Adhiyajña* is God – He who is to be propitiated by sacrifice.”

*adhibhūtaṁ* (n. nom. sg.), aggregate of physical elements.

*kṣaras* (m. nom. sg. noun from √*kṣar*), perishable, destructible.

*bhāvas* (m. nom. sg.), existence, being

*puruṣa* (m. nom. sg.), spirit, man, soul

*ca*, and.

*adhidāivatam* (n. nom. sg.), Supreme, Divine agent.

*adhiyajñas* (m. nom. sg.), Chief of Sacrifice, Basis of Sacrifice, Lord of Sacrifice

*aḥam* (nom. sg.), I.

*eva*, indeed (used as a rhythmic filler)

*atra*, here, in this case.

*dehe* (n. loc. sg.), in the body.

*dehahṛtām vara* (m. voc. sg.), O Chosen of the Embodied, O Best of the Embodied applied to Arjuna.

अन्तकाले च माम् एव

*antakāle ca mām eva*

at the end-time me

मम मुक्त्वा कलेवरम् ।

*mam muktvā kalevaram*

remembering, having relinquished the body,

प्रयाति स मद्भावं

*prayāti sa madbhāvaṁ*

he goes, he to my state of being

अत्र नास्ति सन्देहः ॥

*atra nāsty atra saṁśayaḥ*

there goes, not there is in this case doubt.

अन्तकाले च, remembering

Me,

having relinquished the body,

the who dies goes to My state of being.

In this matter there is no doubt.

*antakāle* (m. loc. sg.), at the time of departure, at the hour of death, lit. “at end time.”

*ca*, and.

*mām* (acc. sg.), me.

*eva*, indeed (used as a rhythmic filler).

*smaran* (pr. act. participle √*smṛ*), remembering, thinking on, thinking of.

*muktvā* (gerund √*muc*), relinquishing, having relinquished, having been liberated from.

*kalevaram* (m. acc. sg.), body, cadaver.

*ya* (m. nom. sg.), who, which.

*prayāti* (3rd sg. pr. indic. act. √*yā*), he departs, he dies.

*sa* (m. nom. sg.), he, this.

*madbhāvaṁ* (m. acc. sg.), my state of being, to my state of being, to my being.

*yāti* (3rd sg. pr. indic. act. √*yā*), he goes, he attains.

*na*, not.

*asti* (3rd sg. pr. indic. √*as*), it is, he is, there is.

*atra*, here, in this case, in this instance.

*saṁśaya* (m. nom. sg.), doubt, question, irresolution.

यं यं वापि स्मरन् भावं

*yaṁ yaṁ vāpi smaran bhāvaṁ*

whatever, moreover, remembering, state  
of being

त्यजत्य् अन्ते कलेवरम् ।

*tyajaty ante kalevaram*

(when) he gives up at the end the body,

तं तं एवैति कौन्तेय

*taṁ taṁ evāiti kāunteya*

to respectively that he goes, O Son of  
Kunti (Arjuna)

सदा तद्भावभावितः ॥

*sadā tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ*

always that state of being caused to  
become.

Moreover whatever state of being he  
remembers

When he gives up the body at the end,  
He goes respectively to that state of  
being, Son of Kunti,

Always transformed into that state of  
being.

*yam yam* (m. acc. sg.), whatever.

*vā api*, moreover, or also.

*smaran* (m. nom. sg. pr. act. participle),  
remembering, thinking of.

*bhāvaṁ* (m. acc. sg.), state of being, being  
*tyajati* (3rd sg. pr. indic. act. √*tyaj*)  
abandons, he gives up.

*ante* (m. loc. sg.), in the end, at the end  
*kalevaram* (m. acc. sg.), body, physical  
body.

*tam tam* (repetition indicates distribution  
acc. sg.), to that, respectively that  
*eva*, indeed (used as a rhythmic filler)

*eti* (3rd sg. pr. indic. act. √*i*), he goes, he  
attains.

*kāunteya* (m. voc. sg.), O Son of Kunti, ep-  
ithet of Arjuna.

*sadā*, always, invariably.

*tad* (n. nom. sg.), that, this.

*bhāva* (m.), state of being, being.

*bhāvitas* (m. nom. sg. causative participle  
√*bhū*), transformed into, caused to be  
come.

(*bhāva-bhāvitas*, m. nom. sg. TP cpd., trans-  
formed into that state of being.)

तस्मै सर्वेषु कालेषु

*tasmat sarveṣu kāleṣu*

therefore at all times

अनुस्मर युद्ध च ।

*anusmara yudhya ca*

remember, and fight

अर्पितमनोबुद्धिर्

*arpitamanobuddhir*

my fixed mind and intelligence

एवैष्यस्य असंशयम् ॥

*evaiṣyasy asaṁśayam*

me thus thou shalt come, without  
doubt.

therefore, at all times

meditate on Me, and fight,

thy mind and intelligence fixed on

Me,

in this way, thou shalt surely come  
to Me.

*tasmat* (abl. sg.), from this, therefore.

*sarveṣu* (m. loc. pl.), in all, at all.

*kāleṣu* (m. loc. pl.), in times, at times.

*mām* (acc. sg.), me.

*anusmara* (2nd sg. imperative act. *anu*  
√*smṛ*), remember! think of!

*yudhya* (2nd sg. imperative act. √*yudh*),  
fight!

*ca*, and.

*mayi* (m. loc. sg.), on me, in me.

*arpita* (m.), fixed, placed, entrusted.

*manobuddhis* (f. nom. sg.), mind and intelli-  
gence.

(*arpitamanobuddhis*, m. nom. sg. BV cpd.,  
having mind and intelligence fixed.)

*mām* (acc. sg.), me, to me.

*eva*, indeed (used as a rhythmic filler).

*eṣyasi* (2nd sg. future act. √*i*), thou shalt  
come, thou shalt attain.

*asaṁśayam* (adv.), without doubt, surely.



प्रयाणकाले मनसाचलेन

*prayāṇakāle manasācalena\**

at departure time with mind unmoving

भक्त्या युक्तो योगबलेन चैव ।

*bhaktiā yukto yogabalena cāiva*

with devotion yoked and with Yoga power

भ्रुवोर् मध्ये प्राणम् आवेश्य सम्यक्

*bhruvor madhye prāṇam āveśya samyak*

of the two eyebrows in the middle, the vital breath entering correctly,

स तं परं पुरुषम् उपैति दिव्यम् ॥

*sa taṁ param puruṣam upāiti divyam*

he this Supreme Spirit approaches, divine.

At the hour of death, with unmoving mind,

With devotion yoked and with Yoga power,

Having made the vital breath enter correctly between the two eyebrows,†

He approaches this divine Supreme Spirit.

*prayāṇakāle* (m. loc. sg.), at departure, time of death.

*manasā* (n. inst. sg.), by mind, with mind; *acalena* (n. inst. sg.), by unmoving, less.

*bhaktiā* (f. inst. sg.), with devotion, worship, with love.

*yuktas* (m. nom. sg. p. pass. participle), united, held, joined, yoked.

*yogabalena* (m. inst. sg.), with Yoga power, with the strength of Yoga.

*ca*, and.

*eva*, indeed (used as a rhythmic filler)

*bhruvos* (f. gen. dual), of the two eyebrows

*madhye* (m. loc. sg.), in the middle

*prāṇam* (m. acc. sg.), the vital breath

*āveśya* (causative gerund *ā* √vi), being caused to enter.

*samyak* (adv.), directly, united, in one direction, correctly, properly.

*sas* (m. nom. sg.), he, this.

*taṁ* (m. acc. sg.), him, this.

*param* (m. acc. sg.), Highest, Supreme

*puruṣam* (m. acc. sg.), Spirit, Soul

*upāiti* (3rd sg. pr. indic. act. *upa* √i), he approaches, he goes to.

*divyam* (m. acc. sg.), divine, heavenly

अक्षरं वेदविदो वदन्ति

*akṣaram vedavidō vadanti\**

the imperishable the Veda-knowing they call,

यत यतो वीतरागाः ।

*yad yatayo vītarāgāḥ*

enter which the ascetics, the free from passion,

ब्रह्मचर्यं चरन्ति

*brahmacaryam caranti*

desiring, a life of chastity they follow,

पदमं संग्रहेण प्रवक्ष्ये ॥

*padam saṅgrahēṇa pravakṣye*

in thee path in brief I shall declare.

at which the Veda-knowing call the imperishable,

enter, which the ascetics, free from passion,

following which they follow a life of chastity,

that path I shall explain to thee briefly.

*yad* (n. nom. sg.), which.

*akṣaram* (n. acc. sg.), imperishable, eternal. *vedavidas* (m. nom. pl.), the Veda-knowing, those versed in the Vedas.

*vadanti* (3rd pl. pr. indic. act. √vad), they say, they call, they say to be.

*viśanti* (3rd pl. pr. indic. act. √viś), they enter, they go into, they pervade.

*yad* (n. nom. sg.), which.

*yatayas* (m. nom. pl.), the ascetics, the strivers, the performers of austerities.

*vītarāgās* (m. nom. pl.), free from passion, free from lust, free from desire.

*yad* (n. nom. sg.), which.

*icchantas* (m. nom. pl. pr. act. participle √iṣ), desiring, wishing for.

*brahmacaryam* (n. acc. sg.), life of chastity, life of a Brahmacārin.

*caranti* (3rd pl. pr. indic. act. √car), they move, they follow.

*tad* (n. acc. sg.), this, that.

*te* (dat. sg.), to thee.

*padam* (n. acc. sg.), path, step.

*saṅgrahēṇa* (m. inst. sg. or adv.), briefly, in brief.

*pravakṣye* (1st sg. future *pra* √vac), I shall declare, I shall speak of, I shall explain.

\* *Tristubh* metre continues. The last line is one syllable too long.

† As in several such Yoga techniques, the anatomical elements are vague to the non-yogin.

सर्वद्वाराणि संयम्य

*sarvadvārāṇi saṁyamya\**

all the gates (of the body) controlling,

मनी हृदि निरुध्य च।

*mano hṛdi nirudhya ca*

and the mind in the heart shutting up,

मूर्धन्य आधायामनः प्राणम्

*mūrdhny ādhāyātmanah prāṇam*

in the head having placed own vital breath,

आस्थितो योगधारणाम् ॥

*āsthito yogadhāraṇām*

established in Yoga concentration,

Controlling all the gates of the body,†  
And shutting up the mind in the heart,

Having placed the vital breath in the head,

Established in Yoga concentration,

*sarvā-*, all.

*dvārāṇi* (n. acc. pl.), gates, doors, the body.

*saṁyamya* (gerund *saṁ* √yam), controlling.

*manas* (n. acc. sg.), mind.

*hṛdi* (n. loc. sg.), in the heart.

*nirudhya* (gerund *ni* √rudh), shutting up, confining, suppressing.

*ca*, and.

*mūrdhni* (n. loc. sg.), in the head.

*ādhāya* (gerund *ā* √dhā), placing, placed.

*ātmanas* (m. gen. sg.), of the self, own.

*prāṇam* (m. acc. sg.), vital breath, inhaled.

*āsthitas* (m. nom. sg.), established, situated in.

*yogadhāraṇām* (f. acc. sg.), Yoga concentration, Yoga fixation.

एकस्य गकारं ब्रह्म

*ekākṣaram brahma*

thus, the single-syllabled Brahman

माम् अनुस्मरन् ।

*mām anusmaran*

me meditating on,

प्रयति त्यजन् देहं

*prayāti tyajan deham*

he goes forth, renouncing the body,

यति परमां गतिम् ॥

*yāti paramām gatim*

he goes to the highest goal.

Thus, uttering the single-syllable Brahman,

Meditating on Me,

He who goes forth, renouncing the body,

Reaches to the Supreme Goal.\*

*om*, the sacred syllable, said to embrace all the secrets of the universe.

*iti*, thus.

*ekākṣaram* (n. acc. sg.), one syllabled, single syllabled.

*brahma* (n. acc. sg.), Brahman.

*vyāharan* (pr. act. participle *vi* ā √hr), uttering, pronouncing, speaking.

*mām* (acc. sg.), me.

*anusmaran* (m. nom. sg. pr. act. participle *anu* √smṛ), meditating on, thinking about, remembering.

*yas* (m. nom. sg.), who.

*prayāti* (3rd sg. pr. indic. act. *pra* √yā), he goes forth, he dies.

*tyajan* (m. nom. sg. pr. participle act. √tyaj), renouncing, abandoning.

*deham* (m./n. acc. sg.), body.

*sas* (m. nom. sg.), he, this one.

*yāti* (3rd sg. pr. indic. act. √yā), he goes, he attains.

*paramām* (f. acc. sg.), to the highest, to the supreme.

*gatim* (f. acc. sg.), goal, path.

\* According to Rāmānuja's commentary, stanzas 12 and 13 refer to the *kāivalyārthin* (seeker of complete detachment) who seeks the complete severance of the *ātman* from the body, and worships God as the *akṣara*, or indestructible, eternal essence (*Brahman*). He is mentioned in VII 16, as the *arthārthin*, or seeker of knowledge of the *ātman* as different from *prakṛti*, or material nature. This is the "Highest Truth" of VII 16.

\* *Śloka* metre resumes.

† Gates of the body, nine in number, viz. the two eyes, two nostrils, two ears, mouth, organ of generation, organ of excretion.

अनन्यचेताः सततं  
*ananyacetāḥ satatam*  
 whose mind does not go elsewhere, ever,

यो मां स्मरति नित्यशः ।  
*yo mām smarati nityaśaḥ*  
 who me he thinks of constantly,

तस्याहं सुलभः पार्थ  
*tasyāhaṁ sulabhaḥ pārtha*  
 for him I easy to reach, Son of Pṛthā,

नित्ययुक्तस्य योगिनः ॥  
*nityayuktasya yoginaḥ*  
 for the constantly yoked yogin.

He who thinks of Me constantly,  
 Whose mind does not go elsewhere,  
 ever,  
 For him, the yogin who is constantly  
 yoked,  
 I am easy to reach, Son of Pṛthā.\*

\* According to Rāmānuja's commentary, this and stanzas 15 and 16 are devoted to the *jñānin* of VII 16, the "man of wisdom," who is never without direct concentration on God, "his mind focussed on God alone because God is incomparably dear to him, and because he cannot sustain his *ātman* without representing God (to himself)... And God himself, unable to endure separation from his worshipper, will choose him." According to the same source, the *aiśvaryaṛthin* (stanza 8 *et seq.*) is reborn. But the *kāivalyaṛthin* (stanzas 12 and 13) and the *jñānin*, described in this and the following stanzas, are not reborn, but go to union with Brahman, or God.

मम पुनर्जन्म  
*mam upetya punarjanma*  
 approaching, rebirth

दुःखालयम् अशश्वतम् ।  
*duḥkhālayam aśāśvatam*  
 misfortune home, impermanent,

अपनुवन्ति महात्मानः  
*āpnuvanti mahātmānaḥ*  
 they incur, the great selves,

सिद्धिं परमां गताः ॥  
*siddhim paramāṁ gatāḥ*  
 to perfection the highest gone.

Approaching Me, those whose selves  
 are great,  
 Who have gone to supreme perfection,  
 do not incur rebirth,  
 that impermanent home of mis-  
 fortune.

*mām* (acc. sg.), me, to me.  
*upetya* (gerund *upa √i*), approaching, coming near to.  
*punarjanma* (n. acc. sg.), "again birth," rebirth.  
*duḥkha* (n.), misfortune, misery, unhappiness.  
*ālayam* (m. acc. sg.), home, abode.  
*(duḥkha-ālayam, m. acc. sg. TP cpd., home of misery.)*  
*aśāśvatam* (m. acc. sg.), impermanent, inconstant.  
*na*, not.  
*āpnuvanti* (3rd pl. pr. indic. act. *āp*), they incur, they attain, they reach.  
*mahātmānaḥ* (m. nom. pl.), great selves, great souls, (as pl. BV cpd.) those whose selves are great.  
*sāmsiddhim* (f. acc. sg.), perfection, to perfection, to accomplishment, to success.  
*paramām* (f. acc. sg.), highest, supreme.  
*gatāḥ* (m. nom. pl. p. pass. participle *√gam*), gone.

शुक्लकृष्णे गती ह्येते  
*śuklakṛṣṇe gatī hyete*

light and dark two paths indeed these

जगतः शाश्वते मते  
*jagataḥ śāśvate mate*

for the universe eternal thought to be

एकया यात्य् अनार्वृत्तिम्  
*ekayā yāty anāvṛttim*

by one he goes to non-return

अन्यया वर्तते पुनः ॥

*anyayā vartate punaḥ*

by the other he returns again.

These are the two paths, light and dark,

Thought to be eternal for the universe.

By one he goes to non-return;

By the other he returns again.\*

\* The choice of whether to return or not is apparently up to the yogin. The literature abounds with yogins who have delayed their deaths so as to reach the half-year that will eventuate in either return or non-return. (Cf. the case of Bhīṣma, who delayed his death at the Battle of Kurukṣetra – see chapter “The Setting of the Bhagavad Gītā.”)

The existence of the “two paths” (light and dark) must seem rather arbitrary to the Western reader. Rāmānuja refers them to the *jñānin* and *kāivalyārthin* of VII 16 on the one hand, and the *aiśvaryārthin* of the same stanza on the other. But this does not explain the element of free will which allows the yogin to fix the time of his death and choose between the two paths.

सर्वी पार्थे जानन्  
*sarvī pārthe jānan*

these two paths, Son of Pṛthā,  
knowing,

युगि मुह्यति कश्चन ।  
*yugi muhyati kaścana*

the yogin he is confused at all

सर्वेषु कालेषु  
*sarveṣu kāleṣu*

therefore at all times

युग्युक्तो भवार्जुन ॥  
*yugyukto bhavārjuna*

steadfast in Yoga be, Arjuna.

knowing these two paths, Son of Pṛthā,

The yogin is not confused at all.

Therefore, at all times,

He steadfast in Yoga, Arjuna.

na, not.

*ete* (f. nom. dual), these two.

*sṛtī* (f. nom. dual), two paths, two roads, two wanderings.

*pārtha* (m. voc. sg.), Son of Pṛthā, epithet of Arjuna.

*jānan* (m. nom. sg. pr. act. participle  $\sqrt{jñā}$ ), knowing.

*yogī* (m. nom. sg.), yogin.

*muhyati* (3rd sg. pr. indic. act.  $\sqrt{muh}$ ), he is deluded, he is confused.

*kaścana*, at all, in any way.

*tasmāt* (m. abl. sg.), from this, therefore.

*sarveṣu* (m. loc. pl.), at all, in all.

*kāleṣu* (m. loc. pl.), at times, in times.

*yoga-yuktas* (m. nom. sg. TP cpd. p. pass participle  $\sqrt{yuj}$ ), steadfast, united to Yoga, disciplined, yoked.

*bhava* (3rd sg. imperative act.  $\sqrt{bhū}$ ), be!

*arjuna* (m. voc. sg.), Arjuna.

वेदेषु यज्ञेषु तपःसु चैव

*vedeṣu yajñeṣu tapaḥsu cāiva\**

in the Vedas, in sacrifices and in  
austerities,

दानेषु यत् पुण्यफलं प्रदिष्टम् ।

*dāneṣu yat puṇyaphalam pradiṣṭam*

in gifts, which pure fruit ordained

अत्येति तत् सर्वम् इदं विदित्वा

*atyeti tat sarvam idam viditvā*

he goes beyond that, all this having known

योगी परं स्थानम् उपैति चाद्यम् ॥

*yogī param sthānam upaiti cādyam*

and the yogin to the supreme state he  
goes, primal.

The yogin, having known all this, goes  
beyond

The pure fruit of action which is  
ordained in the Vedas,

In sacrifices, in austerities and in  
gifts,

And goes to the Supreme Primal  
State.

End of Book VIII

The Yoga of Imperishable Brahman

*vedeṣu* (m. loc. pl.), in the Vedas.

*yajñeṣu* (m. loc. pl.), in sacrifices.

*tapaḥsu* (m. loc. pl.), in austerities.

*ca*, and.

*eva*, indeed (used as a rhythmic filler).

*dāneṣu* (n. loc. pl.), in gifts, in charities.

*yad* (n. acc. sg.), which.

*puṇya* (n.), pure, sacred.

*phalam* (n. acc. sg.), fruit.

(*puṇya-phalam*, n. acc. sg. KD (pl. fruit.)

*pradiṣṭam* (n. acc. sg. p. pass. participle

*√diṣ*), ordained, commanded, prescribed.

*atyeti* (3rd sg. pr. indic. act. *ati* *√i*), he

beyond, he transcends.

*tad* (n. acc. sg.), this, that.

*sarvam idam* (n. acc. sg.), all this.

*viditvā* (gerund *√vid*), knowing, having

known.

*yogī* (m. nom. sg.), yogin.

*param* (n. acc. sg.), to the highest, the

preme.

*sthānam* (n. acc. sg.), state, place, station.

*upaiti* (3rd sg. act. *upa* *√i*), he goes, he

attains.

*ca*, and.

*ca*, and.

*ādyam* (n. acc. sg.), primal, ancient, original.

being at the beginning.

श्रीभगवान् उवाच ।

*śrībhagavān uvāca*

Blessed Lord spoke:

तु ते गुह्यतमम्

*tu te guhyatamam\**

but, to thee the most secret

अहं यन्मया

*aham yaṁ mayā*

I shall declare, to the not disbelieving,

विज्ञानसहितं

*viज्ञānasahitam*

knowledge and discrimination combined,

मोक्षयसे ऋभुभात् ॥

*mokṣayase 'ṛbhūbhāt*

thou shalt be released, thou shalt be

released from evil.

The Blessed Lord spoke:

this most secret thing

I shall declare to thee, who dost not

disbelieve:

knowledge and discrimination com-

combined,

which, having learned, thou shalt be

released from evil.

*śrībhagavān* (m. nom. sg.), the Blessed Lord,  
the Blessed One.

*uvāca* (3rd sg. perfect act. *√vac*), he said, he  
spoke.

*idam* (n. acc. sg.), this.

*tu*, but, indeed.

*te* (dat. sg.), to thee.

*guhyatamam* (superl.), most secret.

*pravakṣyāmi* (1st sg. future act. *pra* *√vac*), I

shall declare, I shall explain.

*anasūyave* (m. dat. sg.), to the not sneering,

to the not disbelieving.

*jñānam* (n. acc. sg.), knowledge.

*viज्ञāna* (n.), discrimination, understanding,

realization.

*sahitam* (n. acc. sg.), combined, together

with, placed together.

*yad* (n. acc. sg.), which.

*jñātvā* (gerund *√jñā*), knowing, having

known.

*mokṣayase* (2nd sg. future pass. *√muc*), thou

shalt be released, thou shalt be freed, thou

shalt be liberated.

*aśubhāt* (m. abl. sg.), from evil, from impur-

ity.

\* *Triṣṭubh* metre.



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THE  
GARUḌA-PURĀṆA

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PART II

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93-96. By taking shelter in Vāsudeva, possessing pure intellect, controlling the self with fortitude, discarding the objects of enjoyment and leaving attachment and envy, serving without expecting reward, controlling speech, body and mind, practising meditation and Yoga, taking recourse to detachment, leaving pride, force, desire, anger, thus calm and serene he attains brahma. After this, he has to do nothing, O son of Kaśyapa.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### *Doors for Departure :*

*Guruḍa said :*

1. How does a person obtain manhood and how does he attain death ? O best of deities, when he dies where does his body go ?

2. Where do the organs of sense repair ? How does the body become untouchable ? How and where does he suffer the fruits of his actions ?

3. Be pleased, for you alone can remove my ignorance. O best of deities, I am Garuḍa, son of Kaśyapa from Vinatā. Please tell me how do men go to Yamaloka or Viṣṇuloka.

*The Lord said :*

4-5. By kidnapping another man's wife and stealing the property of a brāhmaṇa, one becomes brahmarākṣasa in wilderness. The thief of jewels is born in a low caste.

6. Whatsoever one desires one is born, having the symbol of the same. The weapons do not cut his soul nor fire can burn it.

7-8. Nor water wets it nor wind dries it.<sup>1</sup> Mouth, eyes, nose, ears, anus and penis—these are the holes in all animals born of egg, etc. There are eight upper holes from navel up to the head.

9-10. If men have done good deeds, they depart from the upper holes, O bird. Whatever rites are prescribed for the deceased from the day of his death to the end of the year (of his death) shall be performed even by the poor. As for the

1. Bh. Gītā II. 23.

place of enjoyment in whatever body the jīva has entered he reaps the fruits of his actions therein, no matter whether the actions be good or bad.

11. In this way, O king of birds, a person suffers from the faults of body, mind and speech. After his death, he obtains happiness when he has suffered the results of his actions. He is released from the noose of Māyā and he is not likely to be born again to indulge in evil acts.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

### *Importance of Dharma*

*The lord said :*

1. O Garuḍa I have thus explained to you the various proclivities of life for the benefit of men and to ward off the stalemate in which the dead may find themselves.

2. There are eight million four hundred thousand species of creatures divided into four main classes. They are (1) *aṇḍajas* (born of egg), (2) *svedajas* (sweat-born like bugs, etc. (3) *udbhijjas* (born of seeds), (4) *jarāyujjas* (the viviparous.)

3-4. The *aṇḍajas* are of two million one hundred thousand varieties. Similarly, the *Svedajas*, *Udbhijjas* and the *Jarāyujjas* in the last of which are included human beings are also enumerated. It is very difficult for the lower animals to get manhood.

5. The receptacle of the set of five sense-organs can be acquired through great merits. Mankind is divided into four varṇas—Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, Śūdras and also *Antyajjas* (the lowest class).

6. The *Antyajjas* are divided into seven groups Viz, — Washermen, Cobblers, Actors, *Varuḍas*, *Kaivartas*, *Bhedas* and *Bhillas*.

7. Adding the *Mlecchas* and *Dumbas* there are thirteen groups of people. The species of lower strata of animals are thousands.

8. Taking food, indulging in sexual intercourse, sleeping, fearing and becoming angry—these are found in all living beings. Here the distinction is impossible.

9. Bodies are of ten varieties in view of the divisions such as single-footed, etc. Where the deer *Kṛṣṇasāra*<sup>1</sup> is found in plenty that region is called *Dharmadeśa* (the land of virtue)

10. O Bird, the deities *Brahmā* and others, the sages and the Pitṛs, virtue, truthfulness and learning are always present in that land of virtue.

11. Among living beings, the animals are the best; among the animals, the intelligent are the best; among the intelligent, men are the best and among men, the brahmins are the best.

12. Among the brahmins the scholars, among the scholars those who cultivate Vedic studies, among them those who act according to the injunction and among them the *Brahmavādins*<sup>2</sup> are the best.

13. One is guilty of self-deception who does not strive to gain either heaven or salvation after being born as a man whereby he could gain either.

14. A man who has hundred (silver pieces) craves for a thousand; a man who has a thousand, yearns for a lac; a person who has a lac, wishes to rule over a kingdom; a man who rules over a kingdom pines away to become an emperor.

15. An emperor wishes to become a *deva* (god) and on getting godhood he wishes to be the lord of gods. The lord of gods wishes to go still further and still his thirst for power does not recede.

16. A person afflicted by covetous thirst falls into hell. Those who are freed of undue thirst secure a residence in heaven.

17. A man depending upon his own self is sure to be happy. The qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell make one dependent on the objects of sense and hence one is sure to be unhappy.

18. The deer, the elephant, the moth, the honey bee and

1. *Kṛṣṇasāra*—a spotted antelope. The idea is found in M.S. II. 23.

2. *Brahmavādins*—those who discuss and deliberate on Vedic topics.

the fish—these five are destroyed due to addiction to their five sense-organs<sup>1</sup>.

19. In infancy one is extremely obsessed with one's parents; in youth, one is obsessed with one's wife; later in life one becomes obsessed with one's sons and grandsons. Never is one obsessed with the *Ātman*.

20. It is easy for one bound with iron fetters to wooden pegs to get oneself released. But one bound with the nooses of children and wives is never released.

21. It is impossible to escape death whether one is a fool or a scholar, a child or an old man, young (or old and infirm), extremely happy or excessively dejected. He comes and goes. (He dies and is born again.)

22. Man is born alone; man dies alone; he enjoys his merits by himself; he reaps the bitter fruits of his sins by himself.

23-25. Even as every one is watching, one leaves off everything and dies. Casting off the dead body along with logs of wood or clods of earth the kinsmen turn away (from the cremation or burial ground) but the dead man's virtue or evil definitely follows him. His riches recede from him in the house itself and his kinsmen turn away at the cremation grounds with friends.

26-27. The fire consumes the body but the merit and demerit accompany him. The body is burnt by fire but the actions perpetrated by him keep his company.

28-33. Auspicious or otherwise, a man has to experience the fruits of his action. If before sunset wealth is not distributed among the suppliants, I do not know to whom it will go in the morning that follows. If some wealth is not handed over to

1. The following table will elucidate the point very clearly.

Victim	Sense-Organ	Object
Deer	Ear	Listens to sweet music and gets caught by the hunter.
Elephant	Sense of touch	It is caught through she-elephants.
Moth	Eyes	It is attracted by the colour of the flame and is burnt.
Honey bee	Nose	Attracted by the fragrance of lotus it gets caught within.
Fish	Sense of taste	It nibbles at the bait and gets caught.

Even one of the sense-organs is destructive. How is it possible that man who uses all the five will escape destruction?



brahmins and friends or spent in holy rites or pilgrimages, the wealth begins to cry 'who shall be my lord?' Whether plentiful or scanty whatever wealth one has, is due to one's previous merits. Realizing this, one has to spend it away in virtuous rites. It is by wealth that virtue is sustained if the mind is sanctified by faith. A sacred rite devoid of faith is neither fruitful here nor there. It does not flourish. Virtue is the cause of wealth, love and salvation. Hence, one shall be virtuous. It is by faith that virtue is sustained and not by heaps of riches. Indigent sages endowed with faith have attained heaven. *Homas*, gifts, penances and actions without faith are base, O bird, and they are not found fruitful, here or in the life after death.

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

### Obsequial Rites

*Garuda said :*

1. O Lord of gods, please tell me by means of what rite can one prevent a stalemate after death. (What are the rites that men should do in the world to forestall the state of being a ghost for ever ? )

*The lord said :*

2. Please listen, I shall explain briefly the obsequious rites. If one desires to attain salvation, one has to perform them oneself.

3-4. Even in regard to women, and children above the age of five, this is specially insisted on. The rites of *Vṛṣotsarga* (gifting away a bull calf) are for forestalling the continuance of ghosthood. There is no other rite in the world except *Vṛṣotsarga* (for that purpose). While during his life or after death if *Vṛṣotsarga* is performed he will never continue for long as a ghost. There is no necessity for other gifts or sacrifices.

*Garuda said :*

5-6. If *Vṛṣotsarga* is to be performed during life or after death, at what time has it to be performed, O foremost among gods, *Madhusūdana*, please tell me. If the sixteen types of *Śrāddha* are performed what are their effects on the dead man ?

*The lord said :*

7. If *Piṇḍas* are offered without performing *Vṛṣotsarga* no benefit accrues. Every thing given unto the dead is fruitless.

8. If *Vṛṣotsarga* is not carried out on the eleventh day after death, the ghosthood of the dead becomes eternal even if hundreds of *Śrāddhas* are performed in his favour.

*Garuda said :*

9-10. If a person dies of snake-bite, no funeral rite, such as cremation takes place. Similarly, if he dies by drowning or being struck by a horned animal or through weapons or an accident for how many days do the relatives remain impure ? O lord, please remove my doubts on this point.

*The lord said :*

11. If he is a Brahmin, impurity lasts for six months; if a Kṣatriya, two months and a half; if a Vaiśya, one month and a half, and if a Śūdra it lasts for a month.

12. If a person has gifted some precious articles of different sorts to a worthy receiver and has lived a celibate life when alive, he does not go to a wretched state (even if he dies an unnatural death).

13. If a person has performed the rite of *Vṛṣotsarga* and has lived a celibate life, he goes to Brahmaloka, even if he dies an unnatural death.

14. If a person has lived an unrighteous life devoid of good conduct, but has performed *Vṛṣotsarga*, he does not go to the world of Yama after death.

15. When a person dies, his son, brother, grandson, relative, caste-man or the successor should perform *Vṛṣotsarga*.

16. If there be no son, the wife can perform *Vṛṣotsarga*; if no wife, the daughter's son or the daughter herself can do the same. But, in case, he has sons, none else should perform *Vṛṣotsarga*.

womanhood—the cause of multiple sorrows, from unholy activities of my former life.

95. O bird, you think attentively on what I have said about the lamentations of men and women for their acts of omission and commission done in their previous life.

## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

### *Life after Death*

*The lord said :*

1-2. O lord of birds, when the departed soul laments thus, he cries being struck by Yama's servants who drag him for seventeen days in the firmament. On the eighteenth day he reaches the city of Yama.

3. In that beautiful city there abides a group of departed souls. The river *Puṣpabhadra* flows there and a big fig tree grows up there.

4-6. There in that city, the servants of Yama bid him take rest. In utter distress he remembers pleasures he enjoyed in the company of his wife and sons. Thirsty and distressed he weeps bitterly and laments over the erstwhile comforts of his wealth, wife, house, sons, servants, friends and comforts of life. He is extremely distressed with hunger. As he laments the servants of Yama speak to him.

*The servants of Yama said :*

7. Where is your wealth ? Where are your sons ? Where is your wife ? Where are you in this wretched state ? Now suffer for your past evil actions and go by this ancient path.

8. O traveller in this foreign world, do you not know the power of Yama who is the lord of us all—his messengers. Assuredly, you have to travel over that path where there is no provision for barter in virtue or vice.

9. O bird, hear attentively what the messengers of Yama speak to the departed soul. They strike him with the rod of iron.

10. Here, on the earth, whatever is given by his sons every month, rice-ball, etc., due to affection or kindness, he eats the same and then he goes to Sauripura.

11. King Jaṅgama rules in that city who can assume any shape at will. He is frightened by his looks. He feels the urge of taking rest.

12-13. Whatever is offered to him in the three fortnights together with the oblations of water he eats and drinks. He passes over that city and reaches the beautiful town Nagendra by name. He has to travel day and night for two months for reaching that city. He passes over dreadful forests in the way and cries aloud.

14-15. He is beaten by the cruel and merciless messengers of Yama and weeps over and over again. Having eaten the rice-balls and drunk the libation of water offered by the relatives in the second month, he moves further. He is tied with the noose and dragged by the messengers of Yama.

16. He reaches Gandharva nagara (or Gandha-mādana) in the third month. Here, he eats the quarterly rice-ball offered by the relations. Then he moves further.

17. He reaches the city Śailāgama in the fourth month. The stones rain upon him continuously, O lord.

18. There he eats the fourth monthly oblation and feels satisfied.

19. In the fifth month, he goes to Krūrapura. There he eats the rice ball offered by his relatives. In the sixth month he reaches the Krauñcapura.

20. There he feeds upon the rice-ball offered by his relatives in the sixth month. He takes rest for a while but all the time he remains frightened and distressed.

21. He passes over that town being struck and dragged by the messengers of Yama. He reaches Citranagara where rules King Vicitra.

22-23. He is the younger brother of Yama. There he eats the sixth monthly rice-ball but is not satiated fully. Then he moves further; he suffers again and again for want of food.

24. "Do my sons, brothers, parents or relatives exist who may take me out of the ocean of distress wherein I have fallen."

25-28. He laments in the way and is warned by the messengers of Yama. He then, reaches the Vaitaraṇī<sup>1</sup> that flows over hundred Yojanas. It is full of pus and blood, abounds in fish and vultures. Here the fishermen approach him saying, "O traveller, give us liberal fee; we shall row you across the river."

If he has gifted the Vaitaraṇī cow he is rowed across the river. The gift of a cow at the time of death is called Vaitaraṇī which gives relief to the departed soul.

29. The gift of Vaitaraṇī cow destroys his sins and takes him to the region of Viṣṇu. O best of birds, if the Vaitaraṇī cow is not gifted, the departed soul is drowned in that stream.

30. When a person is in good health he should gift a cow to a learned person.

31-32. While drowning he reproaches himself : 'I gave no food to a brahmin traveller nor poured oblations in the fire nor performed *Japa* nor undertook bath nor prayed to the gods. Now, let me suffer for the acts I did in my life.

33. The messengers of Yama strike him again. He repeats those words but in silence this time.

34. He eats the sixth monthly offering made by the relatives and proceeds further. O Garuḍa, the gift of food to the pious brahmins gives relief to the donor in distress.

35. O bird, the departed soul covers two hundred and forty seven Yojanas every day. Thereafter he is completely exhausted.

36. In the seventh month he reaches the city Bahvāpada. He eats the rice-ball offered by his relatives.

37. In the eighth month he reaches Nānākrandapura. There he sees people crying bitterly aloud.

38. Himself in utter distress, he cries in pain. He eats the eighth-monthly rice-ball and feels comfortable.

39. He, then, leaves for Taptapura. Having reached Taptapura in the ninth month he eats the rice-ball and the *Śrāddha* which his son or relatives have gifted in his favour.

40. In the tenth month he reaches Raudrapura. He eats whatever his son or relatives give in his favour.

1. *Vaitaraṇī* : Name of a river in hell.

41. After eating the tenth monthly rice-ball in Raudrapura he goes to Payovarṣaṇa where the clouds rain heavily and cause distress to the departed.

42. Then suffering from heat and thirst he partakes of the eleventh-monthly meal gifted by his relatives.

43. A little before a year has passed or at the end of eleven and a half month he reaches a Śītapura—city of extreme cold and distress.

44. Tormented by cold and hunger he looks in all directions and specks : "I wish I had a relative who would have removed my distress."

45. The attendants of Yama speak to him thus : "Where is thy holy merit that it may give relief to thee." On hearing their words he cries : 'O my fate.'

46. Fate is nothing but a result of accumulated merit or sin. 'I did no good acts, hence this trouble'—pondering over the matter thus, he takes up courage for the time being.

47. At the distance of forty four Yojanas from Śītapura, there is a beautiful city of Dharmarāja (Yama) where live the celestial musicians and the heavenly nymphs.

48. There live eightyfour lacs of people in human and divine forms. The guards are put at the thirteen gates of the city.

49-52. There abide honourable and respectable Śravaṇas, the sons of Brahmā who know and report to Citragupta whatever good or bad actions are performed by the mortals.

The Śravaṇas are eight in number. They move about in heaven, hell and on earth. They can see and hear from afar. Their women are known as Śravaṇīs who are identifiable by their individual names. They are the presiding deities of mortals and have full knowledge of their activities.

53. A mortal should worship them with vows, gifts and prayers. They become cordial to him and cause death in an easy manner.



25-26. With Śravaṇas pleased, the pious people go to Viṣṇuloka. O best of birds, whosoever hears about the glory of Śravaṇas, their origin and pious activities is not covered up by sins. He enjoys pleasures of this world and attains glory hereafter.

## CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

### *Life after Death*

*The lord said :*

1-2. On hearing the words of Śravaṇas and thinking about the problem for a while, Citragupta informs about all those actions pious or impious performed by the people. He repeats them also to the person concerned.

3. Whatever action a person undertakes, by word of mouth, body or mind, whether good or bad, he reaps the fruits thereof.

4. O lord, thus I have told you about the path which the departed soul has to traverse. I have also told you about the places of rest for the departed soul.

5. If food is gifted in his favour he travels in comfort on the High Way. To illuminate the path, an earthen lamp should be kindled, put in the appropriate place and kept burning by day and night.

6. The path, though dark, dreadful, dog-infested and void of resting-place, becomes luminous and pleasant for those who have gifted an earthen lamp.

7. If an earthen jar is gifted on the fourteenth day or the month of Kārttika, it gives comfort to the deceased. Now, I shall tell you in brief about the path of Yama for the departed soul.

8. He goes to the world of manes as a result of the merit accruing from the performance of Vṛṣotsarga. By the rice-ball offered on the eleventh, he attains physical purity.

9. The servants of Yama are satiated by the gift of water-jar.

10. By gifting bed the deceased goes to heaven by the aerial car. The gift of bed can be made on any day or on the twelfth day from death.

11. On the 13th day he should give precious articles of different varieties in favour of the deceased or the person himself, when alive, should gift these articles for himself.

12-13. O Garuḍa, by the merit accruing from these gifts he goes comfortably on that path. O lord of birds, there prevails a uniform law for all : the higher, lower and the middling classes. O bird, you should know that a person reaps the fruits, sour or sweet, in proportion to the nature and extent of actions done by him.

14. Whatever gifts he or his relatives make in his favour stand in good stead while he is on journey to the world of Yama.

*Garuḍa said :*

15. O lord, why should they give *padas* and of what nature. Who shall receive the gifts ? O god of gods, let me know the facts.

*The lord said :*

16. An umbrella, shoes, clothes, a ring, a water-jar, a chair or stool and a vessel—these seven are called *padas*.

17. There is a terrible heat in the way which scorches the departed soul. By the gift of umbrella, the deceased receives shelter of shade and feels comfortable.

18. By the gift of shoes the deceased passes over the sword-edged forest, mounted on the horse.

19. By the gift of a seat (*āsana*) to a Brahmin, the deceased obtains tasty meals in the interval of time while he walks over the path at his leisure.

20. By the gift of a water-jar, he gets enough water on the way which is full of heat, devoid of air and water.

21. A person, gifting a water-jar made of copper, receives, assuredly, the merit of constructing a thousand wells.

22. The messengers of Yama are dreadful to look at, dark and yellow is appearance. They are courteous too, if propitiated by the gift of clothes and ornaments. When satisfied they do not torment the deceased.

23. They wield terrible weapons, run here and there. By the gift of a ring they vanish from the presence of the deceased.

24. The *pada* is completed by the gift of a vessel, a seat, raw food, clarified butter and a sacred thread.

25. Tired and thirsty, the traveller feels comfortable if he has gifted the buffalo's milk in his life-time.

*Garuḍa said :*

26. O lord, things are gifted by the relatives at home in favour of the deceased. How do they reach the deceased and who receives them ?

*The lord said :*

27. God Varuṇa receives those gifts and hands them over to me. I give them to god Bhāskara (the sun), from Bhāskara the deceased person obtains them.

28. As a result of sinful activities when no descendant is left on the earth, the deceased person goes to hell until his sin is exhausted.

29-33. After his term has expired, the pious soul is allowed by Yama, the lord of eightyfour lacs of hells, to have a look at hells and hear the cries of pretas (the departed souls). In the midst of hells, there are 21 notorious hells, viz. Tāmisra, Lohaśaṅku, Mahāraurava, Śālmali, Raurava, Kudvala, Kālasūt-raka, Pūtimṛttikā, Saugatā, Lohatoda, Saviṣa, Pretāpana, Mahā-naraka, Kālola, Sajivana, Mahāpatha, Avīci, Andhatāmisra, Kumbhīpāka, Asipatravana and Patana.

34. Those who have passed several years in the dreadful hell and have no descendants (to offer gifts) in their favour become messengers of Yama.

35. Yama sends them on errand and they share with the dead the food and drink which their relatives offer them from time to time.

36-37. Being extremely hungry they seize the dead man's gifts on the way and eat them. A rice-ball gifted as food to the dead at the end of a month satiates them for a year.

38. By such deeds of merit, gradually he reaches Sauripura. Then by the end of a year, he reaches the vicinity of dreadful Yamaloka.

39. Here, he gives up his dreadful body, of the measure of arm, which he derived within ten days from the ten piṇḍas gifted to him by his descendants. His spirits droop at the sight of Yama as the spirit of Paraśurāma at the sight of Rāma (Dāśarathi).

40. He gives up his previous body for the one derived from his actions. He receives an airy body of the size of a thumb and reaches the sword-edged hell.

41. Here, he walks on single foot bound helplessly by his actions as a caterpillar by reeds.

42. Just as a person casts off his old dress and puts on a new one, so the soul gives up his old body and assumes a new one.<sup>1</sup>

## CHAPTER NINETEEN

### *Life after Death*

*The lord said :*

1. Assuming an airy form derived from his previous actions and suffering from hunger he moves along with Yama.

2. There is a town of Citragupta covering twenty yojanas. There the embodied beings observe their virtue and sin all around.

3. If he had made substantial gifts in his life-time he derives pleasure therefrom. From here Vaivasvata town of Yama is situated at the distance of twentyfour Yojanas.

4. The residents of Vaivasvatapura are satiated by the gifts of iron, salt, cotton and a vessel of gingelly seeds, offered by the relatives of the deceased.

1. A popular theme occurring in the *Bhagavad gītā*, II. 22.

5. The dead repair to Vaivasvata town and inform Dharmadhvaja, the keeper at Yama's gate (about the gifts). Dharmadhvaja is always present at the gate of Yama.

6. Dharmadhvaja is pleased with the gift of seven grains. Propitiated by that, he tells the dead about their virtues and sins.

7. Holy and pious people see Dharmarāja as a god of noble countenance, while the sinful and the wicked see him as a god of dreadful and terrible aspect.

8. The deceased person is terribly afraid at his sight and laments bitterly. Those who have offered gifts in their life-time should entertain no fear.

9. Yama moves from his seat as soon as he sees a holy man. He thinks that he will supersede him in status and reach Brahmaloḥa.

10. Virtue can easily be procured by offering gifts. The path to Yama's region can easily be traversed by acts of Charity. This High Way cannot be easily covered otherwise. O dear, none can reach the city of Yama without doing charitable acts.

11. That dreadful path is full of terror-striking servants of Yama. Each of the cities is guarded by a thousand of these servants.

12. The messengers of Yama torture the sinner in (hot) waters and take off his skin till he becomes a skeleton.

13. The deceased for whom no obsequial rites have been made traverse the path with great difficulty. They are led like animals bound with ropes.

14-15. The person may become a god, a mare, a man of low species, or as Yama ordains he may attain salvation or be born as a human being as a son to his father.

16. He obtains birth according to his activities. He passes through a series of births in this world.

17. Knowing that even the highest happiness is non eternal, he should perform acts of righteousness when he has received a human body.

18. Human body is either reduced to worms, ashes, or feces. Though he carries a lantern in hand, he may fall in a dreadful hell full of darkness.

19. He can acquire human body as a result of his pious

acts. He who performs holy deeds in human body acquires supreme position.

20. If he neglects Dharma, he comes to grief.

21. The soul obtains human body after passing through series of births. O bird, in human body too, his birth as a Brāhmaṇa is a rare event. He who observes vows natural to his caste becomes immortal after death by the blessing of God.

## CHAPTER TWENTY

### *Functions of the Departed Soul*

*Garuḍa said :*

1. Having obtained a new body where does a preta shelter ? Released from pretahood, where does he go to live in?

2-3. Passing through torments in hells which number eighty four lacs and guarded by Yama and his thousand attendants how do the pretas get release and how do they roam about in this mortal world ?

*The lord said :*

4. O king of birds, hear. I shall tell you about the region where the pretas live. Men attain pretahood by stealing other man's riches, by indulging in sexual intercourse with other man's wife or by doing acts of treachery.

5. Having incurred sins, they seek for redemption in their progeny. Being bodiless as well as suffering from hunger and thirst they roam about here and there.

6. Even the captives released from prison are frightened at their sight. They seek for means to kill their kith and kin.

7. They bolt doors on their ancestors, put obstacles in the way of manes. Like thieves, they snatch the mane's food in the way before it reaches them.

8. They return home, stay on the roof and watch the activities of their kins. They cause disease and grief to their relatives.



9-11. Having assumed the form of tertian and such-like fevers they cause diseases due to cold or wind like head-ache or cholera. They stay at the place of leavings or refuse, in the company of other ghosts and partake of food and drink left over by their relatives.

12. In this way, the sinning pretas move about freely.

*Garuḍa said :*

13-14. How do the pretas behave and in what form ? How is it possible to know their attitude, since the pretas do not speak to us ? If you are pleased to do me a favour, you clear off my doubts. O lord, I hear that in the Kali Age many people become ghosts.

*Garuḍa said :*

15. The ghost torments his family people through the enemy. While he was in human body he was affectionate to his people, now that he is dead he becomes hostile to them.

16. He who is devoted to Rudra, follows the path of righteousness, propitiates gods, satiates guests, speaks truth and pleasant words, is not tormented by the pretas.

17. He who does not observe rites, has no faith in the sanctity of the Vedas, hates righteous acts and indulges in falsehood, is tormented by the pretas. By doing unrighteous acts, O Garuḍa, he becomes a preta in this Kali age.

18. From the beginning of Śatya yuga to the end of Dvāpara, nobody became a preta and nobody suffered from preta.

19-20. It is observed that of the many children born of one and the same mother, one is happy, one is addicted to bad habits, one is blessed with progeny, one is tormented by pretas, one abounds in wealth, one gets sons who die young, one is burdened with the offspring of daughters; one is at daggers-drawn with his relatives. This all is due to the bad intentions of the preta, O Garuḍa.

21. A woman becomes barren in life or if she gives birth to children they die at an early age. There is a loss of wealth and cattle. These sufferings are caused by preta.

22. If there is a sudden change in his nature or an enmity with his relatives or an unexpected calamity, the suffering is due to preta.

23. If a person loses faith in religion or if he loses the means of his livelihood or if he feels greedy in excess or if there is a regular quarrel at home, that suffering is due to preta.

24-25. If he slays his parents or reproaches gods and Brahmins and is found guilty of murder that suffering is due to preta.

26. When crops do not grow up, though the rains are abundant; when the expenditure goes up and income is reduced; when quarrels rise in gravity, that suffering is due to preta.

27. When, on travel to a foreign land, he is distressed by the onrush of wind, O lord of birds, that suffering is due to preta.

28. When he associates with the people of low caste or when he performs disreputable acts or when he is interested in acts of unrighteousness, that suffering is due to preta.

29. When the hoarded wealth is destroyed by misfortune or when the work in operation bears no fruit or when there is loss of wealth due to undue taxation or due to fire or theft, that suffering is due to preta.

30. When an incurable disease sets in, or when children suffer from pain or when wife suffers immensely, that suffering is due to preta.

31. When one loses faith in the Vedas, Smṛtis, Purāṇas, and Dharmaśāstras, that suffering is due to preta.

32. When one abuses gods, gurus and Brahmins in their presence or absence, that aberration of nature is due to preta.

33. This is due to preta and to no other course when a person suffers from loss of livelihood or break in social position or break in the continuity of lineage.

34. When women suffer from abortion or do not conceive or when children die at an early age that suffering is due to preta.

35. When he does not perform the annual śrāddha in sincerity and has no inclination either—that suffering is due to preta.

36. When on pilgrimage he indulges in sexual intercourse or neglects his duties or when he fails to prosper though

he has done acts of piety—that suffering is due to preta.

37. When both husband and wife quarrel at meals, when there is a strong inclination to harm others that suffering is due to preta.

38. When trade does not prosper though he has gone abroad where he lives in separation from wife, that suffering is due to preta.

39. When he lives in foreign lands or when he loses position at home, that suffering is due to preta.

40. When he is inimical to his people, regards his son as his enemy, when he has no interest in home and feels uncomfortable there, that suffering is due to preta.

41. When he refuses to obey his parents and has no love for his wife, is of cruel nature, is lost in his own affairs, that suffering is due to preta.

42. If the funeral rites are not performed in the prescribed way, the soul of the deceased (in rebirth) deviates from the righteous path and falls in the company of the wicked. Then Vṛṣotsarga is the only rite to redeem him.

43. O Garuḍa, a person becomes a ghost and undergoes sufferings if he dies an accidental death or if his body is not cremated properly.

44. O best of birds, when the descendent knows all this, he should conduct those rites which may release the deceased from ghosthood. If he does not perform rites for the ghost he himself turns a ghost after death.

45. The person whose house is haunted by a ghost does not feel happy or comfortable. He loses faith, pleasure, devotion, discrimination as well as wealth.

46. His lineage breaks either at the third or at the fifth generation. In each and every birth he lives a wretched, poor and sinful life.

47. There are people who have fierce, dreadful, disfigured and ghostly appearance, who have no regard or honour for their caste, progeny, parents, or womanfolk, who put on fashions, go an unpleasant way and talk loosely. Alas, it is painful to see them suffer, under the force of fate, from the recollection of their past sinful deeds.



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24. Whosoever performs the death anniversary of the dead in the above way, liberates him even if the day of death remains unknown to him.

*The lord said :*

25. In the daily śrāddha the brahmins shall be worshipped, according to one's capacity, with scents and other things and the manes should be invoked and worshipped.

26-27. *Āvāhana*, *Svadhākāra*, *Piṇḍa*, *Agnikaraṇa* need not be performed. The performer shall observe celibacy during the period. He should worship the Viśvedevas, offer the cooked food to the brahmins along with the fee. He should pay homage to them as they take leave of him.

28. With the Viśvedevas in view, the brahmins are fed sumptuously. This rite of feeding the brahmins is called Nitya śrāddha or Deva śrāddha.

29. The Śrāddha for the mother is performed first. That for the father on the anniversary day. That for the grandfather on the father's and mother's side on the next day.

30. If he is unable to perform the same on separate days he should perform all the śrāddhas on the same day. The rite of Vaiśvadeva should also be performed similarly.

31. In that case, the offering is made first to the father, then to the mother and then to the maternal grandfather.

32. In the śrāddha to the mother, if brahmins are not available, eight noble and chaste ladies whose husbands and sons are alive should be fed.

33. When performing *iṣṭāpūrta*, the procedure is the same. When calamities set in, to ward them off, he should perform a śrāddha in the manner of daily śrāddha.

34. The person performing nitya, daiva and vṛddha śrāddhas as well as the kāmya and naimittika rites in the manner as mentioned before achieves the desired result.

Thus, I have told you all, O Garuḍa. What else do you want to know ?

## CHAPTER FORTYSIX

### *Results of activity*

*Garuḍa said :*

1. The different kinds of heavenly enjoyments, worldly pleasures, strength, nourishment and valour men acquire by the power of merit.

2. All these happen to meritorious persons here or there, it is true, definitely true. The lord's statement cannot be otherwise.

3. Virtue triumphs, not evil. Truth triumphs not falsehood. Forgiveness wins, not anger. Viṣṇu conquers not the asuras.

4. I have understood this truth that everything auspicious results from merit. When our merit is at the peak we are devoted to lord Kṛṣṇa.

5-6. There is still a query. What is that action by which one takes sinful births? How does one become a victim of hell? O lord of deities, please tell me briefly what I desire to know; how and what are the forms taken by him?

*Lord Kṛṣṇa said :*

7. O Tārkhya, men indulge in activities which result in meritorious or inauspicious fruits. O Kāśyapa, now listen how men derive traits from their particular activities.

8. The preceptor guides the seeker, the king chastens the wicked, Yama regulates and rectifies the person of secret sins.

9-10. When the expiatory and deterrent tortures in hell cease, the living beings are born again in human form with the characteristic traits of their sins. O foremost among birds, I shall tell you what these signs are.

11. Having suffered and crossed tortures in hell they return to the world of mortals marked with the characteristic signs.

12. If a person has been guilty of falsehood in speech, he becomes a stammerer, a teller of lies or dumb. The brahmin slayer is born consumptive or leprosy; the wine-addict becomes black-toothed.

13. The thief of gold becomes bad-nailed; the defiler of the preceptor's bed becomes ugly-skinned; he who associates with sinners is born in a low family.

14. He who takes meals at another's house without prior invitation is born a crow. A brahmin who performs a sacrifice for low castes is born a village-pig. He who performs many such sacrifices is born an ass.

15. He who eats unscrupulously becomes a tiger in wilderness. He who scolds others without a cause becomes a cat; he who burns dry wood is born a glow-worm.

16. He who imparts knowledge to the undeserving<sup>1</sup> becomes a bull. He who offers stale food to a brahmin becomes a hunch-back. He who is malicious to others is born blind. He who steals a book is born similarly.

17. He who habitually steals fruits is born a monkey or alternatively suffers from goitre.

18-19. He who takes food offered unwillingly becomes impotent. He who is averse to thinking on self is born a stupid trader. He who is ignorant of the truth of virtue falls in a deep ocean. He who steals gold is born an alligator. He who poisons others becomes a snake.

20-21. O bird, he who has sexual intercourse with an ascetic lady assumes a ghostly form. He who steals water becomes a Cātaka.<sup>2</sup> He who steals grams becomes a mouse. He who rapes an immature girl becomes a serpent. He who covets his preceptor's wife becomes a chameleon. He who interferes with the flow of water becomes a fish.

22. He who sells the forbidden articles becomes deformed in the eye. He who censures others is born of defiled womb. He who deceives a woman becomes an owl.

1. Imparts knowledge to the unworthy—

Compare a śruti text quoted by Yāska in his Niruktam—a treatise on etymology :

Vidyā ha vai brāhmaṇam ājagāma

Gopāya mām śevadhiṣṭe'ham asmi /

Asūyakāyānrjave' yatāya

Na mā brūyā viryavati yathā syām //

2. Cātaka—a bird which is supposed to live only on rain drops.

23-24. He who takes food on the fast day after a relative's death becomes a dog. He who does not pay the promised sum to a brahmin becomes a jackal. He who kills a serpent becomes a boar. He who slanders brahmins becomes a tortoise. He who subsists on the worship of idols becomes a Cāṇḍāla.<sup>1</sup>

25. The seller of forbidden fruits becomes indigent. He who keeps a Śūdra woman as concubine becomes a bull. He who kicks the sacred fire becomes a cat. He who eats another's meat becomes a patient.

26. He who indulges in sex at the prohibited time becomes a eunuch. A stealer of scents becomes a foul-smeller. A stealer of other goods becomes a swallow.

27. O lord of birds, these and other signs brought about by their actions are seen in men and others.

28. Persons who commit such sins fall into hell and are re-born in different species of animals.

29. After passing through these births men and women are re-born in human form when their merit and demerit are equalized.

30. When men and women unite in sexual act and both the semen and the blood are mixed, the child born will be nourished with all the elements in proper proportion.

31-32. The receptivity, the inducement, misery, desire, death, effort, feature, complexion, love, hatred, birth, death—these are attributed to the beginningless soul that seeks for its beginning (by entering the womb).

33-34. Bound by its own action the soul takes up body after body and undergoes series of births. This is what I have told you already. This is how the circle whirls in the four species of being. Thus, O Garuḍa, do the birth and

1. The statement would seem absurd but priesthood and idol-worship have often been the target of criticism from very early time. They have become the object of derision even in modern age, at the hands of social reformists among the Arya-samāja—a sect which is very popular in northern India now-a-days.

Compare an oft-quoted verse from the *Pañcatantra* :

Narakāya matis to cet paurohityaṁ samācara /

Varṣaṁ yāvat kimanyena mathacintā-dina-trayam //



death of living beings rotate. The rise in the course is due to virtue and the fall is due to evil.

35. O bird, all these take place in all castes according to their previous actions. In deityhood or manhood the acts of benevolence and indulgence recur due to their previous *karman*.

36-37. O son of Vinatā, whatever is observed is the fruit of action. If a person indulges habitually in evil actions due to passion, it is certain that he will fall into a terrible hell from which there is no escape.

## CHAPTER FORTY-SEVEN

### *On Sins and Vaitaraṇi*

*Garuḍa said :*

1. O lord of gods, please tell me the mode of gifts, their glory and greatness and the magnitude of Vaitaraṇi.<sup>1</sup>

*The lord said:*

2. Listen to the magnitude of the dreadful Vaitaraṇi, the mighty river at the threshold of Yama's city.

3. That river is hundred yojanas wide. It is impassable and foul-smelling. To the sinner it is terrifying even at the very first sight.

4. It is full of putrid blood with sediments and marshy deposits of flesh. On seeing a sinner it assumes the form of melted ghī in a vessel. It abounds in worms and flesh brought by vultures.

1. *Vaitaraṇi*—a river in the way to hell, full of pus, blood, flesh and abounding in worms, etc. which the dead have to cross before they reach the city of Yama. If a person has donated the Vaitaraṇi cow at the time of his death, the river assumes a pleasant sight for him to cross over but if he has not, it flows with pus, etc. making it very unpleasant for him to wade through.

5. It is full of crocodiles, fishes with adamantite blade-like tails. It abounds in aquatic creatures capable of piercing through the flesh.

6. There blaze as many as twelve suns as it were the time of Deluge. The sinful people groan aloud and fall into it.

7. "Alas brother, alas son, alas mother", they shout frequently. They try to swim about but sink in it.

8. It is incumbent on all mortals to witness the mighty river. Persons who had made gifts in their life-time can cross it easily, otherwise they sink into it.

9. Those who have slighted their mothers, preceptors or priests can stay there permanently.

10. So also those who forsake their chaste, virtuous and noble wives without any fault.

11. Those who deceive their credulous masters, friends and sages, women, children, cripples and others get submerged in the putrid slough and groan there painfully.<sup>1</sup>

12. One who attacks a hungry brahmin or reproaches him is eaten up by worms so long as this world lasts.

13-15. One who promises a brahmin to give him a sum but does not give, one who defiles a sacrifice, one who rapes a noble woman, one who slanders others, one who interrupts religious discourses, one who is guilty of perjury, one who is a wine-addict or one who invites brahmins but refuses to feed them—these stay there permanently.

16-18. One who acts as an incendiary, one who poisons others, one who seizes what is given, one who destroys fields and breaks bunds, one who defiles other men's wives or being a brahmin sells wine or marries a slave girl, one who harasses cattle oppressed by thirst, one who outrages the modesty of a virgin, one who terrorises persons worthy of receiving gifts, a śūdra drinking the milk of a brown cow, a brahmin eating meat—these stay there permanently.

19-20. A miser, an atheist, a worthless wretch, a person extremely furious and irritated, a person who considers his own

1. Contrast with note 1, p. 931, where priesthood and idol-worship are held in derision.

# The Art of Dying

*A Journey to Elsewhere*


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## Chapter 4

# Deathbed Coincidences



Ermutigung im Glauben:  
Encouragement in the belief

*I don't know what these things are – fantasies, dreams, wishes, delusions . . . I don't like them, they make my sense of reality wobble. (An interviewee)*

Reported encounters with the dead still hold the same fascination for most people as they did when Gurney, Myers and Podmore published their survey over a century ago. And it seems that it is still remarkably common for a person to have a sudden realization that someone they are close to has died, and to discover later that this did indeed happen at the time they felt this strong intimation of the death. Often the people involved are living far apart, and the one who has the experience does not even know that the other is ill. In its most dramatic form they may see a vision of the dying person, usually either in a dream or on a sudden awakening from sleep, which seems to convey the



message that they have come to say goodbye and to give reassurance that all is well with them.

It is less common for these contacts with the dying to take place when the person is fully awake – in our own sample about two-thirds took place in dreams or on sudden awakenings, or in that drowsy state between sleeping and waking when it is hard to be quite certain whether you are in fact awake or asleep. In full wakefulness visions are seldom seen. More often a strong sense of presence of the person is felt, but they are not actually seen. Sometimes the waking person contacted is overwhelmed by a sudden realization that someone they love is ill or dying, or they may experience an uncharacteristic and inexplicable burst of grief or an intense feeling of unease, which they only later discover occurred at the time of the person's death.

### Feelings of unease

Sarah Murray, a close friend of our daughter's, told us how she had been living in Florence for several months when one day, on her way back to her *pension* from an art class, she had a sudden, overwhelming feeling that something was wrong with her father – who, as far as she knew, was perfectly well and healthy at home in the USA. She had never experienced anything like this before, and the feeling was so powerful that she began to run, feeling that she must ring home immediately and find out if anything was wrong. When she reached the *pension* a phone message was waiting for her, telling her that her father had fallen down the cellar steps and broken his neck.

These experiences are usually brief, and while some, like Sarah's, give rise to a sudden strong conviction that someone they love is very ill or has died, other people simply have a feeling of uneasiness for no apparent reason. Katherine Knight was working in France at the time of her father's death in April 1986:

*I had finished my work and was relaxing with work colleagues. I remember that I was in good humour and was laughing and joking. Out of the blue, I felt a shiver run down my spine and I momentarily became apprehensive. I remember that my first*

*thought was about the money that I had in my room and hoping that it was safe. This feeling of apprehension was very out of character to how I had been previously feeling. I don't think it lasted for too long, but I can't be certain. I also can't remember the exact time, but it must have been mid to late afternoon.*

*I found out later that my father had died of a heart attack on a golf course in England. This took place about the same time as the shivering feeling occurred. Afterwards, when reminiscing about my father with family and friends, I used to joke that he was telling me to look after my money.*

Kathie Guthrie's story is similar:

*Sadly my brother was killed in a car crash some 20 years ago now. I had been at work intending to work till 5 o'clock. At 4.20 p.m. I was uneasy and began getting cross with myself, I just packed up and went home despite really needing to stay at work for one reason or another. I found out at 2.30 a.m. the next morning that my brother had been killed instantly by a drunk driver at 4.20 p.m.*

These two accounts demonstrate how non-specific this feeling can often be. In the first case Katherine attributed her transient feeling of apprehension to her anxiety about the money in her room, and only in the light of subsequent events was another interpretation made. In the second case Kathie probably would not have given a second thought to her feeling of uneasiness had she not discovered the exact moment of her brother's death. It is ambiguous experiences like these two which reinforce the view that they can be dismissed as simply coincidences. And yet the feelings in each case were inexplicable and out of character, and the timing was approximately correct – indeed uncannily accurate in the second case.

However, in many of these accounts both the accuracy of the timing and the strength of the emotional response make it much harder to attribute them to 'just coincidence'. Here Wynn Bainbridge describes the day that her cousin died. Wynn was very close to her cousin, who had been suffering from cancer for about 13 months.

*On 1 January 2002 at about 12.45 p.m. I was working on my computer when I started to feel really ill. I could not put my finger on what was wrong – I had no pain or sickness, just an awful feeling that everything was draining away from me: not like fainting, just a terrible weakness. This feeling lasted for about 20 minutes. Later in the day my cousin's son phoned me to let me know that she had died. While she had decided not to have any more treatment the doctors had expected her to live for another couple of months, so it was very unexpected news. I asked him what time she had died and he told me 12.55 p.m. I have always found this to be extraordinary as this was the time when I felt so ill.*

Janet Wright's story is equally convincing and, like Wynn Bainbridge's account and many others, it emphasizes the close emotional bond between the people involved:

*My husband died in 2005 and my son and daughter were with me, at his hospice bedside, all through the night prior to his death. My daughter, who was very close to her dad, is a professional photographer; she had a wedding booked for the following day and had no choice but to honour the arrangement, so, reluctantly, she had to leave during the morning. At 1.30 p.m. my husband passed away, without regaining consciousness from the previous night (after we had all said our goodbyes). I couldn't immediately phone my daughter [Jayne] as, obviously, I didn't want to interrupt someone's wedding. She phoned me at about 2 p.m. and I told her that her dad had passed away at 1.30. I heard her gasp, but naturally thought she was upset at the sad news.*

*However, when she came to the hospice to see her dad she told me that, although she had given her usual professional attention to her work, trying to put her worries aside, she checked her watch at 1.30, to ensure she was on schedule and then, inexplicably, burst into tears – something she would not have allowed to happen in the middle of someone's wedding. Given the exact timings, we have always wondered if my husband 'visited' her at the moment of his passing.*

The more detailed the accounts we get, the clearer it becomes that too often coincidence is an unsatisfactory explanation. This is Linda Denny's account of what happened on the day her husband's grandfather died. He had lived with them for three years, and had developed cancer of the oesophagus.

*One night my husband – a musician – was working and another grandson was visiting him. I asked Granddad if he would like a cup of tea and he said, 'Yes please', so I went into the kitchen and put the kettle on. As I waited for it to boil, the phone rang and my husband said, 'Is Granddad all right?' so I said that yes, he was all right and I was just making him a cup of tea. He went on to say that he had been playing his guitar at work and a very strong feeling came over him that Granddad was there and he just had to get off the stage and phone me. I reassured him that Granddad was definitely OK and put the phone down. I made the tea, and just as I was about to take it in, my brother-in-law came out and said, 'He's gone.' He had just closed his eyes and died.*

Although Linda's husband knew that his grandfather was terminally ill, the fact that his feeling of unease was so intense that he was compelled to leave the stage and phone home, and the precise timing of his call at the moment his grandfather died, does suggest strongly that this was more than just coincidence. To maintain that both these factors are due simply to chance seems far more improbable than the alternative explanation – that this man had in fact somehow reached out to make contact with his grandson as he was dying.

### Farewell visits

Sometimes these intimations of death are much more specific and take the form of a visit by the dying person, at the time of their death, to someone they are close to. Sometimes they are seen, occasionally they will speak, and often there is simply a strong and unmistakable sense of their presence. But always they seem to indicate that they are dying, have come to say goodbye, and that they are all right. There is no ambiguity about either the

message or the messenger – the people who have this experience are never in any doubt about who it is who is contacting them, and what they are saying. This was Alex Cumming's farewell visit from his father:

*I was a podiatrist and had just started my first patient. The time was 2.15 and while I worked I felt my father's presence with me in which he said that he had died and had just come to let me know. I acknowledged him and continued to work, knowing that he had passed on. There was nothing upsetting about it, it was quite reassuring. Half an hour later the phone rang and the receptionist answered it and I knew that it was my aunt (who was with my mother at that time) phoning me to tell me my father had died.*

These visits, with their very specific farewell message from the dying person, are almost always described as comforting and reassuring – the relatives are left with the strong impression that all is well, and many say that they subsequently lose any fear of death. Jean Hallsworth contacted us after reading an article about approaching-death experiences, and her story is typical:

*In 1979, my mother, 74 years old, had been taken in to hospital as an emergency due to feeling generally unwell on a Thursday. The following day she had perked up, and on Saturday it looked as if she would be coming home soon.*

*I did not visit her on Saturday night but went to see her on Sunday. She seemed to be recovering well. In the early hours of Monday morning, I awoke, half-asleep, and became aware of 'seeing' my mother in colour very clearly, standing in a spotlight in a very dark area, wearing her usual baggy everyday clothes. She was holding her hands together tightly and saying urgently and emphatically, 'Don't worry Jean, I'm all right.' This was repeated, then she faded. I turned to the bedside clock and it was 3.20 a.m.*

*I was told the following day by the nurse that she had died at 3.20 a.m. This was such an odd experience that I thought I had perhaps dreamed it or maybe I was a bit crackers, and I told no*

*one at the time; but the article made me feel that perhaps I wasn't as daft as I thought I was.*

Jane Herbert's mother died when she was 12, and after she had died her father told her the following story.

*My mother had been suffering for two years from a medullary blastoma [brain tumour] only discovered post mortem. She obviously had been deteriorating slowly but her death was not expected imminently. She was in and out of St Thomas's Hospital and was experiencing another stay there when she died. My father (a Cambridge/St Thomas's doctor) is not a man given to flights of fancy, nor is he particularly religious. He was lying in bed one night, reading, when he heard or felt my mother's voice or presence. He 'understood' from her that she was 'going' and he put his book down and just said, 'It's all right darling.' Ten minutes later, St Thomas's phoned to say that she had died.*

Later in life Jane wished she had asked him for more details, whether he physically heard her mother's voice for example, or whether it was just an intense 'knowing'. Unfortunately, by that time her father had a dementing illness and she could not discover anything further. But certainly the impression given is that, like Alex Cumming, he took the visit very much in his stride.

### Physical manifestations

Occasionally these contacts with the dying can take a very physical form. Anne Liddell awoke one night because someone was gripping her hand very tightly. Next day she discovered that this was the time her grandmother died. Jean Henfrey awoke at the moment her grandmother died, with the comforting feeling of her covers being tucked in around her. John Farr was woken by the telephone at the time of his father's death, and heard no voice, but music – his father had loved music and been a musician. The day of his mother's death, Jonathan Leiserach felt someone tugging at his sleeve. The day his grandmother died, John Grant was troubled by a strange smell which grew stronger



throughout the day. Mrs Collie describes how her father heard a child's footsteps at the time his child died in hospital.

*My late father, Peter Kidd, was born in 1910 and was a farm servant in Banffshire. In 1939 his oldest son, then a toddler, was in hospital, having been burned in a fire. One evening as Dad sat at the fire he heard a child's footsteps pass by and disappear in the distance and he told my mother that the boy had died – which he had. My father was distraught and cycled to his parents' croft to speak to his mother, and on his way home he was still distraught, but he told me that as he cycled over a hillock he felt this burden being lifted from him.*

### Feeling the symptoms of the dying

Strangest of all these physical manifestations are several accounts from people who had inexplicable and often very distressing physical symptoms which lasted for several minutes and seemed, with hindsight, to mirror the feelings that the dying person may have been experiencing. Elizabeth Wood, Raymond Hunt, June Sullivan and Janice Ashton all describe such experiences.

Elizabeth's brother had terminal throat cancer but she did not know this. Although she had not seen him for several years, she feels she was closer to him than other members of the family, and feels it natural that this dying contact should have been with her.

*It was during the night of Saturday 11 November 2006. I was woken up very suddenly by something incredibly violent. It made me sit bolt upright by the side of my bed saying repeatedly: 'I don't want to know, I absolutely don't want to know, it is too awful.' I walked to my bathroom to try and forget and think of something else but was seized by the overwhelming conviction that I was dying. I stood stooped in the middle of my bathroom floor, arms hanging down in front of me, panic-stricken by the knowledge I was dying, not knowing exactly why, except that all of my body 'felt wrong'. I tried to analyse what could be wrong but all I could feel was that nothing in my body felt right, my entire body was dying. I decided that since I was dying, I might as well lie on my*

*bed. So I returned to bed and fell promptly asleep again. I would say it was by far the worst night of my life and I felt deeply affected and fragile the next day. I learned the following day, Monday, that my brother had died. He had had a massive haemorrhage . . . I believe that my extremely violent awakening was . . . the feeling of life leaving his body as his blood ran out.*

The following two stories also suggest such a strong correlation between the physical symptoms felt by the dying person and the pain experienced by the person they are close to that it is hard to believe they are not linked in some way. In Chapters 12 and 13 we'll look a little further at some of the evidence which suggests that we may indeed be linked together in a way we don't yet fully understand. June Sullivan:

*A dear friend of mine, considerably older than me, had been in poor health for some time. She had always professed a great deal of affection for me, having known me since childhood, and I had always visited her regularly in her home. On a certain Friday, a mutual friend telephoned me to say our friend had been taken to hospital, but was 'comfortable', so we arranged to meet the following afternoon to visit her. That night I awoke with severe pains in my chest which persisted for a couple of hours, although I never felt the need to call for any help. Suddenly, and quite miraculously, the pain went and I took myself to bed, glancing at the clock and putting my discomfort down to indigestion. At about 6.30 the following morning the phone rang and my husband answered it. Doris died at half-past two, exactly the time my pain had gone. I learned later that the surgeons had tried for two hours to save my friend's poor heart and their efforts had ceased at 2.20 and she died a few minutes later. I have always felt that for those two hours Doris was trying to get in touch with me.*

Janice Ashton:

*I was on the way to work. The time was around 8.15 in the morning and my husband had just stopped to drop me off at a point from where I used to walk the last 15 minutes or so to work.*

*As I shut the car door, I experienced a severe pain around my heart. I tried to wave my husband to stop the car but without success, and I therefore struggled to the back of the pavement and held on to the fence. At that time I then thought, 'I hope I'm not going to have heart trouble like Dad.' The pain then went away and I walked on to work.*

*I had only been at my desk for about ten minutes when I had a telephone call from my father's place of work – the manager rang to tell me that my father had had a heart attack and had been taken to the hospital. He had collapsed soon after arriving at work, which was 7.30 a.m. Around five minutes after this call I had another call saying that my father had been dead on arrival at the hospital.*

In May 1966 Raymond Hunt was home on leave from the Merchant Navy to visit his father, who was seriously ill in hospital with lung cancer.

*After visiting him on 26 May I had a few beers as normal at my local before retiring to bed, falling sound asleep . . . The next thing I remember was waking up with pains in my chest and trouble with my breathing. I tried to reach the light switch but could not because of the pains. I remember looking at the clock at the side of my bed and believe it was 4.15 a.m. The pains were now intense and I was fighting for my breath. I remember grabbing my mouth, forcing it open to help me to breathe. I was fighting for all I was worth but the pains were now unbearable. Then the pains subsided and I was overwhelmed with feelings of great peace and love. All the pain had gone. I cannot possibly describe the feelings of love and great peace I experienced. I did not want the feelings to end, and wherever I was or was going to I wanted that. I did not want to come back to my body or this world.*

*I awoke with a start with someone knocking on the door at about 7 a.m. It was a neighbour on his way to work who had kindly agreed to take any telephone messages from the hospital (we did not have a phone). I knew of course before I opened the door what he was going to say – that my father had passed away during the night . . .*

*The experience had not affected my body: I was just as fit and alive as before I went to bed. But I'm sure you can understand the enormous mental effect it had on me. I could not and still cannot deny what had happened to me . . . I realized that all living things are precious, from the smallest to the largest, including flowers, plants, trees . . . We must all strive for a better world, by helping each other, without hurting anybody in mind or body. I hope my experience can help others, which is maybe why it happened. I know there is nothing to fear in death, and my father was happy.*

The fascinating thing about this experience is how very closely it mirrors the near-death experience. What Raymond describes – the intense pain which suddenly subsides, as though he had left his body, the reluctance to return to his body or this world, the very strong and lasting impression the experience made, and the total lack of fear at the prospect of death – are all described again and again by people who have had near-death experiences. It is as if Raymond was somehow sharing the experience with his father.

### Two ghost stories

The majority of farewell visits from the dying occur either in dreams or on a sudden awakening from sleep, or in that drowsy half-awake, half-asleep state – the hypnagogic state – in which the person may not really know whether or not they were dreaming. They are experienced less often during the course of everyday life when the person is fully awake, and when they do occur the 'visitor' is seldom seen but only felt as a 'presence'. So the following two accounts, in which the dying person was seen in a very physical form during the course of a normal day, are unusual.

Gladys Astén's daughter wrote to us, at her mother's request, to tell us the following fascinating story.

*This story dates back to a time during the Second World War. Mum had gone to visit her sister Irene who was a singer with a band working with the Entertainments National Service Associa-*

tion away from home. During the day, around lunchtime, they had gone out for a walk along a towpath when Irene spotted a man in Fleet Air Arm pilot's uniform on the bridge looking towards them. She said to Mum, 'Oh, doesn't that man on the bridge look like Harold?' (Harold Shaw was Irene's boyfriend). They both agreed and made their way to the bridge to see if it really was him, or someone else who just looked like him and was wearing the same uniform that Harold wore. However, when they got to the bridge, the man had disappeared. There was no one around at all apart from the two of them, nowhere that anyone could have gone to without still being visible, and neither of them could work out how or when the man had disappeared from their sight. This left them both feeling puzzled, and they discussed it on and off for the rest of that day.

The following day, their plan was to return home together so that Irene could surprise her mother (my gran) with a visit on her birthday. When Gran returned home, the girls were both already there and Irene quickly hid behind the settee with the intent of jumping out to surprise her. However, when Gran came into the house, not knowing Irene was behind the settee, she immediately began to tell Mum of some terrible news – that Harold had been killed when his plane was brought down by enemy fire over the Orkneys. It had happened the previous day around lunchtime.

This story is especially interesting because both sisters saw the figure and both were equally convinced it was Harold, and also because the 'sighting' occurred when both were fully awake. The following account sent to us by Jenny Stiles is of a similar daytime sighting by someone who had no way of knowing that the person they saw had died, or was even ill.

*My mother died just before Christmas, Sunday 17 December 2006 at 9.10 p.m. She had suffered a massive stroke six weeks earlier with no chance of recovery. I had been trying to contact my brother in the USA for several months to let him know she had been in a residential care home for 18 months and was rapidly declining. I knew he had moved from Nashville to Washington DC but I had no address or telephone number for him and the search was fruit-*

*less. Then, out of the blue, four days after our mother died, he called me one evening. He was not surprised to hear she had died, he told me he had seen her walking down the street in Washington the previous Sunday afternoon; the time difference between the UK and USA when he thought he saw her was the time she died, or was 'passing over'. He described what she had been wearing – it was a cream suit she owned – but my brother had not seen her for nearly ten years and would not have known she had bought that outfit.*

It's very difficult to interpret these two experiences. Why, if they were truly farewell visits by the dying, did they not make a more personal contact with the person they had evidently come to see? And in the first account, why did both sisters see the figure of Harold when his emotional bond was only with Irene? Could it be that the emotional link between sisters allowed them both to view the apparition? Although it is fanciful, perhaps the reason that the airman did not come closer to say goodbye was just because both sisters seemed to be involved in the process. However, this does not explain the second account. It would be interesting to know what the son's emotions were when he 'saw' his mother, and whether she was indeed letting him know that she had died. The fact that he then rang his sister 'out of the blue' certainly suggests that it was his vision which prompted him to do so.

### Dream visitors

By far the most common way for the dying to make their farewell visits was during a dream, or when the person suddenly awoke with an overwhelming realization that something was wrong, or that someone was trying to contact them. Of over 100 accounts, 66 per cent occurred either in dreams or on a sudden awakening from sleep.

In October 1987 Terry Woods was serving in the Royal Navy as a submariner on board HMS *Revenge* and had sailed for an eight-week patrol.

*Two days after diving I was asleep in bed and had a very real dream that my grandfather had 'died'. The dream was very*



strange in that all of our family was waiting in the place where our grandparents had lived and that I was the last one to arrive. When I arrived and my grandfather saw that we were all there, he picked up my nephew's bike and said, 'That's it, I'm off' and pedalled off over a walkway and disappeared. I woke up the next morning and told my best friend that 'I had a really weird dream that my granddad had died'. My friend reassured me that it was only a dream and not to worry.

While on patrol, submariners are never told of any bad news. This was a problem for the Royal Navy as our next-of-kin were only allowed 40 words a week to inform us of any news (family-grams) – the Navy duly vetted such messages. My mother insisted that my wife put in the family-gram that she was 'sorry about Granddad'. On receipt of my wife's message, the Royal Navy withheld all family-grams for me for three weeks – so I knew something was wrong! The Captain then decided to tell me that the reason for my messages being withheld was because my paternal grandfather had passed away, at approximately 3 a.m. on 18 October 1987. I had no idea that he had been ill. At the time of his death I was fast asleep 200 feet under the Atlantic Ocean. Very spooky . . .

This again highlights the fact that space is no bar for these communications, and even being under water can't stop them. It is certainly not uncommon for people who are away from their families to have anxiety dreams about them, but Terry says the dream was very real, and strange, and this, combined with the precise timing, adds weight to the idea that it may have been communication rather than coincidence.

For Phillip Healey a premonition of his mother's death also came to him in a dream, a dream which he recognized as having some special quality. His mother, whom he was very close to, had dementia. He and his father and sister had looked after her for as long as they could, but finally had to put her in a nursing home.

On the morning of 26 July I had what I can only describe as a dream premonition. It was in colour and I have never had a dream like it before. Mum phoned me up and said, 'Hello Phillip.' I said, 'Mum, are you OK?' She said, 'Yes, I'm all right but I've

got to go.' I woke up and knew it was real. The following morning she passed away.

Dream accounts are interesting because of the narrative quality of the experiences and the wrapping up of the information in dream imagery. Usually though the meaning of the dream is quite apparent to the dreamer. Here Laura Scales describes what happened the night her mother died:

I had a vivid dream. Mum walked into my dining room wearing shorts, walking shoes and a fleece jacket; she was perfectly well and looked younger than she had done for many years! She sat down in an old wicker chair in the dining room. I was in the kitchen and when I turned and saw her I ran across and shouted, 'What are you doing here? You're better!' As I looked along what should have been my hallway, I could see the Cottage Hospital corridor and one of the nurses walking towards me. I called out to the nurse, 'She's better – look!' Mum looked at me and said, 'I am ready to leave now.' I immediately knew that she meant that she was about to die and 'let go'. I looked at her and I said, 'But we haven't said goodbye' and I tried to kiss her, but my face passed through her face as if she wasn't really there. We both looked up and said quietly, 'Please God, just this once!' I was then able to kiss her properly and she disappeared from the dream.

I awoke with a start and looked at the clock in the bedroom – I knew that what I had dreamt was significant. It was 2.15 a.m. The next morning I got up at 5 a.m., anxious for news. The phone rang at 7 a.m. – it was the Cottage Hospital ringing to let us know that Mum had died at 2.50 a.m., just half an hour or so after my dream.

What makes the dream even more unusual is that Mum had not been able to visit my house for about nine months; she was unable to walk and was not well enough to make the journey. In that time I had made significant alterations to the dining room which Mum had never seen. In my dream the dining room was as Mum would have last seen it; it was as if I was seeing it through her eyes, not mine. Of course, you could say I wanted Mum to come and say goodbye and I needed that closure. Whatever the



*reason for the dream, it will always be a special moment in my life.*

There is an interesting parallel here between this dream and those described earlier in this chapter in which people seem to experience the physical pain of the dying. Laura comments that it is as if she is seeing through her mother's eyes. This is again indicative, first of the strong emotional connection that is a common factor in all these coincidences, and second, that the experience is driven by the dying person, who seems to import their own world into the experience. It is worth remembering this, as in many of the accounts there are small hints that this is what is in fact happening.

Notice too the language in the three previous dreams. Terry's granddad: 'That's it, I'm off.' Phillip's mother: 'I'm all right but I've got to go.' And Laura Scales' mother tells her: 'I'm ready to leave now.' Valerie Feasby-Quigley's father (p. 82) also said 'I think I'll go now', language which is more suggestive of the beginning of a journey than the end of a life. This journeying language crops up time and again, and as we saw in the previous chapter, it's often mentioned by relatives who have witnessed the visions of the dying: 'He seemed to be talking to someone and just before he died he said, "Right, I am ready now, you can get my coat".' 'Death', it seems, is not a concept the dying recognize. It's interesting that the rather euphemistic phrase 'passing on' is so often used when describing death; perhaps we should not, after all, regard it as euphemistic but rather as a feeling which the dying may experience and which they try to convey to their survivors.

Richard Bufton is now a college lecturer and heading for retirement. But in the early 1970s he was a commercial diver out in the Gulf:

*I was taking a diving vessel from Bahrain to Ras Tanurra in Saudi Arabia and I had just handed over control of the vessel to another diver. It was in the middle of the British postal strike and we had not received any post for some time. I was lying on the bunk in the forward cabin and in a sort of half-asleep state, when*

*what I can only describe as a vision similar to seeing a teletype ribbon went past my eyes. The words – which I read in my mind – simply said, 'Your grandfather is dead.'*

*I jumped up and climbed the three or four steps into the main cabin, saying to my friend that I had to make a radio-telephone call. I put out a link call through Bahrain Radio to my mother in the UK, and when she answered the phone she said that she had some bad news. I interrupted my mother to tell her that the reason I had rung was because I knew my grandfather was dead.*

In this accurately observed account, Richard describes his mental state at the time of the communication as half-awake and half-asleep. This is the mental state that was found to be effective for telepathy in the Ganzfeld experiment (see Chapter 6, p. 100), and it might perhaps facilitate a telepathic linking with the dying person.

The following account shows very clearly the intensity of emotion that these dreams can convey, and the absolute conviction that they are not just ordinary dreams. Jean Cheesman's husband was bipolar and committed suicide in February 1989. At the time, they were separated but remained good friends and very close. She had seen him the previous day and they had spent time together and he had seemed very positive.

*I woke up crying at 3 o'clock the next morning out of a very 'real' dream where Vincent was sitting on the end of my bed and telling me not to cry any more and that it was all over and that he was finally at peace.*

*I got up, on 'automatic', did some work I needed to do, two clients phoned me around 8 o'clock and I freaked them out completely as I told them I would be taking some time out as my husband had just died. I went over to his flat with Merlin, our dog, and called the police. The Coroner's report was that Vin had indeed died around 3 a.m.*

Jean's account demonstrates very well the special quality which these dreams have and which the dreamer recognizes. That she was convinced enough to tell her clients that her husband had

just died before she had confirmation shows the quality of absolute reality that the dream carried.

All recipients of these dream visits have exactly the same reaction to them – they usually feel enormously comforted and reassured because so often the message their 'visitor' seems to convey is that they are all right. And because the person they love has come to say a final goodbye to them, there is a feeling of rounding off, of closure, which seems to make the mourning process easier.

Dilys Gannon's experience when her grandmother died conveyed just such a message, though she is clearly unsure whether she was truly awake or perhaps in some half-awake, half-asleep state at the time:

*One night I was lying in bed when I was awakened, or at least I at first thought I had been awakened: afterwards I was not sure that I had experienced the 'happening' when I was truly awake in the accepted sense. There came into my vision a bright light and there I saw my grandmother looking at me through a mirror. The mirror had great significance for me and for my grandmother, as she had spent many hours with me, when I was a child, looking into this mirror. She used to ask me questions about things I could see through the mirror and what significance they had. As the light shone through and around this mirror, I saw the figure of my grandmother explaining to me that she had died, but I was not to be upset because she was extremely happy. There was an extreme moment of peace and quiet and I felt the light surrounding me like a blanket. When I woke up I telephoned my mother, who told me I must have been mistaken as we would have heard if my grandmother was ill. Later that day my aunt telephoned to say that my grandmother had died the previous night. She had not wanted to tell us about her illness, as she had hoped she would get better, and she also delayed telephoning us about the death because she was too upset to give us the news immediately.*

Here again there are echoes of the near-death experience – the peace and quiet and light surrounding her 'like a blanket'. It is

hard not to imagine that Dilys was somehow sharing her grandmother's own experience.

### Sudden awakenings

So many people have reported experiences which occurred during a sudden awakening from sleep, or in the 'half-awake, half-asleep' state that it does seem as if this is a state in which people are particularly receptive to farewell visits from the dying. In nearly every case the person is certain that they really did awake, and the whole thing was not a dream. Tina Myer, who has lived in Australia for the past 26 years, and has family living in London, told us what happened the night her brother died:

*One night in 1991, while sleeping, I was suddenly awoken – but not in the normal way where one wakes up and is drowsy. From being fast asleep I was suddenly wide awake, and as my eyes opened in the total darkness of the room, there, coming towards me, quite fast, from the foot of the bed, was the face, in white, of my brother back in London. This was not a dream or my imagination. I awoke my husband to tell him what had happened.*

*I subsequently learned that my dear brother, who had caught a cold which turned into bronchial pneumonia, had died. I can only assume that he was, at the time he was slipping away, thinking of me and, I guess, that by his thinking of me his soul was instantly with me.*

As in all these accounts, it is the dying person who seems to drive the experience, while the one they visit is simply a passive receiver. If we are to give credence to any of these experiences, we have to presuppose that 'mind' is not identical with 'brain', and that perhaps at death there is a loosening of the ties between them which provides a special facility at this time for this kind of communication.

Julie Salmon also experienced what she describes as a 'violent awakening' at the time of her mother's death:

*My mother died at 2 a.m. on 10 December 1993. She had been suffering from breast cancer and was undergoing treatment. I had not been informed that she was terminally ill. However, she took a turn for the worse around 7 December and was admitted to Poole Hospital, Dorset and I visited her there on 8 December. I went to bed on that eve of 9 December and was fast asleep when I suddenly awoke, sat bolt upright in bed and called out 'Mum'. I actually physically reached for the phone to call the hospital, but on checking the time it was 2 a.m. I therefore told myself to 'get a grip' and that I was being hysterical and neurotic, and I eventually fell back to sleep a couple of hours later. I was awoken at 7.30 a.m. on 10 December by my aunt and stepfather to say that Mum had died – at 2 a.m. The experience was deeply upsetting and I shall never forget it. I am crying now while typing this – the whole experience of waking suddenly like that was what I can only describe as 'violent'. Maybe it was psychosomatic, who knows? But it was very real to me, and still is. I have no doubt that she reached out to me at that moment.*

The intensity of emotion that these experiences so often generate is indicated very clearly by the fact that the memory of hers still has the power to reduce Julie to tears years later. Julie is one of the few people who described her experience as 'deeply upsetting' rather than comforting.

Kath McMahon:

*My father was in hospital, and it was in the middle of the night. At the time of his death, around 3 a.m., he visited me and woke me from my sleep. He stood at the end of my bed, just smiling at me and looking down on me. It was the most wonderful and beautiful experience I have ever had; no words were exchanged. I can remember feeling incredibly content and happy, and I drifted back off to sleep in a state of euphoria. The next morning I got up and did my usual chores, forgetting all about the events of the previous night, and then the phone rang. I knew it was my mother, and before she could say anything I informed her that my father had died, last night. She was amazed at my experience.*

A scientific explanation that could be offered for imagery seen on awakening is that it is a hypnopompic hallucination. Some people have very strong visual imagery when they awake, and it could be argued that Kath's account is simply a normal waking hallucination. However, some people regularly have these hypnopompic hallucinations and would recognize them for what they are. Kath makes it quite clear that it was just not like that. It was the most wonderful experience that she had ever had. Clearly there was nothing ordinary about the experience. But also note, as is usual in these cases, that no words were exchanged. It's the feeling and the knowledge that seem to be important.

Occasionally the visitor does speak, though usually simply to attract attention, usually by calling a name. It seems to be very rare that there is any sort of conversation between them. And in some of the accounts it is not always clear whether mind-to-mind communication was taking place without words being spoken, or whether spoken words were actually heard, as in the following account by Richard Geall:

*While serving with the Royal Navy in Portsmouth I received a phone call from my mother in Brighton one Monday evening informing me that my father, whom I knew was very ill with cancer, had been admitted to a hospice and may not last out the week. My intention was to apply for compassionate leave the following day, but at about 3.30 a.m. I was suddenly awake and shot bolt upright in bed hearing my father calling my name. I did not 'see' him but I clearly heard his voice as though he were in the room. I did not go back to sleep but eventually went into work as normal, where I was informed that the duty officer had received a call saying that my father had died at about 3.30 a.m. But I already knew – my father had told me. My mother later said that he was calling for me as he died. I love him dearly and ever since that day I have had an overwhelming sense of his presence.*

Malcolm McCallum and Carol Duncan were also both woken by someone calling their name. Malcolm's father had had open-heart surgery three months earlier, and although his life



expectancy was not considered to be long, no one expected his death to be imminent.

*On the night of his death he was at his own home in Darlington. I was with my own family at my home in a neighbouring village. At some time in the night I was woken up by my father calling my name. As he was calling, I could see what I can only assume to have been his spirit rising high into the night sky. Before picking up our telephone, which rang earlier than usual on the following morning, I was able to tell my wife that it was my mother ringing to tell me that my father had died.*

Angie Baird's little girl was born in May 1979 but unfortunately was sick with a blood disorder and was kept in the intensive care baby unit. For 48 hours she hung on and the doctors were optimistic that the worst was over.

*My bed was just opposite the nurses' station. I awoke suddenly at 3 a.m. on the third morning shaking and tearful and called the nurse and asked if I could be taken up to the next floor to see my baby. I am not a pushy person at all but had a really strong feeling that I needed to go right then and there. The nurse said it was a strange request at that time of the morning but would phone the ICU to see if they would mind. The nurse said that the phone in the ICU was engaged and she would ring again in a moment. Five or so minutes later the phone on the station desk rang. The reason why it was engaged when the nurse rang was that the sister in the ICU was trying to ring down to break the devastating news that my daughter had just passed away. At EXACTLY 3 a.m.!*

*That feeling I had at 3 a.m. was so strong. I just KNEW that something was wrong. It shows how deep a mother's bond goes, no matter how short the bonding time is.*

In nearly all our experiences it has been very clear that it is the person dying who seems to be driving the contact. But in this example it is difficult to argue that a child only two days old is able to drive the experience in a way that one assumes an older child or adult might. It raises the question of the link between a

newborn baby and its mother, and whether this link is somehow hard-wired between the two so that the mother senses at a distance the needs of a newborn infant.

### Clairvoyant dreams

The following dream account, sent to us by Angelina Clements, is interesting and unusual because it seems to fall more into the category of clairvoyance than telepathy. It sounds very much as though she was in the drowsy state between sleeping and waking, though she herself is unsure about this and felt that she was wide awake.

At 6.11 a.m. on the morning her daughter was to die in a car accident, while she lay in bed, Angelina was watching what looked like a conservatory which started to rise up into the sky, and as it did so it changed from being a conservatory to a glass coffin. At the time it puzzled her and she could not explain it. She says:

*I recall thinking, 'That was strange . . .' because I didn't feel like I had just woken up, it didn't feel like I had been dreaming . . . it felt like I was wide awake and had just returned from somewhere.*

Later she discovered that the accident had happened exactly at the time she had this experience. She also saw a photo of her daughter's car, a new Mini Cooper with a glass roof on which was a white logo, and it seemed to her that she had somehow been there, at the time of the accident. She goes on:

*If I was at the scene of the accident, watching down onto the roof of the spinning car, I believe my mind might well have thought I was looking at a conservatory as it tried to interpret what the glass and white lines actually were.*

### Preparatory visits

The following two reports are unusual in that a visit by a dead relative gives prior warning of a death to come. This is Margaret Catherine's unusual 'two-stage' experience.

*Fifteen years ago, I was woken at 2 a.m. by a sharp push in the back. It woke me up suddenly, but I was not afraid, and just knew that my late mother-in-law was standing beside the bed. I knew exactly who it was, even though I could not see anything at all. I drifted back to sleep and had the most vivid dream, where my 22-year-old son was talking to me. He was telling me that he was dead but that I was not to worry or be upset because he was all right . . . When I woke I was very disturbed and tried to contact my son. I found out later that day that he had been drowned the previous night. I am convinced that he did contact me, as did his grandmother who loved him deeply. I have drawn great comfort from his visit to me over the years . . . I can assure you that I am not remotely unhinged and am a very down-to-earth lady, but I do know that my experiences are real, and I have talked to many people who have lost loved ones and had similar experiences.*

The interesting twist in this story is that it combines a warning visit to the boy's mother from his grandmother before he himself appears in the dream. Was this a coincidence? It could be, of course. But this was a young boy whose death couldn't have been anticipated or expected. It does seem as though the only basis for disbelieving it is a strict adherence to the belief that it could not happen. Mike Askins described a similar premonitory visit before the death of his mother:

*I had left England in early February 2002 to work on a copper project in northern Chile, having said goodbyes to my immediate family, including my mother who was 89 and in reasonable health. About three weeks later, on a Friday night I awoke around 12 midnight (5 a.m. British time) having experienced an unusual dream which involved me being a silent and unseen witness to an event where my grandmother and her son (my mother's mum and brother, both deceased) dressed in black entered a house stating that 'they had come to view the body'. It made me waken, and I thought then that my mother had died.*

*The next morning at the office at around 7 a.m. I rang home, with no response. It was a couple of hours later that my wife*

*phoned me to tell me that my mother who had been taken into hospital a few days earlier had died that morning in hospital. She had died around 7.30 a.m. (2.30 a.m. Chile time) which was about two and a half hours after my dream.*

### A cool reception

Nearly all the people who have described their experiences to us have said that they are comforting and reassuring. But very occasionally the visitors are unwelcome and their visits thoroughly disconcerting, or even frightening.

Judy Gaskell describes how, on the night of her mother's death, her mother was staying in Judy's sister's house with some of her grandchildren and son-in-law.

*In the middle of the night, Alice, her favourite granddaughter, was awakened by a figure standing at the end of her bed. It was her grandmother, my mother, telling her she had died and to tell her father as she did not want to shock her daughter, my sister, in the morning. Alice felt frozen in her bed, but eventually awoke her father who looked in on my mother to find her still warm but dead. He called in the family doctor who lived nearby in the village, and the doctor confirmed that my mother had only just passed on and gave the approximate time of death as 2 a.m. When Alice looked at her alarm clock in the morning it had stopped at 2 a.m.*

Not only is the response unusual, but this seems to be a deathbed coincidence by proxy, and it is interesting that Alice's grandmother told her in some detail the reason for the visit, and why she was not contacting the next-of-kin directly, as it were. Her comment about the clock stopping is also intriguing – several people have told us about this particular phenomenon, and their accounts are given in Chapter 8.

Aileen Wright was also too afraid to respond to her visitor. Aileen had been with her husband to visit her father-in-law in hospital:

*As we left, I said to my father-in-law, 'See you again soon.' He shook his head and replied firmly, 'No'. Two days later and around 1.30 in the early hours of the night, I awoke in a sweat – my father-in-law was standing by our bed. He was asking me to wake John, because he wanted to say 'Goodbye'. But I let my father-in-law down, because I felt too afraid to do so and buried myself away from what seemed to be a very real person in our room! I replied that I was too afraid to do so. Kindly, he seemed to accept my let-down – I sensed he understood my fear – and conveyed 'Never mind' . . . Then my father-in-law faded away. A few minutes later – and due to my restlessness – John awoke and asked what was wrong. When I told him that I had just seen his dad, he replied, 'OK', as if I had dreamt it, and then returned to his slumbers. But I definitely did not have a dream! The next morning the telephone rang at around 8 a.m. It was John's mother to say that his father had died in the night. The time given – 1.30.*

Here again, it is interesting to speculate about why it was Aileen who was awoken – or who awoke – and not her husband. We have found throughout this work that different people have different sensitivities. Some people see the deathbed visions of their dying relatives, others don't. Some people have farewell visits from the dying, others don't. It's not possible to say what this factor is, but everyone who does any kind of parapsychological research recognizes what is known as the 'sheep-goat' effect. With some people (the sheep), parapsychological experiments tend to work; with others (the goats) they never do. Maybe in this particular case we had a sheep and a goat in the same bed.

The following account by Derek Whitehead is one of the few cases we have been told about where the young recipient of a farewell visit not only failed to understand its significance but was scared stiff by it. Perhaps because of this he needed an additional hint given in a dream. Unfortunately he wouldn't have understood this either if his friend had not interpreted it for him.

*When I was 18 I was in the Merchant Navy crossing the Pacific Ocean on the way to Australia. One night I was laid on my bunk reading a male magazine – Mayfair or Playboy I think. I looked*

*up and my grandfather was stood next to me looking at me. Well, I shot off the bed, I did scream and he was still there looking at me – I ran for my life up to the bridge, shaking like a leaf. When I came back down he had gone – that night I dreamed that I was trying to visit a ship in dry dock but the crew would not let me on board – which was unheard of in real life. They told me that it was not for me. I awoke at about 4.30 and went onto the bridge and told the mate what had happened. He came from Buckie in Scotland and said that in fishing families, dreaming of a ship on dry land told of a death in the family. I put all this down in a letter to send to my parents. About three weeks later we got to Australia, and the pilot took the post ashore with him. Later that day the agent brought our post on board with a letter from Mum: the day and date were about the same time that Granddad had died.*

Derek adds, 'I don't know what these things are – fantasies, dreams, wishes, delusions . . . I don't like them, they make my sense of reality wobble.'

### The prime of life

An observation that several people have made about their visitors is that they are often described as looking as though they were in the prime of life, with any injuries healed. Laura Scales, for example, in her dream described on p. 61, described her mother as 'perfectly well and looked younger than she had done for many years'! This is interesting because it mirrors very closely what people report when they see dead relatives in the near-death experience. Brenda Barker describes a similar transformation in her father when he visited her on the night he died. Again, note that the implication is that the person is 'on his way' somewhere and has been given special 'permission' to make a detour.

*When I retired to bed I was very restless. I tossed this way and that until suddenly in the early hours my father stood by my bed. He had been ill for a long time, but there he was standing in his prime of life. He didn't speak. My restlessness ceased and I fell asleep. In*



*the morning I knew . . . my father had died late the evening before and had been permitted to visit me on his way into the next life.*

Hilary Froude is an SRN who says she has been a practising nurse/midwife for many years, and during that time has had some unusual experiences.

*The one that was the strangest but perhaps most comforting was when my father died last September. At 3 a.m. something woke me up, and after looking at my clock I noticed my father standing outside the bedroom door with his arms outstretched towards me – albeit a slightly younger version (40–50 rather than the 81 he actually was). I got up and went towards him with my arms outstretched, and he said, 'It's all right, I'm better now' before he disappeared through the wall. At that moment, my father was actually in a nursing home in the final stages of Alzheimer's and died at 6 a.m. that morning.*

If we make the assumption that this experience is driven by the dying person, then we again have to conclude that mind and brain are to some extent different. In Alzheimer's disease the memory circuits are destroyed to the point where the sufferer has no memory of where or who he is or what his history has been, or even that he has a daughter. But here in the experience he is somehow linked to his daughter. In our nursing home study we again and again heard stories about people dying with advanced Alzheimer's disease, unable even to recognize members of their family. Sometimes in a brief, lucid interval shortly before death, they became alert, recognized their family and took their leave of them before dying. The mechanism for this is quite obscure, but the fact that it does occur is well reported.

Here Keith Scrivener describes the night his father-in-law died. He had been very ill from stomach cancer for a long time, and during his illness Keith and his wife had taken their infant son, the old man's only grandchild, to see him as often as possible, as his spirits were always lifted by the child's presence.

*The doctors said my father-in-law only had a few more weeks of life, but his death was not thought to be imminent. He was, however, incapable of moving by himself and had wasted away to almost skeletal proportions.*

*At that time my wife and I shared a double bed, with our infant son in a cot beside us. We all went off to sleep, but later I awoke suddenly; I was wide awake, not sleepy or in a dreamlike state. There, bending over my son's cot, was my father-in-law, not skeletal but in his earlier healthy proportions. He turned to me and said, 'It's all right, I just want to say goodbye to the boy.' Although he was by then in his fifties, my father-in-law looked far younger, radiantly healthy and happy. I looked at the clock and noted the time, then lay back in my bed as nothing seemed strange about this nocturnal visit; in fact I was completely calm, as it seemed very peaceful and normal, and I was instantly asleep again. My wife [his daughter] had slept through this. When my wife and I awoke in the morning I told her about her dad's visit and what time it had occurred. Later, my mother-in-law contacted us to say he had died at the exact time I had seen him checking out his grandson. Neither I nor my mother-in-law had phones at the time, so there was no way I could have known he had died earlier.*

As in so many other accounts, the visit is so calming and reassuring that the person simply falls straight back to sleep.

So what value, if any, do these experiences have? Are they imagination or wishful thinking on the part of the bereaved, who long to have the chance to say some sort of farewell to the person they love? Do they arise simply from a need for comfort? Are the dreams simply dreams, with no import and no meaning, or just inexplicable curiosities? Or are they giving us a very strong clue about what happens when we die? All of these questions we will look at in Chapter 6. The data are out there and freely available. It's important that we take it seriously, so that when our turn comes to die, as it surely will, we are fully prepared for what will happen.

Meanwhile Angelina Clements sums up very well what her



experience meant to her, and which reflects what many other people who have been lucky enough to have these experiences also feel:

*Before this experience I didn't have any definite beliefs about death and the afterlife. I am now convinced that as my daughter became aware that she was going to die she managed to get in touch with me, and I was there to see that she was lifted peacefully from this earth and onto wherever the next life takes us. I don't know if I had ever feared dying – except that I know I had never wanted to die before my children had grown up and were able to manage without me – but now I don't mind how soon I die as I am convinced that my Sarah will be waiting for me whenever my time comes to leave this earth.*

## Chapter 5

### Deathbed Visions: Finding Explanations



Versuchung durch Verzweiflung:  
Temptation through despair

*Unless you experience something like this yourself, I can understand people not believing or feeling the significance of it. All I know is that I have no doubt. (An interviewee)*

*I don't know how to explain it, maybe it's best to leave it unexplained and just be happy to know that someone you loved very much is still caring for you. (An interviewee)*

The people who have witnessed a deathbed vision of a dying relative, or who feel they have received a farewell visit when someone they love has died, have no doubt about the reality of what happened. But for the rest of us it is notoriously difficult to believe the evidence of other people's senses. We may have an entrenched belief that this sort of thing can't happen, and therefore have to believe that it doesn't happen. And many of us feel a

# Autobiography of a Yogi

By Swami Yogananda Paramahansa

**1946 First Edition**



## **Chapter: 43**

### **The Resurrection of Sri Yukteswar**

“Lord Krishna!” The glorious form of the avatar appeared in a shimmering blaze as I sat in my room at the Regent Hotel in Bombay. Shining over the roof of a high building across the street, the ineffable vision had suddenly burst on my sight as I gazed out of my long open third-story window.

The divine figure waved to me, smiling and nodding in greeting. When I could not understand the exact message of Lord Krishna, he departed with a gesture of blessing. Wondrously uplifted, I felt that some spiritual event was presaged.



—By B. K. Mitra in “Kalyana-Kalpataru”

Krishna, ancient prophet of India

A modern artist’s conception of the divine teacher whose spiritual counsel in the *Bhagavad Gita* has become the Hindu Bible. Krishna is portrayed in Hindu art with a peacock feather in his hair

(symbol of the Lord's *lila*, play or creative sport), and carrying a flute, whose enrapturing notes awaken the devotees, one by one, from their sleep of *maya* or cosmic delusion.

My Western voyage had, for the time being, been cancelled. I was scheduled for several public addresses in Bombay before leaving on a return visit to Bengal.

Sitting on my bed in the Bombay hotel at three o'clock in the afternoon of June 19, 1936—one week after the vision of Krishna—I was roused from my meditation by a beatific light. Before my open and astonished eyes, the whole room was transformed into a strange world, the sunlight transmuted into supernal splendor.

Waves of rapture engulfed me as I beheld the flesh and blood form of Sri Yukteswar!

"My son!" Master spoke tenderly, on his face an angel-bewitching smile.

For the first time in my life I did not kneel at his feet in greeting but instantly advanced to gather him hungrily in my arms. Moment of moments! The anguish of past months was toll I counted weightless against the torrential bliss now descending.

"Master mine, beloved of my heart, why did you leave me?" I was incoherent in an excess of joy. "Why did you let me go to the *Kumbha Mela*? How bitterly have I blamed myself for leaving you!"

"I did not want to interfere with your happy anticipation of seeing the pilgrimage spot where first I met Babaji. I left you only for a little while; am I not with you again?"

"But is it *you*, Master, the same Lion of God? Are you wearing a body like the one I buried beneath the cruel Puri sands?"

"Yes, my child, I am the same. This is a flesh and blood body. Though I see it as ethereal, to your sight it is physical. From the cosmic atoms I created an entirely new body, exactly like that cosmic-dream physical body which you laid beneath the dream-sands at Puri in your dream-world. I am in truth resurrected—not on earth but on an astral planet. Its inhabitants are better able than earthly humanity to meet my lofty standards. There you and your exalted loved ones shall someday come to be with me."

"Deathless guru, tell me more!"

Master gave a quick, mirthful chuckle. "Please, dear one," he said, "won't you relax your hold a little?"

"Only a little!" I had been embracing him with an octopus grip. I could detect the same faint, fragrant, natural odor which had been characteristic of his body before. The thrilling touch of his divine flesh still persists around the inner sides of my arms and in my palms whenever I recall those glorious hours.

"As prophets are sent on earth to help men work out their physical karma, so I have been directed by God to serve on an astral planet as a savior," Sri Yukteswar explained. "It is called

*Hiranyaloka* or ‘Illumined Astral Planet.’ There I am aiding advanced beings to rid themselves of astral karma and thus attain liberation from astral rebirths. The dwellers on *Hiranyaloka* are highly developed spiritually; all of them had acquired, in their last earth-incarnation, the meditation-given power of consciously leaving their physical bodies at death. No one can enter *Hiranyaloka* unless he has passed on earth beyond the state of *sabikalpa samadhi* into the higher state of *nirbikalpa samadhi*.<sup>[1](#)</sup>

“The *Hiranyaloka* inhabitants have already passed through the ordinary astral spheres, where nearly all beings from earth must go at death; there they worked out many seeds of their past actions in the astral worlds. None but advanced beings can perform such redemptive work effectually in the astral worlds. Then, in order to free their souls more fully from the cocoon of karmic traces lodged in their astral bodies, these higher beings were drawn by cosmic law to be reborn with new astral bodies on *Hiranyaloka*, the astral sun or heaven, where I have resurrected to help them. There are also highly advanced beings on *Hiranyaloka* who have come from the superior, subtler, causal world.”

My mind was now in such perfect attunement with my guru’s that he was conveying his word-pictures to me partly by speech and partly by thought-transference. I was thus quickly receiving his idea-tabloids.

“You have read in the scriptures,” Master went on, “that God encased the human soul successively in three bodies—the idea, or causal, body; the subtle astral body, seat of man’s mental and emotional natures; and the gross physical body. On earth a man is equipped with his physical senses. An astral being works with his consciousness and feelings and a body made of lifetrans.<sup>[2](#)</sup> A causal-bodied being remains in the blissful realm of ideas. My work is with those astral beings who are preparing to enter the causal world.”

“Adorable Master, please tell me more about the astral cosmos.” Though I had slightly relaxed my embrace at Sri Yukteswar’s request, my arms were still around him. Treasure beyond all treasures, my guru who had laughed at death to reach me!

“There are many astral planets, teeming with astral beings,” Master began. “The inhabitants use astral planes, or masses of light, to travel from one planet to another, faster than electricity and radioactive energies.

“The astral universe, made of various subtle vibrations of light and color, is hundreds of times larger than the material cosmos. The entire physical creation hangs like a little solid basket under the huge luminous balloon of the astral sphere. Just as many physical suns and stars roam in space, so there are also countless astral solar and stellar systems. Their planets have astral suns and moons, more beautiful than the physical ones. The astral luminaries resemble the aurora borealis—the sunny astral aurora being more dazzling than the mild-rayed moon-aurora. The astral day and night are longer than those of earth.

“The astral world is infinitely beautiful, clean, pure, and orderly. There are no dead planets or barren lands. The terrestrial blemishes—weeds, bacteria, insects, snakes—are absent. Unlike the variable climates and seasons of the earth, the astral planets maintain the even temperature of an

eternal spring, with occasional luminous white snow and rain of many-colored lights. Astral planets abound in opal lakes and bright seas and rainbow rivers.

“The ordinary astral universe—not the subtler astral heaven of Hiranyaloka—is peopled with millions of astral beings who have come, more or less recently, from the earth, and also with myriads of fairies, mermaids, fishes, animals, goblins, gnomes, demigods and spirits, all residing on different astral planets in accordance with karmic qualifications. Various spheric mansions or vibratory regions are provided for good and evil spirits. Good ones can travel freely, but the evil spirits are confined to limited zones. In the same way that human beings live on the surface of the earth, worms inside the soil, fish in water, and birds in air, so astral beings of different grades are assigned to suitable vibratory quarters.

“Among the fallen dark angels expelled from other worlds, friction and war take place with lifetronic bombs or mental *mantric* [3](#) vibratory rays. These beings dwell in the gloom-drenched regions of the lower astral cosmos, working out their evil karma.

“In the vast realms above the dark astral prison, all is shining and beautiful. The astral cosmos is more naturally attuned than the earth to the divine will and plan of perfection. Every astral object is manifested primarily by the will of God, and partially by the will-call of astral beings. They possess the power of modifying or enhancing the grace and form of anything already created by the Lord. He has given His astral children the freedom and privilege of changing or improving at will the astral cosmos. On earth a solid must be transformed into liquid or other form through natural or chemical processes, but astral solids are changed into astral liquids, gases, or energy solely and instantly by the will of the inhabitants.

“The earth is dark with warfare and murder in the sea, land, and air,” my guru continued, “but the astral realms know a happy harmony and equality. Astral beings dematerialize or materialize their forms at will. Flowers or fish or animals can metamorphose themselves, for a time, into astral men. All astral beings are free to assume any form, and can easily commune together. No fixed, definite, natural law hems them round—any astral tree, for example, can be successfully asked to produce an astral mango or other desired fruit, flower, or indeed any other object. Certain karmic restrictions are present, but there are no distinctions in the astral world about desirability of various forms. Everything is vibrant with God’s creative light.

“No one is born of woman; offspring are materialized by astral beings through the help of their cosmic will into specially patterned, astrally condensed forms. The recently physically disembodied being arrives in an astral family through invitation, drawn by similar mental and spiritual tendencies.

“The astral body is not subject to cold or heat or other natural conditions. The anatomy includes an astral brain, or the thousand-petaled lotus of light, and six awakened centers in the *sushumna*, or astral cerebro-spinal axis. The heart draws cosmic energy as well as light from the astral brain, and pumps it to the astral nerves and body cells, or lifetrans. Astral beings can affect their bodies by lifetronic force or by *mantric* vibrations.

“The astral body is an exact counterpart of the last physical form. Astral beings retain the same appearance which they possessed in youth in their previous earthly sojourn; occasionally an

astral being chooses, like myself, to retain his old age appearance.” Master, emanating the very essence of youth, chuckled merrily.

“Unlike the spacial, three-dimensional physical world cognized only by the five senses, the astral spheres are visible to the all-inclusive sixth sense—intuition,” Sri Yukteswar went on. “By sheer intuitional feeling, all astral beings see, hear, smell, taste, and touch. They possess three eyes, two of which are partly closed. The third and chief astral eye, vertically placed on the forehead, is open. Astral beings have all the outer sensory organs—ears, eyes, nose, tongue, and skin—but they employ the intuitional sense to experience sensations through any part of the body; they can see through the ear, or nose, or skin. They are able to hear through the eyes or tongue, and can taste through the ears or skin, and so forth.[4](#)

“Man’s physical body is exposed to countless dangers, and is easily hurt or maimed; the ethereal astral body may occasionally be cut or bruised but is healed at once by mere willing.”

“Gurudeva, are all astral persons beautiful?”

“Beauty in the astral world is known to be a spiritual quality, and not an outward conformation,” Sri Yukteswar replied. “Astral beings therefore attach little importance to facial features. They have the privilege, however, of costuming themselves at will with new, colorful, astrally materialized bodies. Just as worldly men don new array for gala events, so astral beings find occasions to bedeck themselves in specially designed forms.

“Joyous astral festivities on the higher astral planets like Hiranyaloka take place when a being is liberated from the astral world through spiritual advancement, and is therefore ready to enter the heaven of the causal world. On such occasions the Invisible Heavenly Father, and the saints who are merged in Him, materialize Themselves into bodies of Their own choice and join the astral celebration. In order to please His beloved devotee, the Lord takes any desired form. If the devotee worshiped through devotion, he sees God as the Divine Mother. To Jesus, the Father-aspect of the Infinite One was appealing beyond other conceptions. The individuality with which the Creator has endowed each of His creatures makes every conceivable and inconceivable demand on the Lord’s versatility!” My guru and I laughed happily together.

“Friends of other lives easily recognize one another in the astral world,” Sri Yukteswar went on in his beautiful, flutelike voice. “Rejoicing at the immortality of friendship, they realize the indestructibility of love, often doubted at the time of the sad, delusive partings of earthly life.

“The intuition of astral beings pierces through the veil and observes human activities on earth, but man cannot view the astral world unless his sixth sense is somewhat developed. Thousands of earth-dwellers have momentarily glimpsed an astral being or an astral world.

“The advanced beings on Hiranyaloka remain mostly awake in ecstasy during the long astral day and night, helping to work out intricate problems of cosmic government and the redemption of prodigal sons, earthbound souls. When the Hiranyaloka beings sleep, they have occasional dreamlike astral visions. Their minds are usually engrossed in the conscious state of highest *nirbikalpa* bliss.



“Inhabitants in all parts of the astral worlds are still subject to mental agonies. The sensitive minds of the higher beings on planets like Hiranyaloka feel keen pain if any mistake is made in conduct or perception of truth. These advanced beings endeavor to attune their every act and thought with the perfection of spiritual law.

“Communication among the astral inhabitants is held entirely by astral telepathy and television; there is none of the confusion and misunderstanding of the written and spoken word which earth-dwellers must endure. Just as persons on the cinema screen appear to move and act through a series of light pictures, and do not actually breathe, so the astral beings walk and work as intelligently guided and coordinated images of light, without the necessity of drawing power from oxygen. Man depends upon solids, liquids, gases, and energy for sustenance; astral beings sustain themselves principally by cosmic light.”

“Master mine, do astral beings eat anything?” I was drinking in his marvelous elucidations with the receptivity of all my faculties—mind, heart, soul. Superconscious perceptions of truth are permanently real and changeless, while fleeting sense experiences and impressions are never more than temporarily or relatively true, and soon lose in memory all their vividness. My guru’s words were so penetratingly imprinted on the parchment of my being that at any time, by transferring my mind to the superconscious state, I can clearly relive the divine experience.

“Luminous raylike vegetables abound in the astral soils,” he answered. “The astral beings consume vegetables, and drink a nectar flowing from glorious fountains of light and from astral brooks and rivers. Just as invisible images of persons on the earth can be dug out of the ether and made visible by a television apparatus, later being dismissed again into space, so the God-created, unseen astral blueprints of vegetables and plants floating in the ether are precipitated on an astral planet by the will of its inhabitants. In the same way, from the wildest fancy of these beings, whole gardens of fragrant flowers are materialized, returning later to the etheric invisibility. Although dwellers on the heavenly planets like Hiranyaloka are almost freed from any necessity of eating, still higher is the unconditioned existence of almost completely liberated souls in the causal world, who eat nothing save the manna of bliss.

“The earth-liberated astral being meets a multitude of relatives, fathers, mothers, wives, husbands, and friends, acquired during different incarnations on earth,<sup>5</sup> as they appear from time to time in various parts of the astral realms. He is therefore at a loss to understand whom to love especially; he learns in this way to give a divine and equal love to all, as children and individualized expressions of God. Though the outward appearance of loved ones may have changed, more or less according to the development of new qualities in the latest life of any particular soul, the astral being employs his unerring intuition to recognize all those once dear to him in other planes of existence, and to welcome them to their new astral home. Because every atom in creation is inextinguishably dowered with individuality,<sup>6</sup> an astral friend will be recognized no matter what costume he may don, even as on earth an actor’s identity is discoverable by close observation despite any disguise.

“The span of life in the astral world is much longer than on earth. A normal advanced astral being’s average life period is from five hundred to one thousand years, measured in accordance with earthly standards of time. As certain redwood trees outlive most trees by millennia, or as some yogis live several hundred years though most men die before the age of sixty, so some

astral beings live much longer than the usual span of astral existence. Visitors to the astral world dwell there for a longer or shorter period in accordance with the weight of their physical karma, which draws them back to earth within a specified time.

“The astral being does not have to contend painfully with death at the time of shedding his luminous body. Many of these beings nevertheless feel slightly nervous at the thought of dropping their astral form for the subtler causal one. The astral world is free from unwilling death, disease, and old age. These three dreads are the curse of earth, where man has allowed his consciousness to identify itself almost wholly with a frail physical body requiring constant aid from air, food, and sleep in order to exist at all.

“Physical death is attended by the disappearance of breath and the disintegration of fleshly cells. Astral death consists of the dispersement of lifetrans, those manifest units of energy which constitute the life of astral beings. At physical death a being loses his consciousness of flesh and becomes aware of his subtle body in the astral world. Experiencing astral death in due time, a being thus passes from the consciousness of astral birth and death to that of physical birth and death. These recurrent cycles of astral and physical encasement are the ineluctable destiny of all unenlightened beings. Scriptural definitions of heaven and hell sometimes stir man’s deeper-than-subconscious memories of his long series of experiences in the blithesome astral and disappointing terrestrial worlds.”

“Beloved Master,” I asked, “will you please describe more in detail the difference between rebirth on the earth and in the astral and causal spheres?”

“Man as an individualized soul is essentially causal-bodied,” my guru explained. “That body is a matrix of the thirty-five *ideas* required by God as the basic or causal thought forces from which He later formed the subtle astral body of nineteen elements and the gross physical body of sixteen elements.

“The nineteen elements of the astral body are mental, emotional, and lifetransic. The nineteen components are intelligence; ego; feeling; mind (sense-consciousness); five instruments of *knowledge*, the subtle counterparts of the senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch; five instruments of *action*, the mental correspondence for the executive abilities to procreate, excrete, talk, walk, and exercise manual skill; and five instruments of *life force*, those empowered to perform the crystallizing, assimilating, eliminating, metabolizing, and circulating functions of the body. This subtle astral encasement of nineteen elements survives the death of the physical body, which is made of sixteen gross metallic and nonmetallic elements.

“God thought out different ideas within Himself and projected them into dreams. Lady Cosmic Dream thus sprang out decorated in all her colossal endless ornaments of relativity.

“In thirty-five thought categories of the causal body, God elaborated all the complexities of man’s nineteen astral and sixteen physical counterparts. By condensation of vibratory forces, first subtle, then gross, He produced man’s astral body and finally his physical form. According to the law of relativity, by which the Prime Simplicity has become the bewildering manifold, the causal cosmos and causal body are different from the astral cosmos and astral body; the physical

cosmos and physical body are likewise characteristically at variance with the other forms of creation.

“The fleshly body is made of the fixed, objectified dreams of the Creator. The dualities are ever-present on earth: disease and health, pain and pleasure, loss and gain. Human beings find limitation and resistance in three-dimensional matter. When man’s desire to live is severely shaken by disease or other causes, death arrives; the heavy overcoat of the flesh is temporarily shed. The soul, however, remains encased in the astral and causal bodies.<sup>7</sup> The adhesive force by which all three bodies are held together is desire. The power of unfulfilled desires is the root of all man’s slavery.

“Physical desires are rooted in egotism and sense pleasures. The compulsion or temptation of sensory experience is more powerful than the desire-force connected with astral attachments or causal perceptions.

“Astral desires center around enjoyment in terms of vibration. Astral beings enjoy the ethereal music of the spheres and are entranced by the sight of all creation as exhaustless expressions of changing light. The astral beings also smell, taste, and touch light. Astral desires are thus connected with an astral being’s power to precipitate all objects and experiences as forms of light or as condensed thoughts or dreams.

“Causal desires are fulfilled by perception only. The nearly-free beings who are encased only in the causal body see the whole universe as realizations of the dream-ideas of God; they can materialize anything and everything in sheer thought. Causal beings therefore consider the enjoyment of physical sensations or astral delights as gross and suffocating to the soul’s fine sensibilities. Causal beings work out their desires by materializing them instantly.<sup>8</sup> Those who find themselves covered only by the delicate veil of the causal body can bring universes into manifestation even as the Creator. Because all creation is made of the cosmic dream-texture, the soul thinly clothed in the causal has vast realizations of power.

“A soul, being invisible by nature, can be distinguished only by the presence of its body or bodies. The mere presence of a body signifies that its existence is made possible by unfulfilled desires.<sup>9</sup>

“So long as the soul of man is encased in one, two, or three body-containers, sealed tightly with the corks of ignorance and desires, he cannot merge with the sea of Spirit. When the gross physical receptacle is destroyed by the hammer of death, the other two coverings—astral and causal—still remain to prevent the soul from consciously joining the Omnipresent Life. When desirelessness is attained through wisdom, its power disintegrates the two remaining vessels. The tiny human soul emerges, free at last; it is one with the Measureless Amplitude.”

I asked my divine guru to shed further light on the high and mysterious causal world.

“The causal world is indescribably subtle,” he replied. “In order to understand it, one would have to possess such tremendous powers of concentration that he could close his eyes and visualize the astral cosmos and the physical cosmos in all their vastness—the luminous balloon with the solid basket—as existing in ideas only. If by this superhuman concentration one succeeded in

converting or resolving the two cosmoses with all their complexities into sheer ideas, he would then reach the causal world and stand on the borderline of fusion between mind and matter. There one perceives all created things—solids, liquids, gases, electricity, energy, all beings, gods, men, animals, plants, bacteria—as forms of consciousness, just as a man can close his eyes and realize that he exists, even though his body is invisible to his physical eyes and is present only as an idea.

“Whatever a human being can do in fancy, a causal being can do in reality. The most colossal imaginative human intelligence is able, in mind only, to range from one extreme of thought to another, to skip mentally from planet to planet, or tumble endlessly down a pit of eternity, or soar rocketlike into the galaxied canopy, or scintillate like a searchlight over milky ways and the starry spaces. But beings in the causal world have a much greater freedom, and can effortlessly manifest their thoughts into instant objectivity, without any material or astral obstruction or karmic limitation.

“Causal beings realize that the physical cosmos is not primarily constructed of electrons, nor is the astral cosmos basically composed of lifetrans—both in reality are created from the minutest particles of God-thought, chopped and divided by *maya*, the law of relativity which intervenes to apparently separate the Noumenon from His phenomena.

“Souls in the causal world recognize one another as individualized points of joyous Spirit; their thought-things are the only objects which surround them. Causal beings see the difference between their bodies and thoughts to be merely ideas. As a man, closing his eyes, can visualize a dazzling white light or a faint blue haze, so causal beings by thought alone are able to see, hear, feel, taste, and touch; they create anything, or dissolve it, by the power of cosmic mind.

“Both death and rebirth in the causal world are in thought. Causal-bodied beings feast only on the ambrosia of eternally new knowledge. They drink from the springs of peace, roam on the trackless soil of perceptions, swim in the ocean-endlessness of bliss. Lo! see their bright thought-bodies zoom past trillions of Spirit-created planets, fresh bubbles of universes, wisdom-stars, spectral dreams of golden nebulae, all over the skiey blue bosom of Infinity!

“Many beings remain for thousands of years in the causal cosmos. By deeper ecstasies the freed soul then withdraws itself from the little causal body and puts on the vastness of the causal cosmos. All the separate eddies of ideas, particularized waves of power, love, will, joy, peace, intuition, calmness, self-control, and concentration melt into the ever-joyous Sea of Bliss. No longer does the soul have to experience its joy as an individualized wave of consciousness, but is merged in the One Cosmic Ocean, with all its waves—eternal laughter, thrills, throbs.

“When a soul is out of the cocoon of the three bodies it escapes forever from the law of relativity and becomes the ineffable Ever-Existent.<sup>10</sup> Behold the butterfly of Omnipresence, its wings etched with stars and moons and suns! The soul expanded into Spirit remains alone in the region of lightless light, darkless dark, thoughtless thought, intoxicated with its ecstasy of joy in God’s dream of cosmic creation.”

“A free soul!” I ejaculated in awe.

“When a soul finally gets out of the three jars of bodily delusions,” Master continued, “it becomes one with the Infinite without any loss of individuality. Christ had won this final freedom even before he was born as Jesus. In three stages of his past, symbolized in his earth-life as the three days of his experience of death and resurrection, he had attained the power to fully arise in Spirit.

“The undeveloped man must undergo countless earthly and astral and causal incarnations in order to emerge from his three bodies. A master who achieves this final freedom may elect to return to earth as a prophet to bring other human beings back to God, or like myself he may choose to reside in the astral cosmos. There a savior assumes some of the burden of the inhabitants’ karma [11](#) and thus helps them to terminate their cycle of reincarnation in the astral cosmos and go on permanently to the causal spheres. Or a freed soul may enter the causal world to aid its beings to shorten their span in the causal body and thus attain the Absolute Freedom.”

“Resurrected One, I want to know more about the karma which forces souls to return to the three worlds.” I could listen forever, I thought, to my omniscient Master. Never in his earth-life had I been able at one time to assimilate so much of his wisdom. Now for the first time I was receiving a clear, definite insight into the enigmatic interspaces on the checkerboard of life and death.

“The physical karma or desires of man must be completely worked out before his permanent stay in astral worlds becomes possible,” my guru elucidated in his thrilling voice. “Two kinds of beings live in the astral spheres. Those who still have earthly karma to dispose of and who must therefore reinhabit a gross physical body in order to pay their karmic debts could be classified, after physical death, as temporary visitors to the astral world rather than as permanent residents.

“Beings with unredeemed earthly karma are not permitted after astral death to go to the high causal sphere of cosmic ideas, but must shuttle to and fro from the physical and astral worlds only, conscious successively of their physical body of sixteen gross elements, and of their astral body of nineteen subtle elements. After each loss of his physical body, however, an undeveloped being from the earth remains for the most part in the deep stupor of the death-sleep and is hardly conscious of the beautiful astral sphere. After the astral rest, such a man returns to the material plane for further lessons, gradually accustoming himself, through repeated journeys, to the worlds of subtle astral texture.

“Normal or long-established residents of the astral universe, on the other hand, are those who, freed forever from all material longings, need return no more to the gross vibrations of earth. Such beings have only astral and causal karma to work out. At astral death these beings pass to the infinitely finer and more delicate causal world. Shedding the thought-form of the causal body at the end of a certain span, determined by cosmic law, these advanced beings then return to Hiranyaloka or a similar high astral planet, reborn in a new astral body to work out their unredeemed astral karma.

“My son, you may now comprehend more fully that I am resurrected by divine decree,” Sri Yukteswar continued, “as a savior of astrally reincarnating souls coming back from the causal sphere, in particular, rather than of those astral beings who are coming up from the earth. Those from the earth, if they still retain vestiges of material karma, do not rise to the very high astral planets like Hiranyaloka.

“Just as most people on earth have not learned through meditation-acquired vision to appreciate the superior joys and advantages of astral life and thus, after death, desire to return to the limited, imperfect pleasures of earth, so many astral beings, during the normal disintegration of their astral bodies, fail to picture the advanced state of spiritual joy in the causal world and, dwelling on thoughts of the more gross and gaudy astral happiness, yearn to revisit the astral paradise. Heavy astral karma must be redeemed by such beings before they can achieve after astral death a permanent stay in the causal thought-world, so thinly partitioned from the Creator.

“Only when a being has no further desires for experiences in the pleasing-to-the-eye astral cosmos, and cannot be tempted to go back there, does he remain in the causal world. Completing there the work of redeeming all causal karma or seeds of past desires, the confined soul thrusts out the last of the three corks of ignorance and, emerging from the final jar of the causal body, commingles with the Eternal.

“Now do you understand?” Master smiled so enchantingly!

“Yes, through your grace. I am speechless with joy and gratitude.”

Never from song or story had I ever received such inspiring knowledge. Though the Hindu scriptures refer to the causal and astral worlds and to man’s three bodies, how remote and meaningless those pages compared with the warm authenticity of my resurrected Master! For him indeed existed not a single “undiscover’d country from whose bourn no traveller returns”!

“The interpenetration of man’s three bodies is expressed in many ways through his threefold nature,” my great guru went on. “In the wakeful state on earth a human being is conscious more or less of his three vehicles. When he is sensuously intent on tasting, smelling, touching, listening, or seeing, he is working principally through his physical body. Visualizing or willing, he is working mainly through his astral body. His causal medium finds expression when man is thinking or diving deep in introspection or meditation; the cosmical thoughts of genius come to the man who habitually contacts his causal body. In this sense an individual may be classified broadly as ‘a material man,’ ‘an energetic man,’ or ‘an intellectual man.’

“A man identifies himself about sixteen hours daily with his physical vehicle. Then he sleeps; if he dreams, he remains in his astral body, effortlessly creating any object even as do the astral beings. If man’s sleep be deep and dreamless, for several hours he is able to transfer his consciousness, or sense of I-ness, to the causal body; such sleep is revivifying. A dreamer is contacting his astral and not his causal body; his sleep is not fully refreshing.”

I had been lovingly observing Sri Yukteswar while he gave his wondrous exposition.

“Angelic guru,” I said, “your body looks exactly as it did when last I wept over it in the Puri ashram.”

“O yes, my new body is a perfect copy of the old one. I materialize or dematerialize this form any time at will, much more frequently than I did while on earth. By quick dematerialization, I now travel instantly by light express from planet to planet or, indeed, from astral to causal or to

physical cosmos.” My divine guru smiled. “Though you move about so fast these days, I had no difficulty in finding you at Bombay!”

“O Master, I was grieving so deeply about your death!”

“Ah, wherein did I die? Isn’t there some contradiction?” Sri Yukteswar’s eyes were twinkling with love and amusement.

“You were only dreaming on earth; on that earth you saw my dream-body,” he went on. “Later you buried that dream-image. Now my finer fleshly body—which you behold and are even now embracing rather closely!—is resurrected on another finer dream-planet of God. Someday that finer dream-body and finer dream-planet will pass away; they too are not forever. All dream-bubbles must eventually burst at a final wakeful touch. Differentiate, my son Yogananda, between dreams and Reality!”

This idea of *Vedantic* [12](#) resurrection struck me with wonder. I was ashamed that I had pitied Master when I had seen his lifeless body at Puri. I comprehended at last that my guru had always been fully awake in God, perceiving his own life and passing on earth, and his present resurrection, as nothing more than relativities of divine ideas in the cosmic dream.

“I have now told you, Yogananda, the truths of my life, death, and resurrection. Grieve not for me; rather broadcast everywhere the story of my resurrection from the God-dreamed earth of men to another God-dreamed planet of astrally garbed souls! New hope will be infused into the hearts of misery-mad, death-fearing dreamers of the world.”

“Yes, Master!” How willingly would I share with others my joy at his resurrection!

“On earth my standards were uncomfortably high, unsuited to the natures of most men. Often I scolded you more than I should have. You passed my test; your love shone through the clouds of all reprimands.” He added tenderly, “I have also come today to tell you: Never again shall I wear the stern gaze of censure. I shall scold you no more.”

How much I had missed the chastisements of my great guru! Each one had been a guardian angel of protection.

“Dearest Master! Rebuke me a million times—do scold me now!”

“I shall chide you no more.” His divine voice was grave, yet with an undercurrent of laughter. “You and I shall smile together, so long as our two forms appear different in the *maya*-dream of God. Finally we shall merge as one in the Cosmic Beloved; our smiles shall be His smile, our unified song of joy vibrating throughout eternity to be broadcast to God-tuned souls!”

Sri Yukteswar gave me light on certain matters which I cannot reveal here. During the two hours that he spent with me in the Bombay hotel room he answered my every question. A number of world prophecies uttered by him that June day in 1936 have already come to pass.

“I leave you now, beloved one!” At these words I felt Master melting away within my encircling arms.



“My child,” his voice rang out, vibrating into my very soul-firmament, “whenever you enter the door of *nirbikalpa samadhi* and call on me, I shall come to you in flesh and blood, even as today.”

With this celestial promise Sri Yukteswar vanished from my sight. A cloud-voice repeated in musical thunder: “Tell all! Whosoever knows by *nirbikalpa* realization that your earth is a dream of God can come to the finer dream-created planet of Hiranyaloka, and there find me resurrected in a body exactly like my earthly one. Yogananda, tell all!”

Gone was the sorrow of parting. The pity and grief for his death, long robber of my peace, now fled in stark shame. Bliss poured forth like a fountain through endless, newly opened soul-pores. Anciently clogged with disuse, they now widened in purity at the driving flood of ecstasy. Subconscious thoughts and feelings of my past incarnations shed their karmic taints, lustrously renewed by Sri Yukteswar’s divine visit.

In this chapter of my autobiography I have obeyed my guru’s behest and spread the glad tiding, though it confound once more an incurious generation. Groveling, man knows well; despair is seldom alien; yet these are perversities, no part of man’s true lot. The day he wills, he is set on the path to freedom. Too long has he hearkened to the dank pessimism of his “dust-thou-art” counselors, heedless of the unconquerable soul.

I was not the only one privileged to behold the Resurrected Guru.

One of Sri Yukteswar’s chelas was an aged woman, affectionately known as *Ma* (Mother), whose home was close to the Puri hermitage. Master had often stopped to chat with her during his morning walk. On the evening of March 16, 1936, Ma arrived at the ashram and asked to see her guru.

“Why, Master died a week ago!” Swami Sebananda, now in charge of the Puri hermitage, looked at her sadly.

“That’s impossible!” She smiled a little. “Perhaps you are just trying to protect the guru from insistent visitors?”

“No.” Sebananda recounted details of the burial. “Come,” he said, “I will take you to the front garden to Sri Yukteswarji’s grave.”

Ma shook her head. “There is no grave for him! This morning at ten o’clock he passed in his usual walk before my door! I talked to him for several minutes in the bright outdoors.

“‘Come this evening to the ashram,’ he said.

“I am here! Blessings pour on this old gray head! The deathless guru wanted me to understand in what transcendent body he had visited me this morning!”

The astounded Sebananda knelt before her.

“Ma,” he said, “what a weight of grief you lift from my heart! He is risen!”

1. In *sabikalpa samadhi* the devotee has spiritually progressed to a state of inward divine union, but cannot maintain his cosmic consciousness except in the immobile trance-state. By continuous meditation, he reaches the superior state of *nirbikalpa samadhi*, where he moves freely in the world and performs his outward duties without any loss of God-realization.▲
2. Sri Yukteswar used the word *prana*; I have translated it as lifetrans. The Hindu scriptures refer not only to the *anu*, “atom,” and to the *paramanu*, “beyond the atom,” finer electronic energies; but also to *prana*, “creative lifetrans force.” Atoms and electrons are blind forces; *prana* is inherently intelligent. The pranic lifetrans in the spermatozoa and ova, for instance, guide the embryonic development according to a karmic design.▲
3. Adjective of *mantra*, chanted seed-sounds discharged by the mental gun of concentration. The *Puranas* (ancient *shastras* or treatises) describe these *mantric* wars between *devas* and *asuras* (gods and demons). An *asura* once tried to slay a *deva* with a potent chant. But due to mispronunciation the mental bomb acted as a boomerang and killed the demon.▲
4. Examples of such powers are not wanting even on earth, as in the case of Helen Keller and other rare beings.▲
5. Lord Buddha was once asked why a man should love all persons equally. “Because,” the great teacher replied, “in the very numerous and varied lifespans of each man, every other being has at one time or another been dear to him.”▲
6. The eight elemental qualities which enter into all created life, from atom to man, are earth, water, fire, air, ether, motion, mind, and individuality. (*Bhagavad Gita*: VII:4.)▲
7. Body signifies any soul-encasement, whether gross or subtle. The three bodies are cages for the Bird of Paradise.▲
8. Even as Babaji helped Lahiri Mahasaya to rid himself of a subconscious desire from some past life for a palace, as described in [chapter 34](#).▲
9. “And he said unto them, Wheresoever the body is, thither will the eagles be gathered together.”—*Luke* 17:37. Wherever the soul is encased in the physical body or in the astral body or in the causal body, there the eagles of desires—which prey on human sense

weaknesses, or on astral and causal attachments—will also gather to keep the soul a prisoner.▲

10. “Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out (i.e., shall reincarnate no more). . . . To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne.”—*Revelation* 3:12, 21.▲
11. Sri Yukteswar was signifying that, even as in his earthly incarnation he had occasionally assumed the weight of disease to lighten his disciples’ karma, so in the astral world his mission as a savior enabled him to take on certain astral karma of dwellers on Hiranyaloka, and thus hasten their evolution into the higher causal world.▲
12. Life and death as relativities of thought only. *Vedanta* points out that God is the only Reality; all creation or separate existence is *maya* or illusion. This philosophy of monism received its highest expression in the *Upanishad* commentaries of Shankara.▲

# 30 Minor Upanishads

*K. Narayanaswami Aiyar*



# THIRTY MINOR UPANISHADS

TRANSLATED BY

K. NĀRĀYAṆASVĀMI AIYAR

Translator of

*Laghu Yoga Vāsishtha, Vāsudevamanana*

*&c.      &c.      &c.*

MADRAS

1914

## GARBHA-UPANISHAD<sup>1</sup>

OF

### KRSHNA-YAJURVEDA

OM. The body is composed of the five (elements); it exists in the five (objects of sense, etc.); it has six supports: it is associated with the six *guṇas*; it has seven *dhātus* (essential ingredients) and three *malas* (impurities); it has three *yonis* (wombs) and is formed of four kinds of food.

Why is the body said to be composed of five? Because there are five elements in this body (*viz.*), *pr̥thivī*, *āpas*, *agni*, *vāyu*, and *ākāś*. In this body of five elements, what is the *pr̥thivī* element? what *āpas*? what *agni*? what *vāyu*? and what *ākāś*? *Pr̥thivī* is said to be that which is hard; *āpas* is said to be that which is liquid; *agni* is said to be that which is hot; *vāyu* is that which moves; *ākāś* is that which is full of holes (or tubes<sup>2</sup>). Of these, *pr̥thivī* is seen in supporting (objects), *āpas* in cohesion, *tejas* (or *agni*) in making forms visible, *vāyu* in moving, *ākāś* chiefly in *avakāśa* (*viz.*, giving space). (Then what are the five objects of sense, etc.?) The ear exists in sound, the skin in touch, the eye in forms, the tongue in taste, and the nose in odour. (Then) the mouth (exists) in speech, the hand in lifting, the feet in walking, the anus in excreting, and the genitals in enjoying. (Then) through *buddhi*, one knows and determines; through *manas*, he thinks and fancies; through *chitta*, he recollects; through *ahaṅkāra*, he feels the idea of 'I'. Thus these perform their respective functions.

<sup>1</sup> The Upanishad treating of embryo, etc.

<sup>2</sup> The Sanskrit word 'sushira' means perforated or tubular.

Whence the six supports? There are six kinds of rasas (essences or tastes)—sweet, sour, saltish, bitter, astringent, and pungent. The body depends upon them while they depend upon the body. There are six changes of state (*viz.*), the body exists, is born, grows, matures, decays, and dies. And there are also six chakras (wheels) depending on the dhāmāni (nerves), (*viz.*), mūlādhāra, svādhishthāna, maṇipūra, anāhata, viśuddhi, and ājñā. Also the guṇas are six—kāma (passion) and others and sama (mental restraint) and others; there being properly—association (with the former) and devotion (to the latter). Then there are seven kinds of sounds, (*viz.*), shadja (sa), rṣhabha (ri), gāndhāra (ga), maḍhyama (ma), pañchama (pa), ḍaivata (ḍa), and nishāda (ni), which are stated to be seven agreeable and disagreeable ones; and there are seven kinds of dhātus having seven colours, (*viz.*), sukla (white), rakṣa (red), kṛṣṇa (dark-blue or indigo), dhūmra (blue), pīṭa (yellow), kapila (orange-red), and pāṇḍara (yellowish white). In whomsoever these substances arise and increase, the rasa (essence) is the cause of the one following and so on (as stated below). (These) rasas are six in number; from the rasas (probably chyme) arises blood: from blood, flesh; from flesh, fat; from fat, bones; from bones, marrow; and from marrow, sukla (the male seminal fluid). From the union of sukla and soṇiṭa (the female vital energy), occurs garbha (conception in the womb). Being stationed in the heart, it is led. In the heart of persons, (there is) an internal agni; in the seat of agni, there is bile; in the seat of bile, there is vāyu; in the seat of vāyu, is hr̥ḍya (heart or Ātmā).

Through having connection at the ṛṭu (season) fit for raising issues, it (the embryo formed in the womb) is like water in the first night; in seven nights, it is like a bubble; at the end of half a month, it becomes a ball. At the end of a month, it is hardened; in two months, the head is formed; in three months, the region about the feet; and in the fourth month, the region about the stomach and the loins and also ankle is formed; in the fifth month, the back (or spinal) bone; in the sixth, the face of the nose, eyes, and ears; in the seventh, it becomes united with Jīva (Ātmā); in the eighth month, it becomes full (of all organs); in the



ninth, it becomes fatty. Śukla belongs to men and ṣoṇiṭa to women. Each (by itself) is neutral (or is powerless). (But in their combination) a son is born when the father's seed preponderates. A daughter is born when the mother's seed preponderates. Should both be equal, a eunuch is born. Since females have more of passion, on account of their deriving more pleasure (than males from sexual union), a greater number of females are born. Action corresponds to the mental state (of the actor). Hence the child (born) takes after (the thought of) the parents. From parents with minds full of anxieties (at the time of union) are born the blind, the lame, the hunchback, the dwarf, and the limbless. (From impregnation) during the eclipses of the sun and the moon, children are born with defective limbs. Increase or decrease, similarities or dissimilarities of bodies arise (in children) through the influence of time, place, action, dṛavya (substance), and enjoyment. From a well-conducted intercourse (or union), the child being born with the form of the father possesses, his qualities, just as the image in a glass reflects truly the original. When śukla bursts into two through the interaction (or blowing against one another) of the vāyu of both śukla and ṣoṇiṭa, then twins (of the same sex) are born. In the same manner when the reṭas (the seminal fluids), viz., (śukla and ṣoṇiṭa) of both the parents burst into two, then mixed progeny (male and female) is the result. Among mankind, five embryos (only can be formed at a pregnancy in the womb). A womb with one embryo is common. There are some with two. Those with three are only to be found (as rarely) as one in a thousand. Where there is a frequent pouring (of seminal fluid into the womb), a greater number of limbs is produced (in the child). When the pouring (within the womb) is only once, then the child becomes dried up (or contracted). By pouring (within) more than once, couples are (sometimes) born.

Then, (viz., in the ninth month), this (in the body) made of the five elements and able to sense odour, taste, etc., through tejās (spiritual fire), etc., which is also made up of the five elements—this cognizes the indestructible Omkāra through its deep wisdom and contemplation. It cognizes as the one letter

(Om). Then there arise in the body the eight prakṛtis<sup>1</sup> and the sixteen vikāras (changes). Through the food and drink of the mother transmitted through her nādis, the child obtains prāṇa. In the ninth month, it is full of all attributes.

It then remembers its previous births, finds out what has been done and what has not been done, and discriminates between actions, right and wrong. (Then it thinks thus :) "Many thousands of wombs have been seen by me, many kinds of food have been tasted (by me), and many breasts have been suckled (by me). All parts of the world have been my place of birth, as also my burning-ground in the past. In eighty-four lakhs<sup>2</sup> of wombs, have I been born. I have been often born and have often died. I have been subject to the cycle of re-births very often. I have had birth and death, again birth and death, and again birth (and so on). There is much suffering whilst living in the womb. Delusion and sorrow attend every birth. In youth are sorrow, grief, dependence on others, ignorance, the non-performance of what is beneficial laziness, and the performance of what is unfavourable. In adult age, (the sources of sorrow are) attachment to sensual objects and the groaning under the three kinds<sup>3</sup> of pain. In old age anxiety, disease, fear of death, desires, love of self, passion, anger, and non-independence—all these produce very great suffering. This birth is the seed of sorrow, and being of the form of sorrow is unbearable. I have not attained the dharma of nivr̥tti, (*viz.*, the means of overcoming the cycle of re-birth) nor have I acquired the means of yoga and jñāna. Alas! I am sunk in the ocean of sorrow and find no remedy for it. Fie on ajñāna! fie on ajñāna! fie on the troubles caused by passion and anger; fie on the fetters of saṃsāra (the mundane existence)! I shall attain wisdom from a guru. If I get myself freed from the womb, then I shall practise sāṅkhya yoga which is the cause of the extinction of all evil and the bestower

<sup>1</sup> The eight prakṛtis are mūlaprakṛti, mahat, ahaṅkāra, and the five elements; the sixteen vikāras are the five organs of sense, the five organs of action, the five prāṇas, and antahkarana.

<sup>2</sup> The Hīndūs believe in so many number of wombs to be born on the earth.

<sup>3</sup> Those that arise from the body, the elements, and the devas.

of the fruit of emancipation. If I get myself freed from the womb, I shall seek refuge in Mahesvara (the great Lord) who is the cause of the extinction of all evil and bestower of the (four <sup>1</sup>) ends of life. If I get myself freed from the womb, then I shall seek refuge in that Lord of the world who is the Chiḍātmā of all saktis and the cause of all causes. If I get myself freed from the womb, then I shall seek refuge in that supreme Lord Bhargah (Śiva or light) who is paśupati (the lord of paśus or souls), Rudra, Mahādeva (the great Deva) and the Guru of the world. If I get myself freed from the bondage of the womb, I shall perform great penances. If I get myself freed from the passage of the womb, I shall worship Viṣṇu in my heart who is the bestower of nectar, who is bliss, who is Nārāyaṇa, and who never decays. I am now confined in my mother's womb; and were I freed from its bonds, I shall please the divine Vāsudeva without diverting my mind from Him. I am burnt through actions, good and bad, committed by me alone before for the sake of others, whilst those who enjoyed the fruits thereof have disappeared. Through non-belief (unspirituality), I formerly gave up all fear (of sin) and committed sins. I now reap their fruits. I shall become a believer hereafter <sup>2</sup>."

Thus does the Jīva (Ātmā) within the (mother's womb) contemplate again and again the many kinds of miseries (it had undergone), and remembering always the miseries of the cycle of re-births, becomes disgusted (with the material enjoyments of the world), often fainting in the inmost centre (*viz.*, heart) of all creatures at (the idea of) his avidyā, desire, and karma. Then this being, who had entered many hundreds of female wombs of beings (in the previous births), comes to the mouth of the womb wishing to obtain release. Here being pressed by the yantra (neck of the uterus), it suffers much trouble. Moreover it is much affected by prasūti (delivery) vāyu. As soon as it is born, it comes in contact with the vaiśṇavī vāyu and ceases to remember anything of the past;

<sup>1</sup> They are kāma (passion), ārtha (acquisition of wealth), dharma (performance of duty), and moksha (salvation).

<sup>2</sup> The reason why it remembers them seems to be that the jīvātmā is in the pineal gland then, prior to its coming down.

it also ceases to see far and to be the cognizer of the real. Coming into contact with the earth, it becomes fierce-eyed and debased. The evil of the eye after it is rubbed with (or cleaned by) water vanishes; and with it, vanishes memory of birth and death, good and bad actions and their affinities. Then how does he understand vāyu, bile, and śleshma (phlegm)? When they are in their proper state, they produce health: with their disturbance, diseases are generated. It should be known that one becomes capable of knowing through a proper quantity of bile; through having a little more or a little less of it, he comes to know more. When the bile is changed (otherwise), he becomes changed and acts like a mad man. And that bile is agni. Agni influenced by karma is kindled by vāyu, the source (or seat) of virtue and vice, as fuel is kindled within (by fire) from without (by the wind).

And of how many kinds is that agni? It has three bodies, three reṭas (seeds or progeny), three puras (cities), three dhātus, and three kinds of agni threefold. Of these three, Vaisvānara is bodiless. And that agni becomes (or is subdivided into) Jñānāgni (wisdom-fire), Ārsanāgni (eye-fire), and Kossthāgni (digestive fire). Of these Jñānāgni pertains to the mind; Ārsanāgni pertains to the senses; and Kossthāgni pertains to dahara and daily cooks (or digests) equally whatever is eaten, drunk, licked, or sucked through prāṇa and apāna. Ārsanāgni is (in) the eye itself and is the cause of vijñāna and enables one to see all objects of form. It has three seats, the (spiritual) eye itself being the (primary) seat, and the eyeballs being the accessory seats. Dakṣiṇāgni is in the heart, Gārhapatya is in the belly, and in the face is Āhavanīya. (In this sacrifice with the three agnis), the Puruṣa is himself the sacrificer; buddhi becomes his wife; saṁtoṣha (contentment) becomes the dīkṣhā (vow) taken; the mind and the organs of the senses become the sacrificial vessels; the karmendriyas (organs of action) are the sacrificial instruments. In this sacrifice of the body, the several devas who become the ṛtvijas (sacrificial priests) perform their parts following the master of the sacrifice, (*viz.*, the true individuality), wherever he goes. In this (sacrifice), the body is the sacrificial place,

the skull of the head is the fire-pit, the hairs are the kuṣa grass; the mouth is the antarveḍi (raised platform in sacrifice); kāma (or passion) is the clarified butter; the period of life is the period of sacrifice; nāda (sound) produced in ḍahara (heart) is the sāmaveḍa (recited during the sacrifice); vaikhari is the yajus (or yajurveda hymns); parā, paśyanti, and madhyamā<sup>1</sup> are the ṛks (or ṛgveda hymns); cruel words are the aṭharvas (aṭharvaveda hymns) and khilas (supplementary texts of each veḍa); true words are the vyāhṛtis<sup>2</sup>. Life, strength, and bile are the paśus (sacrificial creatures) and death is avabhṛta (the bath which concludes the sacrifice). In this sacrifice, the (three) fires blaze up and then according to (the desires of) the wordly, the devas bless him. All who are living (in this world) are the sacrificers. There is none living who does not perform yajña (sacrifice). This body is (created) for yajña, and arises out of yajña and changes according to yajña. If this yajña is continued in a direction changed (from the right course, or is abused), then it leads to an ocean of misery.

In this body, there are sixteen side-teeth, having each a membrane (as its root) and fifteen openings. It (the body) is measured by ninety-six digits. There are in it fourteen nādi seats and 108 joints. There are seventy-two tubes seats with seventy-two nādis between them, of which three are important, viz., idā, piṅgalā, and sushumnā, the fourth is purīṭaṭi, and jīvata the fifth. Above jīvata is bile and near bile is Purīṭaṭi. Above the navel, two digits to the left of it, is seated the source of bile. The food taken in is divided into three parts—urine, fæces, and sāra (the essence or chyme). The urine dividing itself into two, spreads to the left below the navel. The fæces is in the right side and is of seven kinds. The sāra is of five kinds and spreads itself over the body. Hence the semen and blood are produced from food and drink. In this body, vāyu which is moving as prāṇa is the Sūtrāṭma. Through it, one inspires and expires and moves (his limbs). Without it, no limb of the body will be

<sup>1</sup> Vaikhari and the three others are the different stages of nāda (sound).

<sup>2</sup> Vyāhṛtis are parts of the Gāyatrī Mantra, viz., Bhūh, Bhuvah, Svah.

animated. Through vāyu, the current of blood is driven into the nādis from the chakra (plexus) of the heart, and those which can be touched (on the body) are easily discernible. The juicy essences (of food) which arise out of digestion enter the womb which is suspended in the stomach of the mother and coming near the child's head nourishes the child's prāṇa through the sushumnā (on the head or pineal gland). Sushumnā is the Brahma-nādi. Prāṇa and others are found there. It (prāṇa) descends lower and lower as the time of birth approaches and settles in the heart when the child is born. Through yoga, it should be brought from the middle of the eyebrows to the end of sushumnā (*viz.*, the pineal gland), when he becomes the cognizer of the Real like the child in the womb. In the body of this nature, Ātmā is latent and deathless, and is the witness and Puruṣa. It lives in this body, being enveloped (by māyā). Prāṇī (or the jīva having prāṇa) has abhimāna (identification with the body) on account of avidyā. Ajñāna which surrounds it is the seed ; the antaḥkaraṇa (internal organ) is the sprout and the body is the tree. In this tree (of body), there are eight crores of hairs, eighty hundreds of joints, nine hundreds of tendons, eight palams of heart<sup>1</sup>, twelve palams of tongue, one praṣṭha (or two palams) of bile ; one ādhaka of phlegm, one kudupa (or  $\frac{1}{4}$  praṣṭha) of sukla and two praṣṭhas of marrow. One should consider everything as evanescent, like the child in the womb (with its prāṇa, etc.), stationed in the sushumnā (of the head). Then he becomes freed and gets no more body. If not, an ignorant man becomes subject to the cycle of re-births, etc., is exposed like a worm to the drink of urine and fæces, and undergoes in this body the sufferings of hell. Therefore knowing all this, one should be averse to worldly objects. Thus ends the moksha-sāstra of Pippalāda—thus ends the moksha-sāstra of Pippalāda. Thus ends the Upanishad.

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<sup>1</sup> Eight palams are  $\frac{2}{3}$  of a lb. (avdp.)

# Life Before Life

## Extract<sup>1</sup>

### INTRODUCTION

Some young children say that they have been here before. They give various details about previous lives, often describing the way in which they died. Of course, young children say a lot of things, and we may simply think that they are fantasizing as children often do. But what if, in a number of instances, people listened to the children and then tried to find out if the events they described had actually happened? And what if, when those people went to the places the children had named, they found that what the children had said about the past events was indeed true? What then?

### The Case of Kemal Atasoy

Dr. Jürgen Keil, a psychologist from Australia, listened as Kemal Atasoy, a six-year-old boy in Turkey, confidently recounted details of a previous life that he claimed to remember. They were meeting in the boy's home, a comfortable house in an upper middle class neighborhood, and with them were Dr. Keil's interpreter and Kemal's parents, a well-educated couple who seemed amused at times by the enthusiasm that the little boy showed in describing his experiences. He said that he had lived in Istanbul, 500 miles away. He stated that his family's name had been Karakas and that he had been a rich Armenian Christian who lived in a large three-story house. The house, he said, was next to the house of a woman named Aysegul, a well-known personality in Turkey, who had left the country because of legal problems. Kemal said that his house had been on the water, where boats were tied up, and that a church was behind it. He said that his wife and children had Greek first names. He also said that he often carried a large leather bag and that he only lived in the house for part of the year.

No one knew if Kemal's story was true when he met Dr. Keil in 1997. His parents did not know anyone in Istanbul. In fact, Kemal and his mother had never been there, and his father had only visited the city twice on business. In addition, the family knew no Armenians. His parents were Alevi Muslims, a group with a belief in reincarnation, but they did not seem to think that Kemal's statements, which he had been making from the time he was just a toddler at two years of age, were particularly important.

Dr. Keil set out to determine if the statements that Kemal had given fit with someone who had actually lived. The work that Dr. Keil had to perform to find out if such a person even existed demonstrates that Kemal could not have come across the details of the man's life by accident.

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<sup>1</sup> Tucker M.D., Jim. Life Before Life: A Scientific Investigation of Children's Memories of Previous Lives . St. Martin's Press. Kindle Edition.



When Dr. Keil and his interpreter went to Istanbul, they found the house of Aysegul, the woman whom Kemal had named. Next to the house was an empty three-story residence that precisely matched Kemal's description—it was at the edge of the water, where boats were tied up, with a church behind it. Dr. Keil then had trouble finding any evidence that a person like the one Kemal described had ever lived there. No Armenians were living in that part of Istanbul at the time, and Dr. Keil could not find anyone who remembered any Armenians ever having lived there. When he returned to Istanbul later that year, he talked with Armenian church officials, who told him that they were not aware that an Armenian had ever lived in the house. No church records indicated one had, but a fire had destroyed many of the records. Dr. Keil talked with an elderly man in the neighborhood who said that an Armenian had definitely lived there many years before and that the church officials were simply too young to remember that long ago.

Armed with that report, Dr. Keil decided to continue his search for information. The next year, he made a third trip to the area and interviewed a well-respected local historian. During the interview, Dr. Keil made sure he did not prompt any answers or make any suggestions. The historian told a story strikingly similar to the one Kemal had told. The historian said that a rich Armenian Christian had, in fact, lived in that house. He had been the only Armenian in that area, and his family's name was Karakas. His wife was Greek Orthodox, and her family did not approve of the marriage. The couple had three children, but the historian did not know their names. He said that the Karakas clan lived in another part of Istanbul, that they dealt in leather goods, and that the deceased man in question often carried a large leather bag. He also said that the deceased man lived in the house only during the summer months of the year. He had died in 1940 or 1941.

Though Dr. Keil was not able to verify Kemal's statement that the wife and children had Greek first names, the wife came from a Greek family. The first name that Kemal had given for the man turned out to be an Armenian term meaning "nice man." Dr. Keil could not confirm that people actually called Mr. Karakas that, but he was struck by the fact that, even though no one around him knew the expression, Kemal had given a name that could easily have been used to describe Mr. Karakas.

How did this little boy, living in a town 500 miles away, know so many things about a man who had died in Istanbul fifty years before he was born? He could not have heard about the man Dr. Keil had to work so hard to learn anything about. What possible explanation could there be? Kemal had a very simple answer: he said that he had been the man in a previous life.

Kemal is not alone in his claims. Children all over the world have described memories of previous lives. For more than forty years, researchers have investigated their reports. More than 2,500 cases are registered in the files of the Division of Personality Studies at the University of Virginia. Some of the children have said they were deceased family members, and others described previous lives as strangers. In a typical case, a very young child begins to describe memories of another life. The child is persistent about this and often demands to be taken to his other family in another location. When the

child has given names or enough details about the other location, the family often goes there to find that the child's statements fit the life of a person who has died in the recent past.

Were Kemal and the other 2,500 children remembering what they thought they were remembering—events from lives they had previously experienced? That question has occupied researchers for years, and this book will attempt to answer it. Previously, we have only written for a scientific audience, but now that we have forty years' worth of data, the general public deserves the opportunity to evaluate the evidence as well. I will try to present it in as fair a way as possible so that you can judge for yourself. The phenomenon of young children reporting past-life memories is fascinating in and of itself, and as you learn about it, you can gradually form an opinion about what it means. You can eventually decide whether you think that children like Kemal really have come back after having previous lives—and whether the rest of us may be able to come back, too.

## **Appendix: Charts & Mantras**

## The Paths of the Soul after Death

<i>Path</i>	<i>Soul</i>	<i>World</i>	<i>State</i>
	Siddha		Nirguṇa Brahman Merging in Absolute
Devayāna	Jīvanmukta	Brahmaloka	Saguṇa Brahman
Pitṛyāna	Virtuous	Candraloka	Other worlds
Yamaloka	Sinful	Narakas	Purge in hells

## Cosmic Realms

	<b><i>Realm</i></b>	<b><i>Description</i></b>
Unmanifest	Satyaloka / Brahmaloka	Highest realm. Body of pure consciousness
	Tapoloka	Realm of austerities, ascetics
	Janarloka	Realm of the virtuous
Manifest	Maharloka	Intermediate realm
	Svarloka	Heaven
	Bhuvarloka	Atmospheric realm
	Bhūloka	Earth
	Pretaloka	Hovering spirits. Not a realm as such.
	Pātāla	Lower regions.

महामृत्युंजय मन्त्र  
ॐ त्र्यम्बकं यजामहे सुगन्धिं पुष्टि-वर्धनम्।  
उर्वारुकम् इव बन्धनान् मृत्योर् मुक्षीय मा ऽमृतात्॥

mahāmṛtyuñjaya mantra  
Om. tryambakam yajāmahe sugandhim puṣṭi-vardhanam |  
urvārukam iva bandhanān mṛtyor mukṣīya mā 'mṛtāt ||

(R̥gveda 7.59.12; Yajurveda V.S. 3.60; T.S. 1.8.6.i)

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